Commit | Line | Data |
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eb492e01 AB |
1 | /* |
2 | BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux | |
3 | Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies). | |
4 | ||
5 | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
6 | it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as | |
7 | published by the Free Software Foundation; | |
8 | ||
9 | THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS | |
10 | OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, | |
11 | FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. | |
12 | IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY | |
13 | CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES | |
14 | WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN | |
15 | ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF | |
16 | OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. | |
17 | ||
18 | ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS, | |
19 | COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS | |
20 | SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED. | |
21 | */ | |
22 | ||
8c520a59 GP |
23 | #include <linux/crypto.h> |
24 | #include <linux/scatterlist.h> | |
25 | #include <crypto/b128ops.h> | |
26 | ||
eb492e01 AB |
27 | #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h> |
28 | #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h> | |
29 | #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h> | |
2b64d153 | 30 | #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h> |
ac4b7236 | 31 | |
3b19146d | 32 | #include "ecc.h" |
ac4b7236 | 33 | #include "smp.h" |
d22ef0bc | 34 | |
b28b4943 | 35 | #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd) |
b28b4943 | 36 | |
3b19146d JH |
37 | /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */ |
38 | #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY); | |
39 | ||
17b02e62 | 40 | #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000) |
5d3de7df | 41 | |
0edb14de JH |
42 | #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &(dev)->dev_flags) ? \ |
43 | 0x1f : 0x07) | |
44 | #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07 | |
065a13e2 | 45 | |
cbbbe3e2 JH |
46 | /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */ |
47 | #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80 | |
48 | ||
533e35d4 JH |
49 | enum { |
50 | SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, | |
51 | SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, | |
52 | SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, | |
53 | SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, | |
54 | SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, | |
65668776 | 55 | SMP_FLAG_SC, |
d8f8edbe | 56 | SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, |
533e35d4 | 57 | }; |
4bc58f51 JH |
58 | |
59 | struct smp_chan { | |
b68fda68 JH |
60 | struct l2cap_conn *conn; |
61 | struct delayed_work security_timer; | |
b28b4943 | 62 | unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */ |
b68fda68 | 63 | |
4bc58f51 JH |
64 | u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */ |
65 | u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */ | |
66 | u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */ | |
67 | u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */ | |
68 | u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */ | |
69 | u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */ | |
70 | u8 enc_key_size; | |
71 | u8 remote_key_dist; | |
72 | bdaddr_t id_addr; | |
73 | u8 id_addr_type; | |
74 | u8 irk[16]; | |
75 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; | |
76 | struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk; | |
77 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; | |
78 | struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk; | |
79 | struct smp_irk *remote_irk; | |
4a74d658 | 80 | unsigned long flags; |
6a7bd103 | 81 | |
3b19146d JH |
82 | /* Secure Connections variables */ |
83 | u8 local_pk[64]; | |
84 | u8 local_sk[32]; | |
d8f8edbe JH |
85 | u8 remote_pk[64]; |
86 | u8 dhkey[32]; | |
3b19146d | 87 | |
6a7bd103 | 88 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes; |
407cecf6 | 89 | struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac; |
4bc58f51 JH |
90 | }; |
91 | ||
8a2936f4 | 92 | static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len) |
d22ef0bc | 93 | { |
8a2936f4 | 94 | size_t i; |
d22ef0bc | 95 | |
8a2936f4 JH |
96 | for (i = 0; i < len; i++) |
97 | dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i]; | |
d22ef0bc AB |
98 | } |
99 | ||
cbbbe3e2 JH |
100 | static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_hash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, |
101 | size_t len, u8 mac[16]) | |
102 | { | |
103 | uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX]; | |
104 | struct hash_desc desc; | |
105 | struct scatterlist sg; | |
106 | int err; | |
107 | ||
108 | if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX) | |
109 | return -EFBIG; | |
110 | ||
111 | if (!tfm) { | |
112 | BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm); | |
113 | return -EINVAL; | |
114 | } | |
115 | ||
116 | desc.tfm = tfm; | |
117 | desc.flags = 0; | |
118 | ||
119 | crypto_hash_init(&desc); | |
120 | ||
121 | /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */ | |
122 | swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); | |
123 | swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len); | |
124 | ||
125 | BT_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m); | |
126 | BT_DBG("key %16phN", k); | |
127 | ||
128 | err = crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16); | |
129 | if (err) { | |
130 | BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); | |
131 | return err; | |
132 | } | |
133 | ||
134 | sg_init_one(&sg, msg_msb, len); | |
135 | ||
136 | err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, len); | |
137 | if (err) { | |
138 | BT_ERR("Hash update error %d", err); | |
139 | return err; | |
140 | } | |
141 | ||
142 | err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, mac_msb); | |
143 | if (err) { | |
144 | BT_ERR("Hash final error %d", err); | |
145 | return err; | |
146 | } | |
147 | ||
148 | swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16); | |
149 | ||
150 | BT_DBG("mac %16phN", mac); | |
151 | ||
152 | return 0; | |
153 | } | |
154 | ||
155 | static int smp_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32], | |
156 | const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16]) | |
157 | { | |
158 | u8 m[65]; | |
159 | int err; | |
160 | ||
161 | BT_DBG("u %32phN", u); | |
162 | BT_DBG("v %32phN", v); | |
163 | BT_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z); | |
164 | ||
165 | m[0] = z; | |
166 | memcpy(m + 1, v, 32); | |
167 | memcpy(m + 33, u, 32); | |
168 | ||
169 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res); | |
170 | if (err) | |
171 | return err; | |
172 | ||
173 | BT_DBG("res %16phN", res); | |
174 | ||
175 | return err; | |
176 | } | |
177 | ||
d22ef0bc AB |
178 | static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r) |
179 | { | |
180 | struct blkcipher_desc desc; | |
181 | struct scatterlist sg; | |
943a732a | 182 | uint8_t tmp[16], data[16]; |
201a5929 | 183 | int err; |
d22ef0bc AB |
184 | |
185 | if (tfm == NULL) { | |
186 | BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm); | |
187 | return -EINVAL; | |
188 | } | |
189 | ||
190 | desc.tfm = tfm; | |
191 | desc.flags = 0; | |
192 | ||
943a732a | 193 | /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */ |
8a2936f4 | 194 | swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); |
943a732a JH |
195 | |
196 | err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16); | |
d22ef0bc AB |
197 | if (err) { |
198 | BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); | |
199 | return err; | |
200 | } | |
201 | ||
943a732a | 202 | /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */ |
8a2936f4 | 203 | swap_buf(r, data, 16); |
943a732a JH |
204 | |
205 | sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16); | |
d22ef0bc | 206 | |
d22ef0bc AB |
207 | err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16); |
208 | if (err) | |
209 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err); | |
210 | ||
943a732a | 211 | /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */ |
8a2936f4 | 212 | swap_buf(data, r, 16); |
943a732a | 213 | |
d22ef0bc AB |
214 | return err; |
215 | } | |
216 | ||
60478054 JH |
217 | static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3]) |
218 | { | |
943a732a | 219 | u8 _res[16]; |
60478054 JH |
220 | int err; |
221 | ||
222 | /* r' = padding || r */ | |
943a732a JH |
223 | memcpy(_res, r, 3); |
224 | memset(_res + 3, 0, 13); | |
60478054 | 225 | |
943a732a | 226 | err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res); |
60478054 JH |
227 | if (err) { |
228 | BT_ERR("Encrypt error"); | |
229 | return err; | |
230 | } | |
231 | ||
232 | /* The output of the random address function ah is: | |
233 | * ah(h, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24 | |
234 | * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits | |
235 | * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the | |
236 | * result of ah. | |
237 | */ | |
943a732a | 238 | memcpy(res, _res, 3); |
60478054 JH |
239 | |
240 | return 0; | |
241 | } | |
242 | ||
defce9e8 | 243 | bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr) |
60478054 | 244 | { |
defce9e8 JH |
245 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
246 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm; | |
60478054 JH |
247 | u8 hash[3]; |
248 | int err; | |
249 | ||
defce9e8 JH |
250 | if (!chan || !chan->data) |
251 | return false; | |
252 | ||
253 | tfm = chan->data; | |
254 | ||
60478054 JH |
255 | BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk); |
256 | ||
257 | err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash); | |
258 | if (err) | |
259 | return false; | |
260 | ||
261 | return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3); | |
262 | } | |
263 | ||
defce9e8 | 264 | int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa) |
b1e2b3ae | 265 | { |
defce9e8 JH |
266 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
267 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm; | |
b1e2b3ae JH |
268 | int err; |
269 | ||
defce9e8 JH |
270 | if (!chan || !chan->data) |
271 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
272 | ||
273 | tfm = chan->data; | |
274 | ||
b1e2b3ae JH |
275 | get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3); |
276 | ||
277 | rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */ | |
278 | rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */ | |
279 | ||
280 | err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b); | |
281 | if (err < 0) | |
282 | return err; | |
283 | ||
284 | BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa); | |
285 | ||
286 | return 0; | |
287 | } | |
288 | ||
e491eaf3 JH |
289 | static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], |
290 | u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, | |
291 | bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16]) | |
d22ef0bc AB |
292 | { |
293 | u8 p1[16], p2[16]; | |
294 | int err; | |
295 | ||
296 | memset(p1, 0, 16); | |
297 | ||
298 | /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */ | |
943a732a JH |
299 | p1[0] = _iat; |
300 | p1[1] = _rat; | |
301 | memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7); | |
302 | memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7); | |
d22ef0bc AB |
303 | |
304 | /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */ | |
943a732a JH |
305 | memcpy(p2, ra, 6); |
306 | memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6); | |
307 | memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4); | |
d22ef0bc AB |
308 | |
309 | /* res = r XOR p1 */ | |
310 | u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1); | |
311 | ||
312 | /* res = e(k, res) */ | |
e491eaf3 | 313 | err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res); |
d22ef0bc AB |
314 | if (err) { |
315 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
316 | return err; | |
317 | } | |
318 | ||
319 | /* res = res XOR p2 */ | |
320 | u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2); | |
321 | ||
322 | /* res = e(k, res) */ | |
e491eaf3 | 323 | err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res); |
d22ef0bc AB |
324 | if (err) |
325 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
326 | ||
327 | return err; | |
328 | } | |
329 | ||
e491eaf3 JH |
330 | static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16], |
331 | u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16]) | |
d22ef0bc AB |
332 | { |
333 | int err; | |
334 | ||
335 | /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */ | |
943a732a JH |
336 | memcpy(_r, r2, 8); |
337 | memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8); | |
d22ef0bc | 338 | |
e491eaf3 | 339 | err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r); |
d22ef0bc AB |
340 | if (err) |
341 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
342 | ||
343 | return err; | |
344 | } | |
345 | ||
5d88cc73 | 346 | static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data) |
eb492e01 | 347 | { |
5d88cc73 | 348 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
b68fda68 | 349 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
5d88cc73 JH |
350 | struct kvec iv[2]; |
351 | struct msghdr msg; | |
eb492e01 | 352 | |
5d88cc73 JH |
353 | if (!chan) |
354 | return; | |
eb492e01 | 355 | |
5d88cc73 | 356 | BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code); |
eb492e01 | 357 | |
5d88cc73 JH |
358 | iv[0].iov_base = &code; |
359 | iv[0].iov_len = 1; | |
eb492e01 | 360 | |
5d88cc73 JH |
361 | iv[1].iov_base = data; |
362 | iv[1].iov_len = len; | |
eb492e01 | 363 | |
5d88cc73 | 364 | memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); |
eb492e01 | 365 | |
5d88cc73 JH |
366 | msg.msg_iov = (struct iovec *) &iv; |
367 | msg.msg_iovlen = 2; | |
eb492e01 | 368 | |
5d88cc73 | 369 | l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len); |
e2dcd113 | 370 | |
b68fda68 JH |
371 | if (!chan->data) |
372 | return; | |
373 | ||
374 | smp = chan->data; | |
375 | ||
376 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
1b0921d6 | 377 | schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT); |
eb492e01 AB |
378 | } |
379 | ||
d2eb9e10 | 380 | static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq) |
2b64d153 | 381 | { |
d2eb9e10 JH |
382 | if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) { |
383 | if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC) | |
384 | return BT_SECURITY_FIPS; | |
385 | else | |
386 | return BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
387 | } else { | |
2b64d153 | 388 | return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
d2eb9e10 | 389 | } |
2b64d153 BG |
390 | } |
391 | ||
392 | static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level) | |
393 | { | |
394 | switch (sec_level) { | |
d2eb9e10 | 395 | case BT_SECURITY_FIPS: |
2b64d153 BG |
396 | case BT_SECURITY_HIGH: |
397 | return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
398 | case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM: | |
399 | return SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
400 | default: | |
401 | return SMP_AUTH_NONE; | |
402 | } | |
403 | } | |
404 | ||
b8e66eac | 405 | static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, |
f1560463 MH |
406 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, |
407 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq) | |
b8e66eac | 408 | { |
5d88cc73 JH |
409 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
410 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
fd349c02 JH |
411 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
412 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
413 | u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0; | |
54790f73 | 414 | |
b6ae8457 | 415 | if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) { |
7ee4ea36 MH |
416 | local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; |
417 | remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
54790f73 | 418 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING; |
2b64d153 BG |
419 | } else { |
420 | authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
54790f73 VCG |
421 | } |
422 | ||
fd349c02 JH |
423 | if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags)) |
424 | remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
425 | ||
863efaf2 JH |
426 | if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags)) |
427 | local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
428 | ||
df8e1a4c JH |
429 | if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) { |
430 | if ((authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC) && | |
431 | test_bit(HCI_SSP_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) { | |
432 | local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; | |
433 | remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; | |
434 | } | |
435 | } else { | |
436 | authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC; | |
437 | } | |
438 | ||
54790f73 VCG |
439 | if (rsp == NULL) { |
440 | req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; | |
441 | req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; | |
442 | req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
fd349c02 JH |
443 | req->init_key_dist = local_dist; |
444 | req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist; | |
0edb14de | 445 | req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); |
fd349c02 JH |
446 | |
447 | smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist; | |
54790f73 VCG |
448 | return; |
449 | } | |
450 | ||
451 | rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; | |
452 | rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; | |
453 | rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
fd349c02 JH |
454 | rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist; |
455 | rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist; | |
0edb14de | 456 | rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); |
fd349c02 JH |
457 | |
458 | smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist; | |
b8e66eac VCG |
459 | } |
460 | ||
3158c50c VCG |
461 | static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size) |
462 | { | |
5d88cc73 JH |
463 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
464 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1c1def09 | 465 | |
3158c50c | 466 | if ((max_key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) || |
f1560463 | 467 | (max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)) |
3158c50c VCG |
468 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
469 | ||
f7aa611a | 470 | smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size; |
3158c50c VCG |
471 | |
472 | return 0; | |
473 | } | |
474 | ||
6f48e260 JH |
475 | static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
476 | { | |
477 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
478 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
479 | bool complete; | |
480 | ||
481 | BUG_ON(!smp); | |
482 | ||
483 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
6f48e260 | 484 | |
6f48e260 JH |
485 | complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); |
486 | mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete); | |
487 | ||
488 | kfree(smp->csrk); | |
489 | kfree(smp->slave_csrk); | |
490 | ||
491 | crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes); | |
407cecf6 | 492 | crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac); |
6f48e260 JH |
493 | |
494 | /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */ | |
495 | if (!complete) { | |
496 | if (smp->ltk) { | |
970d0f1b JH |
497 | list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); |
498 | kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); | |
6f48e260 JH |
499 | } |
500 | ||
501 | if (smp->slave_ltk) { | |
970d0f1b JH |
502 | list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list); |
503 | kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu); | |
6f48e260 JH |
504 | } |
505 | ||
506 | if (smp->remote_irk) { | |
adae20cb JH |
507 | list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); |
508 | kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); | |
6f48e260 JH |
509 | } |
510 | } | |
511 | ||
512 | chan->data = NULL; | |
513 | kfree(smp); | |
514 | hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon); | |
515 | } | |
516 | ||
84794e11 | 517 | static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason) |
4f957a76 | 518 | { |
bab73cb6 | 519 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
b68fda68 | 520 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
bab73cb6 | 521 | |
84794e11 | 522 | if (reason) |
4f957a76 | 523 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason), |
f1560463 | 524 | &reason); |
4f957a76 | 525 | |
ce39fb4e | 526 | clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags); |
e1e930f5 | 527 | mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); |
f1c09c07 | 528 | |
fc75cc86 | 529 | if (chan->data) |
f1c09c07 | 530 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); |
4f957a76 BG |
531 | } |
532 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
533 | #define JUST_WORKS 0x00 |
534 | #define JUST_CFM 0x01 | |
535 | #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02 | |
536 | #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03 | |
537 | #define REQ_OOB 0x04 | |
538 | #define OVERLAP 0xFF | |
539 | ||
540 | static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = { | |
541 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, | |
542 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, | |
543 | { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, | |
544 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, | |
545 | { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP }, | |
546 | }; | |
547 | ||
581370cc JH |
548 | static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) |
549 | { | |
2bcd4003 JH |
550 | /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets |
551 | * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators. | |
552 | */ | |
581370cc JH |
553 | if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY || |
554 | remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) | |
2bcd4003 | 555 | return JUST_CFM; |
581370cc JH |
556 | |
557 | return gen_method[remote_io][local_io]; | |
558 | } | |
559 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
560 | static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, |
561 | u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) | |
562 | { | |
563 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
564 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
565 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
2b64d153 BG |
566 | u8 method; |
567 | u32 passkey = 0; | |
568 | int ret = 0; | |
569 | ||
570 | /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */ | |
571 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); | |
4a74d658 | 572 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
573 | |
574 | BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io); | |
575 | ||
2bcd4003 JH |
576 | /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming |
577 | * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM | |
578 | * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this | |
579 | * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the | |
580 | * table. | |
581 | */ | |
581370cc | 582 | if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM)) |
2bcd4003 | 583 | method = JUST_CFM; |
2b64d153 | 584 | else |
581370cc | 585 | method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); |
2b64d153 | 586 | |
a82505c7 | 587 | /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ |
4a74d658 | 588 | if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) |
a82505c7 JH |
589 | method = JUST_WORKS; |
590 | ||
02f3e254 JH |
591 | /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */ |
592 | if (method == JUST_CFM && hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) | |
593 | method = JUST_WORKS; | |
594 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
595 | /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */ |
596 | if (method == JUST_WORKS) { | |
4a74d658 | 597 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
598 | return 0; |
599 | } | |
600 | ||
601 | /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */ | |
5eb596f5 | 602 | if (method != JUST_CFM) { |
4a74d658 | 603 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags); |
5eb596f5 JH |
604 | if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
605 | hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
606 | } | |
2b64d153 BG |
607 | |
608 | /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master | |
609 | * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey. | |
610 | */ | |
611 | if (method == OVERLAP) { | |
40bef302 | 612 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
2b64d153 BG |
613 | method = CFM_PASSKEY; |
614 | else | |
615 | method = REQ_PASSKEY; | |
616 | } | |
617 | ||
01ad34d2 | 618 | /* Generate random passkey. */ |
2b64d153 | 619 | if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) { |
943a732a | 620 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
2b64d153 BG |
621 | get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey)); |
622 | passkey %= 1000000; | |
943a732a | 623 | put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk); |
2b64d153 | 624 | BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey); |
4a74d658 | 625 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
626 | } |
627 | ||
2b64d153 | 628 | if (method == REQ_PASSKEY) |
ce39fb4e | 629 | ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
272d90df | 630 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type); |
4eb65e66 JH |
631 | else if (method == JUST_CFM) |
632 | ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, | |
633 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, | |
634 | passkey, 1); | |
2b64d153 | 635 | else |
01ad34d2 | 636 | ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
272d90df | 637 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, |
39adbffe | 638 | passkey, 0); |
2b64d153 | 639 | |
2b64d153 BG |
640 | return ret; |
641 | } | |
642 | ||
1cc61144 | 643 | static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) |
8aab4757 | 644 | { |
8aab4757 | 645 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
8aab4757 VCG |
646 | struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; |
647 | int ret; | |
8aab4757 VCG |
648 | |
649 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
650 | ||
e491eaf3 | 651 | ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, |
b1cd5fd9 | 652 | conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr, |
943a732a JH |
653 | conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr, |
654 | cp.confirm_val); | |
1cc61144 JH |
655 | if (ret) |
656 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
8aab4757 | 657 | |
4a74d658 | 658 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 | 659 | |
8aab4757 VCG |
660 | smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
661 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
662 | if (conn->hcon->out) |
663 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
664 | else | |
665 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
666 | ||
1cc61144 | 667 | return 0; |
8aab4757 VCG |
668 | } |
669 | ||
861580a9 | 670 | static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) |
8aab4757 | 671 | { |
8aab4757 VCG |
672 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
673 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
861580a9 | 674 | u8 confirm[16]; |
8aab4757 VCG |
675 | int ret; |
676 | ||
ec70f36f | 677 | if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes)) |
861580a9 | 678 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
8aab4757 VCG |
679 | |
680 | BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); | |
681 | ||
e491eaf3 | 682 | ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, |
b1cd5fd9 | 683 | hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, |
943a732a | 684 | hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm); |
861580a9 JH |
685 | if (ret) |
686 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
8aab4757 | 687 | |
8aab4757 VCG |
688 | if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) { |
689 | BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)"); | |
861580a9 | 690 | return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; |
8aab4757 VCG |
691 | } |
692 | ||
693 | if (hcon->out) { | |
fe39c7b2 MH |
694 | u8 stk[16]; |
695 | __le64 rand = 0; | |
696 | __le16 ediv = 0; | |
8aab4757 | 697 | |
e491eaf3 | 698 | smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk); |
8aab4757 | 699 | |
f7aa611a | 700 | memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, |
04124681 | 701 | SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size); |
8aab4757 | 702 | |
861580a9 JH |
703 | if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) |
704 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
8aab4757 VCG |
705 | |
706 | hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk); | |
f7aa611a | 707 | hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; |
fe59a05f | 708 | set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); |
8aab4757 | 709 | } else { |
fff3490f | 710 | u8 stk[16], auth; |
fe39c7b2 MH |
711 | __le64 rand = 0; |
712 | __le16 ediv = 0; | |
8aab4757 | 713 | |
943a732a JH |
714 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), |
715 | smp->prnd); | |
8aab4757 | 716 | |
e491eaf3 | 717 | smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk); |
8aab4757 | 718 | |
f7aa611a | 719 | memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, |
f1560463 | 720 | SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size); |
8aab4757 | 721 | |
fff3490f JH |
722 | if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
723 | auth = 1; | |
724 | else | |
725 | auth = 0; | |
726 | ||
7d5843b7 JH |
727 | /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the |
728 | * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master | |
729 | * STK never needs to be stored). | |
730 | */ | |
ce39fb4e | 731 | hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, |
2ceba539 | 732 | SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); |
8aab4757 VCG |
733 | } |
734 | ||
861580a9 | 735 | return 0; |
8aab4757 VCG |
736 | } |
737 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
738 | static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
739 | { | |
740 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
741 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
742 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
743 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
744 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
745 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; | |
746 | bool persistent; | |
747 | ||
748 | if (smp->remote_irk) { | |
749 | mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk); | |
750 | /* Now that user space can be considered to know the | |
751 | * identity address track the connection based on it | |
752 | * from now on. | |
753 | */ | |
754 | bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr); | |
755 | hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type; | |
f3d82d0c | 756 | queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work); |
44f1a7ab JH |
757 | |
758 | /* When receiving an indentity resolving key for | |
759 | * a remote device that does not use a resolvable | |
760 | * private address, just remove the key so that | |
761 | * it is possible to use the controller white | |
762 | * list for scanning. | |
763 | * | |
764 | * Userspace will have been told to not store | |
765 | * this key at this point. So it is safe to | |
766 | * just remove it. | |
767 | */ | |
768 | if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) { | |
adae20cb JH |
769 | list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); |
770 | kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); | |
44f1a7ab JH |
771 | smp->remote_irk = NULL; |
772 | } | |
773 | } | |
774 | ||
775 | /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides | |
776 | * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests. | |
777 | */ | |
778 | persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING); | |
779 | ||
780 | if (smp->csrk) { | |
781 | smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
782 | bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
783 | mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); | |
784 | } | |
785 | ||
786 | if (smp->slave_csrk) { | |
787 | smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
788 | bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
789 | mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent); | |
790 | } | |
791 | ||
792 | if (smp->ltk) { | |
793 | smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
794 | bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
795 | mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); | |
796 | } | |
797 | ||
798 | if (smp->slave_ltk) { | |
799 | smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
800 | bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
801 | mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent); | |
802 | } | |
803 | } | |
804 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
805 | static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp) |
806 | { | |
807 | /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs | |
808 | * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive | |
809 | * them in the correct order. | |
810 | */ | |
811 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) | |
812 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO); | |
813 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) | |
814 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); | |
815 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) | |
816 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
817 | } | |
818 | ||
d6268e86 | 819 | static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) |
44f1a7ab JH |
820 | { |
821 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; | |
86d1407c | 822 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
44f1a7ab JH |
823 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
824 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
825 | __u8 *keydist; | |
826 | ||
827 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
828 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
829 | rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; |
830 | ||
831 | /* The responder sends its keys first */ | |
b28b4943 JH |
832 | if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) { |
833 | smp_allow_key_dist(smp); | |
86d1407c | 834 | return; |
b28b4943 | 835 | } |
44f1a7ab JH |
836 | |
837 | req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
838 | ||
839 | if (hcon->out) { | |
840 | keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; | |
841 | *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; | |
842 | } else { | |
843 | keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; | |
844 | *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; | |
845 | } | |
846 | ||
847 | BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist); | |
848 | ||
849 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { | |
850 | struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; | |
851 | struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; | |
852 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; | |
853 | u8 authenticated; | |
854 | __le16 ediv; | |
855 | __le64 rand; | |
856 | ||
857 | get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk)); | |
858 | get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); | |
859 | get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand)); | |
860 | ||
861 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); | |
862 | ||
863 | authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
864 | ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, | |
865 | SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk, | |
866 | smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); | |
867 | smp->slave_ltk = ltk; | |
868 | ||
869 | ident.ediv = ediv; | |
870 | ident.rand = rand; | |
871 | ||
872 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); | |
873 | ||
874 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; | |
875 | } | |
876 | ||
877 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { | |
878 | struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; | |
879 | struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; | |
880 | ||
881 | memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); | |
882 | ||
883 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); | |
884 | ||
885 | /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address | |
886 | * after the connection has been established. | |
887 | * | |
888 | * This is true even when the connection has been | |
889 | * established using a resolvable random address. | |
890 | */ | |
891 | bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src); | |
892 | addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type; | |
893 | ||
894 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), | |
895 | &addrinfo); | |
896 | ||
897 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
898 | } | |
899 | ||
900 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { | |
901 | struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; | |
902 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; | |
903 | ||
904 | /* Generate a new random key */ | |
905 | get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); | |
906 | ||
907 | csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); | |
908 | if (csrk) { | |
909 | csrk->master = 0x00; | |
910 | memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); | |
911 | } | |
912 | smp->slave_csrk = csrk; | |
913 | ||
914 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); | |
915 | ||
916 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
917 | } | |
918 | ||
919 | /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */ | |
b28b4943 JH |
920 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) { |
921 | smp_allow_key_dist(smp); | |
86d1407c | 922 | return; |
b28b4943 | 923 | } |
44f1a7ab | 924 | |
44f1a7ab JH |
925 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); |
926 | smp_notify_keys(conn); | |
927 | ||
928 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); | |
44f1a7ab JH |
929 | } |
930 | ||
b68fda68 JH |
931 | static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work) |
932 | { | |
933 | struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, | |
934 | security_timer.work); | |
935 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
936 | ||
937 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
938 | ||
1e91c29e | 939 | hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM); |
b68fda68 JH |
940 | } |
941 | ||
8aab4757 VCG |
942 | static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
943 | { | |
5d88cc73 | 944 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
8aab4757 VCG |
945 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
946 | ||
f1560463 | 947 | smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC); |
fc75cc86 | 948 | if (!smp) |
8aab4757 VCG |
949 | return NULL; |
950 | ||
6a7bd103 JH |
951 | smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); |
952 | if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) { | |
953 | BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context"); | |
954 | kfree(smp); | |
955 | return NULL; | |
956 | } | |
957 | ||
407cecf6 JH |
958 | smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_hash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); |
959 | if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) { | |
960 | BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); | |
961 | crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes); | |
962 | kfree(smp); | |
963 | return NULL; | |
964 | } | |
965 | ||
8aab4757 | 966 | smp->conn = conn; |
5d88cc73 | 967 | chan->data = smp; |
8aab4757 | 968 | |
b28b4943 JH |
969 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL); |
970 | ||
b68fda68 JH |
971 | INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout); |
972 | ||
8aab4757 VCG |
973 | hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon); |
974 | ||
975 | return smp; | |
976 | } | |
977 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
978 | int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) |
979 | { | |
b10e8017 | 980 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; |
5d88cc73 | 981 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
2b64d153 BG |
982 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
983 | u32 value; | |
fc75cc86 | 984 | int err; |
2b64d153 BG |
985 | |
986 | BT_DBG(""); | |
987 | ||
fc75cc86 | 988 | if (!conn) |
2b64d153 BG |
989 | return -ENOTCONN; |
990 | ||
5d88cc73 JH |
991 | chan = conn->smp; |
992 | if (!chan) | |
993 | return -ENOTCONN; | |
994 | ||
fc75cc86 JH |
995 | l2cap_chan_lock(chan); |
996 | if (!chan->data) { | |
997 | err = -ENOTCONN; | |
998 | goto unlock; | |
999 | } | |
1000 | ||
5d88cc73 | 1001 | smp = chan->data; |
2b64d153 BG |
1002 | |
1003 | switch (mgmt_op) { | |
1004 | case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: | |
1005 | value = le32_to_cpu(passkey); | |
943a732a | 1006 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
2b64d153 | 1007 | BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value); |
943a732a | 1008 | put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk); |
2b64d153 BG |
1009 | /* Fall Through */ |
1010 | case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY: | |
4a74d658 | 1011 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
1012 | break; |
1013 | case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: | |
1014 | case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: | |
84794e11 | 1015 | smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); |
fc75cc86 JH |
1016 | err = 0; |
1017 | goto unlock; | |
2b64d153 | 1018 | default: |
84794e11 | 1019 | smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); |
fc75cc86 JH |
1020 | err = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
1021 | goto unlock; | |
2b64d153 BG |
1022 | } |
1023 | ||
fc75cc86 JH |
1024 | err = 0; |
1025 | ||
2b64d153 | 1026 | /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */ |
1cc61144 JH |
1027 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) { |
1028 | u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp); | |
1029 | if (rsp) | |
1030 | smp_failure(conn, rsp); | |
1031 | } | |
2b64d153 | 1032 | |
fc75cc86 JH |
1033 | unlock: |
1034 | l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); | |
1035 | return err; | |
2b64d153 BG |
1036 | } |
1037 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1038 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 1039 | { |
3158c50c | 1040 | struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data; |
fc75cc86 | 1041 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
b3c6410b | 1042 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
8aab4757 | 1043 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
c7262e71 | 1044 | u8 key_size, auth, sec_level; |
8aab4757 | 1045 | int ret; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1046 | |
1047 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1048 | ||
c46b98be | 1049 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*req)) |
38e4a915 | 1050 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1051 | |
40bef302 | 1052 | if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
2b64d153 BG |
1053 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
1054 | ||
fc75cc86 | 1055 | if (!chan->data) |
8aab4757 | 1056 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
fc75cc86 | 1057 | else |
5d88cc73 | 1058 | smp = chan->data; |
8aab4757 | 1059 | |
d08fd0e7 AE |
1060 | if (!smp) |
1061 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
d26a2345 | 1062 | |
c05b9339 | 1063 | /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */ |
0edb14de | 1064 | auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
c05b9339 | 1065 | |
b6ae8457 | 1066 | if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) && |
c05b9339 | 1067 | (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) |
b3c6410b JH |
1068 | return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
1069 | ||
1c1def09 VCG |
1070 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
1071 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req)); | |
3158c50c | 1072 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req)); |
88ba43b6 | 1073 | |
5be5e275 | 1074 | if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) |
1afc2a1a JH |
1075 | sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
1076 | else | |
1077 | sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); | |
1078 | ||
c7262e71 JH |
1079 | if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level) |
1080 | conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
fdde0a26 | 1081 | |
49c922bb | 1082 | /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ |
2ed8f65c JH |
1083 | if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { |
1084 | u8 method; | |
1085 | ||
1086 | method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability, | |
1087 | req->io_capability); | |
1088 | if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) | |
1089 | return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; | |
1090 | } | |
1091 | ||
2b64d153 | 1092 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth); |
3158c50c | 1093 | |
65668776 JH |
1094 | if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) |
1095 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); | |
1096 | ||
3158c50c VCG |
1097 | key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size); |
1098 | if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) | |
1099 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
88ba43b6 | 1100 | |
e84a6b13 | 1101 | get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); |
8aab4757 | 1102 | |
1c1def09 VCG |
1103 | smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; |
1104 | memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); | |
f01ead31 | 1105 | |
3158c50c | 1106 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp); |
3b19146d JH |
1107 | |
1108 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); | |
1109 | ||
1110 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { | |
1111 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1112 | /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ | |
1113 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; | |
1114 | /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */ | |
1115 | return 0; | |
1116 | } else { | |
1117 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
1118 | } | |
da85e5e5 | 1119 | |
2b64d153 BG |
1120 | /* Request setup of TK */ |
1121 | ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability); | |
1122 | if (ret) | |
1123 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1124 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1125 | return 0; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1126 | } |
1127 | ||
3b19146d JH |
1128 | static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp) |
1129 | { | |
1130 | BT_DBG(""); | |
1131 | ||
1132 | /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */ | |
1133 | if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk)) | |
1134 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1135 | ||
1136 | BT_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk); | |
1137 | BT_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->local_pk[32]); | |
1138 | BT_DBG("Local Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk); | |
1139 | ||
1140 | smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk); | |
1141 | ||
1142 | return 0; | |
1143 | } | |
1144 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1145 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 1146 | { |
3158c50c | 1147 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data; |
5d88cc73 JH |
1148 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1149 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
0edb14de | 1150 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
3a7dbfb8 | 1151 | u8 key_size, auth; |
7d24ddcc | 1152 | int ret; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1153 | |
1154 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1155 | ||
c46b98be | 1156 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp)) |
38e4a915 | 1157 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1158 | |
40bef302 | 1159 | if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
2b64d153 BG |
1160 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
1161 | ||
3158c50c VCG |
1162 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp)); |
1163 | ||
1c1def09 | 1164 | req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; |
da85e5e5 | 1165 | |
3158c50c VCG |
1166 | key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size); |
1167 | if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) | |
1168 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
1169 | ||
0edb14de | 1170 | auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
c05b9339 | 1171 | |
65668776 JH |
1172 | if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) |
1173 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); | |
d2eb9e10 JH |
1174 | else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
1175 | conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
65668776 | 1176 | |
49c922bb | 1177 | /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ |
2ed8f65c JH |
1178 | if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { |
1179 | u8 method; | |
1180 | ||
1181 | method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability, | |
1182 | rsp->io_capability); | |
1183 | if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) | |
1184 | return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; | |
1185 | } | |
1186 | ||
e84a6b13 | 1187 | get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); |
7d24ddcc | 1188 | |
8aab4757 VCG |
1189 | smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; |
1190 | memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp)); | |
7d24ddcc | 1191 | |
fdcc4bec JH |
1192 | /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared |
1193 | * some bits that we had enabled in our request. | |
1194 | */ | |
1195 | smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; | |
1196 | ||
3b19146d JH |
1197 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
1198 | /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ | |
1199 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; | |
1200 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1201 | return sc_send_public_key(smp); | |
1202 | } | |
1203 | ||
c05b9339 | 1204 | auth |= req->auth_req; |
2b64d153 | 1205 | |
476585ec | 1206 | ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability); |
2b64d153 BG |
1207 | if (ret) |
1208 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1209 | ||
4a74d658 | 1210 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
1211 | |
1212 | /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */ | |
4a74d658 | 1213 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) |
1cc61144 | 1214 | return smp_confirm(smp); |
da85e5e5 VCG |
1215 | |
1216 | return 0; | |
88ba43b6 AB |
1217 | } |
1218 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1219 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 1220 | { |
5d88cc73 JH |
1221 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1222 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
7d24ddcc | 1223 | |
88ba43b6 AB |
1224 | BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); |
1225 | ||
c46b98be | 1226 | if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf)) |
38e4a915 | 1227 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1228 | |
1c1def09 VCG |
1229 | memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); |
1230 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); | |
88ba43b6 | 1231 | |
b28b4943 | 1232 | if (conn->hcon->out) { |
943a732a JH |
1233 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), |
1234 | smp->prnd); | |
b28b4943 JH |
1235 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); |
1236 | return 0; | |
1237 | } | |
1238 | ||
1239 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) | |
1cc61144 | 1240 | return smp_confirm(smp); |
943a732a | 1241 | else |
4a74d658 | 1242 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
da85e5e5 VCG |
1243 | |
1244 | return 0; | |
88ba43b6 AB |
1245 | } |
1246 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1247 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 1248 | { |
5d88cc73 JH |
1249 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1250 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
7d24ddcc | 1251 | |
8aab4757 | 1252 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); |
3158c50c | 1253 | |
c46b98be | 1254 | if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd)) |
38e4a915 | 1255 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1256 | |
943a732a | 1257 | memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); |
8aab4757 | 1258 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); |
e7e62c85 | 1259 | |
861580a9 | 1260 | return smp_random(smp); |
88ba43b6 AB |
1261 | } |
1262 | ||
f81cd823 | 1263 | static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) |
988c5997 | 1264 | { |
c9839a11 | 1265 | struct smp_ltk *key; |
988c5997 VCG |
1266 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
1267 | ||
f3a73d97 | 1268 | key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role); |
988c5997 | 1269 | if (!key) |
f81cd823 | 1270 | return false; |
988c5997 | 1271 | |
a6f7833c | 1272 | if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level) |
f81cd823 | 1273 | return false; |
4dab7864 | 1274 | |
51a8efd7 | 1275 | if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) |
f81cd823 | 1276 | return true; |
988c5997 | 1277 | |
c9839a11 VCG |
1278 | hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val); |
1279 | hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size; | |
988c5997 | 1280 | |
fe59a05f JH |
1281 | /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */ |
1282 | clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); | |
1283 | ||
f81cd823 | 1284 | return true; |
988c5997 | 1285 | } |
f1560463 | 1286 | |
35dc6f83 JH |
1287 | bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level, |
1288 | enum smp_key_pref key_pref) | |
854f4727 JH |
1289 | { |
1290 | if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) | |
1291 | return true; | |
1292 | ||
35dc6f83 JH |
1293 | /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using |
1294 | * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the | |
1295 | * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK | |
1296 | * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we | |
1297 | * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits). | |
9ab65d60 | 1298 | */ |
35dc6f83 JH |
1299 | if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK && |
1300 | test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && | |
f3a73d97 | 1301 | hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role)) |
9ab65d60 JH |
1302 | return false; |
1303 | ||
854f4727 JH |
1304 | if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level) |
1305 | return true; | |
1306 | ||
1307 | return false; | |
1308 | } | |
1309 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1310 | static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 AB |
1311 | { |
1312 | struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data; | |
1313 | struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; | |
f1cb9af5 | 1314 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
0edb14de | 1315 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
8aab4757 | 1316 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
c05b9339 | 1317 | u8 sec_level, auth; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1318 | |
1319 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1320 | ||
c46b98be | 1321 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) |
38e4a915 | 1322 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1323 | |
40bef302 | 1324 | if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
86ca9eac JH |
1325 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
1326 | ||
0edb14de | 1327 | auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
c05b9339 | 1328 | |
5be5e275 | 1329 | if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) |
1afc2a1a JH |
1330 | sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
1331 | else | |
1332 | sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); | |
1333 | ||
35dc6f83 | 1334 | if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) |
854f4727 JH |
1335 | return 0; |
1336 | ||
c7262e71 JH |
1337 | if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) |
1338 | hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
feb45eb5 | 1339 | |
4dab7864 | 1340 | if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) |
988c5997 VCG |
1341 | return 0; |
1342 | ||
8aab4757 | 1343 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
c29d2444 JH |
1344 | if (!smp) |
1345 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
d26a2345 | 1346 | |
b6ae8457 | 1347 | if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) && |
c05b9339 | 1348 | (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) |
616d55be JH |
1349 | return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
1350 | ||
88ba43b6 | 1351 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
88ba43b6 | 1352 | |
da85e5e5 | 1353 | memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); |
c05b9339 | 1354 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth); |
88ba43b6 | 1355 | |
1c1def09 VCG |
1356 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
1357 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); | |
f01ead31 | 1358 | |
88ba43b6 | 1359 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
b28b4943 | 1360 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); |
f1cb9af5 | 1361 | |
da85e5e5 | 1362 | return 0; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1363 | } |
1364 | ||
cc110922 | 1365 | int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) |
eb492e01 | 1366 | { |
cc110922 | 1367 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; |
c68b7f12 | 1368 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
0a66cf20 | 1369 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
2b64d153 | 1370 | __u8 authreq; |
fc75cc86 | 1371 | int ret; |
eb492e01 | 1372 | |
3a0259bb VCG |
1373 | BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level); |
1374 | ||
0a66cf20 JH |
1375 | /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */ |
1376 | if (!conn) | |
1377 | return 1; | |
1378 | ||
c68b7f12 JH |
1379 | chan = conn->smp; |
1380 | ||
757aee0f | 1381 | if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) |
2e65c9d2 AG |
1382 | return 1; |
1383 | ||
35dc6f83 | 1384 | if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) |
eb492e01 | 1385 | return 1; |
f1cb9af5 | 1386 | |
c7262e71 JH |
1387 | if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) |
1388 | hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
1389 | ||
40bef302 | 1390 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
c7262e71 JH |
1391 | if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) |
1392 | return 0; | |
d26a2345 | 1393 | |
fc75cc86 JH |
1394 | l2cap_chan_lock(chan); |
1395 | ||
1396 | /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */ | |
1397 | if (chan->data) { | |
1398 | ret = 0; | |
1399 | goto unlock; | |
1400 | } | |
d26a2345 | 1401 | |
8aab4757 | 1402 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
fc75cc86 JH |
1403 | if (!smp) { |
1404 | ret = 1; | |
1405 | goto unlock; | |
1406 | } | |
2b64d153 BG |
1407 | |
1408 | authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level); | |
d26a2345 | 1409 | |
d2eb9e10 JH |
1410 | if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) |
1411 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC; | |
1412 | ||
79897d20 JH |
1413 | /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level |
1414 | * requires it. | |
2e233644 | 1415 | */ |
79897d20 | 1416 | if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT || |
c7262e71 | 1417 | hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) |
2e233644 JH |
1418 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; |
1419 | ||
40bef302 | 1420 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) { |
d26a2345 | 1421 | struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; |
f01ead31 | 1422 | |
2b64d153 | 1423 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq); |
1c1def09 VCG |
1424 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
1425 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); | |
f01ead31 | 1426 | |
eb492e01 | 1427 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
b28b4943 | 1428 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); |
eb492e01 AB |
1429 | } else { |
1430 | struct smp_cmd_security_req cp; | |
2b64d153 | 1431 | cp.auth_req = authreq; |
eb492e01 | 1432 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
b28b4943 | 1433 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ); |
eb492e01 AB |
1434 | } |
1435 | ||
4a74d658 | 1436 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); |
fc75cc86 | 1437 | ret = 0; |
edca792c | 1438 | |
fc75cc86 JH |
1439 | unlock: |
1440 | l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); | |
1441 | return ret; | |
eb492e01 AB |
1442 | } |
1443 | ||
7034b911 VCG |
1444 | static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
1445 | { | |
16b90839 | 1446 | struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; |
5d88cc73 JH |
1447 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1448 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
16b90839 | 1449 | |
c46b98be JH |
1450 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); |
1451 | ||
1452 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
38e4a915 | 1453 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1454 | |
b28b4943 | 1455 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT); |
6131ddc8 | 1456 | |
16b90839 VCG |
1457 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
1458 | ||
1c1def09 | 1459 | memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
16b90839 | 1460 | |
7034b911 VCG |
1461 | return 0; |
1462 | } | |
1463 | ||
1464 | static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1465 | { | |
16b90839 | 1466 | struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data; |
5d88cc73 JH |
1467 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1468 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
c9839a11 VCG |
1469 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
1470 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
23d0e128 | 1471 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; |
c9839a11 | 1472 | u8 authenticated; |
16b90839 | 1473 | |
c46b98be JH |
1474 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); |
1475 | ||
1476 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
38e4a915 | 1477 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1478 | |
9747a9f3 JH |
1479 | /* Mark the information as received */ |
1480 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; | |
1481 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
1482 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) |
1483 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); | |
196332f5 JH |
1484 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) |
1485 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
b28b4943 | 1486 | |
16b90839 | 1487 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
7034b911 | 1488 | |
ce39fb4e | 1489 | authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH); |
2ceba539 | 1490 | ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK, |
23d0e128 JH |
1491 | authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, |
1492 | rp->ediv, rp->rand); | |
1493 | smp->ltk = ltk; | |
c6e81e9a | 1494 | if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) |
d6268e86 | 1495 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
7034b911 VCG |
1496 | |
1497 | return 0; | |
1498 | } | |
1499 | ||
fd349c02 JH |
1500 | static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
1501 | { | |
1502 | struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
1503 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1504 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
fd349c02 JH |
1505 | |
1506 | BT_DBG(""); | |
1507 | ||
1508 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) | |
38e4a915 | 1509 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
fd349c02 | 1510 | |
b28b4943 | 1511 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO); |
6131ddc8 | 1512 | |
fd349c02 JH |
1513 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); |
1514 | ||
1515 | memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16); | |
1516 | ||
1517 | return 0; | |
1518 | } | |
1519 | ||
1520 | static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, | |
1521 | struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1522 | { | |
1523 | struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
1524 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1525 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
fd349c02 JH |
1526 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
1527 | bdaddr_t rpa; | |
1528 | ||
1529 | BT_DBG(""); | |
1530 | ||
1531 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) | |
38e4a915 | 1532 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
fd349c02 | 1533 | |
9747a9f3 JH |
1534 | /* Mark the information as received */ |
1535 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
1536 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
1537 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) |
1538 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
1539 | ||
fd349c02 JH |
1540 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); |
1541 | ||
a9a58f86 JH |
1542 | /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending |
1543 | * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK | |
1544 | * as "identity information". However, since such | |
1545 | * implementations are not known of and in order to not over | |
1546 | * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never | |
1547 | * received an IRK for such a device. | |
1548 | */ | |
1549 | if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY)) { | |
1550 | BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address"); | |
31dd624e | 1551 | goto distribute; |
a9a58f86 JH |
1552 | } |
1553 | ||
fd349c02 JH |
1554 | bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr); |
1555 | smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type; | |
1556 | ||
1557 | if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type)) | |
1558 | bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst); | |
1559 | else | |
1560 | bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY); | |
1561 | ||
23d0e128 JH |
1562 | smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr, |
1563 | smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa); | |
fd349c02 | 1564 | |
31dd624e | 1565 | distribute: |
c6e81e9a JH |
1566 | if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) |
1567 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); | |
fd349c02 JH |
1568 | |
1569 | return 0; | |
1570 | } | |
1571 | ||
7ee4ea36 MH |
1572 | static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
1573 | { | |
1574 | struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
1575 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1576 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
7ee4ea36 MH |
1577 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; |
1578 | ||
1579 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1580 | ||
1581 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
38e4a915 | 1582 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
7ee4ea36 | 1583 | |
7ee4ea36 MH |
1584 | /* Mark the information as received */ |
1585 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
1586 | ||
1587 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); | |
1588 | ||
7ee4ea36 MH |
1589 | csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); |
1590 | if (csrk) { | |
1591 | csrk->master = 0x01; | |
1592 | memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); | |
1593 | } | |
1594 | smp->csrk = csrk; | |
d6268e86 | 1595 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
7ee4ea36 MH |
1596 | |
1597 | return 0; | |
1598 | } | |
1599 | ||
d8f8edbe JH |
1600 | static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
1601 | { | |
1602 | struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data; | |
1603 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1604 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
1605 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
cbbbe3e2 | 1606 | struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm; |
d8f8edbe JH |
1607 | int err; |
1608 | ||
1609 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1610 | ||
1611 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*key)) | |
1612 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
1613 | ||
1614 | memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64); | |
1615 | ||
1616 | /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving | |
1617 | * the key from the initiating device. | |
1618 | */ | |
1619 | if (!hcon->out) { | |
1620 | err = sc_send_public_key(smp); | |
1621 | if (err) | |
1622 | return err; | |
1623 | } | |
1624 | ||
1625 | BT_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk); | |
1626 | BT_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->remote_pk[32]); | |
1627 | ||
1628 | if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey)) | |
1629 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1630 | ||
1631 | BT_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey); | |
1632 | ||
1633 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags); | |
1634 | ||
cbbbe3e2 JH |
1635 | /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to |
1636 | * send the confirm value. | |
1637 | */ | |
1638 | if (conn->hcon->out) | |
1639 | return 0; | |
1640 | ||
1641 | err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, | |
1642 | 0, cfm.confirm_val); | |
1643 | if (err) | |
1644 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1645 | ||
1646 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm); | |
1647 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
1648 | ||
d8f8edbe JH |
1649 | return 0; |
1650 | } | |
1651 | ||
4befb867 | 1652 | static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) |
eb492e01 | 1653 | { |
5d88cc73 | 1654 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; |
7b9899db | 1655 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
b28b4943 | 1656 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
92381f5c | 1657 | __u8 code, reason; |
eb492e01 AB |
1658 | int err = 0; |
1659 | ||
7b9899db MH |
1660 | if (hcon->type != LE_LINK) { |
1661 | kfree_skb(skb); | |
3432711f | 1662 | return 0; |
7b9899db MH |
1663 | } |
1664 | ||
8ae9b984 | 1665 | if (skb->len < 1) |
92381f5c | 1666 | return -EILSEQ; |
92381f5c | 1667 | |
06ae3314 | 1668 | if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) { |
2e65c9d2 AG |
1669 | reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
1670 | goto done; | |
1671 | } | |
1672 | ||
92381f5c | 1673 | code = skb->data[0]; |
eb492e01 AB |
1674 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code)); |
1675 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
1676 | smp = chan->data; |
1677 | ||
1678 | if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX) | |
1679 | goto drop; | |
1680 | ||
24bd0bd9 | 1681 | if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)) |
b28b4943 JH |
1682 | goto drop; |
1683 | ||
1684 | /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are | |
1685 | * pairing request and security request. | |
8cf9fa12 | 1686 | */ |
b28b4943 JH |
1687 | if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ) |
1688 | goto drop; | |
8cf9fa12 | 1689 | |
eb492e01 AB |
1690 | switch (code) { |
1691 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ: | |
da85e5e5 | 1692 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb); |
eb492e01 AB |
1693 | break; |
1694 | ||
1695 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL: | |
84794e11 | 1696 | smp_failure(conn, 0); |
da85e5e5 | 1697 | err = -EPERM; |
eb492e01 AB |
1698 | break; |
1699 | ||
1700 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP: | |
da85e5e5 | 1701 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
1702 | break; |
1703 | ||
1704 | case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ: | |
da85e5e5 | 1705 | reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
1706 | break; |
1707 | ||
eb492e01 | 1708 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: |
da85e5e5 | 1709 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
1710 | break; |
1711 | ||
eb492e01 | 1712 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: |
da85e5e5 | 1713 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
1714 | break; |
1715 | ||
eb492e01 | 1716 | case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: |
7034b911 VCG |
1717 | reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); |
1718 | break; | |
1719 | ||
eb492e01 | 1720 | case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: |
7034b911 VCG |
1721 | reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb); |
1722 | break; | |
1723 | ||
eb492e01 | 1724 | case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: |
fd349c02 JH |
1725 | reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb); |
1726 | break; | |
1727 | ||
eb492e01 | 1728 | case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: |
fd349c02 JH |
1729 | reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb); |
1730 | break; | |
1731 | ||
eb492e01 | 1732 | case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: |
7ee4ea36 | 1733 | reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb); |
7034b911 VCG |
1734 | break; |
1735 | ||
d8f8edbe JH |
1736 | case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY: |
1737 | reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb); | |
1738 | break; | |
1739 | ||
eb492e01 AB |
1740 | default: |
1741 | BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); | |
eb492e01 | 1742 | reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
3a0259bb | 1743 | goto done; |
eb492e01 AB |
1744 | } |
1745 | ||
3a0259bb | 1746 | done: |
9b7b18ef JH |
1747 | if (!err) { |
1748 | if (reason) | |
1749 | smp_failure(conn, reason); | |
8ae9b984 | 1750 | kfree_skb(skb); |
9b7b18ef JH |
1751 | } |
1752 | ||
eb492e01 | 1753 | return err; |
b28b4943 JH |
1754 | |
1755 | drop: | |
1756 | BT_ERR("%s unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", hcon->hdev->name, | |
1757 | code, &hcon->dst); | |
1758 | kfree_skb(skb); | |
1759 | return 0; | |
eb492e01 | 1760 | } |
7034b911 | 1761 | |
70db83c4 JH |
1762 | static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) |
1763 | { | |
1764 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; | |
1765 | ||
1766 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
1767 | ||
fc75cc86 | 1768 | if (chan->data) |
5d88cc73 | 1769 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); |
5d88cc73 | 1770 | |
70db83c4 JH |
1771 | conn->smp = NULL; |
1772 | l2cap_chan_put(chan); | |
1773 | } | |
1774 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
1775 | static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
1776 | { | |
b68fda68 | 1777 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
44f1a7ab JH |
1778 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; |
1779 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1780 | ||
1781 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
1782 | ||
86d1407c JH |
1783 | if (!smp) |
1784 | return; | |
b68fda68 | 1785 | |
84bc0db5 JH |
1786 | if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) |
1787 | return; | |
1788 | ||
86d1407c JH |
1789 | cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer); |
1790 | ||
d6268e86 | 1791 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
44f1a7ab JH |
1792 | } |
1793 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
1794 | static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
1795 | { | |
1796 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; | |
1797 | ||
1798 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
1799 | ||
1800 | conn->smp = chan; | |
1801 | l2cap_chan_hold(chan); | |
1802 | } | |
1803 | ||
4befb867 JH |
1804 | static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) |
1805 | { | |
1806 | int err; | |
1807 | ||
1808 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
1809 | ||
1810 | err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb); | |
1811 | if (err) { | |
b68fda68 | 1812 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
4befb867 | 1813 | |
b68fda68 JH |
1814 | if (smp) |
1815 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
4befb867 | 1816 | |
1e91c29e | 1817 | hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); |
4befb867 JH |
1818 | } |
1819 | ||
1820 | return err; | |
1821 | } | |
1822 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
1823 | static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, |
1824 | unsigned long hdr_len, | |
1825 | unsigned long len, int nb) | |
1826 | { | |
1827 | struct sk_buff *skb; | |
1828 | ||
1829 | skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1830 | if (!skb) | |
1831 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | |
1832 | ||
1833 | skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX; | |
1834 | bt_cb(skb)->chan = chan; | |
1835 | ||
1836 | return skb; | |
1837 | } | |
1838 | ||
1839 | static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = { | |
1840 | .name = "Security Manager", | |
1841 | .ready = smp_ready_cb, | |
5d88cc73 | 1842 | .recv = smp_recv_cb, |
70db83c4 JH |
1843 | .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb, |
1844 | .teardown = smp_teardown_cb, | |
44f1a7ab | 1845 | .resume = smp_resume_cb, |
70db83c4 JH |
1846 | |
1847 | .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection, | |
70db83c4 JH |
1848 | .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, |
1849 | .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, | |
1850 | .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, | |
1851 | .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, | |
70db83c4 JH |
1852 | .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, |
1853 | .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, | |
1854 | .memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec, | |
1855 | }; | |
1856 | ||
1857 | static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) | |
1858 | { | |
1859 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; | |
1860 | ||
1861 | BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan); | |
1862 | ||
1863 | chan = l2cap_chan_create(); | |
1864 | if (!chan) | |
1865 | return NULL; | |
1866 | ||
1867 | chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type; | |
1868 | chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops; | |
1869 | chan->scid = pchan->scid; | |
1870 | chan->dcid = chan->scid; | |
1871 | chan->imtu = pchan->imtu; | |
1872 | chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; | |
1873 | chan->mode = pchan->mode; | |
1874 | ||
abe84903 JH |
1875 | /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to |
1876 | * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel | |
1877 | * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep | |
1878 | * warnings. | |
1879 | */ | |
1880 | atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP); | |
1881 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
1882 | BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan); |
1883 | ||
1884 | return chan; | |
1885 | } | |
1886 | ||
1887 | static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = { | |
1888 | .name = "Security Manager Root", | |
1889 | .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb, | |
1890 | ||
1891 | /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */ | |
1892 | .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, | |
1893 | .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb, | |
1894 | .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv, | |
1895 | .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, | |
1896 | .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown, | |
1897 | .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready, | |
1898 | .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, | |
1899 | .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, | |
1900 | .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume, | |
1901 | .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, | |
1902 | .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, | |
1903 | .memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec, | |
1904 | }; | |
1905 | ||
711eafe3 JH |
1906 | int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) |
1907 | { | |
70db83c4 | 1908 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
defce9e8 | 1909 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes; |
70db83c4 | 1910 | |
711eafe3 JH |
1911 | BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); |
1912 | ||
adae20cb | 1913 | tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0); |
defce9e8 JH |
1914 | if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) { |
1915 | int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes); | |
711eafe3 | 1916 | BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context"); |
711eafe3 JH |
1917 | return err; |
1918 | } | |
1919 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
1920 | chan = l2cap_chan_create(); |
1921 | if (!chan) { | |
defce9e8 | 1922 | crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes); |
70db83c4 JH |
1923 | return -ENOMEM; |
1924 | } | |
1925 | ||
defce9e8 JH |
1926 | chan->data = tfm_aes; |
1927 | ||
5d88cc73 | 1928 | l2cap_add_scid(chan, L2CAP_CID_SMP); |
70db83c4 JH |
1929 | |
1930 | l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan); | |
1931 | ||
1932 | bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr); | |
1933 | chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC; | |
1934 | chan->state = BT_LISTEN; | |
1935 | chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC; | |
1936 | chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU; | |
1937 | chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops; | |
1938 | ||
abe84903 JH |
1939 | /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */ |
1940 | atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT); | |
1941 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
1942 | hdev->smp_data = chan; |
1943 | ||
711eafe3 JH |
1944 | return 0; |
1945 | } | |
1946 | ||
1947 | void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev) | |
1948 | { | |
70db83c4 | 1949 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
defce9e8 | 1950 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes; |
70db83c4 JH |
1951 | |
1952 | if (!chan) | |
1953 | return; | |
1954 | ||
1955 | BT_DBG("%s chan %p", hdev->name, chan); | |
711eafe3 | 1956 | |
defce9e8 JH |
1957 | tfm_aes = chan->data; |
1958 | if (tfm_aes) { | |
1959 | chan->data = NULL; | |
1960 | crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes); | |
711eafe3 | 1961 | } |
70db83c4 JH |
1962 | |
1963 | hdev->smp_data = NULL; | |
1964 | l2cap_chan_put(chan); | |
711eafe3 | 1965 | } |