Commit | Line | Data |
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eb492e01 AB |
1 | /* |
2 | BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux | |
3 | Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies). | |
4 | ||
5 | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
6 | it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as | |
7 | published by the Free Software Foundation; | |
8 | ||
9 | THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS | |
10 | OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, | |
11 | FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. | |
12 | IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY | |
13 | CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES | |
14 | WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN | |
15 | ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF | |
16 | OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. | |
17 | ||
18 | ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS, | |
19 | COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS | |
20 | SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED. | |
21 | */ | |
22 | ||
8c520a59 GP |
23 | #include <linux/crypto.h> |
24 | #include <linux/scatterlist.h> | |
25 | #include <crypto/b128ops.h> | |
26 | ||
eb492e01 AB |
27 | #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h> |
28 | #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h> | |
29 | #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h> | |
2b64d153 | 30 | #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h> |
ac4b7236 | 31 | |
3b19146d | 32 | #include "ecc.h" |
ac4b7236 | 33 | #include "smp.h" |
d22ef0bc | 34 | |
b28b4943 | 35 | #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd) |
b28b4943 | 36 | |
3b19146d JH |
37 | /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */ |
38 | #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY); | |
39 | ||
17b02e62 | 40 | #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000) |
5d3de7df | 41 | |
0edb14de JH |
42 | #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &(dev)->dev_flags) ? \ |
43 | 0x1f : 0x07) | |
44 | #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07 | |
065a13e2 | 45 | |
cbbbe3e2 JH |
46 | /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */ |
47 | #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80 | |
48 | ||
533e35d4 JH |
49 | enum { |
50 | SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, | |
51 | SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, | |
52 | SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, | |
53 | SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, | |
54 | SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, | |
65668776 | 55 | SMP_FLAG_SC, |
d8f8edbe | 56 | SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, |
aeb7d461 | 57 | SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, |
533e35d4 | 58 | }; |
4bc58f51 JH |
59 | |
60 | struct smp_chan { | |
b68fda68 JH |
61 | struct l2cap_conn *conn; |
62 | struct delayed_work security_timer; | |
b28b4943 | 63 | unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */ |
b68fda68 | 64 | |
4bc58f51 JH |
65 | u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */ |
66 | u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */ | |
67 | u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */ | |
68 | u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */ | |
69 | u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */ | |
70 | u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */ | |
71 | u8 enc_key_size; | |
72 | u8 remote_key_dist; | |
73 | bdaddr_t id_addr; | |
74 | u8 id_addr_type; | |
75 | u8 irk[16]; | |
76 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; | |
77 | struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk; | |
78 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; | |
79 | struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk; | |
80 | struct smp_irk *remote_irk; | |
6a77083a | 81 | u8 *link_key; |
4a74d658 | 82 | unsigned long flags; |
783e0574 | 83 | u8 method; |
6a7bd103 | 84 | |
3b19146d JH |
85 | /* Secure Connections variables */ |
86 | u8 local_pk[64]; | |
87 | u8 local_sk[32]; | |
d8f8edbe JH |
88 | u8 remote_pk[64]; |
89 | u8 dhkey[32]; | |
760b018b | 90 | u8 mackey[16]; |
3b19146d | 91 | |
6a7bd103 | 92 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes; |
407cecf6 | 93 | struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac; |
4bc58f51 JH |
94 | }; |
95 | ||
aeb7d461 JH |
96 | /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core |
97 | * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the | |
98 | * private debug key. | |
99 | */ | |
100 | static const u8 debug_pk[64] = { | |
101 | 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, | |
102 | 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, | |
103 | 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, | |
104 | 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20, | |
105 | ||
106 | 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74, | |
107 | 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76, | |
108 | 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63, | |
109 | 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc, | |
110 | }; | |
111 | ||
112 | static const u8 debug_sk[32] = { | |
113 | 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58, | |
114 | 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a, | |
115 | 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74, | |
116 | 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f, | |
117 | }; | |
118 | ||
8a2936f4 | 119 | static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len) |
d22ef0bc | 120 | { |
8a2936f4 | 121 | size_t i; |
d22ef0bc | 122 | |
8a2936f4 JH |
123 | for (i = 0; i < len; i++) |
124 | dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i]; | |
d22ef0bc AB |
125 | } |
126 | ||
cbbbe3e2 JH |
127 | static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_hash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, |
128 | size_t len, u8 mac[16]) | |
129 | { | |
130 | uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX]; | |
131 | struct hash_desc desc; | |
132 | struct scatterlist sg; | |
133 | int err; | |
134 | ||
135 | if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX) | |
136 | return -EFBIG; | |
137 | ||
138 | if (!tfm) { | |
139 | BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm); | |
140 | return -EINVAL; | |
141 | } | |
142 | ||
143 | desc.tfm = tfm; | |
144 | desc.flags = 0; | |
145 | ||
146 | crypto_hash_init(&desc); | |
147 | ||
148 | /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */ | |
149 | swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); | |
150 | swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len); | |
151 | ||
152 | BT_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m); | |
153 | BT_DBG("key %16phN", k); | |
154 | ||
155 | err = crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16); | |
156 | if (err) { | |
157 | BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); | |
158 | return err; | |
159 | } | |
160 | ||
161 | sg_init_one(&sg, msg_msb, len); | |
162 | ||
163 | err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, len); | |
164 | if (err) { | |
165 | BT_ERR("Hash update error %d", err); | |
166 | return err; | |
167 | } | |
168 | ||
169 | err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, mac_msb); | |
170 | if (err) { | |
171 | BT_ERR("Hash final error %d", err); | |
172 | return err; | |
173 | } | |
174 | ||
175 | swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16); | |
176 | ||
177 | BT_DBG("mac %16phN", mac); | |
178 | ||
179 | return 0; | |
180 | } | |
181 | ||
182 | static int smp_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32], | |
183 | const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16]) | |
184 | { | |
185 | u8 m[65]; | |
186 | int err; | |
187 | ||
188 | BT_DBG("u %32phN", u); | |
189 | BT_DBG("v %32phN", v); | |
190 | BT_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z); | |
191 | ||
192 | m[0] = z; | |
193 | memcpy(m + 1, v, 32); | |
194 | memcpy(m + 33, u, 32); | |
195 | ||
196 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res); | |
197 | if (err) | |
198 | return err; | |
199 | ||
200 | BT_DBG("res %16phN", res); | |
201 | ||
202 | return err; | |
203 | } | |
204 | ||
760b018b JH |
205 | static int smp_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, u8 w[32], u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16], |
206 | u8 a1[7], u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16]) | |
207 | { | |
208 | /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in | |
209 | * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII | |
210 | * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a | |
211 | * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little | |
212 | * endian format. | |
213 | */ | |
214 | const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 }; | |
215 | const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60, | |
216 | 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c }; | |
217 | const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 }; | |
218 | u8 m[53], t[16]; | |
219 | int err; | |
220 | ||
221 | BT_DBG("w %32phN", w); | |
222 | BT_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2); | |
223 | BT_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2); | |
224 | ||
225 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t); | |
226 | if (err) | |
227 | return err; | |
228 | ||
229 | BT_DBG("t %16phN", t); | |
230 | ||
231 | memcpy(m, length, 2); | |
232 | memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7); | |
233 | memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7); | |
234 | memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16); | |
235 | memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16); | |
236 | memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4); | |
237 | ||
238 | m[52] = 0; /* Counter */ | |
239 | ||
240 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey); | |
241 | if (err) | |
242 | return err; | |
243 | ||
244 | BT_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey); | |
245 | ||
246 | m[52] = 1; /* Counter */ | |
247 | ||
248 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk); | |
249 | if (err) | |
250 | return err; | |
251 | ||
252 | BT_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk); | |
253 | ||
254 | return 0; | |
255 | } | |
256 | ||
257 | static int smp_f6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], | |
258 | const u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16], | |
259 | const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7], | |
260 | u8 res[16]) | |
261 | { | |
262 | u8 m[65]; | |
263 | int err; | |
264 | ||
265 | BT_DBG("w %16phN", w); | |
266 | BT_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2); | |
267 | BT_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2); | |
268 | ||
269 | memcpy(m, a2, 7); | |
270 | memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7); | |
271 | memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3); | |
272 | memcpy(m + 17, r, 16); | |
273 | memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16); | |
274 | memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16); | |
275 | ||
276 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res); | |
277 | if (err) | |
278 | return err; | |
279 | ||
280 | BT_DBG("res %16phN", res); | |
281 | ||
282 | return err; | |
283 | } | |
284 | ||
191dc7fe JH |
285 | static int smp_g2(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32], |
286 | const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val) | |
287 | { | |
288 | u8 m[80], tmp[16]; | |
289 | int err; | |
290 | ||
291 | BT_DBG("u %32phN", u); | |
292 | BT_DBG("v %32phN", v); | |
293 | BT_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y); | |
294 | ||
295 | memcpy(m, y, 16); | |
296 | memcpy(m + 16, v, 32); | |
297 | memcpy(m + 48, u, 32); | |
298 | ||
299 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp); | |
300 | if (err) | |
301 | return err; | |
302 | ||
303 | *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp); | |
304 | *val %= 1000000; | |
305 | ||
306 | BT_DBG("val %06u", *val); | |
307 | ||
308 | return 0; | |
309 | } | |
310 | ||
d22ef0bc AB |
311 | static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r) |
312 | { | |
313 | struct blkcipher_desc desc; | |
314 | struct scatterlist sg; | |
943a732a | 315 | uint8_t tmp[16], data[16]; |
201a5929 | 316 | int err; |
d22ef0bc AB |
317 | |
318 | if (tfm == NULL) { | |
319 | BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm); | |
320 | return -EINVAL; | |
321 | } | |
322 | ||
323 | desc.tfm = tfm; | |
324 | desc.flags = 0; | |
325 | ||
943a732a | 326 | /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */ |
8a2936f4 | 327 | swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); |
943a732a JH |
328 | |
329 | err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16); | |
d22ef0bc AB |
330 | if (err) { |
331 | BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); | |
332 | return err; | |
333 | } | |
334 | ||
943a732a | 335 | /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */ |
8a2936f4 | 336 | swap_buf(r, data, 16); |
943a732a JH |
337 | |
338 | sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16); | |
d22ef0bc | 339 | |
d22ef0bc AB |
340 | err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16); |
341 | if (err) | |
342 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err); | |
343 | ||
943a732a | 344 | /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */ |
8a2936f4 | 345 | swap_buf(data, r, 16); |
943a732a | 346 | |
d22ef0bc AB |
347 | return err; |
348 | } | |
349 | ||
6a77083a JH |
350 | static int smp_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], |
351 | const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16]) | |
352 | { | |
353 | int err; | |
354 | ||
355 | BT_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id); | |
356 | ||
357 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res); | |
358 | if (err) | |
359 | return err; | |
360 | ||
361 | BT_DBG("res %16phN", res); | |
362 | ||
363 | return err; | |
364 | } | |
365 | ||
60478054 JH |
366 | static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3]) |
367 | { | |
943a732a | 368 | u8 _res[16]; |
60478054 JH |
369 | int err; |
370 | ||
371 | /* r' = padding || r */ | |
943a732a JH |
372 | memcpy(_res, r, 3); |
373 | memset(_res + 3, 0, 13); | |
60478054 | 374 | |
943a732a | 375 | err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res); |
60478054 JH |
376 | if (err) { |
377 | BT_ERR("Encrypt error"); | |
378 | return err; | |
379 | } | |
380 | ||
381 | /* The output of the random address function ah is: | |
382 | * ah(h, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24 | |
383 | * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits | |
384 | * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the | |
385 | * result of ah. | |
386 | */ | |
943a732a | 387 | memcpy(res, _res, 3); |
60478054 JH |
388 | |
389 | return 0; | |
390 | } | |
391 | ||
defce9e8 | 392 | bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr) |
60478054 | 393 | { |
defce9e8 JH |
394 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
395 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm; | |
60478054 JH |
396 | u8 hash[3]; |
397 | int err; | |
398 | ||
defce9e8 JH |
399 | if (!chan || !chan->data) |
400 | return false; | |
401 | ||
402 | tfm = chan->data; | |
403 | ||
60478054 JH |
404 | BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk); |
405 | ||
406 | err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash); | |
407 | if (err) | |
408 | return false; | |
409 | ||
410 | return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3); | |
411 | } | |
412 | ||
defce9e8 | 413 | int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa) |
b1e2b3ae | 414 | { |
defce9e8 JH |
415 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
416 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm; | |
b1e2b3ae JH |
417 | int err; |
418 | ||
defce9e8 JH |
419 | if (!chan || !chan->data) |
420 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
421 | ||
422 | tfm = chan->data; | |
423 | ||
b1e2b3ae JH |
424 | get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3); |
425 | ||
426 | rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */ | |
427 | rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */ | |
428 | ||
429 | err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b); | |
430 | if (err < 0) | |
431 | return err; | |
432 | ||
433 | BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa); | |
434 | ||
435 | return 0; | |
436 | } | |
437 | ||
e491eaf3 JH |
438 | static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], |
439 | u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, | |
440 | bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16]) | |
d22ef0bc AB |
441 | { |
442 | u8 p1[16], p2[16]; | |
443 | int err; | |
444 | ||
445 | memset(p1, 0, 16); | |
446 | ||
447 | /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */ | |
943a732a JH |
448 | p1[0] = _iat; |
449 | p1[1] = _rat; | |
450 | memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7); | |
451 | memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7); | |
d22ef0bc AB |
452 | |
453 | /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */ | |
943a732a JH |
454 | memcpy(p2, ra, 6); |
455 | memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6); | |
456 | memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4); | |
d22ef0bc AB |
457 | |
458 | /* res = r XOR p1 */ | |
459 | u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1); | |
460 | ||
461 | /* res = e(k, res) */ | |
e491eaf3 | 462 | err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res); |
d22ef0bc AB |
463 | if (err) { |
464 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
465 | return err; | |
466 | } | |
467 | ||
468 | /* res = res XOR p2 */ | |
469 | u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2); | |
470 | ||
471 | /* res = e(k, res) */ | |
e491eaf3 | 472 | err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res); |
d22ef0bc AB |
473 | if (err) |
474 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
475 | ||
476 | return err; | |
477 | } | |
478 | ||
e491eaf3 JH |
479 | static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16], |
480 | u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16]) | |
d22ef0bc AB |
481 | { |
482 | int err; | |
483 | ||
484 | /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */ | |
943a732a JH |
485 | memcpy(_r, r2, 8); |
486 | memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8); | |
d22ef0bc | 487 | |
e491eaf3 | 488 | err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r); |
d22ef0bc AB |
489 | if (err) |
490 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
491 | ||
492 | return err; | |
493 | } | |
494 | ||
5d88cc73 | 495 | static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data) |
eb492e01 | 496 | { |
5d88cc73 | 497 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
b68fda68 | 498 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
5d88cc73 JH |
499 | struct kvec iv[2]; |
500 | struct msghdr msg; | |
eb492e01 | 501 | |
5d88cc73 JH |
502 | if (!chan) |
503 | return; | |
eb492e01 | 504 | |
5d88cc73 | 505 | BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code); |
eb492e01 | 506 | |
5d88cc73 JH |
507 | iv[0].iov_base = &code; |
508 | iv[0].iov_len = 1; | |
eb492e01 | 509 | |
5d88cc73 JH |
510 | iv[1].iov_base = data; |
511 | iv[1].iov_len = len; | |
eb492e01 | 512 | |
5d88cc73 | 513 | memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); |
eb492e01 | 514 | |
5d88cc73 JH |
515 | msg.msg_iov = (struct iovec *) &iv; |
516 | msg.msg_iovlen = 2; | |
eb492e01 | 517 | |
5d88cc73 | 518 | l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len); |
e2dcd113 | 519 | |
b68fda68 JH |
520 | if (!chan->data) |
521 | return; | |
522 | ||
523 | smp = chan->data; | |
524 | ||
525 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
1b0921d6 | 526 | schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT); |
eb492e01 AB |
527 | } |
528 | ||
d2eb9e10 | 529 | static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq) |
2b64d153 | 530 | { |
d2eb9e10 JH |
531 | if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) { |
532 | if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC) | |
533 | return BT_SECURITY_FIPS; | |
534 | else | |
535 | return BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
536 | } else { | |
2b64d153 | 537 | return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
d2eb9e10 | 538 | } |
2b64d153 BG |
539 | } |
540 | ||
541 | static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level) | |
542 | { | |
543 | switch (sec_level) { | |
d2eb9e10 | 544 | case BT_SECURITY_FIPS: |
2b64d153 BG |
545 | case BT_SECURITY_HIGH: |
546 | return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
547 | case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM: | |
548 | return SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
549 | default: | |
550 | return SMP_AUTH_NONE; | |
551 | } | |
552 | } | |
553 | ||
b8e66eac | 554 | static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, |
f1560463 MH |
555 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, |
556 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq) | |
b8e66eac | 557 | { |
5d88cc73 JH |
558 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
559 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
fd349c02 JH |
560 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
561 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
562 | u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0; | |
54790f73 | 563 | |
b6ae8457 | 564 | if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) { |
7ee4ea36 MH |
565 | local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; |
566 | remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
54790f73 | 567 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING; |
2b64d153 BG |
568 | } else { |
569 | authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
54790f73 VCG |
570 | } |
571 | ||
fd349c02 JH |
572 | if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags)) |
573 | remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
574 | ||
863efaf2 JH |
575 | if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags)) |
576 | local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
577 | ||
df8e1a4c JH |
578 | if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) { |
579 | if ((authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC) && | |
580 | test_bit(HCI_SSP_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) { | |
581 | local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; | |
582 | remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; | |
583 | } | |
584 | } else { | |
585 | authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC; | |
586 | } | |
587 | ||
54790f73 VCG |
588 | if (rsp == NULL) { |
589 | req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; | |
590 | req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; | |
591 | req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
fd349c02 JH |
592 | req->init_key_dist = local_dist; |
593 | req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist; | |
0edb14de | 594 | req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); |
fd349c02 JH |
595 | |
596 | smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist; | |
54790f73 VCG |
597 | return; |
598 | } | |
599 | ||
600 | rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; | |
601 | rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; | |
602 | rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
fd349c02 JH |
603 | rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist; |
604 | rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist; | |
0edb14de | 605 | rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); |
fd349c02 JH |
606 | |
607 | smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist; | |
b8e66eac VCG |
608 | } |
609 | ||
3158c50c VCG |
610 | static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size) |
611 | { | |
5d88cc73 JH |
612 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
613 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1c1def09 | 614 | |
3158c50c | 615 | if ((max_key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) || |
f1560463 | 616 | (max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)) |
3158c50c VCG |
617 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
618 | ||
f7aa611a | 619 | smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size; |
3158c50c VCG |
620 | |
621 | return 0; | |
622 | } | |
623 | ||
6f48e260 JH |
624 | static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
625 | { | |
626 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
627 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
628 | bool complete; | |
629 | ||
630 | BUG_ON(!smp); | |
631 | ||
632 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
6f48e260 | 633 | |
6f48e260 JH |
634 | complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); |
635 | mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete); | |
636 | ||
637 | kfree(smp->csrk); | |
638 | kfree(smp->slave_csrk); | |
6a77083a | 639 | kfree(smp->link_key); |
6f48e260 JH |
640 | |
641 | crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes); | |
407cecf6 | 642 | crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac); |
6f48e260 JH |
643 | |
644 | /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */ | |
645 | if (!complete) { | |
646 | if (smp->ltk) { | |
970d0f1b JH |
647 | list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); |
648 | kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); | |
6f48e260 JH |
649 | } |
650 | ||
651 | if (smp->slave_ltk) { | |
970d0f1b JH |
652 | list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list); |
653 | kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu); | |
6f48e260 JH |
654 | } |
655 | ||
656 | if (smp->remote_irk) { | |
adae20cb JH |
657 | list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); |
658 | kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); | |
6f48e260 JH |
659 | } |
660 | } | |
661 | ||
662 | chan->data = NULL; | |
663 | kfree(smp); | |
664 | hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon); | |
665 | } | |
666 | ||
84794e11 | 667 | static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason) |
4f957a76 | 668 | { |
bab73cb6 | 669 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
b68fda68 | 670 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
bab73cb6 | 671 | |
84794e11 | 672 | if (reason) |
4f957a76 | 673 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason), |
f1560463 | 674 | &reason); |
4f957a76 | 675 | |
ce39fb4e | 676 | clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags); |
e1e930f5 | 677 | mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); |
f1c09c07 | 678 | |
fc75cc86 | 679 | if (chan->data) |
f1c09c07 | 680 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); |
4f957a76 BG |
681 | } |
682 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
683 | #define JUST_WORKS 0x00 |
684 | #define JUST_CFM 0x01 | |
685 | #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02 | |
686 | #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03 | |
687 | #define REQ_OOB 0x04 | |
5e3d3d9b | 688 | #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05 |
2b64d153 BG |
689 | #define OVERLAP 0xFF |
690 | ||
691 | static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = { | |
692 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, | |
693 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, | |
694 | { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, | |
695 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, | |
696 | { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP }, | |
697 | }; | |
698 | ||
5e3d3d9b JH |
699 | static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = { |
700 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, | |
701 | { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, | |
702 | { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY }, | |
703 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, | |
704 | { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, | |
705 | }; | |
706 | ||
581370cc JH |
707 | static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) |
708 | { | |
2bcd4003 JH |
709 | /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets |
710 | * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators. | |
711 | */ | |
581370cc JH |
712 | if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY || |
713 | remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) | |
2bcd4003 | 714 | return JUST_CFM; |
581370cc | 715 | |
5e3d3d9b JH |
716 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) |
717 | return sc_method[remote_io][local_io]; | |
718 | ||
581370cc JH |
719 | return gen_method[remote_io][local_io]; |
720 | } | |
721 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
722 | static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, |
723 | u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) | |
724 | { | |
725 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
726 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
727 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
2b64d153 BG |
728 | u32 passkey = 0; |
729 | int ret = 0; | |
730 | ||
731 | /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */ | |
732 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); | |
4a74d658 | 733 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
734 | |
735 | BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io); | |
736 | ||
2bcd4003 JH |
737 | /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming |
738 | * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM | |
739 | * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this | |
740 | * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the | |
741 | * table. | |
742 | */ | |
581370cc | 743 | if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM)) |
783e0574 | 744 | smp->method = JUST_CFM; |
2b64d153 | 745 | else |
783e0574 | 746 | smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); |
2b64d153 | 747 | |
a82505c7 | 748 | /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ |
783e0574 JH |
749 | if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, |
750 | &smp->flags)) | |
751 | smp->method = JUST_WORKS; | |
a82505c7 | 752 | |
02f3e254 | 753 | /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */ |
783e0574 JH |
754 | if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && |
755 | hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) | |
756 | smp->method = JUST_WORKS; | |
02f3e254 | 757 | |
2b64d153 | 758 | /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */ |
783e0574 | 759 | if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) { |
4a74d658 | 760 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
761 | return 0; |
762 | } | |
763 | ||
764 | /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */ | |
783e0574 | 765 | if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) { |
4a74d658 | 766 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags); |
5eb596f5 JH |
767 | if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
768 | hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
769 | } | |
2b64d153 BG |
770 | |
771 | /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master | |
772 | * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey. | |
773 | */ | |
783e0574 | 774 | if (smp->method == OVERLAP) { |
40bef302 | 775 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
783e0574 | 776 | smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY; |
2b64d153 | 777 | else |
783e0574 | 778 | smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY; |
2b64d153 BG |
779 | } |
780 | ||
01ad34d2 | 781 | /* Generate random passkey. */ |
783e0574 | 782 | if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) { |
943a732a | 783 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
2b64d153 BG |
784 | get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey)); |
785 | passkey %= 1000000; | |
943a732a | 786 | put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk); |
2b64d153 | 787 | BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey); |
4a74d658 | 788 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
789 | } |
790 | ||
783e0574 | 791 | if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) |
ce39fb4e | 792 | ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
272d90df | 793 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type); |
783e0574 | 794 | else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM) |
4eb65e66 JH |
795 | ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
796 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, | |
797 | passkey, 1); | |
2b64d153 | 798 | else |
01ad34d2 | 799 | ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
272d90df | 800 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, |
39adbffe | 801 | passkey, 0); |
2b64d153 | 802 | |
2b64d153 BG |
803 | return ret; |
804 | } | |
805 | ||
1cc61144 | 806 | static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) |
8aab4757 | 807 | { |
8aab4757 | 808 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
8aab4757 VCG |
809 | struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; |
810 | int ret; | |
8aab4757 VCG |
811 | |
812 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
813 | ||
e491eaf3 | 814 | ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, |
b1cd5fd9 | 815 | conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr, |
943a732a JH |
816 | conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr, |
817 | cp.confirm_val); | |
1cc61144 JH |
818 | if (ret) |
819 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
8aab4757 | 820 | |
4a74d658 | 821 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 | 822 | |
8aab4757 VCG |
823 | smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
824 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
825 | if (conn->hcon->out) |
826 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
827 | else | |
828 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
829 | ||
1cc61144 | 830 | return 0; |
8aab4757 VCG |
831 | } |
832 | ||
861580a9 | 833 | static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) |
8aab4757 | 834 | { |
8aab4757 VCG |
835 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
836 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
861580a9 | 837 | u8 confirm[16]; |
8aab4757 VCG |
838 | int ret; |
839 | ||
ec70f36f | 840 | if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes)) |
861580a9 | 841 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
8aab4757 VCG |
842 | |
843 | BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); | |
844 | ||
e491eaf3 | 845 | ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, |
b1cd5fd9 | 846 | hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, |
943a732a | 847 | hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm); |
861580a9 JH |
848 | if (ret) |
849 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
8aab4757 | 850 | |
8aab4757 VCG |
851 | if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) { |
852 | BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)"); | |
861580a9 | 853 | return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; |
8aab4757 VCG |
854 | } |
855 | ||
856 | if (hcon->out) { | |
fe39c7b2 MH |
857 | u8 stk[16]; |
858 | __le64 rand = 0; | |
859 | __le16 ediv = 0; | |
8aab4757 | 860 | |
e491eaf3 | 861 | smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk); |
8aab4757 | 862 | |
f7aa611a | 863 | memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, |
04124681 | 864 | SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size); |
8aab4757 | 865 | |
861580a9 JH |
866 | if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) |
867 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
8aab4757 VCG |
868 | |
869 | hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk); | |
f7aa611a | 870 | hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; |
fe59a05f | 871 | set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); |
8aab4757 | 872 | } else { |
fff3490f | 873 | u8 stk[16], auth; |
fe39c7b2 MH |
874 | __le64 rand = 0; |
875 | __le16 ediv = 0; | |
8aab4757 | 876 | |
943a732a JH |
877 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), |
878 | smp->prnd); | |
8aab4757 | 879 | |
e491eaf3 | 880 | smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk); |
8aab4757 | 881 | |
f7aa611a | 882 | memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, |
f1560463 | 883 | SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size); |
8aab4757 | 884 | |
fff3490f JH |
885 | if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
886 | auth = 1; | |
887 | else | |
888 | auth = 0; | |
889 | ||
7d5843b7 JH |
890 | /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the |
891 | * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master | |
892 | * STK never needs to be stored). | |
893 | */ | |
ce39fb4e | 894 | hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, |
2ceba539 | 895 | SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); |
8aab4757 VCG |
896 | } |
897 | ||
861580a9 | 898 | return 0; |
8aab4757 VCG |
899 | } |
900 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
901 | static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
902 | { | |
903 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
904 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
905 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
906 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
907 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
908 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; | |
909 | bool persistent; | |
910 | ||
911 | if (smp->remote_irk) { | |
912 | mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk); | |
913 | /* Now that user space can be considered to know the | |
914 | * identity address track the connection based on it | |
915 | * from now on. | |
916 | */ | |
917 | bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr); | |
918 | hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type; | |
f3d82d0c | 919 | queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work); |
44f1a7ab JH |
920 | |
921 | /* When receiving an indentity resolving key for | |
922 | * a remote device that does not use a resolvable | |
923 | * private address, just remove the key so that | |
924 | * it is possible to use the controller white | |
925 | * list for scanning. | |
926 | * | |
927 | * Userspace will have been told to not store | |
928 | * this key at this point. So it is safe to | |
929 | * just remove it. | |
930 | */ | |
931 | if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) { | |
adae20cb JH |
932 | list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); |
933 | kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); | |
44f1a7ab JH |
934 | smp->remote_irk = NULL; |
935 | } | |
936 | } | |
937 | ||
938 | /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides | |
939 | * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests. | |
940 | */ | |
941 | persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING); | |
942 | ||
943 | if (smp->csrk) { | |
944 | smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
945 | bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
946 | mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); | |
947 | } | |
948 | ||
949 | if (smp->slave_csrk) { | |
950 | smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
951 | bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
952 | mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent); | |
953 | } | |
954 | ||
955 | if (smp->ltk) { | |
956 | smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
957 | bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
958 | mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); | |
959 | } | |
960 | ||
961 | if (smp->slave_ltk) { | |
962 | smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
963 | bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
964 | mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent); | |
965 | } | |
6a77083a JH |
966 | |
967 | if (smp->link_key) { | |
e3befab9 JH |
968 | struct link_key *key; |
969 | u8 type; | |
970 | ||
971 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags)) | |
972 | type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION; | |
973 | else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) | |
974 | type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256; | |
975 | else | |
976 | type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256; | |
977 | ||
978 | key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst, | |
979 | smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent); | |
980 | if (key) { | |
981 | mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent); | |
982 | ||
983 | /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant | |
984 | * flag is not set. | |
985 | */ | |
986 | if (!test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags) && | |
987 | key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) { | |
988 | list_del_rcu(&key->list); | |
989 | kfree_rcu(key, rcu); | |
990 | } | |
991 | } | |
6a77083a JH |
992 | } |
993 | } | |
994 | ||
995 | static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp) | |
996 | { | |
997 | /* These constants are as specified in the core specification. | |
998 | * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp1' and 'lebr'. | |
999 | */ | |
1000 | const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; | |
1001 | const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c }; | |
1002 | ||
1003 | smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1004 | if (!smp->link_key) | |
1005 | return; | |
1006 | ||
1007 | if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) { | |
1008 | kfree(smp->link_key); | |
1009 | smp->link_key = NULL; | |
1010 | return; | |
1011 | } | |
1012 | ||
1013 | if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) { | |
1014 | kfree(smp->link_key); | |
1015 | smp->link_key = NULL; | |
1016 | return; | |
1017 | } | |
44f1a7ab JH |
1018 | } |
1019 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
1020 | static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp) |
1021 | { | |
1022 | /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs | |
1023 | * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive | |
1024 | * them in the correct order. | |
1025 | */ | |
1026 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) | |
1027 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO); | |
1028 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) | |
1029 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); | |
1030 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) | |
1031 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
1032 | } | |
1033 | ||
d6268e86 | 1034 | static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) |
44f1a7ab JH |
1035 | { |
1036 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; | |
86d1407c | 1037 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
44f1a7ab JH |
1038 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
1039 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
1040 | __u8 *keydist; | |
1041 | ||
1042 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1043 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
1044 | rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; |
1045 | ||
1046 | /* The responder sends its keys first */ | |
b28b4943 JH |
1047 | if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) { |
1048 | smp_allow_key_dist(smp); | |
86d1407c | 1049 | return; |
b28b4943 | 1050 | } |
44f1a7ab JH |
1051 | |
1052 | req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
1053 | ||
1054 | if (hcon->out) { | |
1055 | keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; | |
1056 | *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; | |
1057 | } else { | |
1058 | keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; | |
1059 | *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; | |
1060 | } | |
1061 | ||
6a77083a JH |
1062 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
1063 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY) | |
1064 | sc_generate_link_key(smp); | |
1065 | ||
1066 | /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */ | |
1067 | *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; | |
1068 | } | |
1069 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
1070 | BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist); |
1071 | ||
1072 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { | |
1073 | struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; | |
1074 | struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; | |
1075 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; | |
1076 | u8 authenticated; | |
1077 | __le16 ediv; | |
1078 | __le64 rand; | |
1079 | ||
1080 | get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk)); | |
1081 | get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); | |
1082 | get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand)); | |
1083 | ||
1084 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); | |
1085 | ||
1086 | authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
1087 | ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, | |
1088 | SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk, | |
1089 | smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); | |
1090 | smp->slave_ltk = ltk; | |
1091 | ||
1092 | ident.ediv = ediv; | |
1093 | ident.rand = rand; | |
1094 | ||
1095 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); | |
1096 | ||
1097 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; | |
1098 | } | |
1099 | ||
1100 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { | |
1101 | struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; | |
1102 | struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; | |
1103 | ||
1104 | memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); | |
1105 | ||
1106 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); | |
1107 | ||
1108 | /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address | |
1109 | * after the connection has been established. | |
1110 | * | |
1111 | * This is true even when the connection has been | |
1112 | * established using a resolvable random address. | |
1113 | */ | |
1114 | bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src); | |
1115 | addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type; | |
1116 | ||
1117 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), | |
1118 | &addrinfo); | |
1119 | ||
1120 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
1121 | } | |
1122 | ||
1123 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { | |
1124 | struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; | |
1125 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; | |
1126 | ||
1127 | /* Generate a new random key */ | |
1128 | get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); | |
1129 | ||
1130 | csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1131 | if (csrk) { | |
1132 | csrk->master = 0x00; | |
1133 | memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); | |
1134 | } | |
1135 | smp->slave_csrk = csrk; | |
1136 | ||
1137 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); | |
1138 | ||
1139 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
1140 | } | |
1141 | ||
1142 | /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */ | |
b28b4943 JH |
1143 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) { |
1144 | smp_allow_key_dist(smp); | |
86d1407c | 1145 | return; |
b28b4943 | 1146 | } |
44f1a7ab | 1147 | |
44f1a7ab JH |
1148 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); |
1149 | smp_notify_keys(conn); | |
1150 | ||
1151 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); | |
44f1a7ab JH |
1152 | } |
1153 | ||
b68fda68 JH |
1154 | static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work) |
1155 | { | |
1156 | struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, | |
1157 | security_timer.work); | |
1158 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
1159 | ||
1160 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1161 | ||
1e91c29e | 1162 | hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM); |
b68fda68 JH |
1163 | } |
1164 | ||
8aab4757 VCG |
1165 | static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
1166 | { | |
5d88cc73 | 1167 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
8aab4757 VCG |
1168 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
1169 | ||
f1560463 | 1170 | smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC); |
fc75cc86 | 1171 | if (!smp) |
8aab4757 VCG |
1172 | return NULL; |
1173 | ||
6a7bd103 JH |
1174 | smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); |
1175 | if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) { | |
1176 | BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context"); | |
1177 | kfree(smp); | |
1178 | return NULL; | |
1179 | } | |
1180 | ||
407cecf6 JH |
1181 | smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_hash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); |
1182 | if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) { | |
1183 | BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); | |
1184 | crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes); | |
1185 | kfree(smp); | |
1186 | return NULL; | |
1187 | } | |
1188 | ||
8aab4757 | 1189 | smp->conn = conn; |
5d88cc73 | 1190 | chan->data = smp; |
8aab4757 | 1191 | |
b28b4943 JH |
1192 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL); |
1193 | ||
b68fda68 JH |
1194 | INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout); |
1195 | ||
8aab4757 VCG |
1196 | hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon); |
1197 | ||
1198 | return smp; | |
1199 | } | |
1200 | ||
760b018b JH |
1201 | static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16]) |
1202 | { | |
1203 | struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; | |
1204 | u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7]; | |
1205 | ||
1206 | if (hcon->out) { | |
1207 | na = smp->prnd; | |
1208 | nb = smp->rrnd; | |
1209 | } else { | |
1210 | na = smp->rrnd; | |
1211 | nb = smp->prnd; | |
1212 | } | |
1213 | ||
1214 | memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); | |
1215 | memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); | |
1216 | a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; | |
1217 | b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; | |
1218 | ||
1219 | return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk); | |
1220 | } | |
1221 | ||
dddd3059 | 1222 | static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp, __le32 passkey) |
760b018b JH |
1223 | { |
1224 | struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; | |
1225 | struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check; | |
1226 | u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr; | |
1227 | u8 io_cap[3], r[16]; | |
1228 | ||
760b018b JH |
1229 | memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); |
1230 | memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); | |
1231 | a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; | |
1232 | b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; | |
1233 | ||
1234 | if (hcon->out) { | |
1235 | local_addr = a; | |
1236 | remote_addr = b; | |
1237 | memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3); | |
1238 | } else { | |
1239 | local_addr = b; | |
1240 | remote_addr = a; | |
1241 | memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3); | |
1242 | } | |
1243 | ||
dddd3059 JH |
1244 | memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); |
1245 | ||
1246 | if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) | |
1247 | memcpy(r, &passkey, sizeof(passkey)); | |
760b018b JH |
1248 | |
1249 | smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap, | |
1250 | local_addr, remote_addr, check.e); | |
1251 | ||
1252 | smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check); | |
dddd3059 JH |
1253 | } |
1254 | ||
1255 | static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) | |
1256 | { | |
1257 | switch (mgmt_op) { | |
1258 | case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: | |
1259 | smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); | |
1260 | return 0; | |
1261 | case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: | |
1262 | smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED); | |
1263 | return 0; | |
1264 | } | |
1265 | ||
1266 | sc_dhkey_check(smp, passkey); | |
760b018b JH |
1267 | |
1268 | return 0; | |
1269 | } | |
1270 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
1271 | int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) |
1272 | { | |
b10e8017 | 1273 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; |
5d88cc73 | 1274 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
2b64d153 BG |
1275 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
1276 | u32 value; | |
fc75cc86 | 1277 | int err; |
2b64d153 BG |
1278 | |
1279 | BT_DBG(""); | |
1280 | ||
fc75cc86 | 1281 | if (!conn) |
2b64d153 BG |
1282 | return -ENOTCONN; |
1283 | ||
5d88cc73 JH |
1284 | chan = conn->smp; |
1285 | if (!chan) | |
1286 | return -ENOTCONN; | |
1287 | ||
fc75cc86 JH |
1288 | l2cap_chan_lock(chan); |
1289 | if (!chan->data) { | |
1290 | err = -ENOTCONN; | |
1291 | goto unlock; | |
1292 | } | |
1293 | ||
5d88cc73 | 1294 | smp = chan->data; |
2b64d153 | 1295 | |
760b018b JH |
1296 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
1297 | err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey); | |
1298 | goto unlock; | |
1299 | } | |
1300 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
1301 | switch (mgmt_op) { |
1302 | case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: | |
1303 | value = le32_to_cpu(passkey); | |
943a732a | 1304 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
2b64d153 | 1305 | BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value); |
943a732a | 1306 | put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk); |
2b64d153 BG |
1307 | /* Fall Through */ |
1308 | case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY: | |
4a74d658 | 1309 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
1310 | break; |
1311 | case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: | |
1312 | case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: | |
84794e11 | 1313 | smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); |
fc75cc86 JH |
1314 | err = 0; |
1315 | goto unlock; | |
2b64d153 | 1316 | default: |
84794e11 | 1317 | smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); |
fc75cc86 JH |
1318 | err = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
1319 | goto unlock; | |
2b64d153 BG |
1320 | } |
1321 | ||
fc75cc86 JH |
1322 | err = 0; |
1323 | ||
2b64d153 | 1324 | /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */ |
1cc61144 JH |
1325 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) { |
1326 | u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp); | |
1327 | if (rsp) | |
1328 | smp_failure(conn, rsp); | |
1329 | } | |
2b64d153 | 1330 | |
fc75cc86 JH |
1331 | unlock: |
1332 | l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); | |
1333 | return err; | |
2b64d153 BG |
1334 | } |
1335 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1336 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 1337 | { |
3158c50c | 1338 | struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data; |
fc75cc86 | 1339 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
b3c6410b | 1340 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
8aab4757 | 1341 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
c7262e71 | 1342 | u8 key_size, auth, sec_level; |
8aab4757 | 1343 | int ret; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1344 | |
1345 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1346 | ||
c46b98be | 1347 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*req)) |
38e4a915 | 1348 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1349 | |
40bef302 | 1350 | if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
2b64d153 BG |
1351 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
1352 | ||
fc75cc86 | 1353 | if (!chan->data) |
8aab4757 | 1354 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
fc75cc86 | 1355 | else |
5d88cc73 | 1356 | smp = chan->data; |
8aab4757 | 1357 | |
d08fd0e7 AE |
1358 | if (!smp) |
1359 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
d26a2345 | 1360 | |
c05b9339 | 1361 | /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */ |
0edb14de | 1362 | auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
c05b9339 | 1363 | |
b6ae8457 | 1364 | if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) && |
c05b9339 | 1365 | (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) |
b3c6410b JH |
1366 | return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
1367 | ||
1c1def09 VCG |
1368 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
1369 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req)); | |
3158c50c | 1370 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req)); |
88ba43b6 | 1371 | |
5e3d3d9b JH |
1372 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth); |
1373 | ||
1374 | if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) | |
1375 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); | |
1376 | ||
5be5e275 | 1377 | if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) |
1afc2a1a JH |
1378 | sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
1379 | else | |
1380 | sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); | |
1381 | ||
c7262e71 JH |
1382 | if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level) |
1383 | conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
fdde0a26 | 1384 | |
49c922bb | 1385 | /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ |
2ed8f65c JH |
1386 | if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { |
1387 | u8 method; | |
1388 | ||
1389 | method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability, | |
1390 | req->io_capability); | |
1391 | if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) | |
1392 | return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; | |
1393 | } | |
1394 | ||
3158c50c VCG |
1395 | key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size); |
1396 | if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) | |
1397 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
88ba43b6 | 1398 | |
e84a6b13 | 1399 | get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); |
8aab4757 | 1400 | |
1c1def09 VCG |
1401 | smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; |
1402 | memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); | |
f01ead31 | 1403 | |
3158c50c | 1404 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp); |
3b19146d JH |
1405 | |
1406 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); | |
1407 | ||
1408 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { | |
1409 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1410 | /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ | |
1411 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; | |
1412 | /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */ | |
1413 | return 0; | |
1414 | } else { | |
1415 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
1416 | } | |
da85e5e5 | 1417 | |
2b64d153 BG |
1418 | /* Request setup of TK */ |
1419 | ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability); | |
1420 | if (ret) | |
1421 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1422 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1423 | return 0; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1424 | } |
1425 | ||
3b19146d JH |
1426 | static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp) |
1427 | { | |
1428 | BT_DBG(""); | |
1429 | ||
6c0dcc50 JH |
1430 | while (true) { |
1431 | /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */ | |
1432 | if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk)) | |
1433 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1434 | ||
1435 | /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that we didn't | |
1436 | * accidentially generate a debug key. | |
1437 | */ | |
1438 | if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32)) | |
1439 | break; | |
1440 | } | |
3b19146d JH |
1441 | |
1442 | BT_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk); | |
1443 | BT_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->local_pk[32]); | |
1444 | BT_DBG("Local Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk); | |
1445 | ||
1446 | smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk); | |
1447 | ||
1448 | return 0; | |
1449 | } | |
1450 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1451 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 1452 | { |
3158c50c | 1453 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data; |
5d88cc73 JH |
1454 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1455 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
0edb14de | 1456 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
3a7dbfb8 | 1457 | u8 key_size, auth; |
7d24ddcc | 1458 | int ret; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1459 | |
1460 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1461 | ||
c46b98be | 1462 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp)) |
38e4a915 | 1463 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1464 | |
40bef302 | 1465 | if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
2b64d153 BG |
1466 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
1467 | ||
3158c50c VCG |
1468 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp)); |
1469 | ||
1c1def09 | 1470 | req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; |
da85e5e5 | 1471 | |
3158c50c VCG |
1472 | key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size); |
1473 | if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) | |
1474 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
1475 | ||
0edb14de | 1476 | auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
c05b9339 | 1477 | |
65668776 JH |
1478 | if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) |
1479 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); | |
d2eb9e10 JH |
1480 | else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
1481 | conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
65668776 | 1482 | |
49c922bb | 1483 | /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ |
2ed8f65c JH |
1484 | if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { |
1485 | u8 method; | |
1486 | ||
1487 | method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability, | |
1488 | rsp->io_capability); | |
1489 | if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) | |
1490 | return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; | |
1491 | } | |
1492 | ||
e84a6b13 | 1493 | get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); |
7d24ddcc | 1494 | |
8aab4757 VCG |
1495 | smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; |
1496 | memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp)); | |
7d24ddcc | 1497 | |
fdcc4bec JH |
1498 | /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared |
1499 | * some bits that we had enabled in our request. | |
1500 | */ | |
1501 | smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; | |
1502 | ||
3b19146d JH |
1503 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
1504 | /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ | |
1505 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; | |
1506 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1507 | return sc_send_public_key(smp); | |
1508 | } | |
1509 | ||
c05b9339 | 1510 | auth |= req->auth_req; |
2b64d153 | 1511 | |
476585ec | 1512 | ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability); |
2b64d153 BG |
1513 | if (ret) |
1514 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1515 | ||
4a74d658 | 1516 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
1517 | |
1518 | /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */ | |
4a74d658 | 1519 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) |
1cc61144 | 1520 | return smp_confirm(smp); |
da85e5e5 VCG |
1521 | |
1522 | return 0; | |
88ba43b6 AB |
1523 | } |
1524 | ||
dcee2b32 JH |
1525 | static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) |
1526 | { | |
1527 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
1528 | ||
1529 | BT_DBG(""); | |
1530 | ||
1531 | /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */ | |
1532 | if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags)) | |
1533 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1534 | ||
1535 | if (conn->hcon->out) { | |
1536 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), | |
1537 | smp->prnd); | |
1538 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
1539 | } | |
1540 | ||
1541 | return 0; | |
1542 | } | |
1543 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1544 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 1545 | { |
5d88cc73 JH |
1546 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1547 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
7d24ddcc | 1548 | |
88ba43b6 AB |
1549 | BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); |
1550 | ||
c46b98be | 1551 | if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf)) |
38e4a915 | 1552 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1553 | |
1c1def09 VCG |
1554 | memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); |
1555 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); | |
88ba43b6 | 1556 | |
dcee2b32 JH |
1557 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) |
1558 | return sc_check_confirm(smp); | |
1559 | ||
b28b4943 | 1560 | if (conn->hcon->out) { |
943a732a JH |
1561 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), |
1562 | smp->prnd); | |
b28b4943 JH |
1563 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); |
1564 | return 0; | |
1565 | } | |
1566 | ||
1567 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) | |
1cc61144 | 1568 | return smp_confirm(smp); |
943a732a | 1569 | else |
4a74d658 | 1570 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
da85e5e5 VCG |
1571 | |
1572 | return 0; | |
88ba43b6 AB |
1573 | } |
1574 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1575 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 1576 | { |
5d88cc73 JH |
1577 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1578 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
191dc7fe JH |
1579 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
1580 | u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb; | |
1581 | u32 passkey; | |
1582 | int err; | |
7d24ddcc | 1583 | |
8aab4757 | 1584 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); |
3158c50c | 1585 | |
c46b98be | 1586 | if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd)) |
38e4a915 | 1587 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1588 | |
943a732a | 1589 | memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); |
8aab4757 | 1590 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); |
e7e62c85 | 1591 | |
191dc7fe JH |
1592 | if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) |
1593 | return smp_random(smp); | |
1594 | ||
1595 | if (hcon->out) { | |
1596 | u8 cfm[16]; | |
1597 | ||
1598 | err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk, | |
1599 | smp->rrnd, 0, cfm); | |
1600 | if (err) | |
1601 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1602 | ||
1603 | if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16)) | |
1604 | return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; | |
1605 | ||
1606 | pkax = smp->local_pk; | |
1607 | pkbx = smp->remote_pk; | |
1608 | na = smp->prnd; | |
1609 | nb = smp->rrnd; | |
1610 | } else { | |
1611 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), | |
1612 | smp->prnd); | |
1613 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); | |
1614 | ||
1615 | pkax = smp->remote_pk; | |
1616 | pkbx = smp->local_pk; | |
1617 | na = smp->rrnd; | |
1618 | nb = smp->prnd; | |
1619 | } | |
1620 | ||
760b018b JH |
1621 | /* Generate MacKey and LTK */ |
1622 | err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk); | |
1623 | if (err) | |
1624 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1625 | ||
191dc7fe JH |
1626 | err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey); |
1627 | if (err) | |
1628 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1629 | ||
dddd3059 JH |
1630 | if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) { |
1631 | if (hcon->out) { | |
1632 | sc_dhkey_check(smp, passkey); | |
1633 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); | |
1634 | } | |
1635 | return 0; | |
1636 | } | |
1637 | ||
191dc7fe JH |
1638 | err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
1639 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, | |
1640 | passkey, 0); | |
1641 | if (err) | |
1642 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1643 | ||
1644 | return 0; | |
88ba43b6 AB |
1645 | } |
1646 | ||
f81cd823 | 1647 | static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) |
988c5997 | 1648 | { |
c9839a11 | 1649 | struct smp_ltk *key; |
988c5997 VCG |
1650 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
1651 | ||
f3a73d97 | 1652 | key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role); |
988c5997 | 1653 | if (!key) |
f81cd823 | 1654 | return false; |
988c5997 | 1655 | |
a6f7833c | 1656 | if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level) |
f81cd823 | 1657 | return false; |
4dab7864 | 1658 | |
51a8efd7 | 1659 | if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) |
f81cd823 | 1660 | return true; |
988c5997 | 1661 | |
c9839a11 VCG |
1662 | hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val); |
1663 | hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size; | |
988c5997 | 1664 | |
fe59a05f JH |
1665 | /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */ |
1666 | clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); | |
1667 | ||
f81cd823 | 1668 | return true; |
988c5997 | 1669 | } |
f1560463 | 1670 | |
35dc6f83 JH |
1671 | bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level, |
1672 | enum smp_key_pref key_pref) | |
854f4727 JH |
1673 | { |
1674 | if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) | |
1675 | return true; | |
1676 | ||
35dc6f83 JH |
1677 | /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using |
1678 | * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the | |
1679 | * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK | |
1680 | * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we | |
1681 | * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits). | |
9ab65d60 | 1682 | */ |
35dc6f83 JH |
1683 | if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK && |
1684 | test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && | |
f3a73d97 | 1685 | hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role)) |
9ab65d60 JH |
1686 | return false; |
1687 | ||
854f4727 JH |
1688 | if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level) |
1689 | return true; | |
1690 | ||
1691 | return false; | |
1692 | } | |
1693 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1694 | static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 AB |
1695 | { |
1696 | struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data; | |
1697 | struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; | |
f1cb9af5 | 1698 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
0edb14de | 1699 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
8aab4757 | 1700 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
c05b9339 | 1701 | u8 sec_level, auth; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1702 | |
1703 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1704 | ||
c46b98be | 1705 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) |
38e4a915 | 1706 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1707 | |
40bef302 | 1708 | if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
86ca9eac JH |
1709 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
1710 | ||
0edb14de | 1711 | auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
c05b9339 | 1712 | |
5be5e275 | 1713 | if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) |
1afc2a1a JH |
1714 | sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
1715 | else | |
1716 | sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); | |
1717 | ||
35dc6f83 | 1718 | if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) |
854f4727 JH |
1719 | return 0; |
1720 | ||
c7262e71 JH |
1721 | if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) |
1722 | hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
feb45eb5 | 1723 | |
4dab7864 | 1724 | if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) |
988c5997 VCG |
1725 | return 0; |
1726 | ||
8aab4757 | 1727 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
c29d2444 JH |
1728 | if (!smp) |
1729 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
d26a2345 | 1730 | |
b6ae8457 | 1731 | if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) && |
c05b9339 | 1732 | (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) |
616d55be JH |
1733 | return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
1734 | ||
88ba43b6 | 1735 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
88ba43b6 | 1736 | |
da85e5e5 | 1737 | memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); |
c05b9339 | 1738 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth); |
88ba43b6 | 1739 | |
1c1def09 VCG |
1740 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
1741 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); | |
f01ead31 | 1742 | |
88ba43b6 | 1743 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
b28b4943 | 1744 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); |
f1cb9af5 | 1745 | |
da85e5e5 | 1746 | return 0; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1747 | } |
1748 | ||
cc110922 | 1749 | int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) |
eb492e01 | 1750 | { |
cc110922 | 1751 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; |
c68b7f12 | 1752 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
0a66cf20 | 1753 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
2b64d153 | 1754 | __u8 authreq; |
fc75cc86 | 1755 | int ret; |
eb492e01 | 1756 | |
3a0259bb VCG |
1757 | BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level); |
1758 | ||
0a66cf20 JH |
1759 | /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */ |
1760 | if (!conn) | |
1761 | return 1; | |
1762 | ||
c68b7f12 JH |
1763 | chan = conn->smp; |
1764 | ||
757aee0f | 1765 | if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) |
2e65c9d2 AG |
1766 | return 1; |
1767 | ||
35dc6f83 | 1768 | if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) |
eb492e01 | 1769 | return 1; |
f1cb9af5 | 1770 | |
c7262e71 JH |
1771 | if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) |
1772 | hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
1773 | ||
40bef302 | 1774 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
c7262e71 JH |
1775 | if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) |
1776 | return 0; | |
d26a2345 | 1777 | |
fc75cc86 JH |
1778 | l2cap_chan_lock(chan); |
1779 | ||
1780 | /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */ | |
1781 | if (chan->data) { | |
1782 | ret = 0; | |
1783 | goto unlock; | |
1784 | } | |
d26a2345 | 1785 | |
8aab4757 | 1786 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
fc75cc86 JH |
1787 | if (!smp) { |
1788 | ret = 1; | |
1789 | goto unlock; | |
1790 | } | |
2b64d153 BG |
1791 | |
1792 | authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level); | |
d26a2345 | 1793 | |
d2eb9e10 JH |
1794 | if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) |
1795 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC; | |
1796 | ||
79897d20 JH |
1797 | /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level |
1798 | * requires it. | |
2e233644 | 1799 | */ |
79897d20 | 1800 | if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT || |
c7262e71 | 1801 | hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) |
2e233644 JH |
1802 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; |
1803 | ||
40bef302 | 1804 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) { |
d26a2345 | 1805 | struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; |
f01ead31 | 1806 | |
2b64d153 | 1807 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq); |
1c1def09 VCG |
1808 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
1809 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); | |
f01ead31 | 1810 | |
eb492e01 | 1811 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
b28b4943 | 1812 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); |
eb492e01 AB |
1813 | } else { |
1814 | struct smp_cmd_security_req cp; | |
2b64d153 | 1815 | cp.auth_req = authreq; |
eb492e01 | 1816 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
b28b4943 | 1817 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ); |
eb492e01 AB |
1818 | } |
1819 | ||
4a74d658 | 1820 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); |
fc75cc86 | 1821 | ret = 0; |
edca792c | 1822 | |
fc75cc86 JH |
1823 | unlock: |
1824 | l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); | |
1825 | return ret; | |
eb492e01 AB |
1826 | } |
1827 | ||
7034b911 VCG |
1828 | static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
1829 | { | |
16b90839 | 1830 | struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; |
5d88cc73 JH |
1831 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1832 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
16b90839 | 1833 | |
c46b98be JH |
1834 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); |
1835 | ||
1836 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
38e4a915 | 1837 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1838 | |
b28b4943 | 1839 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT); |
6131ddc8 | 1840 | |
16b90839 VCG |
1841 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
1842 | ||
1c1def09 | 1843 | memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
16b90839 | 1844 | |
7034b911 VCG |
1845 | return 0; |
1846 | } | |
1847 | ||
1848 | static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1849 | { | |
16b90839 | 1850 | struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data; |
5d88cc73 JH |
1851 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1852 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
c9839a11 VCG |
1853 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
1854 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
23d0e128 | 1855 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; |
c9839a11 | 1856 | u8 authenticated; |
16b90839 | 1857 | |
c46b98be JH |
1858 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); |
1859 | ||
1860 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
38e4a915 | 1861 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1862 | |
9747a9f3 JH |
1863 | /* Mark the information as received */ |
1864 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; | |
1865 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
1866 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) |
1867 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); | |
196332f5 JH |
1868 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) |
1869 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
b28b4943 | 1870 | |
16b90839 | 1871 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
7034b911 | 1872 | |
ce39fb4e | 1873 | authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH); |
2ceba539 | 1874 | ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK, |
23d0e128 JH |
1875 | authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, |
1876 | rp->ediv, rp->rand); | |
1877 | smp->ltk = ltk; | |
c6e81e9a | 1878 | if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) |
d6268e86 | 1879 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
7034b911 VCG |
1880 | |
1881 | return 0; | |
1882 | } | |
1883 | ||
fd349c02 JH |
1884 | static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
1885 | { | |
1886 | struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
1887 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1888 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
fd349c02 JH |
1889 | |
1890 | BT_DBG(""); | |
1891 | ||
1892 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) | |
38e4a915 | 1893 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
fd349c02 | 1894 | |
b28b4943 | 1895 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO); |
6131ddc8 | 1896 | |
fd349c02 JH |
1897 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); |
1898 | ||
1899 | memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16); | |
1900 | ||
1901 | return 0; | |
1902 | } | |
1903 | ||
1904 | static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, | |
1905 | struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1906 | { | |
1907 | struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
1908 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1909 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
fd349c02 JH |
1910 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
1911 | bdaddr_t rpa; | |
1912 | ||
1913 | BT_DBG(""); | |
1914 | ||
1915 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) | |
38e4a915 | 1916 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
fd349c02 | 1917 | |
9747a9f3 JH |
1918 | /* Mark the information as received */ |
1919 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
1920 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
1921 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) |
1922 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
1923 | ||
fd349c02 JH |
1924 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); |
1925 | ||
a9a58f86 JH |
1926 | /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending |
1927 | * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK | |
1928 | * as "identity information". However, since such | |
1929 | * implementations are not known of and in order to not over | |
1930 | * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never | |
1931 | * received an IRK for such a device. | |
1932 | */ | |
1933 | if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY)) { | |
1934 | BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address"); | |
31dd624e | 1935 | goto distribute; |
a9a58f86 JH |
1936 | } |
1937 | ||
fd349c02 JH |
1938 | bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr); |
1939 | smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type; | |
1940 | ||
1941 | if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type)) | |
1942 | bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst); | |
1943 | else | |
1944 | bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY); | |
1945 | ||
23d0e128 JH |
1946 | smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr, |
1947 | smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa); | |
fd349c02 | 1948 | |
31dd624e | 1949 | distribute: |
c6e81e9a JH |
1950 | if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) |
1951 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); | |
fd349c02 JH |
1952 | |
1953 | return 0; | |
1954 | } | |
1955 | ||
7ee4ea36 MH |
1956 | static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
1957 | { | |
1958 | struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
1959 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1960 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
7ee4ea36 MH |
1961 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; |
1962 | ||
1963 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1964 | ||
1965 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
38e4a915 | 1966 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
7ee4ea36 | 1967 | |
7ee4ea36 MH |
1968 | /* Mark the information as received */ |
1969 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
1970 | ||
1971 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); | |
1972 | ||
7ee4ea36 MH |
1973 | csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); |
1974 | if (csrk) { | |
1975 | csrk->master = 0x01; | |
1976 | memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); | |
1977 | } | |
1978 | smp->csrk = csrk; | |
d6268e86 | 1979 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
7ee4ea36 MH |
1980 | |
1981 | return 0; | |
1982 | } | |
1983 | ||
5e3d3d9b JH |
1984 | static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp) |
1985 | { | |
1986 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
1987 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1988 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote; | |
1989 | u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method; | |
1990 | ||
1991 | /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs | |
1992 | * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get | |
1993 | * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the | |
1994 | * first byte which contains the opcode. | |
1995 | */ | |
1996 | if (hcon->out) { | |
1997 | local = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
1998 | remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; | |
1999 | } else { | |
2000 | local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; | |
2001 | remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
2002 | } | |
2003 | ||
2004 | local_io = local->io_capability; | |
2005 | remote_io = remote->io_capability; | |
2006 | ||
2007 | local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM); | |
2008 | remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM); | |
2009 | ||
2010 | /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table, | |
2011 | * otherwise use JUST WORKS. | |
2012 | */ | |
2013 | if (local_mitm || remote_mitm) | |
2014 | method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); | |
2015 | else | |
2016 | method = JUST_WORKS; | |
2017 | ||
2018 | /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ | |
2019 | if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) | |
2020 | method = JUST_WORKS; | |
2021 | ||
2022 | return method; | |
2023 | } | |
2024 | ||
d8f8edbe JH |
2025 | static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
2026 | { | |
2027 | struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data; | |
2028 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
2029 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
2030 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
5e3d3d9b | 2031 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
cbbbe3e2 | 2032 | struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm; |
d8f8edbe JH |
2033 | int err; |
2034 | ||
2035 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
2036 | ||
2037 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*key)) | |
2038 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
2039 | ||
2040 | memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64); | |
2041 | ||
2042 | /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving | |
2043 | * the key from the initiating device. | |
2044 | */ | |
2045 | if (!hcon->out) { | |
2046 | err = sc_send_public_key(smp); | |
2047 | if (err) | |
2048 | return err; | |
2049 | } | |
2050 | ||
2051 | BT_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk); | |
2052 | BT_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->remote_pk[32]); | |
2053 | ||
2054 | if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey)) | |
2055 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2056 | ||
2057 | BT_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey); | |
2058 | ||
2059 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags); | |
2060 | ||
5e3d3d9b JH |
2061 | smp->method = sc_select_method(smp); |
2062 | ||
2063 | BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method); | |
2064 | ||
2065 | /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */ | |
2066 | if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM) | |
2067 | hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; | |
2068 | else | |
2069 | hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS; | |
2070 | ||
aeb7d461 JH |
2071 | if (!memcmp(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64)) |
2072 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); | |
2073 | ||
cbbbe3e2 JH |
2074 | /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to |
2075 | * send the confirm value. | |
2076 | */ | |
2077 | if (conn->hcon->out) | |
2078 | return 0; | |
2079 | ||
2080 | err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, | |
2081 | 0, cfm.confirm_val); | |
2082 | if (err) | |
2083 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2084 | ||
2085 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm); | |
2086 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
2087 | ||
d8f8edbe JH |
2088 | return 0; |
2089 | } | |
2090 | ||
6433a9a2 JH |
2091 | static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
2092 | { | |
2093 | struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data; | |
2094 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
2095 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
2096 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
2097 | u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr; | |
2098 | u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16]; | |
d378a2d7 | 2099 | u8 key_type, auth; |
6433a9a2 JH |
2100 | int err; |
2101 | ||
2102 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
2103 | ||
2104 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*check)) | |
2105 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
2106 | ||
2107 | memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); | |
2108 | memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); | |
2109 | a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; | |
2110 | b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; | |
2111 | ||
2112 | if (hcon->out) { | |
2113 | local_addr = a; | |
2114 | remote_addr = b; | |
2115 | memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3); | |
2116 | } else { | |
2117 | local_addr = b; | |
2118 | remote_addr = a; | |
2119 | memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3); | |
2120 | } | |
2121 | ||
2122 | memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); | |
2123 | ||
2124 | err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r, | |
2125 | io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e); | |
2126 | if (err) | |
2127 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2128 | ||
2129 | if (memcmp(check->e, e, 16)) | |
2130 | return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED; | |
2131 | ||
d378a2d7 JH |
2132 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags)) |
2133 | key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG; | |
2134 | else | |
2135 | key_type = SMP_LTK_P256; | |
2136 | ||
2137 | if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) | |
2138 | auth = 1; | |
2139 | else | |
2140 | auth = 0; | |
2141 | ||
6433a9a2 | 2142 | smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, |
d378a2d7 | 2143 | key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, |
6433a9a2 JH |
2144 | 0, 0); |
2145 | ||
2146 | if (hcon->out) { | |
2147 | hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk); | |
2148 | hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; | |
2149 | } | |
2150 | ||
2151 | return 0; | |
2152 | } | |
2153 | ||
4befb867 | 2154 | static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) |
eb492e01 | 2155 | { |
5d88cc73 | 2156 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; |
7b9899db | 2157 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
b28b4943 | 2158 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
92381f5c | 2159 | __u8 code, reason; |
eb492e01 AB |
2160 | int err = 0; |
2161 | ||
7b9899db MH |
2162 | if (hcon->type != LE_LINK) { |
2163 | kfree_skb(skb); | |
3432711f | 2164 | return 0; |
7b9899db MH |
2165 | } |
2166 | ||
8ae9b984 | 2167 | if (skb->len < 1) |
92381f5c | 2168 | return -EILSEQ; |
92381f5c | 2169 | |
06ae3314 | 2170 | if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) { |
2e65c9d2 AG |
2171 | reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
2172 | goto done; | |
2173 | } | |
2174 | ||
92381f5c | 2175 | code = skb->data[0]; |
eb492e01 AB |
2176 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code)); |
2177 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
2178 | smp = chan->data; |
2179 | ||
2180 | if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX) | |
2181 | goto drop; | |
2182 | ||
24bd0bd9 | 2183 | if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)) |
b28b4943 JH |
2184 | goto drop; |
2185 | ||
2186 | /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are | |
2187 | * pairing request and security request. | |
8cf9fa12 | 2188 | */ |
b28b4943 JH |
2189 | if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ) |
2190 | goto drop; | |
8cf9fa12 | 2191 | |
eb492e01 AB |
2192 | switch (code) { |
2193 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ: | |
da85e5e5 | 2194 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb); |
eb492e01 AB |
2195 | break; |
2196 | ||
2197 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL: | |
84794e11 | 2198 | smp_failure(conn, 0); |
da85e5e5 | 2199 | err = -EPERM; |
eb492e01 AB |
2200 | break; |
2201 | ||
2202 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP: | |
da85e5e5 | 2203 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
2204 | break; |
2205 | ||
2206 | case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ: | |
da85e5e5 | 2207 | reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
2208 | break; |
2209 | ||
eb492e01 | 2210 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: |
da85e5e5 | 2211 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
2212 | break; |
2213 | ||
eb492e01 | 2214 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: |
da85e5e5 | 2215 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
2216 | break; |
2217 | ||
eb492e01 | 2218 | case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: |
7034b911 VCG |
2219 | reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); |
2220 | break; | |
2221 | ||
eb492e01 | 2222 | case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: |
7034b911 VCG |
2223 | reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb); |
2224 | break; | |
2225 | ||
eb492e01 | 2226 | case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: |
fd349c02 JH |
2227 | reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb); |
2228 | break; | |
2229 | ||
eb492e01 | 2230 | case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: |
fd349c02 JH |
2231 | reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb); |
2232 | break; | |
2233 | ||
eb492e01 | 2234 | case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: |
7ee4ea36 | 2235 | reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb); |
7034b911 VCG |
2236 | break; |
2237 | ||
d8f8edbe JH |
2238 | case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY: |
2239 | reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb); | |
2240 | break; | |
2241 | ||
6433a9a2 JH |
2242 | case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK: |
2243 | reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb); | |
2244 | break; | |
2245 | ||
eb492e01 AB |
2246 | default: |
2247 | BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); | |
eb492e01 | 2248 | reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
3a0259bb | 2249 | goto done; |
eb492e01 AB |
2250 | } |
2251 | ||
3a0259bb | 2252 | done: |
9b7b18ef JH |
2253 | if (!err) { |
2254 | if (reason) | |
2255 | smp_failure(conn, reason); | |
8ae9b984 | 2256 | kfree_skb(skb); |
9b7b18ef JH |
2257 | } |
2258 | ||
eb492e01 | 2259 | return err; |
b28b4943 JH |
2260 | |
2261 | drop: | |
2262 | BT_ERR("%s unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", hcon->hdev->name, | |
2263 | code, &hcon->dst); | |
2264 | kfree_skb(skb); | |
2265 | return 0; | |
eb492e01 | 2266 | } |
7034b911 | 2267 | |
70db83c4 JH |
2268 | static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) |
2269 | { | |
2270 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; | |
2271 | ||
2272 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
2273 | ||
fc75cc86 | 2274 | if (chan->data) |
5d88cc73 | 2275 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); |
5d88cc73 | 2276 | |
70db83c4 JH |
2277 | conn->smp = NULL; |
2278 | l2cap_chan_put(chan); | |
2279 | } | |
2280 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
2281 | static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
2282 | { | |
b68fda68 | 2283 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
44f1a7ab JH |
2284 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; |
2285 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
2286 | ||
2287 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
2288 | ||
86d1407c JH |
2289 | if (!smp) |
2290 | return; | |
b68fda68 | 2291 | |
84bc0db5 JH |
2292 | if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) |
2293 | return; | |
2294 | ||
86d1407c JH |
2295 | cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer); |
2296 | ||
d6268e86 | 2297 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
44f1a7ab JH |
2298 | } |
2299 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
2300 | static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
2301 | { | |
2302 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; | |
2303 | ||
2304 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
2305 | ||
2306 | conn->smp = chan; | |
2307 | l2cap_chan_hold(chan); | |
2308 | } | |
2309 | ||
4befb867 JH |
2310 | static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) |
2311 | { | |
2312 | int err; | |
2313 | ||
2314 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
2315 | ||
2316 | err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb); | |
2317 | if (err) { | |
b68fda68 | 2318 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
4befb867 | 2319 | |
b68fda68 JH |
2320 | if (smp) |
2321 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
4befb867 | 2322 | |
1e91c29e | 2323 | hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); |
4befb867 JH |
2324 | } |
2325 | ||
2326 | return err; | |
2327 | } | |
2328 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
2329 | static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, |
2330 | unsigned long hdr_len, | |
2331 | unsigned long len, int nb) | |
2332 | { | |
2333 | struct sk_buff *skb; | |
2334 | ||
2335 | skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
2336 | if (!skb) | |
2337 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | |
2338 | ||
2339 | skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX; | |
2340 | bt_cb(skb)->chan = chan; | |
2341 | ||
2342 | return skb; | |
2343 | } | |
2344 | ||
2345 | static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = { | |
2346 | .name = "Security Manager", | |
2347 | .ready = smp_ready_cb, | |
5d88cc73 | 2348 | .recv = smp_recv_cb, |
70db83c4 JH |
2349 | .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb, |
2350 | .teardown = smp_teardown_cb, | |
44f1a7ab | 2351 | .resume = smp_resume_cb, |
70db83c4 JH |
2352 | |
2353 | .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection, | |
70db83c4 JH |
2354 | .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, |
2355 | .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, | |
2356 | .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, | |
2357 | .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, | |
70db83c4 JH |
2358 | .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, |
2359 | .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, | |
2360 | .memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec, | |
2361 | }; | |
2362 | ||
2363 | static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) | |
2364 | { | |
2365 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; | |
2366 | ||
2367 | BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan); | |
2368 | ||
2369 | chan = l2cap_chan_create(); | |
2370 | if (!chan) | |
2371 | return NULL; | |
2372 | ||
2373 | chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type; | |
2374 | chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops; | |
2375 | chan->scid = pchan->scid; | |
2376 | chan->dcid = chan->scid; | |
2377 | chan->imtu = pchan->imtu; | |
2378 | chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; | |
2379 | chan->mode = pchan->mode; | |
2380 | ||
abe84903 JH |
2381 | /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to |
2382 | * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel | |
2383 | * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep | |
2384 | * warnings. | |
2385 | */ | |
2386 | atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP); | |
2387 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
2388 | BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan); |
2389 | ||
2390 | return chan; | |
2391 | } | |
2392 | ||
2393 | static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = { | |
2394 | .name = "Security Manager Root", | |
2395 | .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb, | |
2396 | ||
2397 | /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */ | |
2398 | .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, | |
2399 | .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb, | |
2400 | .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv, | |
2401 | .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, | |
2402 | .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown, | |
2403 | .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready, | |
2404 | .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, | |
2405 | .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, | |
2406 | .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume, | |
2407 | .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, | |
2408 | .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, | |
2409 | .memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec, | |
2410 | }; | |
2411 | ||
711eafe3 JH |
2412 | int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) |
2413 | { | |
70db83c4 | 2414 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
defce9e8 | 2415 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes; |
70db83c4 | 2416 | |
711eafe3 JH |
2417 | BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); |
2418 | ||
adae20cb | 2419 | tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0); |
defce9e8 JH |
2420 | if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) { |
2421 | int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes); | |
711eafe3 | 2422 | BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context"); |
711eafe3 JH |
2423 | return err; |
2424 | } | |
2425 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
2426 | chan = l2cap_chan_create(); |
2427 | if (!chan) { | |
defce9e8 | 2428 | crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes); |
70db83c4 JH |
2429 | return -ENOMEM; |
2430 | } | |
2431 | ||
defce9e8 JH |
2432 | chan->data = tfm_aes; |
2433 | ||
5d88cc73 | 2434 | l2cap_add_scid(chan, L2CAP_CID_SMP); |
70db83c4 JH |
2435 | |
2436 | l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan); | |
2437 | ||
2438 | bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr); | |
2439 | chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC; | |
2440 | chan->state = BT_LISTEN; | |
2441 | chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC; | |
2442 | chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU; | |
2443 | chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops; | |
2444 | ||
abe84903 JH |
2445 | /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */ |
2446 | atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT); | |
2447 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
2448 | hdev->smp_data = chan; |
2449 | ||
711eafe3 JH |
2450 | return 0; |
2451 | } | |
2452 | ||
2453 | void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev) | |
2454 | { | |
70db83c4 | 2455 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
defce9e8 | 2456 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes; |
70db83c4 JH |
2457 | |
2458 | if (!chan) | |
2459 | return; | |
2460 | ||
2461 | BT_DBG("%s chan %p", hdev->name, chan); | |
711eafe3 | 2462 | |
defce9e8 JH |
2463 | tfm_aes = chan->data; |
2464 | if (tfm_aes) { | |
2465 | chan->data = NULL; | |
2466 | crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes); | |
711eafe3 | 2467 | } |
70db83c4 JH |
2468 | |
2469 | hdev->smp_data = NULL; | |
2470 | l2cap_chan_put(chan); | |
711eafe3 | 2471 | } |