Bluetooth: Add basic SMP defines for LE Secure Connections
[deliverable/linux.git] / net / bluetooth / smp.c
CommitLineData
eb492e01
AB
1/*
2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
4
5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 published by the Free Software Foundation;
8
9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
17
18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
21*/
22
8c520a59
GP
23#include <linux/crypto.h>
24#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
25#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
26
eb492e01
AB
27#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
28#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
29#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
2b64d153 30#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
ac4b7236
MH
31
32#include "smp.h"
d22ef0bc 33
b28b4943 34#define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
b28b4943 35
17b02e62 36#define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
5d3de7df 37
065a13e2 38#define AUTH_REQ_MASK 0x07
88d3a8ac 39#define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
065a13e2 40
533e35d4
JH
41enum {
42 SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
43 SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING,
44 SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
45 SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
46 SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
47};
4bc58f51
JH
48
49struct smp_chan {
b68fda68
JH
50 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
51 struct delayed_work security_timer;
b28b4943 52 unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
b68fda68 53
4bc58f51
JH
54 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
55 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
56 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
57 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
58 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
59 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
60 u8 enc_key_size;
61 u8 remote_key_dist;
62 bdaddr_t id_addr;
63 u8 id_addr_type;
64 u8 irk[16];
65 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
66 struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk;
67 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
68 struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
69 struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
4a74d658 70 unsigned long flags;
6a7bd103
JH
71
72 struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
4bc58f51
JH
73};
74
8a2936f4 75static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
d22ef0bc 76{
8a2936f4 77 size_t i;
d22ef0bc 78
8a2936f4
JH
79 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
80 dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
d22ef0bc
AB
81}
82
83static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
84{
85 struct blkcipher_desc desc;
86 struct scatterlist sg;
943a732a 87 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
201a5929 88 int err;
d22ef0bc
AB
89
90 if (tfm == NULL) {
91 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
92 return -EINVAL;
93 }
94
95 desc.tfm = tfm;
96 desc.flags = 0;
97
943a732a 98 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
8a2936f4 99 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
943a732a
JH
100
101 err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
d22ef0bc
AB
102 if (err) {
103 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
104 return err;
105 }
106
943a732a 107 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
8a2936f4 108 swap_buf(r, data, 16);
943a732a
JH
109
110 sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16);
d22ef0bc 111
d22ef0bc
AB
112 err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
113 if (err)
114 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
115
943a732a 116 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
8a2936f4 117 swap_buf(data, r, 16);
943a732a 118
d22ef0bc
AB
119 return err;
120}
121
60478054
JH
122static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
123{
943a732a 124 u8 _res[16];
60478054
JH
125 int err;
126
127 /* r' = padding || r */
943a732a
JH
128 memcpy(_res, r, 3);
129 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
60478054 130
943a732a 131 err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
60478054
JH
132 if (err) {
133 BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
134 return err;
135 }
136
137 /* The output of the random address function ah is:
138 * ah(h, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
139 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
140 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
141 * result of ah.
142 */
943a732a 143 memcpy(res, _res, 3);
60478054
JH
144
145 return 0;
146}
147
defce9e8 148bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
60478054 149{
defce9e8
JH
150 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
151 struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
60478054
JH
152 u8 hash[3];
153 int err;
154
defce9e8
JH
155 if (!chan || !chan->data)
156 return false;
157
158 tfm = chan->data;
159
60478054
JH
160 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
161
162 err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
163 if (err)
164 return false;
165
166 return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
167}
168
defce9e8 169int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
b1e2b3ae 170{
defce9e8
JH
171 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
172 struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
b1e2b3ae
JH
173 int err;
174
defce9e8
JH
175 if (!chan || !chan->data)
176 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
177
178 tfm = chan->data;
179
b1e2b3ae
JH
180 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
181
182 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
183 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
184
185 err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
186 if (err < 0)
187 return err;
188
189 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
190
191 return 0;
192}
193
e491eaf3
JH
194static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
195 u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat,
196 bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
d22ef0bc
AB
197{
198 u8 p1[16], p2[16];
199 int err;
200
201 memset(p1, 0, 16);
202
203 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
943a732a
JH
204 p1[0] = _iat;
205 p1[1] = _rat;
206 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
207 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
d22ef0bc
AB
208
209 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
943a732a
JH
210 memcpy(p2, ra, 6);
211 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
212 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
d22ef0bc
AB
213
214 /* res = r XOR p1 */
215 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
216
217 /* res = e(k, res) */
e491eaf3 218 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
d22ef0bc
AB
219 if (err) {
220 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
221 return err;
222 }
223
224 /* res = res XOR p2 */
225 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
226
227 /* res = e(k, res) */
e491eaf3 228 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
d22ef0bc
AB
229 if (err)
230 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
231
232 return err;
233}
234
e491eaf3
JH
235static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16],
236 u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
d22ef0bc
AB
237{
238 int err;
239
240 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
943a732a
JH
241 memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
242 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
d22ef0bc 243
e491eaf3 244 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r);
d22ef0bc
AB
245 if (err)
246 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
247
248 return err;
249}
250
5d88cc73 251static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
eb492e01 252{
5d88cc73 253 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
b68fda68 254 struct smp_chan *smp;
5d88cc73
JH
255 struct kvec iv[2];
256 struct msghdr msg;
eb492e01 257
5d88cc73
JH
258 if (!chan)
259 return;
eb492e01 260
5d88cc73 261 BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
eb492e01 262
5d88cc73
JH
263 iv[0].iov_base = &code;
264 iv[0].iov_len = 1;
eb492e01 265
5d88cc73
JH
266 iv[1].iov_base = data;
267 iv[1].iov_len = len;
eb492e01 268
5d88cc73 269 memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
eb492e01 270
5d88cc73
JH
271 msg.msg_iov = (struct iovec *) &iv;
272 msg.msg_iovlen = 2;
eb492e01 273
5d88cc73 274 l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
e2dcd113 275
b68fda68
JH
276 if (!chan->data)
277 return;
278
279 smp = chan->data;
280
281 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
1b0921d6 282 schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
eb492e01
AB
283}
284
2b64d153
BG
285static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
286{
287 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM)
288 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
289 else
290 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
291}
292
293static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
294{
295 switch (sec_level) {
296 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
297 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
298 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
299 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
300 default:
301 return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
302 }
303}
304
b8e66eac 305static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
f1560463
MH
306 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
307 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
b8e66eac 308{
5d88cc73
JH
309 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
310 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
fd349c02
JH
311 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
312 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
313 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
54790f73 314
b6ae8457 315 if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
7ee4ea36
MH
316 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
317 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
54790f73 318 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
2b64d153
BG
319 } else {
320 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
54790f73
VCG
321 }
322
fd349c02
JH
323 if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags))
324 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
325
863efaf2
JH
326 if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
327 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
328
54790f73
VCG
329 if (rsp == NULL) {
330 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
331 req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
332 req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
fd349c02
JH
333 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
334 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
065a13e2 335 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
fd349c02
JH
336
337 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
54790f73
VCG
338 return;
339 }
340
341 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
342 rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
343 rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
fd349c02
JH
344 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
345 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
065a13e2 346 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
fd349c02
JH
347
348 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
b8e66eac
VCG
349}
350
3158c50c
VCG
351static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
352{
5d88cc73
JH
353 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
354 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1c1def09 355
3158c50c 356 if ((max_key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) ||
f1560463 357 (max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE))
3158c50c
VCG
358 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
359
f7aa611a 360 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
3158c50c
VCG
361
362 return 0;
363}
364
6f48e260
JH
365static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
366{
367 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
368 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
369 bool complete;
370
371 BUG_ON(!smp);
372
373 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
6f48e260 374
6f48e260
JH
375 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
376 mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete);
377
378 kfree(smp->csrk);
379 kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
380
381 crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
382
383 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
384 if (!complete) {
385 if (smp->ltk) {
970d0f1b
JH
386 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
387 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
6f48e260
JH
388 }
389
390 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
970d0f1b
JH
391 list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
392 kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
6f48e260
JH
393 }
394
395 if (smp->remote_irk) {
adae20cb
JH
396 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
397 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
6f48e260
JH
398 }
399 }
400
401 chan->data = NULL;
402 kfree(smp);
403 hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon);
404}
405
84794e11 406static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
4f957a76 407{
bab73cb6 408 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
b68fda68 409 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
bab73cb6 410
84794e11 411 if (reason)
4f957a76 412 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
f1560463 413 &reason);
4f957a76 414
ce39fb4e 415 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags);
e1e930f5 416 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
f1c09c07 417
fc75cc86 418 if (chan->data)
f1c09c07 419 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
4f957a76
BG
420}
421
2b64d153
BG
422#define JUST_WORKS 0x00
423#define JUST_CFM 0x01
424#define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
425#define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
426#define REQ_OOB 0x04
427#define OVERLAP 0xFF
428
429static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
430 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
431 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
432 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
433 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
434 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
435};
436
581370cc
JH
437static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
438{
2bcd4003
JH
439 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
440 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
441 */
581370cc
JH
442 if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
443 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
2bcd4003 444 return JUST_CFM;
581370cc
JH
445
446 return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
447}
448
2b64d153
BG
449static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
450 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
451{
452 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
5d88cc73
JH
453 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
454 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2b64d153
BG
455 u8 method;
456 u32 passkey = 0;
457 int ret = 0;
458
459 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
460 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
4a74d658 461 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
2b64d153
BG
462
463 BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
464
2bcd4003
JH
465 /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
466 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
467 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
468 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
469 * table.
470 */
581370cc 471 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
2bcd4003 472 method = JUST_CFM;
2b64d153 473 else
581370cc 474 method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
2b64d153 475
a82505c7 476 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
4a74d658 477 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
a82505c7
JH
478 method = JUST_WORKS;
479
02f3e254
JH
480 /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
481 if (method == JUST_CFM && hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
482 method = JUST_WORKS;
483
2b64d153
BG
484 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
485 if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
4a74d658 486 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
2b64d153
BG
487 return 0;
488 }
489
490 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
5eb596f5 491 if (method != JUST_CFM) {
4a74d658 492 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
5eb596f5
JH
493 if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
494 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
495 }
2b64d153
BG
496
497 /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
498 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
499 */
500 if (method == OVERLAP) {
40bef302 501 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2b64d153
BG
502 method = CFM_PASSKEY;
503 else
504 method = REQ_PASSKEY;
505 }
506
01ad34d2 507 /* Generate random passkey. */
2b64d153 508 if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
943a732a 509 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
2b64d153
BG
510 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
511 passkey %= 1000000;
943a732a 512 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
2b64d153 513 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
4a74d658 514 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
2b64d153
BG
515 }
516
2b64d153 517 if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
ce39fb4e 518 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
272d90df 519 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
4eb65e66
JH
520 else if (method == JUST_CFM)
521 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
522 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
523 passkey, 1);
2b64d153 524 else
01ad34d2 525 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
272d90df 526 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
39adbffe 527 passkey, 0);
2b64d153 528
2b64d153
BG
529 return ret;
530}
531
1cc61144 532static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
8aab4757 533{
8aab4757 534 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
8aab4757
VCG
535 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
536 int ret;
8aab4757
VCG
537
538 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
539
e491eaf3 540 ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
b1cd5fd9 541 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
943a732a
JH
542 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
543 cp.confirm_val);
1cc61144
JH
544 if (ret)
545 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
8aab4757 546
4a74d658 547 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2b64d153 548
8aab4757
VCG
549 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
550
b28b4943
JH
551 if (conn->hcon->out)
552 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
553 else
554 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
555
1cc61144 556 return 0;
8aab4757
VCG
557}
558
861580a9 559static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
8aab4757 560{
8aab4757
VCG
561 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
562 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
861580a9 563 u8 confirm[16];
8aab4757
VCG
564 int ret;
565
ec70f36f 566 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes))
861580a9 567 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
8aab4757
VCG
568
569 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
570
e491eaf3 571 ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
b1cd5fd9 572 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
943a732a 573 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
861580a9
JH
574 if (ret)
575 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
8aab4757 576
8aab4757
VCG
577 if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) {
578 BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
861580a9 579 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
8aab4757
VCG
580 }
581
582 if (hcon->out) {
fe39c7b2
MH
583 u8 stk[16];
584 __le64 rand = 0;
585 __le16 ediv = 0;
8aab4757 586
e491eaf3 587 smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
8aab4757 588
f7aa611a 589 memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
04124681 590 SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
8aab4757 591
861580a9
JH
592 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
593 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
8aab4757
VCG
594
595 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk);
f7aa611a 596 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
fe59a05f 597 set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
8aab4757 598 } else {
fff3490f 599 u8 stk[16], auth;
fe39c7b2
MH
600 __le64 rand = 0;
601 __le16 ediv = 0;
8aab4757 602
943a732a
JH
603 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
604 smp->prnd);
8aab4757 605
e491eaf3 606 smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
8aab4757 607
f7aa611a 608 memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
f1560463 609 SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
8aab4757 610
fff3490f
JH
611 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
612 auth = 1;
613 else
614 auth = 0;
615
7d5843b7
JH
616 /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
617 * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
618 * STK never needs to be stored).
619 */
ce39fb4e 620 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
2ceba539 621 SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
8aab4757
VCG
622 }
623
861580a9 624 return 0;
8aab4757
VCG
625}
626
44f1a7ab
JH
627static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
628{
629 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
630 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
631 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
632 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
633 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
634 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
635 bool persistent;
636
637 if (smp->remote_irk) {
638 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);
639 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
640 * identity address track the connection based on it
641 * from now on.
642 */
643 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
644 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
f3d82d0c 645 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
44f1a7ab
JH
646
647 /* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
648 * a remote device that does not use a resolvable
649 * private address, just remove the key so that
650 * it is possible to use the controller white
651 * list for scanning.
652 *
653 * Userspace will have been told to not store
654 * this key at this point. So it is safe to
655 * just remove it.
656 */
657 if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {
adae20cb
JH
658 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
659 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
44f1a7ab
JH
660 smp->remote_irk = NULL;
661 }
662 }
663
664 /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
665 * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
666 */
667 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
668
669 if (smp->csrk) {
670 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
671 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
672 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
673 }
674
675 if (smp->slave_csrk) {
676 smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
677 bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
678 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
679 }
680
681 if (smp->ltk) {
682 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
683 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
684 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
685 }
686
687 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
688 smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
689 bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
690 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
691 }
692}
693
b28b4943
JH
694static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
695{
696 /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
697 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
698 * them in the correct order.
699 */
700 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
701 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
702 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
703 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
704 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
705 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
706}
707
d6268e86 708static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
44f1a7ab
JH
709{
710 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
86d1407c 711 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
44f1a7ab
JH
712 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
713 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
714 __u8 *keydist;
715
716 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
717
44f1a7ab
JH
718 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
719
720 /* The responder sends its keys first */
b28b4943
JH
721 if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
722 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
86d1407c 723 return;
b28b4943 724 }
44f1a7ab
JH
725
726 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
727
728 if (hcon->out) {
729 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
730 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
731 } else {
732 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
733 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
734 }
735
736 BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
737
738 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
739 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
740 struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
741 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
742 u8 authenticated;
743 __le16 ediv;
744 __le64 rand;
745
746 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
747 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
748 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
749
750 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
751
752 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
753 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
754 SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
755 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
756 smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
757
758 ident.ediv = ediv;
759 ident.rand = rand;
760
761 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
762
763 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
764 }
765
766 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
767 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
768 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
769
770 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
771
772 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
773
774 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
775 * after the connection has been established.
776 *
777 * This is true even when the connection has been
778 * established using a resolvable random address.
779 */
780 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
781 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
782
783 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
784 &addrinfo);
785
786 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
787 }
788
789 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
790 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
791 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
792
793 /* Generate a new random key */
794 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
795
796 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
797 if (csrk) {
798 csrk->master = 0x00;
799 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
800 }
801 smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
802
803 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
804
805 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
806 }
807
808 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
b28b4943
JH
809 if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
810 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
86d1407c 811 return;
b28b4943 812 }
44f1a7ab 813
44f1a7ab
JH
814 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
815 smp_notify_keys(conn);
816
817 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
44f1a7ab
JH
818}
819
b68fda68
JH
820static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
821{
822 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
823 security_timer.work);
824 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
825
826 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
827
1e91c29e 828 hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
b68fda68
JH
829}
830
8aab4757
VCG
831static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
832{
5d88cc73 833 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
8aab4757
VCG
834 struct smp_chan *smp;
835
f1560463 836 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
fc75cc86 837 if (!smp)
8aab4757
VCG
838 return NULL;
839
6a7bd103
JH
840 smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
841 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
842 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
843 kfree(smp);
844 return NULL;
845 }
846
8aab4757 847 smp->conn = conn;
5d88cc73 848 chan->data = smp;
8aab4757 849
b28b4943
JH
850 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
851
b68fda68
JH
852 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
853
8aab4757
VCG
854 hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
855
856 return smp;
857}
858
2b64d153
BG
859int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
860{
b10e8017 861 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
5d88cc73 862 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2b64d153
BG
863 struct smp_chan *smp;
864 u32 value;
fc75cc86 865 int err;
2b64d153
BG
866
867 BT_DBG("");
868
fc75cc86 869 if (!conn)
2b64d153
BG
870 return -ENOTCONN;
871
5d88cc73
JH
872 chan = conn->smp;
873 if (!chan)
874 return -ENOTCONN;
875
fc75cc86
JH
876 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
877 if (!chan->data) {
878 err = -ENOTCONN;
879 goto unlock;
880 }
881
5d88cc73 882 smp = chan->data;
2b64d153
BG
883
884 switch (mgmt_op) {
885 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
886 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
943a732a 887 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
2b64d153 888 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
943a732a 889 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
2b64d153
BG
890 /* Fall Through */
891 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
4a74d658 892 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
2b64d153
BG
893 break;
894 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
895 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
84794e11 896 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
fc75cc86
JH
897 err = 0;
898 goto unlock;
2b64d153 899 default:
84794e11 900 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
fc75cc86
JH
901 err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
902 goto unlock;
2b64d153
BG
903 }
904
fc75cc86
JH
905 err = 0;
906
2b64d153 907 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
1cc61144
JH
908 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
909 u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
910 if (rsp)
911 smp_failure(conn, rsp);
912 }
2b64d153 913
fc75cc86
JH
914unlock:
915 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
916 return err;
2b64d153
BG
917}
918
da85e5e5 919static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
88ba43b6 920{
3158c50c 921 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
fc75cc86 922 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
b3c6410b 923 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
8aab4757 924 struct smp_chan *smp;
c7262e71 925 u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
8aab4757 926 int ret;
88ba43b6
AB
927
928 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
929
c46b98be 930 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
38e4a915 931 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
c46b98be 932
40bef302 933 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
2b64d153
BG
934 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
935
fc75cc86 936 if (!chan->data)
8aab4757 937 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
fc75cc86 938 else
5d88cc73 939 smp = chan->data;
8aab4757 940
d08fd0e7
AE
941 if (!smp)
942 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
d26a2345 943
c05b9339
JH
944 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
945 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
946
b6ae8457 947 if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
c05b9339 948 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
b3c6410b
JH
949 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
950
1c1def09
VCG
951 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
952 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
3158c50c 953 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
88ba43b6 954
5be5e275 955 if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
1afc2a1a
JH
956 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
957 else
958 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
959
c7262e71
JH
960 if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
961 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
fdde0a26 962
49c922bb 963 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
2ed8f65c
JH
964 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
965 u8 method;
966
967 method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
968 req->io_capability);
969 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
970 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
971 }
972
2b64d153 973 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
3158c50c
VCG
974
975 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
976 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
977 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
88ba43b6 978
e84a6b13 979 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
8aab4757 980
1c1def09
VCG
981 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
982 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
f01ead31 983
3158c50c 984 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
b28b4943 985 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
da85e5e5 986
2b64d153
BG
987 /* Request setup of TK */
988 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
989 if (ret)
990 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
991
da85e5e5 992 return 0;
88ba43b6
AB
993}
994
da85e5e5 995static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
88ba43b6 996{
3158c50c 997 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
5d88cc73
JH
998 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
999 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3a7dbfb8 1000 u8 key_size, auth;
7d24ddcc 1001 int ret;
88ba43b6
AB
1002
1003 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1004
c46b98be 1005 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
38e4a915 1006 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
c46b98be 1007
40bef302 1008 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2b64d153
BG
1009 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1010
3158c50c
VCG
1011 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
1012
1c1def09 1013 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
da85e5e5 1014
3158c50c
VCG
1015 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
1016 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1017 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1018
c05b9339
JH
1019 auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
1020
49c922bb 1021 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
2ed8f65c
JH
1022 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1023 u8 method;
1024
1025 method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
1026 rsp->io_capability);
1027 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1028 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1029 }
1030
e84a6b13 1031 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
7d24ddcc 1032
8aab4757
VCG
1033 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1034 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
7d24ddcc 1035
fdcc4bec
JH
1036 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1037 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1038 */
1039 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1040
c05b9339 1041 auth |= req->auth_req;
2b64d153 1042
476585ec 1043 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
2b64d153
BG
1044 if (ret)
1045 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1046
4a74d658 1047 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2b64d153
BG
1048
1049 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
4a74d658 1050 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
1cc61144 1051 return smp_confirm(smp);
da85e5e5
VCG
1052
1053 return 0;
88ba43b6
AB
1054}
1055
da85e5e5 1056static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
88ba43b6 1057{
5d88cc73
JH
1058 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1059 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
7d24ddcc 1060
88ba43b6
AB
1061 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
1062
c46b98be 1063 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
38e4a915 1064 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
c46b98be 1065
1c1def09
VCG
1066 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
1067 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
88ba43b6 1068
b28b4943 1069 if (conn->hcon->out) {
943a732a
JH
1070 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1071 smp->prnd);
b28b4943
JH
1072 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1073 return 0;
1074 }
1075
1076 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
1cc61144 1077 return smp_confirm(smp);
943a732a 1078 else
4a74d658 1079 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
da85e5e5
VCG
1080
1081 return 0;
88ba43b6
AB
1082}
1083
da85e5e5 1084static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
88ba43b6 1085{
5d88cc73
JH
1086 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1087 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
7d24ddcc 1088
8aab4757 1089 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
3158c50c 1090
c46b98be 1091 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
38e4a915 1092 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
c46b98be 1093
943a732a 1094 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
8aab4757 1095 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
e7e62c85 1096
861580a9 1097 return smp_random(smp);
88ba43b6
AB
1098}
1099
f81cd823 1100static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
988c5997 1101{
c9839a11 1102 struct smp_ltk *key;
988c5997
VCG
1103 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1104
98a0b845 1105 key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
e804d25d 1106 hcon->role);
988c5997 1107 if (!key)
f81cd823 1108 return false;
988c5997 1109
a6f7833c 1110 if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
f81cd823 1111 return false;
4dab7864 1112
51a8efd7 1113 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
f81cd823 1114 return true;
988c5997 1115
c9839a11
VCG
1116 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val);
1117 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
988c5997 1118
fe59a05f
JH
1119 /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
1120 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
1121
f81cd823 1122 return true;
988c5997 1123}
f1560463 1124
35dc6f83
JH
1125bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
1126 enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
854f4727
JH
1127{
1128 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
1129 return true;
1130
35dc6f83
JH
1131 /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
1132 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
1133 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
1134 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
1135 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
9ab65d60 1136 */
35dc6f83
JH
1137 if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
1138 test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
b2d5e254 1139 hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
e804d25d 1140 hcon->role))
9ab65d60
JH
1141 return false;
1142
854f4727
JH
1143 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
1144 return true;
1145
1146 return false;
1147}
1148
da85e5e5 1149static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
88ba43b6
AB
1150{
1151 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
1152 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
f1cb9af5 1153 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
8aab4757 1154 struct smp_chan *smp;
c05b9339 1155 u8 sec_level, auth;
88ba43b6
AB
1156
1157 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1158
c46b98be 1159 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
38e4a915 1160 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
c46b98be 1161
40bef302 1162 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
86ca9eac
JH
1163 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1164
c05b9339
JH
1165 auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
1166
5be5e275 1167 if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
1afc2a1a
JH
1168 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
1169 else
1170 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
1171
35dc6f83 1172 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
854f4727
JH
1173 return 0;
1174
c7262e71
JH
1175 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
1176 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
feb45eb5 1177
4dab7864 1178 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
988c5997
VCG
1179 return 0;
1180
8aab4757 1181 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
c29d2444
JH
1182 if (!smp)
1183 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
d26a2345 1184
b6ae8457 1185 if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) &&
c05b9339 1186 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
616d55be
JH
1187 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1188
88ba43b6 1189 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
88ba43b6 1190
da85e5e5 1191 memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
c05b9339 1192 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
88ba43b6 1193
1c1def09
VCG
1194 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
1195 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
f01ead31 1196
88ba43b6 1197 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
b28b4943 1198 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
f1cb9af5 1199
da85e5e5 1200 return 0;
88ba43b6
AB
1201}
1202
cc110922 1203int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
eb492e01 1204{
cc110922 1205 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
c68b7f12 1206 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
0a66cf20 1207 struct smp_chan *smp;
2b64d153 1208 __u8 authreq;
fc75cc86 1209 int ret;
eb492e01 1210
3a0259bb
VCG
1211 BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
1212
0a66cf20
JH
1213 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
1214 if (!conn)
1215 return 1;
1216
c68b7f12
JH
1217 chan = conn->smp;
1218
757aee0f 1219 if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
2e65c9d2
AG
1220 return 1;
1221
35dc6f83 1222 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
eb492e01 1223 return 1;
f1cb9af5 1224
c7262e71
JH
1225 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
1226 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
1227
40bef302 1228 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
c7262e71
JH
1229 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
1230 return 0;
d26a2345 1231
fc75cc86
JH
1232 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
1233
1234 /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
1235 if (chan->data) {
1236 ret = 0;
1237 goto unlock;
1238 }
d26a2345 1239
8aab4757 1240 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
fc75cc86
JH
1241 if (!smp) {
1242 ret = 1;
1243 goto unlock;
1244 }
2b64d153
BG
1245
1246 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
d26a2345 1247
79897d20
JH
1248 /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
1249 * requires it.
2e233644 1250 */
79897d20 1251 if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
c7262e71 1252 hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2e233644
JH
1253 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
1254
40bef302 1255 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
d26a2345 1256 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
f01ead31 1257
2b64d153 1258 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
1c1def09
VCG
1259 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
1260 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
f01ead31 1261
eb492e01 1262 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
b28b4943 1263 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
eb492e01
AB
1264 } else {
1265 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
2b64d153 1266 cp.auth_req = authreq;
eb492e01 1267 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
b28b4943 1268 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
eb492e01
AB
1269 }
1270
4a74d658 1271 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
fc75cc86 1272 ret = 0;
edca792c 1273
fc75cc86
JH
1274unlock:
1275 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
1276 return ret;
eb492e01
AB
1277}
1278
7034b911
VCG
1279static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1280{
16b90839 1281 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
5d88cc73
JH
1282 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1283 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
16b90839 1284
c46b98be
JH
1285 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1286
1287 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
38e4a915 1288 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
c46b98be 1289
b28b4943 1290 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
6131ddc8 1291
16b90839
VCG
1292 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
1293
1c1def09 1294 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
16b90839 1295
7034b911
VCG
1296 return 0;
1297}
1298
1299static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1300{
16b90839 1301 struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
5d88cc73
JH
1302 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1303 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
c9839a11
VCG
1304 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1305 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
23d0e128 1306 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
c9839a11 1307 u8 authenticated;
16b90839 1308
c46b98be
JH
1309 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1310
1311 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
38e4a915 1312 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
c46b98be 1313
9747a9f3
JH
1314 /* Mark the information as received */
1315 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1316
b28b4943
JH
1317 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
1318 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
196332f5
JH
1319 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
1320 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
b28b4943 1321
16b90839 1322 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
7034b911 1323
ce39fb4e 1324 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
2ceba539 1325 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
23d0e128
JH
1326 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
1327 rp->ediv, rp->rand);
1328 smp->ltk = ltk;
c6e81e9a 1329 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
d6268e86 1330 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
7034b911
VCG
1331
1332 return 0;
1333}
1334
fd349c02
JH
1335static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1336{
1337 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
5d88cc73
JH
1338 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1339 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
fd349c02
JH
1340
1341 BT_DBG("");
1342
1343 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
38e4a915 1344 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
fd349c02 1345
b28b4943 1346 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
6131ddc8 1347
fd349c02
JH
1348 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
1349
1350 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
1351
1352 return 0;
1353}
1354
1355static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
1356 struct sk_buff *skb)
1357{
1358 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
5d88cc73
JH
1359 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1360 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
fd349c02
JH
1361 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1362 bdaddr_t rpa;
1363
1364 BT_DBG("");
1365
1366 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
38e4a915 1367 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
fd349c02 1368
9747a9f3
JH
1369 /* Mark the information as received */
1370 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1371
b28b4943
JH
1372 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
1373 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
1374
fd349c02
JH
1375 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
1376
a9a58f86
JH
1377 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
1378 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
1379 * as "identity information". However, since such
1380 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
1381 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
1382 * received an IRK for such a device.
1383 */
1384 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY)) {
1385 BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address");
31dd624e 1386 goto distribute;
a9a58f86
JH
1387 }
1388
fd349c02
JH
1389 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
1390 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
1391
1392 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
1393 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
1394 else
1395 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
1396
23d0e128
JH
1397 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
1398 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
fd349c02 1399
31dd624e 1400distribute:
c6e81e9a
JH
1401 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
1402 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
fd349c02
JH
1403
1404 return 0;
1405}
1406
7ee4ea36
MH
1407static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1408{
1409 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
5d88cc73
JH
1410 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1411 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
7ee4ea36
MH
1412 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1413
1414 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1415
1416 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
38e4a915 1417 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
7ee4ea36 1418
7ee4ea36
MH
1419 /* Mark the information as received */
1420 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1421
1422 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
1423
7ee4ea36
MH
1424 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1425 if (csrk) {
1426 csrk->master = 0x01;
1427 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1428 }
1429 smp->csrk = csrk;
d6268e86 1430 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
7ee4ea36
MH
1431
1432 return 0;
1433}
1434
4befb867 1435static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
eb492e01 1436{
5d88cc73 1437 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
7b9899db 1438 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
b28b4943 1439 struct smp_chan *smp;
92381f5c 1440 __u8 code, reason;
eb492e01
AB
1441 int err = 0;
1442
7b9899db
MH
1443 if (hcon->type != LE_LINK) {
1444 kfree_skb(skb);
3432711f 1445 return 0;
7b9899db
MH
1446 }
1447
8ae9b984 1448 if (skb->len < 1)
92381f5c 1449 return -EILSEQ;
92381f5c 1450
06ae3314 1451 if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
2e65c9d2
AG
1452 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1453 goto done;
1454 }
1455
92381f5c 1456 code = skb->data[0];
eb492e01
AB
1457 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
1458
b28b4943
JH
1459 smp = chan->data;
1460
1461 if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
1462 goto drop;
1463
24bd0bd9 1464 if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
b28b4943
JH
1465 goto drop;
1466
1467 /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
1468 * pairing request and security request.
8cf9fa12 1469 */
b28b4943
JH
1470 if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
1471 goto drop;
8cf9fa12 1472
eb492e01
AB
1473 switch (code) {
1474 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
da85e5e5 1475 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
eb492e01
AB
1476 break;
1477
1478 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
84794e11 1479 smp_failure(conn, 0);
da85e5e5 1480 err = -EPERM;
eb492e01
AB
1481 break;
1482
1483 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
da85e5e5 1484 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
88ba43b6
AB
1485 break;
1486
1487 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
da85e5e5 1488 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
88ba43b6
AB
1489 break;
1490
eb492e01 1491 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
da85e5e5 1492 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
88ba43b6
AB
1493 break;
1494
eb492e01 1495 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
da85e5e5 1496 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
88ba43b6
AB
1497 break;
1498
eb492e01 1499 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
7034b911
VCG
1500 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
1501 break;
1502
eb492e01 1503 case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
7034b911
VCG
1504 reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
1505 break;
1506
eb492e01 1507 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
fd349c02
JH
1508 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
1509 break;
1510
eb492e01 1511 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
fd349c02
JH
1512 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
1513 break;
1514
eb492e01 1515 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
7ee4ea36 1516 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
7034b911
VCG
1517 break;
1518
eb492e01
AB
1519 default:
1520 BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
eb492e01 1521 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
3a0259bb 1522 goto done;
eb492e01
AB
1523 }
1524
3a0259bb 1525done:
9b7b18ef
JH
1526 if (!err) {
1527 if (reason)
1528 smp_failure(conn, reason);
8ae9b984 1529 kfree_skb(skb);
9b7b18ef
JH
1530 }
1531
eb492e01 1532 return err;
b28b4943
JH
1533
1534drop:
1535 BT_ERR("%s unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", hcon->hdev->name,
1536 code, &hcon->dst);
1537 kfree_skb(skb);
1538 return 0;
eb492e01 1539}
7034b911 1540
70db83c4
JH
1541static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
1542{
1543 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
1544
1545 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
1546
fc75cc86 1547 if (chan->data)
5d88cc73 1548 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
5d88cc73 1549
70db83c4
JH
1550 conn->smp = NULL;
1551 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
1552}
1553
44f1a7ab
JH
1554static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
1555{
b68fda68 1556 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
44f1a7ab
JH
1557 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
1558 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1559
1560 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
1561
86d1407c
JH
1562 if (!smp)
1563 return;
b68fda68 1564
84bc0db5
JH
1565 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
1566 return;
1567
86d1407c
JH
1568 cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
1569
d6268e86 1570 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
44f1a7ab
JH
1571}
1572
70db83c4
JH
1573static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
1574{
1575 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
1576
1577 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
1578
1579 conn->smp = chan;
1580 l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
1581}
1582
4befb867
JH
1583static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
1584{
1585 int err;
1586
1587 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
1588
1589 err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
1590 if (err) {
b68fda68 1591 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
4befb867 1592
b68fda68
JH
1593 if (smp)
1594 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
4befb867 1595
1e91c29e 1596 hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
4befb867
JH
1597 }
1598
1599 return err;
1600}
1601
70db83c4
JH
1602static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
1603 unsigned long hdr_len,
1604 unsigned long len, int nb)
1605{
1606 struct sk_buff *skb;
1607
1608 skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1609 if (!skb)
1610 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
1611
1612 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
1613 bt_cb(skb)->chan = chan;
1614
1615 return skb;
1616}
1617
1618static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
1619 .name = "Security Manager",
1620 .ready = smp_ready_cb,
5d88cc73 1621 .recv = smp_recv_cb,
70db83c4
JH
1622 .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
1623 .teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
44f1a7ab 1624 .resume = smp_resume_cb,
70db83c4
JH
1625
1626 .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
70db83c4
JH
1627 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
1628 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
1629 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
1630 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
70db83c4
JH
1631 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
1632 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
1633 .memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
1634};
1635
1636static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
1637{
1638 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
1639
1640 BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
1641
1642 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
1643 if (!chan)
1644 return NULL;
1645
1646 chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
1647 chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
1648 chan->scid = pchan->scid;
1649 chan->dcid = chan->scid;
1650 chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
1651 chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
1652 chan->mode = pchan->mode;
1653
abe84903
JH
1654 /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
1655 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
1656 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
1657 * warnings.
1658 */
1659 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
1660
70db83c4
JH
1661 BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
1662
1663 return chan;
1664}
1665
1666static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
1667 .name = "Security Manager Root",
1668 .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
1669
1670 /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
1671 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
1672 .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
1673 .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
1674 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
1675 .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
1676 .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
1677 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
1678 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
1679 .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
1680 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
1681 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
1682 .memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
1683};
1684
711eafe3
JH
1685int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
1686{
70db83c4 1687 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
defce9e8 1688 struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
70db83c4 1689
711eafe3
JH
1690 BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
1691
adae20cb 1692 tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
defce9e8
JH
1693 if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
1694 int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
711eafe3 1695 BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context");
711eafe3
JH
1696 return err;
1697 }
1698
70db83c4
JH
1699 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
1700 if (!chan) {
defce9e8 1701 crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
70db83c4
JH
1702 return -ENOMEM;
1703 }
1704
defce9e8
JH
1705 chan->data = tfm_aes;
1706
5d88cc73 1707 l2cap_add_scid(chan, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
70db83c4
JH
1708
1709 l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
1710
1711 bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
1712 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
1713 chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
1714 chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
1715 chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
1716 chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
1717
abe84903
JH
1718 /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
1719 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
1720
70db83c4
JH
1721 hdev->smp_data = chan;
1722
711eafe3
JH
1723 return 0;
1724}
1725
1726void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
1727{
70db83c4 1728 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
defce9e8 1729 struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
70db83c4
JH
1730
1731 if (!chan)
1732 return;
1733
1734 BT_DBG("%s chan %p", hdev->name, chan);
711eafe3 1735
defce9e8
JH
1736 tfm_aes = chan->data;
1737 if (tfm_aes) {
1738 chan->data = NULL;
1739 crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
711eafe3 1740 }
70db83c4
JH
1741
1742 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
1743 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
711eafe3 1744}
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