Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
3e1c2515 | 1 | /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o. |
1da177e4 LT |
2 | * |
3 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
4 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
5 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
6 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
7 | * | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
c59ede7b | 10 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
3fc689e9 | 11 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
12 | #include <linux/module.h> |
13 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
14 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
15 | #include <linux/security.h> | |
16 | #include <linux/file.h> | |
17 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
18 | #include <linux/mman.h> | |
19 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> | |
20 | #include <linux/swap.h> | |
1da177e4 LT |
21 | #include <linux/skbuff.h> |
22 | #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
23 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | |
25 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> | |
b5376771 | 26 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
b460cbc5 | 27 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
3898b1b4 AM |
28 | #include <linux/prctl.h> |
29 | #include <linux/securebits.h> | |
3486740a | 30 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
40401530 | 31 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
51b79bee | 32 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
72c2d582 | 33 | |
b5f22a59 SH |
34 | /* |
35 | * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in | |
36 | * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. | |
37 | * However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only | |
38 | * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root | |
39 | * bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or | |
40 | * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities | |
41 | * support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities. | |
42 | * | |
43 | * Warn if that happens, once per boot. | |
44 | */ | |
d7627467 | 45 | static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) |
b5f22a59 SH |
46 | { |
47 | static int warned; | |
48 | if (!warned) { | |
49 | printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and" | |
50 | " effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all" | |
51 | " capabilities.\n", fname); | |
52 | warned = 1; | |
53 | } | |
54 | } | |
55 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
56 | int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
57 | { | |
1da177e4 LT |
58 | return 0; |
59 | } | |
60 | ||
1d045980 DH |
61 | /** |
62 | * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability | |
3699c53c | 63 | * @cred: The credentials to use |
3486740a | 64 | * @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability |
1d045980 DH |
65 | * @cap: The capability to check for |
66 | * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not | |
67 | * | |
68 | * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst | |
69 | * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not. | |
70 | * | |
3699c53c DH |
71 | * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable() |
72 | * and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics: | |
73 | * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the | |
74 | * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. | |
a6dbb1ef | 75 | */ |
6a9de491 EP |
76 | int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, |
77 | int cap, int audit) | |
1da177e4 | 78 | { |
520d9eab | 79 | struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; |
3486740a | 80 | |
520d9eab EB |
81 | /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace |
82 | * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target | |
83 | * user namespace's parents. | |
84 | */ | |
85 | for (;;) { | |
3486740a | 86 | /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ |
520d9eab | 87 | if (ns == cred->user_ns) |
3486740a SH |
88 | return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; |
89 | ||
90 | /* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */ | |
520d9eab | 91 | if (ns == &init_user_ns) |
3486740a SH |
92 | return -EPERM; |
93 | ||
520d9eab EB |
94 | /* |
95 | * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the | |
96 | * user namespace has all caps. | |
97 | */ | |
98 | if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) | |
99 | return 0; | |
100 | ||
3486740a | 101 | /* |
520d9eab | 102 | * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have |
3486740a SH |
103 | * it over all children user namespaces as well. |
104 | */ | |
520d9eab | 105 | ns = ns->parent; |
3486740a SH |
106 | } |
107 | ||
108 | /* We never get here */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
109 | } |
110 | ||
1d045980 DH |
111 | /** |
112 | * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock | |
113 | * @ts: The time to set | |
114 | * @tz: The timezone to set | |
115 | * | |
116 | * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone | |
117 | * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied. | |
118 | */ | |
1e6d7679 | 119 | int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz) |
1da177e4 LT |
120 | { |
121 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) | |
122 | return -EPERM; | |
123 | return 0; | |
124 | } | |
125 | ||
1d045980 | 126 | /** |
9e48858f | 127 | * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access |
1d045980 DH |
128 | * another |
129 | * @child: The process to be accessed | |
130 | * @mode: The mode of attachment. | |
131 | * | |
8409cca7 SH |
132 | * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target |
133 | * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. | |
134 | * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace | |
135 | * access is allowed. | |
136 | * Else denied. | |
137 | * | |
1d045980 DH |
138 | * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission |
139 | * granted, -ve if denied. | |
140 | */ | |
9e48858f | 141 | int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) |
1da177e4 | 142 | { |
c69e8d9c | 143 | int ret = 0; |
8409cca7 | 144 | const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; |
c69e8d9c DH |
145 | |
146 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
8409cca7 SH |
147 | cred = current_cred(); |
148 | child_cred = __task_cred(child); | |
c4a4d603 | 149 | if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && |
8409cca7 SH |
150 | cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) |
151 | goto out; | |
c4a4d603 | 152 | if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) |
8409cca7 SH |
153 | goto out; |
154 | ret = -EPERM; | |
155 | out: | |
c69e8d9c DH |
156 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
157 | return ret; | |
5cd9c58f DH |
158 | } |
159 | ||
1d045980 DH |
160 | /** |
161 | * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current | |
162 | * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer | |
163 | * | |
8409cca7 SH |
164 | * If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's |
165 | * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. | |
166 | * If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace | |
167 | * access is allowed. | |
168 | * Else denied. | |
169 | * | |
1d045980 DH |
170 | * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current |
171 | * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
172 | */ | |
5cd9c58f DH |
173 | int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
174 | { | |
c69e8d9c | 175 | int ret = 0; |
8409cca7 | 176 | const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; |
c69e8d9c DH |
177 | |
178 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
8409cca7 SH |
179 | cred = __task_cred(parent); |
180 | child_cred = current_cred(); | |
c4a4d603 | 181 | if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && |
8409cca7 SH |
182 | cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) |
183 | goto out; | |
c4a4d603 | 184 | if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) |
8409cca7 SH |
185 | goto out; |
186 | ret = -EPERM; | |
187 | out: | |
c69e8d9c DH |
188 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
189 | return ret; | |
1da177e4 LT |
190 | } |
191 | ||
1d045980 DH |
192 | /** |
193 | * cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets | |
194 | * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets | |
195 | * @effective: The place to record the effective set | |
196 | * @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set | |
197 | * @permitted: The place to record the permitted set | |
198 | * | |
199 | * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns | |
200 | * them to the caller. | |
201 | */ | |
202 | int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
203 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1da177e4 | 204 | { |
c69e8d9c | 205 | const struct cred *cred; |
b6dff3ec | 206 | |
1da177e4 | 207 | /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */ |
c69e8d9c DH |
208 | rcu_read_lock(); |
209 | cred = __task_cred(target); | |
b6dff3ec DH |
210 | *effective = cred->cap_effective; |
211 | *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; | |
212 | *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; | |
c69e8d9c | 213 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1da177e4 LT |
214 | return 0; |
215 | } | |
216 | ||
1d045980 DH |
217 | /* |
218 | * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old | |
219 | * permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not. | |
220 | */ | |
72c2d582 AM |
221 | static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) |
222 | { | |
72c2d582 | 223 | |
1d045980 DH |
224 | /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP |
225 | * capability | |
226 | */ | |
c4a4d603 | 227 | if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, |
6a9de491 | 228 | CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) |
1d045980 | 229 | return 0; |
1d045980 | 230 | return 1; |
1209726c | 231 | } |
72c2d582 | 232 | |
1d045980 DH |
233 | /** |
234 | * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities | |
235 | * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here | |
236 | * @old: The current task's current credentials | |
237 | * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set | |
238 | * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set | |
239 | * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set | |
240 | * | |
241 | * This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current | |
242 | * process's capability sets. The changes are made to the proposed new | |
243 | * credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM. | |
244 | */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
245 | int cap_capset(struct cred *new, |
246 | const struct cred *old, | |
247 | const kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
248 | const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, | |
249 | const kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1da177e4 | 250 | { |
d84f4f99 DH |
251 | if (cap_inh_is_capped() && |
252 | !cap_issubset(*inheritable, | |
253 | cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, | |
254 | old->cap_permitted))) | |
72c2d582 | 255 | /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ |
1da177e4 | 256 | return -EPERM; |
d84f4f99 | 257 | |
3b7391de | 258 | if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable, |
d84f4f99 DH |
259 | cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, |
260 | old->cap_bset))) | |
3b7391de SH |
261 | /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */ |
262 | return -EPERM; | |
1da177e4 LT |
263 | |
264 | /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ | |
d84f4f99 | 265 | if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted)) |
1da177e4 | 266 | return -EPERM; |
1da177e4 LT |
267 | |
268 | /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */ | |
d84f4f99 | 269 | if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted)) |
1da177e4 | 270 | return -EPERM; |
1da177e4 | 271 | |
d84f4f99 DH |
272 | new->cap_effective = *effective; |
273 | new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; | |
274 | new->cap_permitted = *permitted; | |
1da177e4 LT |
275 | return 0; |
276 | } | |
277 | ||
1d045980 DH |
278 | /* |
279 | * Clear proposed capability sets for execve(). | |
280 | */ | |
b5376771 SH |
281 | static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
282 | { | |
a6f76f23 | 283 | cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted); |
b5376771 SH |
284 | bprm->cap_effective = false; |
285 | } | |
286 | ||
1d045980 DH |
287 | /** |
288 | * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges | |
289 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV | |
290 | * | |
291 | * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV | |
292 | * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should | |
293 | * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected? | |
294 | * | |
295 | * Returns 0 if granted; +ve if granted, but inode_killpriv() is required; and | |
296 | * -ve to deny the change. | |
297 | */ | |
b5376771 SH |
298 | int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) |
299 | { | |
300 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
301 | int error; | |
302 | ||
acfa4380 | 303 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) |
b5376771 SH |
304 | return 0; |
305 | ||
306 | error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); | |
307 | if (error <= 0) | |
308 | return 0; | |
309 | return 1; | |
310 | } | |
311 | ||
1d045980 DH |
312 | /** |
313 | * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode | |
314 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter | |
315 | * | |
316 | * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode. | |
317 | * | |
318 | * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. | |
319 | */ | |
b5376771 SH |
320 | int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) |
321 | { | |
322 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
323 | ||
acfa4380 | 324 | if (!inode->i_op->removexattr) |
b5376771 SH |
325 | return 0; |
326 | ||
327 | return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS); | |
328 | } | |
329 | ||
1d045980 DH |
330 | /* |
331 | * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached | |
332 | * to a file. | |
333 | */ | |
c0b00441 | 334 | static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, |
a6f76f23 | 335 | struct linux_binprm *bprm, |
4d49f671 ZL |
336 | bool *effective, |
337 | bool *has_cap) | |
b5376771 | 338 | { |
a6f76f23 | 339 | struct cred *new = bprm->cred; |
c0b00441 EP |
340 | unsigned i; |
341 | int ret = 0; | |
342 | ||
343 | if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) | |
a6f76f23 | 344 | *effective = true; |
c0b00441 | 345 | |
4d49f671 ZL |
346 | if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) |
347 | *has_cap = true; | |
348 | ||
c0b00441 EP |
349 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { |
350 | __u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i]; | |
351 | __u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i]; | |
352 | ||
353 | /* | |
354 | * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | |
355 | */ | |
a6f76f23 DH |
356 | new->cap_permitted.cap[i] = |
357 | (new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) | | |
358 | (new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable); | |
c0b00441 | 359 | |
a6f76f23 DH |
360 | if (permitted & ~new->cap_permitted.cap[i]) |
361 | /* insufficient to execute correctly */ | |
c0b00441 | 362 | ret = -EPERM; |
c0b00441 EP |
363 | } |
364 | ||
365 | /* | |
366 | * For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they | |
367 | * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are | |
368 | * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities. | |
369 | */ | |
a6f76f23 | 370 | return *effective ? ret : 0; |
c0b00441 EP |
371 | } |
372 | ||
1d045980 DH |
373 | /* |
374 | * Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file. | |
375 | */ | |
c0b00441 EP |
376 | int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps) |
377 | { | |
378 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
b5376771 | 379 | __u32 magic_etc; |
e338d263 | 380 | unsigned tocopy, i; |
c0b00441 EP |
381 | int size; |
382 | struct vfs_cap_data caps; | |
383 | ||
384 | memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data)); | |
385 | ||
acfa4380 | 386 | if (!inode || !inode->i_op->getxattr) |
c0b00441 EP |
387 | return -ENODATA; |
388 | ||
389 | size = inode->i_op->getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps, | |
390 | XATTR_CAPS_SZ); | |
a6f76f23 | 391 | if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
c0b00441 EP |
392 | /* no data, that's ok */ |
393 | return -ENODATA; | |
c0b00441 EP |
394 | if (size < 0) |
395 | return size; | |
b5376771 | 396 | |
e338d263 | 397 | if (size < sizeof(magic_etc)) |
b5376771 SH |
398 | return -EINVAL; |
399 | ||
c0b00441 | 400 | cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc); |
b5376771 | 401 | |
a6f76f23 | 402 | switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) { |
e338d263 AM |
403 | case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1: |
404 | if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1) | |
405 | return -EINVAL; | |
406 | tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1; | |
407 | break; | |
408 | case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2: | |
409 | if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2) | |
410 | return -EINVAL; | |
411 | tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2; | |
412 | break; | |
b5376771 SH |
413 | default: |
414 | return -EINVAL; | |
415 | } | |
e338d263 | 416 | |
5459c164 | 417 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { |
c0b00441 EP |
418 | if (i >= tocopy) |
419 | break; | |
420 | cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted); | |
421 | cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable); | |
e338d263 | 422 | } |
a6f76f23 | 423 | |
7d8b6c63 EP |
424 | cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; |
425 | cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; | |
426 | ||
c0b00441 | 427 | return 0; |
b5376771 SH |
428 | } |
429 | ||
1d045980 DH |
430 | /* |
431 | * Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from | |
432 | * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being | |
433 | * constructed by execve(). | |
434 | */ | |
4d49f671 | 435 | static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap) |
b5376771 | 436 | { |
b5376771 | 437 | int rc = 0; |
c0b00441 | 438 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; |
b5376771 | 439 | |
3318a386 SH |
440 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); |
441 | ||
1f29fae2 SH |
442 | if (!file_caps_enabled) |
443 | return 0; | |
444 | ||
182be684 | 445 | if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) |
b5376771 | 446 | return 0; |
b5376771 | 447 | |
f4a4a8b1 | 448 | rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); |
c0b00441 EP |
449 | if (rc < 0) { |
450 | if (rc == -EINVAL) | |
451 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", | |
452 | __func__, rc, bprm->filename); | |
453 | else if (rc == -ENODATA) | |
454 | rc = 0; | |
b5376771 SH |
455 | goto out; |
456 | } | |
b5376771 | 457 | |
4d49f671 | 458 | rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap); |
a6f76f23 DH |
459 | if (rc == -EINVAL) |
460 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", | |
461 | __func__, rc, bprm->filename); | |
b5376771 SH |
462 | |
463 | out: | |
b5376771 SH |
464 | if (rc) |
465 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
466 | ||
467 | return rc; | |
468 | } | |
469 | ||
1d045980 DH |
470 | /** |
471 | * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). | |
472 | * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds | |
473 | * | |
474 | * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being | |
475 | * constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered, | |
476 | * which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. | |
a6f76f23 DH |
477 | */ |
478 | int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1da177e4 | 479 | { |
a6f76f23 DH |
480 | const struct cred *old = current_cred(); |
481 | struct cred *new = bprm->cred; | |
7d8db180 | 482 | bool effective, has_cap = false; |
b5376771 | 483 | int ret; |
18815a18 | 484 | kuid_t root_uid; |
1da177e4 | 485 | |
a6f76f23 | 486 | effective = false; |
4d49f671 | 487 | ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap); |
a6f76f23 DH |
488 | if (ret < 0) |
489 | return ret; | |
1da177e4 | 490 | |
18815a18 EB |
491 | root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); |
492 | ||
5459c164 | 493 | if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { |
b5f22a59 SH |
494 | /* |
495 | * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs | |
496 | * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it | |
497 | * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin. | |
498 | */ | |
18815a18 | 499 | if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) { |
b5f22a59 SH |
500 | warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename); |
501 | goto skip; | |
502 | } | |
5459c164 AM |
503 | /* |
504 | * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root | |
505 | * executables under compatibility mode, we override the | |
506 | * capability sets for the file. | |
507 | * | |
a6f76f23 | 508 | * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit. |
5459c164 | 509 | */ |
18815a18 | 510 | if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) { |
5459c164 | 511 | /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */ |
a6f76f23 DH |
512 | new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset, |
513 | old->cap_inheritable); | |
1da177e4 | 514 | } |
18815a18 | 515 | if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) |
a6f76f23 | 516 | effective = true; |
1da177e4 | 517 | } |
b5f22a59 | 518 | skip: |
b5376771 | 519 | |
d52fc5dd EP |
520 | /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ |
521 | if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) | |
522 | bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; | |
523 | ||
524 | ||
a6f76f23 | 525 | /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised |
259e5e6c AL |
526 | * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. |
527 | * | |
528 | * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs. | |
a6f76f23 | 529 | */ |
18815a18 EB |
530 | if ((!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || |
531 | !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) || | |
a6f76f23 DH |
532 | !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) && |
533 | bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) { | |
534 | /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ | |
259e5e6c AL |
535 | if (!capable(CAP_SETUID) || |
536 | (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) { | |
a6f76f23 DH |
537 | new->euid = new->uid; |
538 | new->egid = new->gid; | |
1da177e4 | 539 | } |
b3a222e5 SH |
540 | new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted, |
541 | old->cap_permitted); | |
1da177e4 LT |
542 | } |
543 | ||
a6f76f23 DH |
544 | new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid; |
545 | new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; | |
1da177e4 | 546 | |
4bf2ea77 EP |
547 | if (effective) |
548 | new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; | |
549 | else | |
550 | cap_clear(new->cap_effective); | |
a6f76f23 | 551 | bprm->cap_effective = effective; |
1da177e4 | 552 | |
3fc689e9 EP |
553 | /* |
554 | * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set | |
555 | * | |
556 | * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: | |
557 | * 1) cap_effective has all caps | |
558 | * 2) we are root | |
559 | * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) | |
560 | * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. | |
561 | * | |
562 | * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think | |
563 | * that is interesting information to audit. | |
564 | */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
565 | if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) { |
566 | if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) || | |
18815a18 | 567 | !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || |
a6f76f23 DH |
568 | issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { |
569 | ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); | |
570 | if (ret < 0) | |
571 | return ret; | |
572 | } | |
3fc689e9 | 573 | } |
1da177e4 | 574 | |
d84f4f99 | 575 | new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); |
a6f76f23 | 576 | return 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
577 | } |
578 | ||
1d045980 DH |
579 | /** |
580 | * cap_bprm_secureexec - Determine whether a secure execution is required | |
581 | * @bprm: The execution parameters | |
582 | * | |
583 | * Determine whether a secure execution is required, return 1 if it is, and 0 | |
584 | * if it is not. | |
585 | * | |
586 | * The credentials have been committed by this point, and so are no longer | |
587 | * available through @bprm->cred. | |
a6f76f23 DH |
588 | */ |
589 | int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1da177e4 | 590 | { |
c69e8d9c | 591 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
18815a18 | 592 | kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, 0); |
b6dff3ec | 593 | |
18815a18 | 594 | if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, root_uid)) { |
b5376771 SH |
595 | if (bprm->cap_effective) |
596 | return 1; | |
a6f76f23 | 597 | if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_permitted)) |
b5376771 SH |
598 | return 1; |
599 | } | |
600 | ||
18815a18 EB |
601 | return (!uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) || |
602 | !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid)); | |
1da177e4 LT |
603 | } |
604 | ||
1d045980 DH |
605 | /** |
606 | * cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered | |
607 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered | |
608 | * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed | |
609 | * @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to | |
610 | * @size: The size of value | |
611 | * @flags: The replacement flag | |
612 | * | |
613 | * Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if | |
614 | * permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
615 | * | |
616 | * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those | |
617 | * who aren't privileged to do so. | |
618 | */ | |
8f0cfa52 DH |
619 | int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, |
620 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
1da177e4 | 621 | { |
b5376771 SH |
622 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
623 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
624 | return -EPERM; | |
625 | return 0; | |
1d045980 DH |
626 | } |
627 | ||
628 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
c5b60b5e | 629 | sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && |
1da177e4 LT |
630 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
631 | return -EPERM; | |
632 | return 0; | |
633 | } | |
634 | ||
1d045980 DH |
635 | /** |
636 | * cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed | |
637 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered | |
638 | * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed | |
639 | * | |
640 | * Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if | |
641 | * permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
642 | * | |
643 | * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who | |
644 | * aren't privileged to remove them. | |
645 | */ | |
8f0cfa52 | 646 | int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
1da177e4 | 647 | { |
b5376771 SH |
648 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
649 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
650 | return -EPERM; | |
651 | return 0; | |
1d045980 DH |
652 | } |
653 | ||
654 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
c5b60b5e | 655 | sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && |
1da177e4 LT |
656 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
657 | return -EPERM; | |
658 | return 0; | |
659 | } | |
660 | ||
a6f76f23 | 661 | /* |
1da177e4 LT |
662 | * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of |
663 | * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid. | |
664 | * | |
665 | * 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of | |
666 | * {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are | |
667 | * cleared. | |
668 | * | |
669 | * 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective | |
670 | * capabilities of the process are cleared. | |
671 | * | |
672 | * 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective | |
673 | * capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities. | |
674 | * | |
a6f76f23 | 675 | * fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should |
1da177e4 LT |
676 | * never happen. |
677 | * | |
a6f76f23 | 678 | * -astor |
1da177e4 LT |
679 | * |
680 | * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99 | |
681 | * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it | |
682 | * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and | |
683 | * effective sets will be retained. | |
684 | * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some | |
685 | * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges! | |
686 | * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital | |
687 | * files.. | |
688 | * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this. | |
689 | */ | |
d84f4f99 | 690 | static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
1da177e4 | 691 | { |
18815a18 EB |
692 | kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0); |
693 | ||
694 | if ((uid_eq(old->uid, root_uid) || | |
695 | uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) || | |
696 | uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) && | |
697 | (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && | |
698 | !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) && | |
699 | !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid)) && | |
3898b1b4 | 700 | !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) { |
d84f4f99 DH |
701 | cap_clear(new->cap_permitted); |
702 | cap_clear(new->cap_effective); | |
1da177e4 | 703 | } |
18815a18 | 704 | if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) |
d84f4f99 | 705 | cap_clear(new->cap_effective); |
18815a18 | 706 | if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) |
d84f4f99 | 707 | new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; |
1da177e4 LT |
708 | } |
709 | ||
1d045980 DH |
710 | /** |
711 | * cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call | |
712 | * @new: The proposed credentials | |
713 | * @old: The current task's current credentials | |
714 | * @flags: Indications of what has changed | |
715 | * | |
716 | * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are | |
717 | * actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them. | |
718 | */ | |
d84f4f99 | 719 | int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) |
1da177e4 LT |
720 | { |
721 | switch (flags) { | |
722 | case LSM_SETID_RE: | |
723 | case LSM_SETID_ID: | |
724 | case LSM_SETID_RES: | |
1d045980 DH |
725 | /* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless |
726 | * otherwise suppressed */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
727 | if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) |
728 | cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old); | |
1da177e4 | 729 | break; |
1da177e4 | 730 | |
1d045980 DH |
731 | case LSM_SETID_FS: |
732 | /* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless | |
733 | * otherwise suppressed | |
734 | * | |
d84f4f99 DH |
735 | * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities? |
736 | * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here. | |
737 | */ | |
738 | if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { | |
18815a18 EB |
739 | kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0); |
740 | if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid)) | |
d84f4f99 DH |
741 | new->cap_effective = |
742 | cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective); | |
1d045980 | 743 | |
18815a18 | 744 | if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid)) |
d84f4f99 DH |
745 | new->cap_effective = |
746 | cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective, | |
747 | new->cap_permitted); | |
1da177e4 | 748 | } |
d84f4f99 | 749 | break; |
1d045980 | 750 | |
1da177e4 LT |
751 | default: |
752 | return -EINVAL; | |
753 | } | |
754 | ||
755 | return 0; | |
756 | } | |
757 | ||
b5376771 SH |
758 | /* |
759 | * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and | |
760 | * task_setnice, assumes that | |
761 | * . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed | |
762 | * . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes, | |
763 | * then those actions should be allowed | |
764 | * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but | |
765 | * yet with increased caps. | |
766 | * So we check for increased caps on the target process. | |
767 | */ | |
de45e806 | 768 | static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p) |
b5376771 | 769 | { |
f54fb863 | 770 | int is_subset, ret = 0; |
c69e8d9c DH |
771 | |
772 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
773 | is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted, | |
774 | current_cred()->cap_permitted); | |
f54fb863 SH |
775 | if (!is_subset && !ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) |
776 | ret = -EPERM; | |
c69e8d9c DH |
777 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
778 | ||
f54fb863 | 779 | return ret; |
b5376771 SH |
780 | } |
781 | ||
1d045980 DH |
782 | /** |
783 | * cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted | |
784 | * @p: The task to affect | |
1d045980 DH |
785 | * |
786 | * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the | |
787 | * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
788 | */ | |
b0ae1981 | 789 | int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) |
b5376771 SH |
790 | { |
791 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
792 | } | |
793 | ||
1d045980 DH |
794 | /** |
795 | * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted | |
796 | * @p: The task to affect | |
797 | * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set | |
798 | * | |
799 | * Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified | |
800 | * task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
801 | */ | |
802 | int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) | |
b5376771 SH |
803 | { |
804 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
805 | } | |
806 | ||
1d045980 DH |
807 | /** |
808 | * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted | |
809 | * @p: The task to affect | |
810 | * @nice: The nice value to set | |
811 | * | |
812 | * Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the | |
813 | * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
814 | */ | |
815 | int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
b5376771 SH |
816 | { |
817 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
818 | } | |
819 | ||
3b7391de | 820 | /* |
1d045980 DH |
821 | * Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP. Attempt to remove the specified capability from |
822 | * the current task's bounding set. Returns 0 on success, -ve on error. | |
3b7391de | 823 | */ |
6d6f3328 | 824 | static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap) |
3b7391de | 825 | { |
6d6f3328 TH |
826 | struct cred *new; |
827 | ||
160da84d | 828 | if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP)) |
3b7391de SH |
829 | return -EPERM; |
830 | if (!cap_valid(cap)) | |
831 | return -EINVAL; | |
d84f4f99 | 832 | |
6d6f3328 TH |
833 | new = prepare_creds(); |
834 | if (!new) | |
835 | return -ENOMEM; | |
d84f4f99 | 836 | cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap); |
6d6f3328 | 837 | return commit_creds(new); |
3b7391de | 838 | } |
3898b1b4 | 839 | |
1d045980 DH |
840 | /** |
841 | * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module | |
842 | * @option: The process control function requested | |
843 | * @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function | |
844 | * | |
845 | * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may | |
846 | * also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here. | |
847 | * | |
848 | * Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented | |
849 | * here, other -ve on error. If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM | |
850 | * modules will consider performing the function. | |
851 | */ | |
3898b1b4 | 852 | int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, |
d84f4f99 | 853 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) |
3898b1b4 | 854 | { |
6d6f3328 | 855 | const struct cred *old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f99 | 856 | struct cred *new; |
d84f4f99 | 857 | |
3898b1b4 AM |
858 | switch (option) { |
859 | case PR_CAPBSET_READ: | |
860 | if (!cap_valid(arg2)) | |
6d6f3328 TH |
861 | return -EINVAL; |
862 | return !!cap_raised(old->cap_bset, arg2); | |
d84f4f99 | 863 | |
3898b1b4 | 864 | case PR_CAPBSET_DROP: |
6d6f3328 | 865 | return cap_prctl_drop(arg2); |
3898b1b4 AM |
866 | |
867 | /* | |
868 | * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a | |
869 | * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem | |
870 | * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem | |
871 | * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended. | |
872 | * | |
873 | * Note: | |
874 | * | |
875 | * PR_SET_SECUREBITS = | |
876 | * issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED) | |
877 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | |
878 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED) | |
879 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | |
880 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED) | |
881 | * | |
882 | * will ensure that the current process and all of its | |
883 | * children will be locked into a pure | |
884 | * capability-based-privilege environment. | |
885 | */ | |
886 | case PR_SET_SECUREBITS: | |
6d6f3328 TH |
887 | if ((((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1) |
888 | & (old->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ | |
889 | || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ | |
d84f4f99 | 890 | || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ |
6a9de491 | 891 | || (cap_capable(current_cred(), |
c4a4d603 | 892 | current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, |
3699c53c | 893 | SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ |
3898b1b4 AM |
894 | /* |
895 | * [1] no changing of bits that are locked | |
896 | * [2] no unlocking of locks | |
897 | * [3] no setting of unsupported bits | |
898 | * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about | |
899 | * the "sendmail capabilities bug") | |
900 | */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
901 | ) |
902 | /* cannot change a locked bit */ | |
6d6f3328 TH |
903 | return -EPERM; |
904 | ||
905 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
906 | if (!new) | |
907 | return -ENOMEM; | |
d84f4f99 | 908 | new->securebits = arg2; |
6d6f3328 | 909 | return commit_creds(new); |
d84f4f99 | 910 | |
3898b1b4 | 911 | case PR_GET_SECUREBITS: |
6d6f3328 | 912 | return old->securebits; |
3898b1b4 | 913 | |
3898b1b4 | 914 | case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS: |
6d6f3328 | 915 | return !!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); |
d84f4f99 | 916 | |
3898b1b4 AM |
917 | case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS: |
918 | if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */ | |
6d6f3328 | 919 | return -EINVAL; |
d84f4f99 | 920 | if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) |
6d6f3328 TH |
921 | return -EPERM; |
922 | ||
923 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
924 | if (!new) | |
925 | return -ENOMEM; | |
d84f4f99 DH |
926 | if (arg2) |
927 | new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); | |
3898b1b4 | 928 | else |
d84f4f99 | 929 | new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); |
6d6f3328 | 930 | return commit_creds(new); |
3898b1b4 AM |
931 | |
932 | default: | |
933 | /* No functionality available - continue with default */ | |
6d6f3328 | 934 | return -ENOSYS; |
3898b1b4 | 935 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
936 | } |
937 | ||
1d045980 DH |
938 | /** |
939 | * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted | |
940 | * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made | |
941 | * @pages: The size of the mapping | |
942 | * | |
943 | * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current | |
944 | * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not. | |
945 | */ | |
34b4e4aa | 946 | int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) |
1da177e4 LT |
947 | { |
948 | int cap_sys_admin = 0; | |
949 | ||
6a9de491 | 950 | if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, |
3699c53c | 951 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) |
1da177e4 | 952 | cap_sys_admin = 1; |
34b4e4aa | 953 | return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); |
1da177e4 | 954 | } |
7c73875e EP |
955 | |
956 | /* | |
d007794a | 957 | * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr |
7c73875e | 958 | * @addr: address attempting to be mapped |
7c73875e | 959 | * |
6f262d8e | 960 | * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need |
7c73875e EP |
961 | * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the |
962 | * capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed | |
963 | * -EPERM if not. | |
964 | */ | |
d007794a | 965 | int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) |
7c73875e EP |
966 | { |
967 | int ret = 0; | |
968 | ||
a2551df7 | 969 | if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { |
6a9de491 | 970 | ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, |
7c73875e EP |
971 | SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); |
972 | /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ | |
973 | if (ret == 0) | |
974 | current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; | |
975 | } | |
976 | return ret; | |
977 | } | |
d007794a | 978 | |
e5467859 AV |
979 | int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
980 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) | |
d007794a | 981 | { |
e5467859 | 982 | return 0; |
d007794a | 983 | } |