5 The key request service is part of the key retention service (refer to
6 Documentation/security/keys.txt). This document explains more fully how
7 the requesting algorithm works.
9 The process starts by either the kernel requesting a service by calling
12 struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type,
13 const char *description,
14 const char *callout_info);
18 struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type,
19 const char *description,
20 const char *callout_info,
26 struct key *request_key_async(const struct key_type *type,
27 const char *description,
28 const char *callout_info,
33 struct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type,
34 const char *description,
35 const char *callout_info,
39 Or by userspace invoking the request_key system call:
41 key_serial_t request_key(const char *type,
42 const char *description,
43 const char *callout_info,
44 key_serial_t dest_keyring);
46 The main difference between the access points is that the in-kernel interface
47 does not need to link the key to a keyring to prevent it from being immediately
48 destroyed. The kernel interface returns a pointer directly to the key, and
49 it's up to the caller to destroy the key.
51 The request_key*_with_auxdata() calls are like the in-kernel request_key*()
52 calls, except that they permit auxiliary data to be passed to the upcaller (the
53 default is NULL). This is only useful for those key types that define their
54 own upcall mechanism rather than using /sbin/request-key.
56 The two async in-kernel calls may return keys that are still in the process of
57 being constructed. The two non-async ones will wait for construction to
60 The userspace interface links the key to a keyring associated with the process
61 to prevent the key from going away, and returns the serial number of the key to
65 The following example assumes that the key types involved don't define their
66 own upcall mechanisms. If they do, then those should be substituted for the
67 forking and execution of /sbin/request-key.
74 A request proceeds in the following manner:
76 (1) Process A calls request_key() [the userspace syscall calls the kernel
79 (2) request_key() searches the process's subscribed keyrings to see if there's
80 a suitable key there. If there is, it returns the key. If there isn't,
81 and callout_info is not set, an error is returned. Otherwise the process
82 proceeds to the next step.
84 (3) request_key() sees that A doesn't have the desired key yet, so it creates
87 (a) An uninstantiated key U of requested type and description.
89 (b) An authorisation key V that refers to key U and notes that process A
90 is the context in which key U should be instantiated and secured, and
91 from which associated key requests may be satisfied.
93 (4) request_key() then forks and executes /sbin/request-key with a new session
94 keyring that contains a link to auth key V.
96 (5) /sbin/request-key assumes the authority associated with key U.
98 (6) /sbin/request-key execs an appropriate program to perform the actual
101 (7) The program may want to access another key from A's context (say a
102 Kerberos TGT key). It just requests the appropriate key, and the keyring
103 search notes that the session keyring has auth key V in its bottom level.
105 This will permit it to then search the keyrings of process A with the
106 UID, GID, groups and security info of process A as if it was process A,
107 and come up with key W.
109 (8) The program then does what it must to get the data with which to
110 instantiate key U, using key W as a reference (perhaps it contacts a
111 Kerberos server using the TGT) and then instantiates key U.
113 (9) Upon instantiating key U, auth key V is automatically revoked so that it
114 may not be used again.
116 (10) The program then exits 0 and request_key() deletes key V and returns key
119 This also extends further. If key W (step 7 above) didn't exist, key W would
120 be created uninstantiated, another auth key (X) would be created (as per step
121 3) and another copy of /sbin/request-key spawned (as per step 4); but the
122 context specified by auth key X will still be process A, as it was in auth key
125 This is because process A's keyrings can't simply be attached to
126 /sbin/request-key at the appropriate places because (a) execve will discard two
127 of them, and (b) it requires the same UID/GID/Groups all the way through.
130 ====================================
131 NEGATIVE INSTANTIATION AND REJECTION
132 ====================================
134 Rather than instantiating a key, it is possible for the possessor of an
135 authorisation key to negatively instantiate a key that's under construction.
136 This is a short duration placeholder that causes any attempt at re-requesting
137 the key whilst it exists to fail with error ENOKEY if negated or the specified
140 This is provided to prevent excessive repeated spawning of /sbin/request-key
141 processes for a key that will never be obtainable.
143 Should the /sbin/request-key process exit anything other than 0 or die on a
144 signal, the key under construction will be automatically negatively
145 instantiated for a short amount of time.
152 A search of any particular keyring proceeds in the following fashion:
154 (1) When the key management code searches for a key (keyring_search_aux) it
155 firstly calls key_permission(SEARCH) on the keyring it's starting with,
156 if this denies permission, it doesn't search further.
158 (2) It considers all the non-keyring keys within that keyring and, if any key
159 matches the criteria specified, calls key_permission(SEARCH) on it to see
160 if the key is allowed to be found. If it is, that key is returned; if
161 not, the search continues, and the error code is retained if of higher
162 priority than the one currently set.
164 (3) It then considers all the keyring-type keys in the keyring it's currently
165 searching. It calls key_permission(SEARCH) on each keyring, and if this
166 grants permission, it recurses, executing steps (2) and (3) on that
169 The process stops immediately a valid key is found with permission granted to
170 use it. Any error from a previous match attempt is discarded and the key is
173 When search_process_keyrings() is invoked, it performs the following searches
176 (1) If extant, the process's thread keyring is searched.
178 (2) If extant, the process's process keyring is searched.
180 (3) The process's session keyring is searched.
182 (4) If the process has assumed the authority associated with a request_key()
183 authorisation key then:
185 (a) If extant, the calling process's thread keyring is searched.
187 (b) If extant, the calling process's process keyring is searched.
189 (c) The calling process's session keyring is searched.
191 The moment one succeeds, all pending errors are discarded and the found key is
194 Only if all these fail does the whole thing fail with the highest priority
195 error. Note that several errors may have come from LSM.
197 The error priority is:
199 EKEYREVOKED > EKEYEXPIRED > ENOKEY
201 EACCES/EPERM are only returned on a direct search of a specific keyring where
202 the basal keyring does not grant Search permission.