1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/export.h>
52 #include <linux/slab.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
73 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
74 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
75 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
76 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
78 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
79 * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate
80 * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */
83 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
84 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
86 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
87 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
89 /* number of audit rules */
92 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
95 struct audit_cap_data
{
96 kernel_cap_t permitted
;
97 kernel_cap_t inheritable
;
99 unsigned int fE
; /* effective bit of a file capability */
100 kernel_cap_t effective
; /* effective set of a process */
104 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
105 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
106 * pointers at syscall exit time).
108 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
110 struct list_head list
; /* audit_context->names_list */
119 struct audit_cap_data fcap
;
120 unsigned int fcap_ver
;
121 int name_len
; /* number of name's characters to log */
122 bool name_put
; /* call __putname() for this name */
124 * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of
125 * names allocated in the task audit context. Thus this name
126 * should be freed on syscall exit
131 struct audit_aux_data
{
132 struct audit_aux_data
*next
;
136 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
138 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
139 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
141 struct audit_aux_data_execve
{
142 struct audit_aux_data d
;
145 struct mm_struct
*mm
;
148 struct audit_aux_data_pids
{
149 struct audit_aux_data d
;
150 pid_t target_pid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
151 uid_t target_auid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
152 uid_t target_uid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
153 unsigned int target_sessionid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
154 u32 target_sid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
155 char target_comm
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
][TASK_COMM_LEN
];
159 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
{
160 struct audit_aux_data d
;
161 struct audit_cap_data fcap
;
162 unsigned int fcap_ver
;
163 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap
;
164 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap
;
167 struct audit_aux_data_capset
{
168 struct audit_aux_data d
;
170 struct audit_cap_data cap
;
173 struct audit_tree_refs
{
174 struct audit_tree_refs
*next
;
175 struct audit_chunk
*c
[31];
178 /* The per-task audit context. */
179 struct audit_context
{
180 int dummy
; /* must be the first element */
181 int in_syscall
; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
182 enum audit_state state
, current_state
;
183 unsigned int serial
; /* serial number for record */
184 int major
; /* syscall number */
185 struct timespec ctime
; /* time of syscall entry */
186 unsigned long argv
[4]; /* syscall arguments */
187 long return_code
;/* syscall return code */
189 int return_valid
; /* return code is valid */
191 * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this
192 * syscall. The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will
193 * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance
194 * reasons. Except during allocation they should never be referenced
195 * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used
196 * by running the names_list.
198 struct audit_names preallocated_names
[AUDIT_NAMES
];
199 int name_count
; /* total records in names_list */
200 struct list_head names_list
; /* anchor for struct audit_names->list */
201 char * filterkey
; /* key for rule that triggered record */
203 struct audit_context
*previous
; /* For nested syscalls */
204 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
205 struct audit_aux_data
*aux_pids
;
206 struct sockaddr_storage
*sockaddr
;
208 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
210 uid_t uid
, euid
, suid
, fsuid
;
211 gid_t gid
, egid
, sgid
, fsgid
;
212 unsigned long personality
;
218 unsigned int target_sessionid
;
220 char target_comm
[TASK_COMM_LEN
];
222 struct audit_tree_refs
*trees
, *first_trees
;
223 struct list_head killed_trees
;
241 unsigned long qbytes
;
245 struct mq_attr mqstat
;
254 unsigned int msg_prio
;
255 struct timespec abs_timeout
;
264 struct audit_cap_data cap
;
279 static inline int open_arg(int flags
, int mask
)
281 int n
= ACC_MODE(flags
);
282 if (flags
& (O_TRUNC
| O_CREAT
))
283 n
|= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
;
287 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int mask
)
294 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx
->arch
, n
)) {
296 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
297 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE
, n
))
299 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
300 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ
, n
))
302 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
303 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR
, n
))
306 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
307 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
308 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32
, n
))
310 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
311 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32
, n
))
313 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
314 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32
, n
))
318 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[1]);
320 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[2]);
321 case 4: /* socketcall */
322 return ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) && ctx
->argv
[0] == SYS_BIND
);
324 return mask
& AUDIT_PERM_EXEC
;
330 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int val
)
332 struct audit_names
*n
;
333 umode_t mode
= (umode_t
)val
;
338 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
339 if ((n
->ino
!= -1) &&
340 ((n
->mode
& S_IFMT
) == mode
))
348 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
349 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
350 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
351 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
352 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
353 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
354 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
357 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
358 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
362 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
366 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_chunk
*chunk
)
368 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
369 int left
= ctx
->tree_count
;
371 p
->c
[--left
] = chunk
;
372 ctx
->tree_count
= left
;
381 ctx
->tree_count
= 30;
387 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
389 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
390 ctx
->trees
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs
), GFP_KERNEL
);
396 p
->next
= ctx
->trees
;
398 ctx
->first_trees
= ctx
->trees
;
399 ctx
->tree_count
= 31;
404 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
405 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, int count
)
407 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
408 struct audit_tree_refs
*q
;
411 /* we started with empty chain */
412 p
= ctx
->first_trees
;
414 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
419 for (q
= p
; q
!= ctx
->trees
; q
= q
->next
, n
= 31) {
421 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
425 while (n
-- > ctx
->tree_count
) {
426 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
430 ctx
->tree_count
= count
;
434 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
436 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, *q
;
437 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
; p
= q
) {
443 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_tree
*tree
)
445 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
446 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
451 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
!= ctx
->trees
; p
= p
->next
) {
452 for (n
= 0; n
< 31; n
++)
453 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
458 for (n
= ctx
->tree_count
; n
< 31; n
++)
459 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
466 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
467 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
470 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
471 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
472 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
474 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
475 struct audit_krule
*rule
,
476 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
477 struct audit_names
*name
,
478 enum audit_state
*state
,
481 const struct cred
*cred
;
485 cred
= rcu_dereference_check(tsk
->cred
, tsk
== current
|| task_creation
);
487 for (i
= 0; i
< rule
->field_count
; i
++) {
488 struct audit_field
*f
= &rule
->fields
[i
];
489 struct audit_names
*n
;
494 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->pid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
499 ctx
->ppid
= sys_getppid();
500 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->ppid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
504 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
507 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
510 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
513 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->fsuid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
516 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
519 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
522 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
525 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->fsgid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
528 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->personality
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
532 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->arch
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
536 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
)
537 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_code
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
540 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
) {
542 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_SUCCESS
);
544 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_FAILURE
);
549 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
550 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
553 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
554 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
555 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
564 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
565 audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
568 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
569 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
570 audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
579 result
= (name
->ino
== f
->val
);
581 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
582 if (audit_comparator(n
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
591 result
= audit_watch_compare(rule
->watch
, name
->ino
, name
->dev
);
595 result
= match_tree_refs(ctx
, rule
->tree
);
600 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
602 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
603 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
604 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
607 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
608 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
609 match for now to avoid losing information that
610 may be wanted. An error message will also be
614 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &sid
);
617 result
= security_audit_rule_match(sid
, f
->type
,
626 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
627 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
628 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
631 /* Find files that match */
633 result
= security_audit_rule_match(
634 name
->osid
, f
->type
, f
->op
,
637 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
638 if (security_audit_rule_match(n
->osid
, f
->type
,
646 /* Find ipc objects that match */
647 if (!ctx
|| ctx
->type
!= AUDIT_IPC
)
649 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx
->ipc
.osid
,
660 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->argv
[f
->type
-AUDIT_ARG0
], f
->op
, f
->val
);
662 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY
:
663 /* ignore this field for filtering */
667 result
= audit_match_perm(ctx
, f
->val
);
670 result
= audit_match_filetype(ctx
, f
->val
);
679 if (rule
->prio
<= ctx
->prio
)
681 if (rule
->filterkey
) {
682 kfree(ctx
->filterkey
);
683 ctx
->filterkey
= kstrdup(rule
->filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
685 ctx
->prio
= rule
->prio
;
687 switch (rule
->action
) {
688 case AUDIT_NEVER
: *state
= AUDIT_DISABLED
; break;
689 case AUDIT_ALWAYS
: *state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
; break;
694 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
695 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
696 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
698 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_task(struct task_struct
*tsk
, char **key
)
700 struct audit_entry
*e
;
701 enum audit_state state
;
704 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK
], list
) {
705 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, NULL
, NULL
,
707 if (state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
708 *key
= kstrdup(e
->rule
.filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
714 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
717 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
718 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
719 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
720 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
722 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
723 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
724 struct list_head
*list
)
726 struct audit_entry
*e
;
727 enum audit_state state
;
729 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
730 return AUDIT_DISABLED
;
733 if (!list_empty(list
)) {
734 int word
= AUDIT_WORD(ctx
->major
);
735 int bit
= AUDIT_BIT(ctx
->major
);
737 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
738 if ((e
->rule
.mask
[word
] & bit
) == bit
&&
739 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, NULL
,
742 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
748 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
752 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
753 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
755 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
756 struct audit_names
*n
,
757 struct audit_context
*ctx
) {
759 int h
= audit_hash_ino((u32
)n
->ino
);
760 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_inode_hash
[h
];
761 struct audit_entry
*e
;
762 enum audit_state state
;
764 word
= AUDIT_WORD(ctx
->major
);
765 bit
= AUDIT_BIT(ctx
->major
);
767 if (list_empty(list
))
770 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
771 if ((e
->rule
.mask
[word
] & bit
) == bit
&&
772 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, n
, &state
, false)) {
773 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
781 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
782 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
783 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
784 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
786 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct
*tsk
, struct audit_context
*ctx
)
788 struct audit_names
*n
;
790 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
795 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
796 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk
, n
, ctx
))
802 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_get_context(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
806 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
808 if (likely(!context
))
810 context
->return_valid
= return_valid
;
813 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
814 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
817 * This is actually a test for:
818 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
819 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
821 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
823 if (unlikely(return_code
<= -ERESTARTSYS
) &&
824 (return_code
>= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK
) &&
825 (return_code
!= -ENOIOCTLCMD
))
826 context
->return_code
= -EINTR
;
828 context
->return_code
= return_code
;
830 if (context
->in_syscall
&& !context
->dummy
) {
831 audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT
]);
832 audit_filter_inodes(tsk
, context
);
835 tsk
->audit_context
= NULL
;
839 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context
*context
)
841 struct audit_names
*n
, *next
;
844 if (context
->put_count
+ context
->ino_count
!= context
->name_count
) {
845 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
846 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
847 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
849 context
->serial
, context
->major
, context
->in_syscall
,
850 context
->name_count
, context
->put_count
,
852 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
853 printk(KERN_ERR
"names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i
,
854 n
->name
, n
->name
?: "(null)");
861 context
->put_count
= 0;
862 context
->ino_count
= 0;
865 list_for_each_entry_safe(n
, next
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
867 if (n
->name
&& n
->name_put
)
872 context
->name_count
= 0;
873 path_put(&context
->pwd
);
874 context
->pwd
.dentry
= NULL
;
875 context
->pwd
.mnt
= NULL
;
878 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context
*context
)
880 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
882 while ((aux
= context
->aux
)) {
883 context
->aux
= aux
->next
;
886 while ((aux
= context
->aux_pids
)) {
887 context
->aux_pids
= aux
->next
;
892 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context
*context
,
893 enum audit_state state
)
895 memset(context
, 0, sizeof(*context
));
896 context
->state
= state
;
897 context
->prio
= state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
900 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state
)
902 struct audit_context
*context
;
904 if (!(context
= kmalloc(sizeof(*context
), GFP_KERNEL
)))
906 audit_zero_context(context
, state
);
907 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->killed_trees
);
908 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->names_list
);
913 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
916 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
917 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
918 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
921 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
923 struct audit_context
*context
;
924 enum audit_state state
;
927 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled
))
928 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
930 state
= audit_filter_task(tsk
, &key
);
931 if (likely(state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
))
934 if (!(context
= audit_alloc_context(state
))) {
936 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
939 context
->filterkey
= key
;
941 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
942 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk
, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
946 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context
*context
)
948 struct audit_context
*previous
;
952 previous
= context
->previous
;
953 if (previous
|| (count
&& count
< 10)) {
955 printk(KERN_ERR
"audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
956 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
957 context
->serial
, context
->major
,
958 context
->name_count
, count
);
960 audit_free_names(context
);
961 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
962 free_tree_refs(context
);
963 audit_free_aux(context
);
964 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
965 kfree(context
->sockaddr
);
970 printk(KERN_ERR
"audit: freed %d contexts\n", count
);
973 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer
*ab
)
980 security_task_getsecid(current
, &sid
);
984 error
= security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
);
986 if (error
!= -EINVAL
)
991 audit_log_format(ab
, " subj=%s", ctx
);
992 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
996 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
1000 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context
);
1002 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1004 char name
[sizeof(tsk
->comm
)];
1005 struct mm_struct
*mm
= tsk
->mm
;
1006 struct vm_area_struct
*vma
;
1008 /* tsk == current */
1010 get_task_comm(name
, tsk
);
1011 audit_log_format(ab
, " comm=");
1012 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, name
);
1015 down_read(&mm
->mmap_sem
);
1018 if ((vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXECUTABLE
) &&
1020 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "exe=",
1021 &vma
->vm_file
->f_path
);
1026 up_read(&mm
->mmap_sem
);
1028 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
1031 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context
*context
, pid_t pid
,
1032 uid_t auid
, uid_t uid
, unsigned int sessionid
,
1033 u32 sid
, char *comm
)
1035 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1040 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_OBJ_PID
);
1044 audit_log_format(ab
, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid
, auid
,
1046 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1047 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=(none)");
1050 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1051 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1053 audit_log_format(ab
, " ocomm=");
1054 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, comm
);
1061 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1062 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1063 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1065 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1066 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1067 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1068 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1069 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1071 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context
*context
,
1072 struct audit_buffer
**ab
,
1075 const char __user
*p
,
1078 char arg_num_len_buf
[12];
1079 const char __user
*tmp_p
= p
;
1080 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1081 size_t arg_num_len
= snprintf(arg_num_len_buf
, 12, "%d", arg_num
) + 5;
1082 size_t len
, len_left
, to_send
;
1083 size_t max_execve_audit_len
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1084 unsigned int i
, has_cntl
= 0, too_long
= 0;
1087 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1088 len_left
= len
= strnlen_user(p
, MAX_ARG_STRLEN
) - 1;
1091 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1092 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1093 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1096 if (unlikely((len
== -1) || len
> MAX_ARG_STRLEN
- 1)) {
1098 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1102 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1104 if (len_left
> MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
)
1105 to_send
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1108 ret
= copy_from_user(buf
, tmp_p
, to_send
);
1110 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1111 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1116 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1119 buf
[to_send
] = '\0';
1120 has_cntl
= audit_string_contains_control(buf
, to_send
);
1123 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1124 * send half as much in each message
1126 max_execve_audit_len
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
/ 2;
1129 len_left
-= to_send
;
1131 } while (len_left
> 0);
1135 if (len
> max_execve_audit_len
)
1138 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1139 for (i
= 0; len_left
> 0; i
++) {
1142 if (len_left
> max_execve_audit_len
)
1143 to_send
= max_execve_audit_len
;
1147 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1148 room_left
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
- arg_num_len
- *len_sent
;
1150 room_left
-= (to_send
* 2);
1152 room_left
-= to_send
;
1153 if (room_left
< 0) {
1156 *ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EXECVE
);
1162 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1163 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1165 if ((i
== 0) && (too_long
))
1166 audit_log_format(*ab
, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num
,
1167 has_cntl
? 2*len
: len
);
1170 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1171 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1172 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1174 if (len
>= max_execve_audit_len
)
1175 ret
= copy_from_user(buf
, p
, to_send
);
1180 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1183 buf
[to_send
] = '\0';
1185 /* actually log it */
1186 audit_log_format(*ab
, " a%d", arg_num
);
1188 audit_log_format(*ab
, "[%d]", i
);
1189 audit_log_format(*ab
, "=");
1191 audit_log_n_hex(*ab
, buf
, to_send
);
1193 audit_log_string(*ab
, buf
);
1196 len_left
-= to_send
;
1197 *len_sent
+= arg_num_len
;
1199 *len_sent
+= to_send
* 2;
1201 *len_sent
+= to_send
;
1203 /* include the null we didn't log */
1207 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context
*context
,
1208 struct audit_buffer
**ab
,
1209 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*axi
)
1212 size_t len
, len_sent
= 0;
1213 const char __user
*p
;
1216 if (axi
->mm
!= current
->mm
)
1217 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1219 p
= (const char __user
*)axi
->mm
->arg_start
;
1221 audit_log_format(*ab
, "argc=%d", axi
->argc
);
1224 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1225 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1226 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1227 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1229 buf
= kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
+ 1, GFP_KERNEL
);
1231 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1235 for (i
= 0; i
< axi
->argc
; i
++) {
1236 len
= audit_log_single_execve_arg(context
, ab
, i
,
1245 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *prefix
, kernel_cap_t
*cap
)
1249 audit_log_format(ab
, " %s=", prefix
);
1250 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i
) {
1251 audit_log_format(ab
, "%08x", cap
->cap
[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S
-1) - i
]);
1255 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, struct audit_names
*name
)
1257 kernel_cap_t
*perm
= &name
->fcap
.permitted
;
1258 kernel_cap_t
*inh
= &name
->fcap
.inheritable
;
1261 if (!cap_isclear(*perm
)) {
1262 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_fp", perm
);
1265 if (!cap_isclear(*inh
)) {
1266 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_fi", inh
);
1271 audit_log_format(ab
, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name
->fcap
.fE
, name
->fcap_ver
);
1274 static void show_special(struct audit_context
*context
, int *call_panic
)
1276 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1279 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, context
->type
);
1283 switch (context
->type
) {
1284 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
: {
1285 int nargs
= context
->socketcall
.nargs
;
1286 audit_log_format(ab
, "nargs=%d", nargs
);
1287 for (i
= 0; i
< nargs
; i
++)
1288 audit_log_format(ab
, " a%d=%lx", i
,
1289 context
->socketcall
.args
[i
]);
1292 u32 osid
= context
->ipc
.osid
;
1294 audit_log_format(ab
, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1295 context
->ipc
.uid
, context
->ipc
.gid
, context
->ipc
.mode
);
1299 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1300 audit_log_format(ab
, " osid=%u", osid
);
1303 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1304 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1307 if (context
->ipc
.has_perm
) {
1309 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
,
1310 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM
);
1311 audit_log_format(ab
,
1312 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1313 context
->ipc
.qbytes
,
1314 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
,
1315 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
,
1316 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
);
1321 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
: {
1322 audit_log_format(ab
,
1323 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1324 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1325 context
->mq_open
.oflag
, context
->mq_open
.mode
,
1326 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_flags
,
1327 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_maxmsg
,
1328 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_msgsize
,
1329 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_curmsgs
);
1331 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
: {
1332 audit_log_format(ab
,
1333 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1334 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1335 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
,
1336 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
,
1337 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
,
1338 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_sec
,
1339 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_nsec
);
1341 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
: {
1342 audit_log_format(ab
, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1343 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
,
1344 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
);
1346 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
: {
1347 struct mq_attr
*attr
= &context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
;
1348 audit_log_format(ab
,
1349 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1351 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
,
1352 attr
->mq_flags
, attr
->mq_maxmsg
,
1353 attr
->mq_msgsize
, attr
->mq_curmsgs
);
1355 case AUDIT_CAPSET
: {
1356 audit_log_format(ab
, "pid=%d", context
->capset
.pid
);
1357 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pi", &context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
);
1358 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pp", &context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
);
1359 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pe", &context
->capset
.cap
.effective
);
1362 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context
->mmap
.fd
,
1363 context
->mmap
.flags
);
1369 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context
*context
, struct audit_names
*n
,
1370 int record_num
, int *call_panic
)
1372 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1373 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_PATH
);
1375 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1377 audit_log_format(ab
, "item=%d", record_num
);
1380 switch (n
->name_len
) {
1381 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL
:
1382 /* log the full path */
1383 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1384 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
);
1387 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1388 * directory component is the cwd */
1389 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "name=", &context
->pwd
);
1392 /* log the name's directory component */
1393 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1394 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
,
1398 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=(null)");
1400 if (n
->ino
!= (unsigned long)-1) {
1401 audit_log_format(ab
, " inode=%lu"
1402 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
1403 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1416 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1417 n
->osid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1418 audit_log_format(ab
, " osid=%u", n
->osid
);
1421 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1422 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1426 audit_log_fcaps(ab
, n
);
1431 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context
*context
, struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1433 const struct cred
*cred
;
1434 int i
, call_panic
= 0;
1435 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1436 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
1438 struct audit_names
*n
;
1440 /* tsk == current */
1441 context
->pid
= tsk
->pid
;
1443 context
->ppid
= sys_getppid();
1444 cred
= current_cred();
1445 context
->uid
= cred
->uid
;
1446 context
->gid
= cred
->gid
;
1447 context
->euid
= cred
->euid
;
1448 context
->suid
= cred
->suid
;
1449 context
->fsuid
= cred
->fsuid
;
1450 context
->egid
= cred
->egid
;
1451 context
->sgid
= cred
->sgid
;
1452 context
->fsgid
= cred
->fsgid
;
1453 context
->personality
= tsk
->personality
;
1455 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SYSCALL
);
1457 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1458 audit_log_format(ab
, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1459 context
->arch
, context
->major
);
1460 if (context
->personality
!= PER_LINUX
)
1461 audit_log_format(ab
, " per=%lx", context
->personality
);
1462 if (context
->return_valid
)
1463 audit_log_format(ab
, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1464 (context
->return_valid
==AUDITSC_SUCCESS
)?"yes":"no",
1465 context
->return_code
);
1467 spin_lock_irq(&tsk
->sighand
->siglock
);
1468 if (tsk
->signal
&& tsk
->signal
->tty
&& tsk
->signal
->tty
->name
)
1469 tty
= tsk
->signal
->tty
->name
;
1472 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk
->sighand
->siglock
);
1474 audit_log_format(ab
,
1475 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1476 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1477 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1478 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1483 context
->name_count
,
1489 context
->euid
, context
->suid
, context
->fsuid
,
1490 context
->egid
, context
->sgid
, context
->fsgid
, tty
,
1494 audit_log_task_info(ab
, tsk
);
1495 audit_log_key(ab
, context
->filterkey
);
1498 for (aux
= context
->aux
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1500 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, aux
->type
);
1502 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1504 switch (aux
->type
) {
1506 case AUDIT_EXECVE
: {
1507 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
1508 audit_log_execve_info(context
, &ab
, axi
);
1511 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
: {
1512 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1513 audit_log_format(ab
, "fver=%x", axs
->fcap_ver
);
1514 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fp", &axs
->fcap
.permitted
);
1515 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fi", &axs
->fcap
.inheritable
);
1516 audit_log_format(ab
, " fe=%d", axs
->fcap
.fE
);
1517 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pp", &axs
->old_pcap
.permitted
);
1518 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pi", &axs
->old_pcap
.inheritable
);
1519 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pe", &axs
->old_pcap
.effective
);
1520 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pp", &axs
->new_pcap
.permitted
);
1521 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pi", &axs
->new_pcap
.inheritable
);
1522 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pe", &axs
->new_pcap
.effective
);
1530 show_special(context
, &call_panic
);
1532 if (context
->fds
[0] >= 0) {
1533 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_FD_PAIR
);
1535 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1536 context
->fds
[0], context
->fds
[1]);
1541 if (context
->sockaddr_len
) {
1542 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SOCKADDR
);
1544 audit_log_format(ab
, "saddr=");
1545 audit_log_n_hex(ab
, (void *)context
->sockaddr
,
1546 context
->sockaddr_len
);
1551 for (aux
= context
->aux_pids
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1552 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1554 for (i
= 0; i
< axs
->pid_count
; i
++)
1555 if (audit_log_pid_context(context
, axs
->target_pid
[i
],
1556 axs
->target_auid
[i
],
1558 axs
->target_sessionid
[i
],
1560 axs
->target_comm
[i
]))
1564 if (context
->target_pid
&&
1565 audit_log_pid_context(context
, context
->target_pid
,
1566 context
->target_auid
, context
->target_uid
,
1567 context
->target_sessionid
,
1568 context
->target_sid
, context
->target_comm
))
1571 if (context
->pwd
.dentry
&& context
->pwd
.mnt
) {
1572 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_CWD
);
1574 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "cwd=", &context
->pwd
);
1580 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
)
1581 audit_log_name(context
, n
, i
++, &call_panic
);
1583 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1584 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EOE
);
1588 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1592 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1593 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1595 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1597 void audit_free(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1599 struct audit_context
*context
;
1601 context
= audit_get_context(tsk
, 0, 0);
1602 if (likely(!context
))
1605 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1606 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1607 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1608 * in the context of the idle thread */
1609 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1610 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1611 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1612 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1613 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1615 audit_free_context(context
);
1619 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1620 * @arch: architecture type
1621 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1622 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1623 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1624 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1625 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1627 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1628 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1629 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1630 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1631 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1632 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1635 void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch
, int major
,
1636 unsigned long a1
, unsigned long a2
,
1637 unsigned long a3
, unsigned long a4
)
1639 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1640 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
1641 enum audit_state state
;
1643 if (unlikely(!context
))
1647 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1648 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1649 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1650 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1651 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1655 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1657 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1658 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1660 if (context
->in_syscall
) {
1661 struct audit_context
*newctx
;
1665 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1666 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1667 context
->serial
, tsk
->pid
, context
->major
, major
);
1669 newctx
= audit_alloc_context(context
->state
);
1671 newctx
->previous
= context
;
1673 tsk
->audit_context
= newctx
;
1675 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1676 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1677 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1678 * to abandon auditing. */
1679 audit_zero_context(context
, context
->state
);
1682 BUG_ON(context
->in_syscall
|| context
->name_count
);
1687 context
->arch
= arch
;
1688 context
->major
= major
;
1689 context
->argv
[0] = a1
;
1690 context
->argv
[1] = a2
;
1691 context
->argv
[2] = a3
;
1692 context
->argv
[3] = a4
;
1694 state
= context
->state
;
1695 context
->dummy
= !audit_n_rules
;
1696 if (!context
->dummy
&& state
== AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
) {
1698 state
= audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY
]);
1700 if (likely(state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
))
1703 context
->serial
= 0;
1704 context
->ctime
= CURRENT_TIME
;
1705 context
->in_syscall
= 1;
1706 context
->current_state
= state
;
1710 void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct
*child
)
1712 struct audit_context
*ctx
= current
->audit_context
;
1713 struct audit_context
*p
= child
->audit_context
;
1716 if (!ctx
->in_syscall
|| ctx
->current_state
!= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1718 p
->arch
= ctx
->arch
;
1719 p
->major
= ctx
->major
;
1720 memcpy(p
->argv
, ctx
->argv
, sizeof(ctx
->argv
));
1721 p
->ctime
= ctx
->ctime
;
1722 p
->dummy
= ctx
->dummy
;
1723 p
->in_syscall
= ctx
->in_syscall
;
1724 p
->filterkey
= kstrdup(ctx
->filterkey
, GFP_KERNEL
);
1725 p
->ppid
= current
->pid
;
1726 p
->prio
= ctx
->prio
;
1727 p
->current_state
= ctx
->current_state
;
1731 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1732 * @pt_regs: syscall registers
1734 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1735 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1736 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1737 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1738 * free the names stored from getname().
1740 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success
, long return_code
)
1742 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1743 struct audit_context
*context
;
1746 success
= AUDITSC_SUCCESS
;
1748 success
= AUDITSC_FAILURE
;
1750 context
= audit_get_context(tsk
, success
, return_code
);
1751 if (likely(!context
))
1754 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1755 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1757 context
->in_syscall
= 0;
1758 context
->prio
= context
->state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
1760 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1761 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1763 if (context
->previous
) {
1764 struct audit_context
*new_context
= context
->previous
;
1765 context
->previous
= NULL
;
1766 audit_free_context(context
);
1767 tsk
->audit_context
= new_context
;
1769 audit_free_names(context
);
1770 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
1771 audit_free_aux(context
);
1772 context
->aux
= NULL
;
1773 context
->aux_pids
= NULL
;
1774 context
->target_pid
= 0;
1775 context
->target_sid
= 0;
1776 context
->sockaddr_len
= 0;
1778 context
->fds
[0] = -1;
1779 if (context
->state
!= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
) {
1780 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
1781 context
->filterkey
= NULL
;
1783 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
1787 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode
*inode
)
1789 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1790 struct audit_context
*context
;
1791 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1792 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1794 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
)))
1796 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1798 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1800 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1804 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
)))
1806 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context
))) {
1807 printk(KERN_WARNING
"out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1808 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1809 audit_put_chunk(chunk
);
1810 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1813 put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
);
1817 static void handle_path(const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1819 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1820 struct audit_context
*context
;
1821 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1822 const struct dentry
*d
, *parent
;
1823 struct audit_chunk
*drop
;
1827 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1829 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1834 seq
= read_seqbegin(&rename_lock
);
1836 struct inode
*inode
= d
->d_inode
;
1837 if (inode
&& unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
))) {
1838 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1839 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1841 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
))) {
1847 parent
= d
->d_parent
;
1852 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock
, seq
) || drop
)) { /* in this order */
1855 /* just a race with rename */
1856 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1859 audit_put_chunk(drop
);
1860 if (grow_tree_refs(context
)) {
1861 /* OK, got more space */
1862 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1867 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1868 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1869 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1876 static struct audit_names
*audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context
*context
)
1878 struct audit_names
*aname
;
1880 if (context
->name_count
< AUDIT_NAMES
) {
1881 aname
= &context
->preallocated_names
[context
->name_count
];
1882 memset(aname
, 0, sizeof(*aname
));
1884 aname
= kzalloc(sizeof(*aname
), GFP_NOFS
);
1887 aname
->should_free
= true;
1890 aname
->ino
= (unsigned long)-1;
1891 list_add_tail(&aname
->list
, &context
->names_list
);
1893 context
->name_count
++;
1895 context
->ino_count
++;
1901 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1902 * @name: name to add
1904 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1905 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1907 void __audit_getname(const char *name
)
1909 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1910 struct audit_names
*n
;
1912 if (IS_ERR(name
) || !name
)
1915 if (!context
->in_syscall
) {
1916 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1917 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1918 __FILE__
, __LINE__
, context
->serial
, name
);
1924 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
1929 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1932 if (!context
->pwd
.dentry
)
1933 get_fs_pwd(current
->fs
, &context
->pwd
);
1936 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1937 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1939 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1940 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1941 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1943 void audit_putname(const char *name
)
1945 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1948 if (!context
->in_syscall
) {
1949 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1950 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1951 __FILE__
, __LINE__
, context
->serial
, name
);
1952 if (context
->name_count
) {
1953 struct audit_names
*n
;
1956 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
)
1957 printk(KERN_ERR
"name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i
,
1958 n
->name
, n
->name
?: "(null)");
1965 ++context
->put_count
;
1966 if (context
->put_count
> context
->name_count
) {
1967 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1968 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1971 context
->serial
, context
->major
,
1972 context
->in_syscall
, name
, context
->name_count
,
1973 context
->put_count
);
1980 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names
*name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1982 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps
;
1988 rc
= get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry
, &caps
);
1992 name
->fcap
.permitted
= caps
.permitted
;
1993 name
->fcap
.inheritable
= caps
.inheritable
;
1994 name
->fcap
.fE
= !!(caps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
1995 name
->fcap_ver
= (caps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
2001 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
2002 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names
*name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
,
2003 const struct inode
*inode
)
2005 name
->ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
2006 name
->dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
;
2007 name
->mode
= inode
->i_mode
;
2008 name
->uid
= inode
->i_uid
;
2009 name
->gid
= inode
->i_gid
;
2010 name
->rdev
= inode
->i_rdev
;
2011 security_inode_getsecid(inode
, &name
->osid
);
2012 audit_copy_fcaps(name
, dentry
);
2016 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
2017 * @name: name being audited
2018 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2020 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
2022 void __audit_inode(const char *name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
)
2024 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2025 const struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2026 struct audit_names
*n
;
2028 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
2031 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2032 if (n
->name
&& (n
->name
== name
))
2036 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname() */
2037 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
2041 handle_path(dentry
);
2042 audit_copy_inode(n
, dentry
, inode
);
2046 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2047 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2048 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2050 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2051 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2052 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2053 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2054 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2055 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2056 * unsuccessful attempts.
2058 void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry
*dentry
,
2059 const struct inode
*parent
)
2061 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2062 const char *found_parent
= NULL
, *found_child
= NULL
;
2063 const struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2064 const char *dname
= dentry
->d_name
.name
;
2065 struct audit_names
*n
;
2068 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
2074 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2075 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2079 if (n
->ino
== parent
->i_ino
&&
2080 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
, &dirlen
)) {
2081 n
->name_len
= dirlen
; /* update parent data in place */
2082 found_parent
= n
->name
;
2087 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2088 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2092 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2093 if (!strcmp(dname
, n
->name
) ||
2094 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
, &dirlen
)) {
2096 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, inode
);
2098 n
->ino
= (unsigned long)-1;
2099 found_child
= n
->name
;
2105 if (!found_parent
) {
2106 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
2109 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, parent
);
2113 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
2117 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2118 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2119 * audit_free_names() */
2121 n
->name
= found_parent
;
2122 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
2123 /* don't call __putname() */
2124 n
->name_put
= false;
2128 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, inode
);
2131 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child
);
2134 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2135 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2136 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2137 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2139 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2141 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
2142 struct timespec
*t
, unsigned int *serial
)
2144 if (!ctx
->in_syscall
)
2147 ctx
->serial
= audit_serial();
2148 t
->tv_sec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_sec
;
2149 t
->tv_nsec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_nsec
;
2150 *serial
= ctx
->serial
;
2153 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
2158 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2159 static atomic_t session_id
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2162 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2163 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2164 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2168 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2170 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct
*task
, uid_t loginuid
)
2172 unsigned int sessionid
= atomic_inc_return(&session_id
);
2173 struct audit_context
*context
= task
->audit_context
;
2175 if (context
&& context
->in_syscall
) {
2176 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2178 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_LOGIN
);
2180 audit_log_format(ab
, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2181 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2182 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2183 task
->pid
, task_uid(task
),
2184 task
->loginuid
, loginuid
,
2185 task
->sessionid
, sessionid
);
2189 task
->sessionid
= sessionid
;
2190 task
->loginuid
= loginuid
;
2195 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2198 * @attr: queue attributes
2201 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag
, umode_t mode
, struct mq_attr
*attr
)
2203 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2206 memcpy(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, attr
, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2208 memset(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2210 context
->mq_open
.oflag
= oflag
;
2211 context
->mq_open
.mode
= mode
;
2213 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
;
2217 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2218 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2219 * @msg_len: Message length
2220 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2221 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2224 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes
, size_t msg_len
, unsigned int msg_prio
,
2225 const struct timespec
*abs_timeout
)
2227 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2228 struct timespec
*p
= &context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
;
2231 memcpy(p
, abs_timeout
, sizeof(struct timespec
));
2233 memset(p
, 0, sizeof(struct timespec
));
2235 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2236 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
= msg_len
;
2237 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
= msg_prio
;
2239 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
;
2243 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2244 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2245 * @notification: Notification event
2249 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes
, const struct sigevent
*notification
)
2251 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2254 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= notification
->sigev_signo
;
2256 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= 0;
2258 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2259 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
;
2263 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2264 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2268 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes
, struct mq_attr
*mqstat
)
2270 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2271 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2272 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
= *mqstat
;
2273 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
;
2277 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2278 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2281 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
)
2283 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2284 context
->ipc
.uid
= ipcp
->uid
;
2285 context
->ipc
.gid
= ipcp
->gid
;
2286 context
->ipc
.mode
= ipcp
->mode
;
2287 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 0;
2288 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp
, &context
->ipc
.osid
);
2289 context
->type
= AUDIT_IPC
;
2293 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2294 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2295 * @uid: msgq user id
2296 * @gid: msgq group id
2297 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2299 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2301 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
, umode_t mode
)
2303 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2305 context
->ipc
.qbytes
= qbytes
;
2306 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
= uid
;
2307 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
= gid
;
2308 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
= mode
;
2309 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 1;
2312 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2314 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*ax
;
2315 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2317 if (likely(!audit_enabled
|| !context
|| context
->dummy
))
2320 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2324 ax
->argc
= bprm
->argc
;
2325 ax
->envc
= bprm
->envc
;
2327 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_EXECVE
;
2328 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2329 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2335 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2336 * @nargs: number of args
2340 void audit_socketcall(int nargs
, unsigned long *args
)
2342 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2344 if (likely(!context
|| context
->dummy
))
2347 context
->type
= AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
;
2348 context
->socketcall
.nargs
= nargs
;
2349 memcpy(context
->socketcall
.args
, args
, nargs
* sizeof(unsigned long));
2353 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2354 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2355 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2358 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1
, int fd2
)
2360 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2361 context
->fds
[0] = fd1
;
2362 context
->fds
[1] = fd2
;
2366 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2367 * @len: data length in user space
2368 * @a: data address in kernel space
2370 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2372 int audit_sockaddr(int len
, void *a
)
2374 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2376 if (likely(!context
|| context
->dummy
))
2379 if (!context
->sockaddr
) {
2380 void *p
= kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2383 context
->sockaddr
= p
;
2386 context
->sockaddr_len
= len
;
2387 memcpy(context
->sockaddr
, a
, len
);
2391 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct
*t
)
2393 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2395 context
->target_pid
= t
->pid
;
2396 context
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2397 context
->target_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2398 context
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2399 security_task_getsecid(t
, &context
->target_sid
);
2400 memcpy(context
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2404 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2405 * @sig: signal value
2406 * @t: task being signaled
2408 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2409 * and uid that is doing that.
2411 int __audit_signal_info(int sig
, struct task_struct
*t
)
2413 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axp
;
2414 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
2415 struct audit_context
*ctx
= tsk
->audit_context
;
2416 uid_t uid
= current_uid(), t_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2418 if (audit_pid
&& t
->tgid
== audit_pid
) {
2419 if (sig
== SIGTERM
|| sig
== SIGHUP
|| sig
== SIGUSR1
|| sig
== SIGUSR2
) {
2420 audit_sig_pid
= tsk
->pid
;
2421 if (tsk
->loginuid
!= -1)
2422 audit_sig_uid
= tsk
->loginuid
;
2424 audit_sig_uid
= uid
;
2425 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &audit_sig_sid
);
2427 if (!audit_signals
|| audit_dummy_context())
2431 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2432 * in audit_context */
2433 if (!ctx
->target_pid
) {
2434 ctx
->target_pid
= t
->tgid
;
2435 ctx
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2436 ctx
->target_uid
= t_uid
;
2437 ctx
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2438 security_task_getsecid(t
, &ctx
->target_sid
);
2439 memcpy(ctx
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2443 axp
= (void *)ctx
->aux_pids
;
2444 if (!axp
|| axp
->pid_count
== AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
) {
2445 axp
= kzalloc(sizeof(*axp
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2449 axp
->d
.type
= AUDIT_OBJ_PID
;
2450 axp
->d
.next
= ctx
->aux_pids
;
2451 ctx
->aux_pids
= (void *)axp
;
2453 BUG_ON(axp
->pid_count
>= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
);
2455 axp
->target_pid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t
->tgid
;
2456 axp
->target_auid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2457 axp
->target_uid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t_uid
;
2458 axp
->target_sessionid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2459 security_task_getsecid(t
, &axp
->target_sid
[axp
->pid_count
]);
2460 memcpy(axp
->target_comm
[axp
->pid_count
], t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2467 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2468 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2469 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2470 * @old: the old credentials
2472 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2473 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2477 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2478 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2480 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*ax
;
2481 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2482 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps
;
2483 struct dentry
*dentry
;
2485 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2489 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
;
2490 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2491 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2493 dentry
= dget(bprm
->file
->f_dentry
);
2494 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry
, &vcaps
);
2497 ax
->fcap
.permitted
= vcaps
.permitted
;
2498 ax
->fcap
.inheritable
= vcaps
.inheritable
;
2499 ax
->fcap
.fE
= !!(vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
2500 ax
->fcap_ver
= (vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
2502 ax
->old_pcap
.permitted
= old
->cap_permitted
;
2503 ax
->old_pcap
.inheritable
= old
->cap_inheritable
;
2504 ax
->old_pcap
.effective
= old
->cap_effective
;
2506 ax
->new_pcap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2507 ax
->new_pcap
.inheritable
= new->cap_inheritable
;
2508 ax
->new_pcap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2513 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2514 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2515 * @new: the new credentials
2516 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2518 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2519 * audit system if applicable
2521 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid
,
2522 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2524 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2525 context
->capset
.pid
= pid
;
2526 context
->capset
.cap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2527 context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
= new->cap_effective
;
2528 context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2529 context
->type
= AUDIT_CAPSET
;
2532 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd
, int flags
)
2534 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2535 context
->mmap
.fd
= fd
;
2536 context
->mmap
.flags
= flags
;
2537 context
->type
= AUDIT_MMAP
;
2540 static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *reason
, long signr
)
2544 unsigned int sessionid
;
2546 auid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2547 sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2548 current_uid_gid(&uid
, &gid
);
2550 audit_log_format(ab
, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2551 auid
, uid
, gid
, sessionid
);
2552 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
2553 audit_log_format(ab
, " pid=%d comm=", current
->pid
);
2554 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, current
->comm
);
2555 audit_log_format(ab
, " reason=");
2556 audit_log_string(ab
, reason
);
2557 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld", signr
);
2560 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2561 * @signr: signal value
2563 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2564 * should record the event for investigation.
2566 void audit_core_dumps(long signr
)
2568 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2573 if (signr
== SIGQUIT
) /* don't care for those */
2576 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2577 audit_log_abend(ab
, "memory violation", signr
);
2581 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall
)
2583 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2585 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2586 audit_log_abend(ab
, "seccomp", SIGKILL
);
2587 audit_log_format(ab
, " syscall=%ld", syscall
);
2591 struct list_head
*audit_killed_trees(void)
2593 struct audit_context
*ctx
= current
->audit_context
;
2594 if (likely(!ctx
|| !ctx
->in_syscall
))
2596 return &ctx
->killed_trees
;