1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/module.h>
52 #include <linux/mount.h>
53 #include <linux/socket.h>
54 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
55 #include <linux/audit.h>
56 #include <linux/personality.h>
57 #include <linux/time.h>
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/compiler.h>
60 #include <asm/unistd.h>
61 #include <linux/security.h>
62 #include <linux/list.h>
63 #include <linux/tty.h>
64 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
65 #include <linux/highmem.h>
66 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
67 #include <linux/inotify.h>
71 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
72 * for saving names from getname(). */
73 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
75 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
76 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
78 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
79 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
81 /* number of audit rules */
84 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
87 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
88 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
89 * pointers at syscall exit time).
91 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
94 int name_len
; /* number of name's characters to log */
95 unsigned name_put
; /* call __putname() for this name */
105 struct audit_aux_data
{
106 struct audit_aux_data
*next
;
110 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
112 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
113 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
115 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open
{
116 struct audit_aux_data d
;
122 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv
{
123 struct audit_aux_data d
;
126 unsigned int msg_prio
;
127 struct timespec abs_timeout
;
130 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify
{
131 struct audit_aux_data d
;
133 struct sigevent notification
;
136 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr
{
137 struct audit_aux_data d
;
139 struct mq_attr mqstat
;
142 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl
{
143 struct audit_aux_data d
;
145 unsigned long qbytes
;
152 struct audit_aux_data_execve
{
153 struct audit_aux_data d
;
156 struct mm_struct
*mm
;
159 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall
{
160 struct audit_aux_data d
;
162 unsigned long args
[0];
165 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr
{
166 struct audit_aux_data d
;
171 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair
{
172 struct audit_aux_data d
;
176 struct audit_aux_data_pids
{
177 struct audit_aux_data d
;
178 pid_t target_pid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
179 uid_t target_auid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
180 uid_t target_uid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
181 unsigned int target_sessionid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
182 u32 target_sid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
183 char target_comm
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
][TASK_COMM_LEN
];
187 struct audit_tree_refs
{
188 struct audit_tree_refs
*next
;
189 struct audit_chunk
*c
[31];
192 /* The per-task audit context. */
193 struct audit_context
{
194 int dummy
; /* must be the first element */
195 int in_syscall
; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
196 enum audit_state state
;
197 unsigned int serial
; /* serial number for record */
198 struct timespec ctime
; /* time of syscall entry */
199 int major
; /* syscall number */
200 unsigned long argv
[4]; /* syscall arguments */
201 int return_valid
; /* return code is valid */
202 long return_code
;/* syscall return code */
203 int auditable
; /* 1 if record should be written */
205 struct audit_names names
[AUDIT_NAMES
];
206 char * filterkey
; /* key for rule that triggered record */
208 struct audit_context
*previous
; /* For nested syscalls */
209 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
210 struct audit_aux_data
*aux_pids
;
212 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
214 uid_t uid
, euid
, suid
, fsuid
;
215 gid_t gid
, egid
, sgid
, fsgid
;
216 unsigned long personality
;
222 unsigned int target_sessionid
;
224 char target_comm
[TASK_COMM_LEN
];
226 struct audit_tree_refs
*trees
, *first_trees
;
235 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
236 static inline int open_arg(int flags
, int mask
)
238 int n
= ACC_MODE(flags
);
239 if (flags
& (O_TRUNC
| O_CREAT
))
240 n
|= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
;
244 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int mask
)
246 unsigned n
= ctx
->major
;
247 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx
->arch
, n
)) {
249 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
250 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE
, n
))
252 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
253 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ
, n
))
255 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
256 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR
, n
))
259 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
260 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
261 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32
, n
))
263 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
264 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32
, n
))
266 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
267 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32
, n
))
271 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[1]);
273 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[2]);
274 case 4: /* socketcall */
275 return ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) && ctx
->argv
[0] == SYS_BIND
);
277 return mask
& AUDIT_PERM_EXEC
;
284 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
285 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
286 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
287 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
288 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
289 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
290 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
293 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
294 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_chunk
*chunk
)
296 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
297 int left
= ctx
->tree_count
;
299 p
->c
[--left
] = chunk
;
300 ctx
->tree_count
= left
;
309 ctx
->tree_count
= 30;
315 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
317 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
318 ctx
->trees
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs
), GFP_KERNEL
);
324 p
->next
= ctx
->trees
;
326 ctx
->first_trees
= ctx
->trees
;
327 ctx
->tree_count
= 31;
332 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
333 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, int count
)
335 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
336 struct audit_tree_refs
*q
;
339 /* we started with empty chain */
340 p
= ctx
->first_trees
;
342 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
347 for (q
= p
; q
!= ctx
->trees
; q
= q
->next
, n
= 31) {
349 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
353 while (n
-- > ctx
->tree_count
) {
354 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
358 ctx
->tree_count
= count
;
362 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
364 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, *q
;
365 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
; p
= q
) {
371 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_tree
*tree
)
373 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
374 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
379 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
!= ctx
->trees
; p
= p
->next
) {
380 for (n
= 0; n
< 31; n
++)
381 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
386 for (n
= ctx
->tree_count
; n
< 31; n
++)
387 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
394 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
395 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
397 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
398 struct audit_krule
*rule
,
399 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
400 struct audit_names
*name
,
401 enum audit_state
*state
)
403 int i
, j
, need_sid
= 1;
406 for (i
= 0; i
< rule
->field_count
; i
++) {
407 struct audit_field
*f
= &rule
->fields
[i
];
412 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->pid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
417 ctx
->ppid
= sys_getppid();
418 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->ppid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
422 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
425 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->euid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
428 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->suid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
431 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->fsuid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
434 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
437 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->egid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
440 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->sgid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
443 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->fsgid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
446 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->personality
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
450 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->arch
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
454 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
)
455 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_code
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
458 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
) {
460 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_SUCCESS
);
462 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_FAILURE
);
467 result
= audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->dev
),
470 for (j
= 0; j
< ctx
->name_count
; j
++) {
471 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx
->names
[j
].dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
480 result
= audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->dev
),
483 for (j
= 0; j
< ctx
->name_count
; j
++) {
484 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx
->names
[j
].dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
493 result
= (name
->ino
== f
->val
);
495 for (j
= 0; j
< ctx
->name_count
; j
++) {
496 if (audit_comparator(ctx
->names
[j
].ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
504 if (name
&& rule
->watch
->ino
!= (unsigned long)-1)
505 result
= (name
->dev
== rule
->watch
->dev
&&
506 name
->ino
== rule
->watch
->ino
);
510 result
= match_tree_refs(ctx
, rule
->tree
);
515 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
517 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
518 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
519 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
522 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
523 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
524 match for now to avoid losing information that
525 may be wanted. An error message will also be
529 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &sid
);
532 result
= security_audit_rule_match(sid
, f
->type
,
541 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
542 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
543 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
546 /* Find files that match */
548 result
= security_audit_rule_match(
549 name
->osid
, f
->type
, f
->op
,
552 for (j
= 0; j
< ctx
->name_count
; j
++) {
553 if (security_audit_rule_match(
562 /* Find ipc objects that match */
564 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
565 for (aux
= ctx
->aux
; aux
;
567 if (aux
->type
== AUDIT_IPC
) {
568 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
569 if (security_audit_rule_match(axi
->osid
, f
->type
, f
->op
, f
->lsm_rule
, ctx
)) {
583 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->argv
[f
->type
-AUDIT_ARG0
], f
->op
, f
->val
);
585 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY
:
586 /* ignore this field for filtering */
590 result
= audit_match_perm(ctx
, f
->val
);
598 ctx
->filterkey
= kstrdup(rule
->filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
599 switch (rule
->action
) {
600 case AUDIT_NEVER
: *state
= AUDIT_DISABLED
; break;
601 case AUDIT_ALWAYS
: *state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
; break;
606 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
607 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
608 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
610 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_task(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
612 struct audit_entry
*e
;
613 enum audit_state state
;
616 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK
], list
) {
617 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, NULL
, NULL
, &state
)) {
623 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
626 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
627 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
628 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
629 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
631 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
632 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
633 struct list_head
*list
)
635 struct audit_entry
*e
;
636 enum audit_state state
;
638 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
639 return AUDIT_DISABLED
;
642 if (!list_empty(list
)) {
643 int word
= AUDIT_WORD(ctx
->major
);
644 int bit
= AUDIT_BIT(ctx
->major
);
646 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
647 if ((e
->rule
.mask
[word
] & bit
) == bit
&&
648 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, NULL
,
656 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
659 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
660 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
661 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
662 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
664 enum audit_state
audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
665 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
668 struct audit_entry
*e
;
669 enum audit_state state
;
671 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
672 return AUDIT_DISABLED
;
675 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->name_count
; i
++) {
676 int word
= AUDIT_WORD(ctx
->major
);
677 int bit
= AUDIT_BIT(ctx
->major
);
678 struct audit_names
*n
= &ctx
->names
[i
];
679 int h
= audit_hash_ino((u32
)n
->ino
);
680 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_inode_hash
[h
];
682 if (list_empty(list
))
685 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
686 if ((e
->rule
.mask
[word
] & bit
) == bit
&&
687 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, n
, &state
)) {
694 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
697 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
702 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_get_context(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
706 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
708 if (likely(!context
))
710 context
->return_valid
= return_valid
;
713 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
714 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
717 * This is actually a test for:
718 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
719 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
721 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
723 if (unlikely(return_code
<= -ERESTARTSYS
) &&
724 (return_code
>= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK
) &&
725 (return_code
!= -ENOIOCTLCMD
))
726 context
->return_code
= -EINTR
;
728 context
->return_code
= return_code
;
730 if (context
->in_syscall
&& !context
->dummy
&& !context
->auditable
) {
731 enum audit_state state
;
733 state
= audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT
]);
734 if (state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
) {
735 context
->auditable
= 1;
739 state
= audit_filter_inodes(tsk
, context
);
740 if (state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
741 context
->auditable
= 1;
747 tsk
->audit_context
= NULL
;
751 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context
*context
)
756 if (context
->auditable
757 ||context
->put_count
+ context
->ino_count
!= context
->name_count
) {
758 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
759 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
760 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
762 context
->serial
, context
->major
, context
->in_syscall
,
763 context
->name_count
, context
->put_count
,
765 for (i
= 0; i
< context
->name_count
; i
++) {
766 printk(KERN_ERR
"names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i
,
767 context
->names
[i
].name
,
768 context
->names
[i
].name
?: "(null)");
775 context
->put_count
= 0;
776 context
->ino_count
= 0;
779 for (i
= 0; i
< context
->name_count
; i
++) {
780 if (context
->names
[i
].name
&& context
->names
[i
].name_put
)
781 __putname(context
->names
[i
].name
);
783 context
->name_count
= 0;
784 path_put(&context
->pwd
);
785 context
->pwd
.dentry
= NULL
;
786 context
->pwd
.mnt
= NULL
;
789 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context
*context
)
791 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
793 while ((aux
= context
->aux
)) {
794 context
->aux
= aux
->next
;
797 while ((aux
= context
->aux_pids
)) {
798 context
->aux_pids
= aux
->next
;
803 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context
*context
,
804 enum audit_state state
)
806 memset(context
, 0, sizeof(*context
));
807 context
->state
= state
;
810 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state
)
812 struct audit_context
*context
;
814 if (!(context
= kmalloc(sizeof(*context
), GFP_KERNEL
)))
816 audit_zero_context(context
, state
);
821 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
824 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
825 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
826 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
829 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
831 struct audit_context
*context
;
832 enum audit_state state
;
834 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled
))
835 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
837 state
= audit_filter_task(tsk
);
838 if (likely(state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
))
841 if (!(context
= audit_alloc_context(state
))) {
842 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
846 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
847 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk
, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
851 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context
*context
)
853 struct audit_context
*previous
;
857 previous
= context
->previous
;
858 if (previous
|| (count
&& count
< 10)) {
860 printk(KERN_ERR
"audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
861 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
862 context
->serial
, context
->major
,
863 context
->name_count
, count
);
865 audit_free_names(context
);
866 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
867 free_tree_refs(context
);
868 audit_free_aux(context
);
869 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
874 printk(KERN_ERR
"audit: freed %d contexts\n", count
);
877 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer
*ab
)
884 security_task_getsecid(current
, &sid
);
888 error
= security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
);
890 if (error
!= -EINVAL
)
895 audit_log_format(ab
, " subj=%s", ctx
);
896 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
900 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
904 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context
);
906 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, struct task_struct
*tsk
)
908 char name
[sizeof(tsk
->comm
)];
909 struct mm_struct
*mm
= tsk
->mm
;
910 struct vm_area_struct
*vma
;
914 get_task_comm(name
, tsk
);
915 audit_log_format(ab
, " comm=");
916 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, name
);
919 down_read(&mm
->mmap_sem
);
922 if ((vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXECUTABLE
) &&
924 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "exe=",
925 &vma
->vm_file
->f_path
);
930 up_read(&mm
->mmap_sem
);
932 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
935 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context
*context
, pid_t pid
,
936 uid_t auid
, uid_t uid
, unsigned int sessionid
,
939 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
944 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_OBJ_PID
);
948 audit_log_format(ab
, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid
, auid
,
950 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
951 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=(none)");
954 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
955 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
957 audit_log_format(ab
, " ocomm=");
958 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, comm
);
965 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
966 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
967 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
969 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
970 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
971 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
972 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
973 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
975 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context
*context
,
976 struct audit_buffer
**ab
,
979 const char __user
*p
,
982 char arg_num_len_buf
[12];
983 const char __user
*tmp_p
= p
;
984 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
985 size_t arg_num_len
= snprintf(arg_num_len_buf
, 12, "%d", arg_num
) + 3;
986 size_t len
, len_left
, to_send
;
987 size_t max_execve_audit_len
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
988 unsigned int i
, has_cntl
= 0, too_long
= 0;
991 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
992 len_left
= len
= strnlen_user(p
, MAX_ARG_STRLEN
) - 1;
995 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
996 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
997 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1000 if (unlikely((len
== -1) || len
> MAX_ARG_STRLEN
- 1)) {
1002 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1006 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1008 if (len_left
> MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
)
1009 to_send
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1012 ret
= copy_from_user(buf
, tmp_p
, to_send
);
1014 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1015 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1020 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1023 buf
[to_send
] = '\0';
1024 has_cntl
= audit_string_contains_control(buf
, to_send
);
1027 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1028 * send half as much in each message
1030 max_execve_audit_len
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
/ 2;
1033 len_left
-= to_send
;
1035 } while (len_left
> 0);
1039 if (len
> max_execve_audit_len
)
1042 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1043 for (i
= 0; len_left
> 0; i
++) {
1046 if (len_left
> max_execve_audit_len
)
1047 to_send
= max_execve_audit_len
;
1051 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1052 room_left
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
- arg_num_len
- *len_sent
;
1054 room_left
-= (to_send
* 2);
1056 room_left
-= to_send
;
1057 if (room_left
< 0) {
1060 *ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EXECVE
);
1066 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1067 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1069 if ((i
== 0) && (too_long
))
1070 audit_log_format(*ab
, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num
,
1071 has_cntl
? 2*len
: len
);
1074 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1075 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1076 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1078 if (len
>= max_execve_audit_len
)
1079 ret
= copy_from_user(buf
, p
, to_send
);
1084 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1087 buf
[to_send
] = '\0';
1089 /* actually log it */
1090 audit_log_format(*ab
, "a%d", arg_num
);
1092 audit_log_format(*ab
, "[%d]", i
);
1093 audit_log_format(*ab
, "=");
1095 audit_log_n_hex(*ab
, buf
, to_send
);
1097 audit_log_format(*ab
, "\"%s\"", buf
);
1098 audit_log_format(*ab
, "\n");
1101 len_left
-= to_send
;
1102 *len_sent
+= arg_num_len
;
1104 *len_sent
+= to_send
* 2;
1106 *len_sent
+= to_send
;
1108 /* include the null we didn't log */
1112 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context
*context
,
1113 struct audit_buffer
**ab
,
1114 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*axi
)
1117 size_t len
, len_sent
= 0;
1118 const char __user
*p
;
1121 if (axi
->mm
!= current
->mm
)
1122 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1124 p
= (const char __user
*)axi
->mm
->arg_start
;
1126 audit_log_format(*ab
, "argc=%d ", axi
->argc
);
1129 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1130 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1131 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1132 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1134 buf
= kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
+ 1, GFP_KERNEL
);
1136 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1140 for (i
= 0; i
< axi
->argc
; i
++) {
1141 len
= audit_log_single_execve_arg(context
, ab
, i
,
1150 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context
*context
, struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1152 int i
, call_panic
= 0;
1153 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1154 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
1157 /* tsk == current */
1158 context
->pid
= tsk
->pid
;
1160 context
->ppid
= sys_getppid();
1161 context
->uid
= tsk
->uid
;
1162 context
->gid
= tsk
->gid
;
1163 context
->euid
= tsk
->euid
;
1164 context
->suid
= tsk
->suid
;
1165 context
->fsuid
= tsk
->fsuid
;
1166 context
->egid
= tsk
->egid
;
1167 context
->sgid
= tsk
->sgid
;
1168 context
->fsgid
= tsk
->fsgid
;
1169 context
->personality
= tsk
->personality
;
1171 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SYSCALL
);
1173 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1174 audit_log_format(ab
, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1175 context
->arch
, context
->major
);
1176 if (context
->personality
!= PER_LINUX
)
1177 audit_log_format(ab
, " per=%lx", context
->personality
);
1178 if (context
->return_valid
)
1179 audit_log_format(ab
, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1180 (context
->return_valid
==AUDITSC_SUCCESS
)?"yes":"no",
1181 context
->return_code
);
1183 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex
);
1184 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
1185 if (tsk
->signal
&& tsk
->signal
->tty
&& tsk
->signal
->tty
->name
)
1186 tty
= tsk
->signal
->tty
->name
;
1189 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
1190 audit_log_format(ab
,
1191 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1192 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1193 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1194 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1199 context
->name_count
,
1205 context
->euid
, context
->suid
, context
->fsuid
,
1206 context
->egid
, context
->sgid
, context
->fsgid
, tty
,
1209 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex
);
1211 audit_log_task_info(ab
, tsk
);
1212 if (context
->filterkey
) {
1213 audit_log_format(ab
, " key=");
1214 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, context
->filterkey
);
1216 audit_log_format(ab
, " key=(null)");
1219 for (aux
= context
->aux
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1221 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, aux
->type
);
1223 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1225 switch (aux
->type
) {
1226 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
: {
1227 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
1228 audit_log_format(ab
,
1229 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1230 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1231 axi
->oflag
, axi
->mode
, axi
->attr
.mq_flags
,
1232 axi
->attr
.mq_maxmsg
, axi
->attr
.mq_msgsize
,
1233 axi
->attr
.mq_curmsgs
);
1236 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
: {
1237 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
1238 audit_log_format(ab
,
1239 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1240 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1241 axi
->mqdes
, axi
->msg_len
, axi
->msg_prio
,
1242 axi
->abs_timeout
.tv_sec
, axi
->abs_timeout
.tv_nsec
);
1245 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
: {
1246 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
1247 audit_log_format(ab
,
1248 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1250 axi
->notification
.sigev_signo
);
1253 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
: {
1254 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
1255 audit_log_format(ab
,
1256 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1259 axi
->mqstat
.mq_flags
, axi
->mqstat
.mq_maxmsg
,
1260 axi
->mqstat
.mq_msgsize
, axi
->mqstat
.mq_curmsgs
);
1264 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
1265 audit_log_format(ab
,
1266 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1267 axi
->uid
, axi
->gid
, axi
->mode
);
1268 if (axi
->osid
!= 0) {
1271 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1272 axi
->osid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1273 audit_log_format(ab
, " osid=%u",
1277 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1278 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1283 case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM
: {
1284 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
1285 audit_log_format(ab
,
1286 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1287 axi
->qbytes
, axi
->uid
, axi
->gid
, axi
->mode
);
1290 case AUDIT_EXECVE
: {
1291 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
1292 audit_log_execve_info(context
, &ab
, axi
);
1295 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
: {
1297 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1298 audit_log_format(ab
, "nargs=%d", axs
->nargs
);
1299 for (i
=0; i
<axs
->nargs
; i
++)
1300 audit_log_format(ab
, " a%d=%lx", i
, axs
->args
[i
]);
1303 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR
: {
1304 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1306 audit_log_format(ab
, "saddr=");
1307 audit_log_n_hex(ab
, axs
->a
, axs
->len
);
1310 case AUDIT_FD_PAIR
: {
1311 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1312 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs
->fd
[0], axs
->fd
[1]);
1319 for (aux
= context
->aux_pids
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1320 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1323 for (i
= 0; i
< axs
->pid_count
; i
++)
1324 if (audit_log_pid_context(context
, axs
->target_pid
[i
],
1325 axs
->target_auid
[i
],
1327 axs
->target_sessionid
[i
],
1329 axs
->target_comm
[i
]))
1333 if (context
->target_pid
&&
1334 audit_log_pid_context(context
, context
->target_pid
,
1335 context
->target_auid
, context
->target_uid
,
1336 context
->target_sessionid
,
1337 context
->target_sid
, context
->target_comm
))
1340 if (context
->pwd
.dentry
&& context
->pwd
.mnt
) {
1341 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_CWD
);
1343 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "cwd=", &context
->pwd
);
1347 for (i
= 0; i
< context
->name_count
; i
++) {
1348 struct audit_names
*n
= &context
->names
[i
];
1350 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_PATH
);
1352 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1354 audit_log_format(ab
, "item=%d", i
);
1357 switch(n
->name_len
) {
1358 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL
:
1359 /* log the full path */
1360 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1361 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
);
1364 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1365 * directory component is the cwd */
1366 audit_log_d_path(ab
, " name=", &context
->pwd
);
1369 /* log the name's directory component */
1370 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1371 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
,
1375 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=(null)");
1377 if (n
->ino
!= (unsigned long)-1) {
1378 audit_log_format(ab
, " inode=%lu"
1379 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1380 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1393 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1394 n
->osid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1395 audit_log_format(ab
, " osid=%u", n
->osid
);
1398 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1399 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1406 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1407 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EOE
);
1411 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1415 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1416 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1418 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1420 void audit_free(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1422 struct audit_context
*context
;
1424 context
= audit_get_context(tsk
, 0, 0);
1425 if (likely(!context
))
1428 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1429 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1430 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1431 * in the context of the idle thread */
1432 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1433 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->auditable
)
1434 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1436 audit_free_context(context
);
1440 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1441 * @tsk: task being audited
1442 * @arch: architecture type
1443 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1444 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1445 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1446 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1447 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1449 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1450 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1451 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1452 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1453 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1454 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1457 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch
, int major
,
1458 unsigned long a1
, unsigned long a2
,
1459 unsigned long a3
, unsigned long a4
)
1461 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1462 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
1463 enum audit_state state
;
1468 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1469 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1470 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1471 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1472 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1476 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1478 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1479 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1481 if (context
->in_syscall
) {
1482 struct audit_context
*newctx
;
1486 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1487 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1488 context
->serial
, tsk
->pid
, context
->major
, major
);
1490 newctx
= audit_alloc_context(context
->state
);
1492 newctx
->previous
= context
;
1494 tsk
->audit_context
= newctx
;
1496 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1497 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1498 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1499 * to abandon auditing. */
1500 audit_zero_context(context
, context
->state
);
1503 BUG_ON(context
->in_syscall
|| context
->name_count
);
1508 context
->arch
= arch
;
1509 context
->major
= major
;
1510 context
->argv
[0] = a1
;
1511 context
->argv
[1] = a2
;
1512 context
->argv
[2] = a3
;
1513 context
->argv
[3] = a4
;
1515 state
= context
->state
;
1516 context
->dummy
= !audit_n_rules
;
1517 if (!context
->dummy
&& (state
== AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT
|| state
== AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
))
1518 state
= audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY
]);
1519 if (likely(state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
))
1522 context
->serial
= 0;
1523 context
->ctime
= CURRENT_TIME
;
1524 context
->in_syscall
= 1;
1525 context
->auditable
= !!(state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
);
1530 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1531 * @tsk: task being audited
1532 * @valid: success/failure flag
1533 * @return_code: syscall return value
1535 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1536 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1537 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1538 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1539 * free the names stored from getname().
1541 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid
, long return_code
)
1543 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1544 struct audit_context
*context
;
1546 context
= audit_get_context(tsk
, valid
, return_code
);
1548 if (likely(!context
))
1551 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->auditable
)
1552 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1554 context
->in_syscall
= 0;
1555 context
->auditable
= 0;
1557 if (context
->previous
) {
1558 struct audit_context
*new_context
= context
->previous
;
1559 context
->previous
= NULL
;
1560 audit_free_context(context
);
1561 tsk
->audit_context
= new_context
;
1563 audit_free_names(context
);
1564 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
1565 audit_free_aux(context
);
1566 context
->aux
= NULL
;
1567 context
->aux_pids
= NULL
;
1568 context
->target_pid
= 0;
1569 context
->target_sid
= 0;
1570 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
1571 context
->filterkey
= NULL
;
1572 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
1576 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode
*inode
)
1578 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1579 struct audit_context
*context
;
1580 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1581 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1583 if (likely(list_empty(&inode
->inotify_watches
)))
1585 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1587 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1589 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1593 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
)))
1595 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context
))) {
1596 printk(KERN_WARNING
"out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1597 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1598 audit_put_chunk(chunk
);
1599 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1602 put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
);
1606 static void handle_path(const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1608 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1609 struct audit_context
*context
;
1610 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1611 const struct dentry
*d
, *parent
;
1612 struct audit_chunk
*drop
;
1616 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1618 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1623 seq
= read_seqbegin(&rename_lock
);
1625 struct inode
*inode
= d
->d_inode
;
1626 if (inode
&& unlikely(!list_empty(&inode
->inotify_watches
))) {
1627 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1628 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1630 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
))) {
1636 parent
= d
->d_parent
;
1641 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock
, seq
) || drop
)) { /* in this order */
1644 /* just a race with rename */
1645 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1648 audit_put_chunk(drop
);
1649 if (grow_tree_refs(context
)) {
1650 /* OK, got more space */
1651 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1656 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1657 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1658 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1666 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1667 * @name: name to add
1669 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1670 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1672 void __audit_getname(const char *name
)
1674 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1676 if (IS_ERR(name
) || !name
)
1679 if (!context
->in_syscall
) {
1680 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1681 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1682 __FILE__
, __LINE__
, context
->serial
, name
);
1687 BUG_ON(context
->name_count
>= AUDIT_NAMES
);
1688 context
->names
[context
->name_count
].name
= name
;
1689 context
->names
[context
->name_count
].name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1690 context
->names
[context
->name_count
].name_put
= 1;
1691 context
->names
[context
->name_count
].ino
= (unsigned long)-1;
1692 context
->names
[context
->name_count
].osid
= 0;
1693 ++context
->name_count
;
1694 if (!context
->pwd
.dentry
) {
1695 read_lock(¤t
->fs
->lock
);
1696 context
->pwd
= current
->fs
->pwd
;
1697 path_get(¤t
->fs
->pwd
);
1698 read_unlock(¤t
->fs
->lock
);
1703 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1704 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1706 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1707 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1708 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1710 void audit_putname(const char *name
)
1712 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1715 if (!context
->in_syscall
) {
1716 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1717 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1718 __FILE__
, __LINE__
, context
->serial
, name
);
1719 if (context
->name_count
) {
1721 for (i
= 0; i
< context
->name_count
; i
++)
1722 printk(KERN_ERR
"name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i
,
1723 context
->names
[i
].name
,
1724 context
->names
[i
].name
?: "(null)");
1731 ++context
->put_count
;
1732 if (context
->put_count
> context
->name_count
) {
1733 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1734 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1737 context
->serial
, context
->major
,
1738 context
->in_syscall
, name
, context
->name_count
,
1739 context
->put_count
);
1746 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context
*context
,
1747 const struct inode
*inode
)
1749 if (context
->name_count
>= AUDIT_NAMES
) {
1751 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1752 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
1753 MAJOR(inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
),
1754 MINOR(inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
),
1758 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
1761 context
->name_count
++;
1763 context
->ino_count
++;
1768 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1769 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names
*name
, const struct inode
*inode
)
1771 name
->ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1772 name
->dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
;
1773 name
->mode
= inode
->i_mode
;
1774 name
->uid
= inode
->i_uid
;
1775 name
->gid
= inode
->i_gid
;
1776 name
->rdev
= inode
->i_rdev
;
1777 security_inode_getsecid(inode
, &name
->osid
);
1781 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1782 * @name: name being audited
1783 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1785 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1787 void __audit_inode(const char *name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1790 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1791 const struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1793 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1795 if (context
->name_count
1796 && context
->names
[context
->name_count
-1].name
1797 && context
->names
[context
->name_count
-1].name
== name
)
1798 idx
= context
->name_count
- 1;
1799 else if (context
->name_count
> 1
1800 && context
->names
[context
->name_count
-2].name
1801 && context
->names
[context
->name_count
-2].name
== name
)
1802 idx
= context
->name_count
- 2;
1804 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1805 * associated name? */
1806 if (audit_inc_name_count(context
, inode
))
1808 idx
= context
->name_count
- 1;
1809 context
->names
[idx
].name
= NULL
;
1811 handle_path(dentry
);
1812 audit_copy_inode(&context
->names
[idx
], inode
);
1816 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1817 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1818 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1819 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1821 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1822 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1823 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1824 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1825 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1826 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1827 * unsuccessful attempts.
1829 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname
, const struct dentry
*dentry
,
1830 const struct inode
*parent
)
1833 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1834 const char *found_parent
= NULL
, *found_child
= NULL
;
1835 const struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1838 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1843 /* determine matching parent */
1847 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
1848 for (idx
= 0; idx
< context
->name_count
; idx
++) {
1849 struct audit_names
*n
= &context
->names
[idx
];
1854 if (n
->ino
== parent
->i_ino
&&
1855 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
, &dirlen
)) {
1856 n
->name_len
= dirlen
; /* update parent data in place */
1857 found_parent
= n
->name
;
1862 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
1863 for (idx
= 0; idx
< context
->name_count
; idx
++) {
1864 struct audit_names
*n
= &context
->names
[idx
];
1869 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
1870 if (!strcmp(dname
, n
->name
) ||
1871 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
, &dirlen
)) {
1873 audit_copy_inode(n
, inode
);
1875 n
->ino
= (unsigned long)-1;
1876 found_child
= n
->name
;
1882 if (!found_parent
) {
1883 if (audit_inc_name_count(context
, parent
))
1885 idx
= context
->name_count
- 1;
1886 context
->names
[idx
].name
= NULL
;
1887 audit_copy_inode(&context
->names
[idx
], parent
);
1891 if (audit_inc_name_count(context
, inode
))
1893 idx
= context
->name_count
- 1;
1895 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1896 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1897 * audit_free_names() */
1899 context
->names
[idx
].name
= found_parent
;
1900 context
->names
[idx
].name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1901 /* don't call __putname() */
1902 context
->names
[idx
].name_put
= 0;
1904 context
->names
[idx
].name
= NULL
;
1908 audit_copy_inode(&context
->names
[idx
], inode
);
1910 context
->names
[idx
].ino
= (unsigned long)-1;
1913 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child
);
1916 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1917 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1918 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1919 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1921 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1923 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
1924 struct timespec
*t
, unsigned int *serial
)
1927 ctx
->serial
= audit_serial();
1928 t
->tv_sec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_sec
;
1929 t
->tv_nsec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_nsec
;
1930 *serial
= ctx
->serial
;
1934 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1935 static atomic_t session_id
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1938 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1939 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1940 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1944 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1946 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct
*task
, uid_t loginuid
)
1948 unsigned int sessionid
= atomic_inc_return(&session_id
);
1949 struct audit_context
*context
= task
->audit_context
;
1951 if (context
&& context
->in_syscall
) {
1952 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1954 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_LOGIN
);
1956 audit_log_format(ab
, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1957 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
1958 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
1959 task
->pid
, task
->uid
,
1960 task
->loginuid
, loginuid
,
1961 task
->sessionid
, sessionid
);
1965 task
->sessionid
= sessionid
;
1966 task
->loginuid
= loginuid
;
1971 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
1974 * @u_attr: queue attributes
1976 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1978 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag
, mode_t mode
, struct mq_attr __user
*u_attr
)
1980 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open
*ax
;
1981 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1986 if (likely(!context
))
1989 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
1993 if (u_attr
!= NULL
) {
1994 if (copy_from_user(&ax
->attr
, u_attr
, sizeof(ax
->attr
))) {
1999 memset(&ax
->attr
, 0, sizeof(ax
->attr
));
2004 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
;
2005 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2006 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2011 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
2012 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2013 * @msg_len: Message length
2014 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2015 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2017 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2019 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes
, size_t msg_len
, unsigned int msg_prio
,
2020 const struct timespec __user
*u_abs_timeout
)
2022 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv
*ax
;
2023 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2028 if (likely(!context
))
2031 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2035 if (u_abs_timeout
!= NULL
) {
2036 if (copy_from_user(&ax
->abs_timeout
, u_abs_timeout
, sizeof(ax
->abs_timeout
))) {
2041 memset(&ax
->abs_timeout
, 0, sizeof(ax
->abs_timeout
));
2044 ax
->msg_len
= msg_len
;
2045 ax
->msg_prio
= msg_prio
;
2047 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
;
2048 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2049 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2054 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
2055 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2056 * @msg_len: Message length
2057 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
2058 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2060 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2062 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes
, size_t msg_len
,
2063 unsigned int __user
*u_msg_prio
,
2064 const struct timespec __user
*u_abs_timeout
)
2066 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv
*ax
;
2067 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2072 if (likely(!context
))
2075 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2079 if (u_msg_prio
!= NULL
) {
2080 if (get_user(ax
->msg_prio
, u_msg_prio
)) {
2087 if (u_abs_timeout
!= NULL
) {
2088 if (copy_from_user(&ax
->abs_timeout
, u_abs_timeout
, sizeof(ax
->abs_timeout
))) {
2093 memset(&ax
->abs_timeout
, 0, sizeof(ax
->abs_timeout
));
2096 ax
->msg_len
= msg_len
;
2098 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
;
2099 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2100 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2105 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2106 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2107 * @u_notification: Notification event
2109 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2112 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes
, const struct sigevent __user
*u_notification
)
2114 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify
*ax
;
2115 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2120 if (likely(!context
))
2123 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2127 if (u_notification
!= NULL
) {
2128 if (copy_from_user(&ax
->notification
, u_notification
, sizeof(ax
->notification
))) {
2133 memset(&ax
->notification
, 0, sizeof(ax
->notification
));
2137 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
;
2138 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2139 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2144 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2145 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2148 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2150 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes
, struct mq_attr
*mqstat
)
2152 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr
*ax
;
2153 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2158 if (likely(!context
))
2161 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2166 ax
->mqstat
= *mqstat
;
2168 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
;
2169 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2170 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2175 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2176 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2178 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2180 int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
)
2182 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl
*ax
;
2183 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2185 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2189 ax
->uid
= ipcp
->uid
;
2190 ax
->gid
= ipcp
->gid
;
2191 ax
->mode
= ipcp
->mode
;
2192 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp
, &ax
->osid
);
2193 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_IPC
;
2194 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2195 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2200 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2201 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2202 * @uid: msgq user id
2203 * @gid: msgq group id
2204 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2206 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2208 int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
, mode_t mode
)
2210 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl
*ax
;
2211 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2213 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2217 ax
->qbytes
= qbytes
;
2222 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM
;
2223 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2224 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2228 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2230 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*ax
;
2231 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2233 if (likely(!audit_enabled
|| !context
|| context
->dummy
))
2236 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2240 ax
->argc
= bprm
->argc
;
2241 ax
->envc
= bprm
->envc
;
2243 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_EXECVE
;
2244 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2245 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2251 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2252 * @nargs: number of args
2255 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2257 int audit_socketcall(int nargs
, unsigned long *args
)
2259 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall
*ax
;
2260 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2262 if (likely(!context
|| context
->dummy
))
2265 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
) + nargs
* sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL
);
2270 memcpy(ax
->args
, args
, nargs
* sizeof(unsigned long));
2272 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
;
2273 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2274 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2279 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2280 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2281 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2283 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2285 int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1
, int fd2
)
2287 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2288 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair
*ax
;
2290 if (likely(!context
)) {
2294 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2302 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_FD_PAIR
;
2303 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2304 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2309 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2310 * @len: data length in user space
2311 * @a: data address in kernel space
2313 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2315 int audit_sockaddr(int len
, void *a
)
2317 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr
*ax
;
2318 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2320 if (likely(!context
|| context
->dummy
))
2323 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
) + len
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2328 memcpy(ax
->a
, a
, len
);
2330 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_SOCKADDR
;
2331 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2332 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2336 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct
*t
)
2338 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2340 context
->target_pid
= t
->pid
;
2341 context
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2342 context
->target_uid
= t
->uid
;
2343 context
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2344 security_task_getsecid(t
, &context
->target_sid
);
2345 memcpy(context
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2349 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2350 * @sig: signal value
2351 * @t: task being signaled
2353 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2354 * and uid that is doing that.
2356 int __audit_signal_info(int sig
, struct task_struct
*t
)
2358 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axp
;
2359 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
2360 struct audit_context
*ctx
= tsk
->audit_context
;
2362 if (audit_pid
&& t
->tgid
== audit_pid
) {
2363 if (sig
== SIGTERM
|| sig
== SIGHUP
|| sig
== SIGUSR1
) {
2364 audit_sig_pid
= tsk
->pid
;
2365 if (tsk
->loginuid
!= -1)
2366 audit_sig_uid
= tsk
->loginuid
;
2368 audit_sig_uid
= tsk
->uid
;
2369 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &audit_sig_sid
);
2371 if (!audit_signals
|| audit_dummy_context())
2375 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2376 * in audit_context */
2377 if (!ctx
->target_pid
) {
2378 ctx
->target_pid
= t
->tgid
;
2379 ctx
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2380 ctx
->target_uid
= t
->uid
;
2381 ctx
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2382 security_task_getsecid(t
, &ctx
->target_sid
);
2383 memcpy(ctx
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2387 axp
= (void *)ctx
->aux_pids
;
2388 if (!axp
|| axp
->pid_count
== AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
) {
2389 axp
= kzalloc(sizeof(*axp
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2393 axp
->d
.type
= AUDIT_OBJ_PID
;
2394 axp
->d
.next
= ctx
->aux_pids
;
2395 ctx
->aux_pids
= (void *)axp
;
2397 BUG_ON(axp
->pid_count
>= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
);
2399 axp
->target_pid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t
->tgid
;
2400 axp
->target_auid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2401 axp
->target_uid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t
->uid
;
2402 axp
->target_sessionid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2403 security_task_getsecid(t
, &axp
->target_sid
[axp
->pid_count
]);
2404 memcpy(axp
->target_comm
[axp
->pid_count
], t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2411 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2412 * @signr: signal value
2414 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2415 * should record the event for investigation.
2417 void audit_core_dumps(long signr
)
2419 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2421 uid_t auid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2422 unsigned int sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2427 if (signr
== SIGQUIT
) /* don't care for those */
2430 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2431 audit_log_format(ab
, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2432 auid
, current
->uid
, current
->gid
, sessionid
);
2433 security_task_getsecid(current
, &sid
);
2438 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
))
2439 audit_log_format(ab
, " ssid=%u", sid
);
2441 audit_log_format(ab
, " subj=%s", ctx
);
2442 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
2445 audit_log_format(ab
, " pid=%d comm=", current
->pid
);
2446 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, current
->comm
);
2447 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld", signr
);