projects / deliverable / linux.git / blob
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blame | history | raw | HEAD
Bluetooth: Make SMP context private to smp.c
[deliverable/linux.git] / net / bluetooth / smp.c
1 /*
2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
4
5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 published by the Free Software Foundation;
8
9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
17
18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
21 */
22
23 #include <linux/crypto.h>
24 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
25 #include <crypto/b128ops.h>
26
27 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
28 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
29 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
30 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
31
32 #include "smp.h"
33
34 #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
35
36 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK 0x07
37
38 #define SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID 1
39 #define SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING 2
40 #define SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH 3
41 #define SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE 4
42 #define SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR 5
43
44 struct smp_chan {
45 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
46 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
47 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
48 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
49 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
50 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
51 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
52 u8 enc_key_size;
53 u8 remote_key_dist;
54 bdaddr_t id_addr;
55 u8 id_addr_type;
56 u8 irk[16];
57 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
58 struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk;
59 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
60 struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
61 struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
62 unsigned long smp_flags;
63 struct work_struct confirm;
64 struct work_struct random;
65 };
66
67 static inline void swap128(const u8 src[16], u8 dst[16])
68 {
69 int i;
70 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
71 dst[15 - i] = src[i];
72 }
73
74 static inline void swap56(const u8 src[7], u8 dst[7])
75 {
76 int i;
77 for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
78 dst[6 - i] = src[i];
79 }
80
81 static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
82 {
83 struct blkcipher_desc desc;
84 struct scatterlist sg;
85 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
86 int err;
87
88 if (tfm == NULL) {
89 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
90 return -EINVAL;
91 }
92
93 desc.tfm = tfm;
94 desc.flags = 0;
95
96 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
97 swap128(k, tmp);
98
99 err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
100 if (err) {
101 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
102 return err;
103 }
104
105 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
106 swap128(r, data);
107
108 sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16);
109
110 err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
111 if (err)
112 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
113
114 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
115 swap128(data, r);
116
117 return err;
118 }
119
120 static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
121 {
122 u8 _res[16];
123 int err;
124
125 /* r' = padding || r */
126 memcpy(_res, r, 3);
127 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
128
129 err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
130 if (err) {
131 BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
132 return err;
133 }
134
135 /* The output of the random address function ah is:
136 * ah(h, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
137 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
138 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
139 * result of ah.
140 */
141 memcpy(res, _res, 3);
142
143 return 0;
144 }
145
146 bool smp_irk_matches(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16],
147 bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
148 {
149 u8 hash[3];
150 int err;
151
152 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
153
154 err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
155 if (err)
156 return false;
157
158 return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
159 }
160
161 int smp_generate_rpa(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
162 {
163 int err;
164
165 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
166
167 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
168 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
169
170 err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
171 if (err < 0)
172 return err;
173
174 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
175
176 return 0;
177 }
178
179 static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
180 u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia,
181 u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
182 {
183 u8 p1[16], p2[16];
184 int err;
185
186 memset(p1, 0, 16);
187
188 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
189 p1[0] = _iat;
190 p1[1] = _rat;
191 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
192 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
193
194 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
195 memcpy(p2, ra, 6);
196 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
197 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
198
199 /* res = r XOR p1 */
200 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
201
202 /* res = e(k, res) */
203 err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
204 if (err) {
205 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
206 return err;
207 }
208
209 /* res = res XOR p2 */
210 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
211
212 /* res = e(k, res) */
213 err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
214 if (err)
215 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
216
217 return err;
218 }
219
220 static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16],
221 u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
222 {
223 int err;
224
225 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
226 memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
227 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
228
229 err = smp_e(tfm, k, _r);
230 if (err)
231 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
232
233 return err;
234 }
235
236 static struct sk_buff *smp_build_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code,
237 u16 dlen, void *data)
238 {
239 struct sk_buff *skb;
240 struct l2cap_hdr *lh;
241 int len;
242
243 len = L2CAP_HDR_SIZE + sizeof(code) + dlen;
244
245 if (len > conn->mtu)
246 return NULL;
247
248 skb = bt_skb_alloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
249 if (!skb)
250 return NULL;
251
252 lh = (struct l2cap_hdr *) skb_put(skb, L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
253 lh->len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(code) + dlen);
254 lh->cid = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CID_SMP);
255
256 memcpy(skb_put(skb, sizeof(code)), &code, sizeof(code));
257
258 memcpy(skb_put(skb, dlen), data, dlen);
259
260 return skb;
261 }
262
263 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
264 {
265 struct sk_buff *skb = smp_build_cmd(conn, code, len, data);
266
267 BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
268
269 if (!skb)
270 return;
271
272 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
273 hci_send_acl(conn->hchan, skb, 0);
274
275 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
276 schedule_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
277 }
278
279 static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
280 {
281 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM)
282 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
283 else
284 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
285 }
286
287 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
288 {
289 switch (sec_level) {
290 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
291 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
292 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
293 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
294 default:
295 return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
296 }
297 }
298
299 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
300 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
301 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
302 {
303 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
304 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
305 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
306 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
307
308 if (test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
309 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
310 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
311 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
312 } else {
313 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
314 }
315
316 if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags))
317 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
318
319 if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
320 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
321
322 if (rsp == NULL) {
323 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
324 req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
325 req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
326 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
327 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
328 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
329
330 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
331 return;
332 }
333
334 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
335 rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
336 rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
337 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
338 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
339 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
340
341 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
342 }
343
344 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
345 {
346 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
347
348 if ((max_key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) ||
349 (max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE))
350 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
351
352 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
353
354 return 0;
355 }
356
357 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
358 {
359 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
360
361 if (reason)
362 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
363 &reason);
364
365 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags);
366 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
367 HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
368
369 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
370
371 if (test_and_clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
372 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
373 }
374
375 #define JUST_WORKS 0x00
376 #define JUST_CFM 0x01
377 #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
378 #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
379 #define REQ_OOB 0x04
380 #define OVERLAP 0xFF
381
382 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
383 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
384 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
385 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
386 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
387 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
388 };
389
390 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
391 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
392 {
393 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
394 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
395 u8 method;
396 u32 passkey = 0;
397 int ret = 0;
398
399 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
400 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
401 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
402
403 BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
404
405 /* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
406 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */
407 /* Otherwise, look up method from the table */
408 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM) ||
409 local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
410 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
411 method = JUST_WORKS;
412 else
413 method = gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
414
415 /* If not bonding, don't ask user to confirm a Zero TK */
416 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM)
417 method = JUST_WORKS;
418
419 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
420 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
421 &smp->smp_flags))
422 method = JUST_WORKS;
423
424 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
425 if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
426 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
427 return 0;
428 }
429
430 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
431 if (method != JUST_CFM)
432 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->smp_flags);
433
434 /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
435 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
436 */
437 if (method == OVERLAP) {
438 if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
439 method = CFM_PASSKEY;
440 else
441 method = REQ_PASSKEY;
442 }
443
444 /* Generate random passkey. */
445 if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
446 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
447 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
448 passkey %= 1000000;
449 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
450 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
451 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
452 }
453
454 hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
455
456 if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
457 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
458 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
459 else if (method == JUST_CFM)
460 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
461 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
462 passkey, 1);
463 else
464 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
465 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
466 passkey, 0);
467
468 hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
469
470 return ret;
471 }
472
473 static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
474 {
475 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, confirm);
476 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
477 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
478 struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hdev->tfm_aes;
479 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
480 int ret;
481 u8 reason;
482
483 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
484
485 /* Prevent mutual access to hdev->tfm_aes */
486 hci_dev_lock(hdev);
487
488 ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
489 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
490 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
491 cp.confirm_val);
492
493 hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
494
495 if (ret) {
496 reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
497 goto error;
498 }
499
500 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
501
502 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
503
504 return;
505
506 error:
507 smp_failure(conn, reason);
508 }
509
510 static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
511 {
512 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, random);
513 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
514 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
515 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
516 struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hdev->tfm_aes;
517 u8 reason, confirm[16];
518 int ret;
519
520 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tfm)) {
521 reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
522 goto error;
523 }
524
525 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
526
527 /* Prevent mutual access to hdev->tfm_aes */
528 hci_dev_lock(hdev);
529
530 ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
531 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
532 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
533
534 hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
535
536 if (ret) {
537 reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
538 goto error;
539 }
540
541 if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) {
542 BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
543 reason = SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
544 goto error;
545 }
546
547 if (hcon->out) {
548 u8 stk[16];
549 __le64 rand = 0;
550 __le16 ediv = 0;
551
552 smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
553
554 memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
555 SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
556
557 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) {
558 reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
559 goto error;
560 }
561
562 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk);
563 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
564 } else {
565 u8 stk[16];
566 __le64 rand = 0;
567 __le16 ediv = 0;
568
569 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
570 smp->prnd);
571
572 smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
573
574 memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
575 SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
576
577 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
578 HCI_SMP_STK_SLAVE, 0, stk, smp->enc_key_size,
579 ediv, rand);
580 }
581
582 return;
583
584 error:
585 smp_failure(conn, reason);
586 }
587
588 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
589 {
590 struct smp_chan *smp;
591
592 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
593 if (!smp)
594 return NULL;
595
596 INIT_WORK(&smp->confirm, confirm_work);
597 INIT_WORK(&smp->random, random_work);
598
599 smp->conn = conn;
600 conn->smp_chan = smp;
601 conn->hcon->smp_conn = conn;
602
603 hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
604
605 return smp;
606 }
607
608 void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
609 {
610 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
611 bool complete;
612
613 BUG_ON(!smp);
614
615 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->smp_flags);
616 mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete);
617
618 kfree(smp->csrk);
619 kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
620
621 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
622 if (!complete) {
623 if (smp->ltk) {
624 list_del(&smp->ltk->list);
625 kfree(smp->ltk);
626 }
627
628 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
629 list_del(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
630 kfree(smp->slave_ltk);
631 }
632
633 if (smp->remote_irk) {
634 list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
635 kfree(smp->remote_irk);
636 }
637 }
638
639 kfree(smp);
640 conn->smp_chan = NULL;
641 conn->hcon->smp_conn = NULL;
642 hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon);
643 }
644
645 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
646 {
647 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->smp_conn;
648 struct smp_chan *smp;
649 u32 value;
650
651 BT_DBG("");
652
653 if (!conn)
654 return -ENOTCONN;
655
656 smp = conn->smp_chan;
657
658 switch (mgmt_op) {
659 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
660 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
661 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
662 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
663 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
664 /* Fall Through */
665 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
666 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
667 break;
668 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
669 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
670 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
671 return 0;
672 default:
673 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
674 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
675 }
676
677 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
678 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags))
679 queue_work(hcon->hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
680
681 return 0;
682 }
683
684 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
685 {
686 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
687 struct smp_chan *smp;
688 u8 key_size;
689 u8 auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
690 int ret;
691
692 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
693
694 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
695 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
696
697 if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
698 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
699
700 if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
701 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
702 else
703 smp = conn->smp_chan;
704
705 if (!smp)
706 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
707
708 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
709 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
710 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
711
712 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
713 if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)
714 auth = req->auth_req;
715
716 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
717
718 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
719
720 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
721 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
722 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
723
724 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
725
726 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
727 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
728
729 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
730
731 /* Request setup of TK */
732 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
733 if (ret)
734 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
735
736 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->smp_flags);
737
738 return 0;
739 }
740
741 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
742 {
743 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
744 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
745 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
746 u8 key_size, auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
747 int ret;
748
749 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
750
751 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
752 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
753
754 if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
755 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
756
757 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
758
759 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
760
761 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
762 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
763 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
764
765 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
766
767 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
768 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
769
770 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
771 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
772 */
773 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
774
775 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) &&
776 (rsp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
777 auth = SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
778
779 auth |= (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_MITM;
780
781 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
782 if (ret)
783 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
784
785 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
786
787 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
788 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags))
789 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
790
791 return 0;
792 }
793
794 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
795 {
796 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
797 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
798
799 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
800
801 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
802 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
803
804 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
805 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
806
807 if (conn->hcon->out)
808 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
809 smp->prnd);
810 else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags))
811 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
812 else
813 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
814
815 return 0;
816 }
817
818 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
819 {
820 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
821 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
822
823 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
824
825 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
826 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
827
828 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
829 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
830
831 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->random);
832
833 return 0;
834 }
835
836 static u8 smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
837 {
838 struct smp_ltk *key;
839 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
840
841 key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
842 hcon->out);
843 if (!key)
844 return 0;
845
846 if (sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM && !key->authenticated)
847 return 0;
848
849 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
850 return 1;
851
852 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val);
853 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
854
855 return 1;
856 }
857
858 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
859 {
860 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
861 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
862 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
863 struct smp_chan *smp;
864
865 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
866
867 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
868 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
869
870 if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
871 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
872
873 hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
874
875 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
876 return 0;
877
878 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
879 return 0;
880
881 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
882
883 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
884
885 memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
886 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, rp->auth_req);
887
888 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
889 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
890
891 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
892
893 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->smp_flags);
894
895 return 0;
896 }
897
898 bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level)
899 {
900 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
901 return true;
902
903 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
904 return true;
905
906 return false;
907 }
908
909 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
910 {
911 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
912 struct smp_chan *smp;
913 __u8 authreq;
914
915 BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
916
917 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
918 if (!conn)
919 return 1;
920
921 if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
922 return 1;
923
924 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level))
925 return 1;
926
927 if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
928 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, sec_level))
929 goto done;
930
931 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
932 return 0;
933
934 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
935 if (!smp)
936 return 1;
937
938 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
939
940 /* hcon->auth_type is set by pair_device in mgmt.c. If the MITM
941 * flag is set we should also set it for the SMP request.
942 */
943 if ((hcon->auth_type & 0x01))
944 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
945
946 if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
947 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
948
949 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
950 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
951 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
952
953 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
954 } else {
955 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
956 cp.auth_req = authreq;
957 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
958 }
959
960 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->smp_flags);
961
962 done:
963 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
964
965 return 0;
966 }
967
968 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
969 {
970 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
971 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
972
973 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
974
975 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
976 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
977
978 /* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
979 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
980 return 0;
981
982 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
983
984 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
985
986 return 0;
987 }
988
989 static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
990 {
991 struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
992 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
993 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
994 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
995 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
996 u8 authenticated;
997
998 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
999
1000 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
1001 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1002
1003 /* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
1004 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
1005 return 0;
1006
1007 /* Mark the information as received */
1008 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1009
1010 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
1011
1012 hci_dev_lock(hdev);
1013 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
1014 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, HCI_SMP_LTK,
1015 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
1016 rp->ediv, rp->rand);
1017 smp->ltk = ltk;
1018 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY))
1019 smp_distribute_keys(conn);
1020 hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
1021
1022 return 0;
1023 }
1024
1025 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1026 {
1027 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
1028 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
1029
1030 BT_DBG("");
1031
1032 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
1033 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1034
1035 /* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
1036 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY))
1037 return 0;
1038
1039 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
1040
1041 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
1042
1043 return 0;
1044 }
1045
1046 static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
1047 struct sk_buff *skb)
1048 {
1049 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
1050 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
1051 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1052 bdaddr_t rpa;
1053
1054 BT_DBG("");
1055
1056 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
1057 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1058
1059 /* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
1060 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY))
1061 return 0;
1062
1063 /* Mark the information as received */
1064 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1065
1066 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
1067
1068 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
1069 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
1070 * as "identity information". However, since such
1071 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
1072 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
1073 * received an IRK for such a device.
1074 */
1075 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY)) {
1076 BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address");
1077 smp_distribute_keys(conn);
1078 return 0;
1079 }
1080
1081 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
1082 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
1083
1084 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
1085 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
1086 else
1087 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
1088
1089 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
1090 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
1091
1092 smp_distribute_keys(conn);
1093
1094 return 0;
1095 }
1096
1097 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1098 {
1099 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
1100 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
1101 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1102 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1103
1104 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1105
1106 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
1107 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1108
1109 /* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
1110 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN))
1111 return 0;
1112
1113 /* Mark the information as received */
1114 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1115
1116 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
1117
1118 hci_dev_lock(hdev);
1119 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1120 if (csrk) {
1121 csrk->master = 0x01;
1122 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1123 }
1124 smp->csrk = csrk;
1125 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN))
1126 smp_distribute_keys(conn);
1127 hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
1128
1129 return 0;
1130 }
1131
1132 int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1133 {
1134 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1135 __u8 code, reason;
1136 int err = 0;
1137
1138 if (hcon->type != LE_LINK) {
1139 kfree_skb(skb);
1140 return 0;
1141 }
1142
1143 if (skb->len < 1) {
1144 kfree_skb(skb);
1145 return -EILSEQ;
1146 }
1147
1148 if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
1149 err = -ENOTSUPP;
1150 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1151 goto done;
1152 }
1153
1154 code = skb->data[0];
1155 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
1156
1157 /*
1158 * The SMP context must be initialized for all other PDUs except
1159 * pairing and security requests. If we get any other PDU when
1160 * not initialized simply disconnect (done if this function
1161 * returns an error).
1162 */
1163 if (code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ &&
1164 !conn->smp_chan) {
1165 BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP command 0x%02x. Disconnecting.", code);
1166 kfree_skb(skb);
1167 return -ENOTSUPP;
1168 }
1169
1170 switch (code) {
1171 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
1172 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
1173 break;
1174
1175 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
1176 smp_failure(conn, 0);
1177 reason = 0;
1178 err = -EPERM;
1179 break;
1180
1181 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
1182 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
1183 break;
1184
1185 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
1186 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
1187 break;
1188
1189 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
1190 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
1191 break;
1192
1193 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
1194 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
1195 break;
1196
1197 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
1198 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
1199 break;
1200
1201 case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
1202 reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
1203 break;
1204
1205 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
1206 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
1207 break;
1208
1209 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
1210 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
1211 break;
1212
1213 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
1214 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
1215 break;
1216
1217 default:
1218 BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
1219
1220 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1221 err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
1222 goto done;
1223 }
1224
1225 done:
1226 if (reason)
1227 smp_failure(conn, reason);
1228
1229 kfree_skb(skb);
1230 return err;
1231 }
1232
1233 static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1234 {
1235 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
1236 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1237 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1238 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1239 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1240 bool persistent;
1241
1242 if (smp->remote_irk) {
1243 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);
1244 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
1245 * identity address track the connection based on it
1246 * from now on.
1247 */
1248 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
1249 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
1250 l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon);
1251 }
1252
1253 /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
1254 * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
1255 */
1256 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
1257
1258 if (smp->csrk) {
1259 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1260 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1261 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
1262 }
1263
1264 if (smp->slave_csrk) {
1265 smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1266 bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1267 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
1268 }
1269
1270 if (smp->ltk) {
1271 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1272 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1273 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
1274 }
1275
1276 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
1277 smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1278 bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1279 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
1280 }
1281 }
1282
1283 int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1284 {
1285 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
1286 struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
1287 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1288 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1289 __u8 *keydist;
1290
1291 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1292
1293 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
1294 return 0;
1295
1296 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1297
1298 /* The responder sends its keys first */
1299 if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
1300 return 0;
1301
1302 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1303
1304 if (hcon->out) {
1305 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
1306 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
1307 } else {
1308 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
1309 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
1310 }
1311
1312 BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
1313
1314 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
1315 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
1316 struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
1317 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
1318 u8 authenticated;
1319 __le16 ediv;
1320 __le64 rand;
1321
1322 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
1323 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
1324 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
1325
1326 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
1327
1328 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1329 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1330 HCI_SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
1331 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1332 smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
1333
1334 ident.ediv = ediv;
1335 ident.rand = rand;
1336
1337 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
1338
1339 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1340 }
1341
1342 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
1343 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
1344 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
1345
1346 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
1347
1348 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
1349
1350 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
1351 * after the connection has been established.
1352 *
1353 * This is true even when the connection has been
1354 * established using a resolvable random address.
1355 */
1356 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
1357 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
1358
1359 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
1360 &addrinfo);
1361
1362 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1363 }
1364
1365 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
1366 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
1367 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1368
1369 /* Generate a new random key */
1370 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
1371
1372 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1373 if (csrk) {
1374 csrk->master = 0x00;
1375 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1376 }
1377 smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
1378
1379 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
1380
1381 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1382 }
1383
1384 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
1385 if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
1386 return 0;
1387
1388 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags);
1389 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
1390 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->smp_flags);
1391 smp_notify_keys(conn);
1392
1393 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
1394
1395 return 0;
1396 }
Linux kernel - Deliverables
This page took 0.086458 seconds and 5 git commands to generate.