[UDP]: Make full use of proto.h.udp_hash innovation.
[deliverable/linux.git] / net / ipv4 / syncookies.c
1 /*
2 * Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel
3 *
4 * Copyright (C) 1997 Andi Kleen
5 * Based on ideas by D.J.Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
6 *
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
8 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
9 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
10 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
11 *
12 * $Id: syncookies.c,v 1.18 2002/02/01 22:01:04 davem Exp $
13 */
14
15 #include <linux/tcp.h>
16 #include <linux/slab.h>
17 #include <linux/random.h>
18 #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
19 #include <linux/kernel.h>
20 #include <net/tcp.h>
21
22 extern int sysctl_tcp_syncookies;
23
24 __u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-3+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS];
25 EXPORT_SYMBOL(syncookie_secret);
26
27 static __init int init_syncookies(void)
28 {
29 get_random_bytes(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
30 return 0;
31 }
32 __initcall(init_syncookies);
33
34 #define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
35 #define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
36
37 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32, cookie_scratch)[16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
38
39 static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
40 u32 count, int c)
41 {
42 __u32 *tmp = __get_cpu_var(cookie_scratch);
43
44 memcpy(tmp + 3, syncookie_secret[c], sizeof(syncookie_secret[c]));
45 tmp[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
46 tmp[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
47 tmp[2] = ((__force u32)sport << 16) + (__force u32)dport;
48 tmp[3] = count;
49 sha_transform(tmp + 16, (__u8 *)tmp, tmp + 16 + 5);
50
51 return tmp[17];
52 }
53
54 static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
55 __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count,
56 __u32 data)
57 {
58 /*
59 * Compute the secure sequence number.
60 * The output should be:
61 * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
62 * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
63 * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
64 * minute by 1.
65 * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
66 * MSS into the second hash value.
67 */
68
69 return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
70 sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
71 ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
72 & COOKIEMASK));
73 }
74
75 /*
76 * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
77 * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
78 * range. This must be checked by the caller.
79 *
80 * The count value used to generate the cookie must be within
81 * "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count". The return value
82 * is (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
83 */
84 static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
85 __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq,
86 __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
87 {
88 __u32 diff;
89
90 /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
91 cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
92
93 /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
94 diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS);
95 if (diff >= maxdiff)
96 return (__u32)-1;
97
98 return (cookie -
99 cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1))
100 & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
101 }
102
103 /*
104 * This table has to be sorted and terminated with (__u16)-1.
105 * XXX generate a better table.
106 * Unresolved Issues: HIPPI with a 64k MSS is not well supported.
107 */
108 static __u16 const msstab[] = {
109 64 - 1,
110 256 - 1,
111 512 - 1,
112 536 - 1,
113 1024 - 1,
114 1440 - 1,
115 1460 - 1,
116 4312 - 1,
117 (__u16)-1
118 };
119 /* The number doesn't include the -1 terminator */
120 #define NUM_MSS (ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) - 1)
121
122 /*
123 * Generate a syncookie. mssp points to the mss, which is returned
124 * rounded down to the value encoded in the cookie.
125 */
126 __u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp)
127 {
128 struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
129 const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
130 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
131 int mssind;
132 const __u16 mss = *mssp;
133
134 tp->last_synq_overflow = jiffies;
135
136 /* XXX sort msstab[] by probability? Binary search? */
137 for (mssind = 0; mss > msstab[mssind + 1]; mssind++)
138 ;
139 *mssp = msstab[mssind] + 1;
140
141 NET_INC_STATS_BH(LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESSENT);
142
143 return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
144 th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq),
145 jiffies / (HZ * 60), mssind);
146 }
147
148 /*
149 * This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted.
150 * Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and
151 * sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential
152 * backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here.
153 */
154 #define COUNTER_TRIES 4
155 /*
156 * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie.
157 * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not.
158 */
159 static inline int cookie_check(struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 cookie)
160 {
161 const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
162 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
163 __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
164 __u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
165 th->source, th->dest, seq,
166 jiffies / (HZ * 60),
167 COUNTER_TRIES);
168
169 return mssind < NUM_MSS ? msstab[mssind] + 1 : 0;
170 }
171
172 static inline struct sock *get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
173 struct request_sock *req,
174 struct dst_entry *dst)
175 {
176 struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
177 struct sock *child;
178
179 child = icsk->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
180 if (child)
181 inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child);
182 else
183 reqsk_free(req);
184
185 return child;
186 }
187
188 struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
189 struct ip_options *opt)
190 {
191 struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
192 struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
193 struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
194 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
195 __u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
196 struct sock *ret = sk;
197 struct request_sock *req;
198 int mss;
199 struct rtable *rt;
200 __u8 rcv_wscale;
201
202 if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack)
203 goto out;
204
205 if (time_after(jiffies, tp->last_synq_overflow + TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT) ||
206 (mss = cookie_check(skb, cookie)) == 0) {
207 NET_INC_STATS_BH(LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED);
208 goto out;
209 }
210
211 NET_INC_STATS_BH(LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV);
212
213 ret = NULL;
214 req = reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops); /* for safety */
215 if (!req)
216 goto out;
217
218 if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) {
219 reqsk_free(req);
220 goto out;
221 }
222 ireq = inet_rsk(req);
223 treq = tcp_rsk(req);
224 treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
225 treq->snt_isn = cookie;
226 req->mss = mss;
227 ireq->rmt_port = th->source;
228 ireq->loc_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
229 ireq->rmt_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
230 ireq->opt = NULL;
231
232 /* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope
233 * the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8)
234 */
235 if (opt && opt->optlen) {
236 int opt_size = sizeof(struct ip_options) + opt->optlen;
237
238 ireq->opt = kmalloc(opt_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
239 if (ireq->opt != NULL && ip_options_echo(ireq->opt, skb)) {
240 kfree(ireq->opt);
241 ireq->opt = NULL;
242 }
243 }
244
245 ireq->snd_wscale = ireq->rcv_wscale = ireq->tstamp_ok = 0;
246 ireq->wscale_ok = ireq->sack_ok = 0;
247 req->expires = 0UL;
248 req->retrans = 0;
249
250 /*
251 * We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct
252 * window size. We should better make sure that the window size
253 * hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see
254 * no easy way to do this.
255 */
256 {
257 struct flowi fl = { .nl_u = { .ip4_u =
258 { .daddr = ((opt && opt->srr) ?
259 opt->faddr :
260 ireq->rmt_addr),
261 .saddr = ireq->loc_addr,
262 .tos = RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk) } },
263 .proto = IPPROTO_TCP,
264 .uli_u = { .ports =
265 { .sport = th->dest,
266 .dport = th->source } } };
267 security_req_classify_flow(req, &fl);
268 if (ip_route_output_key(&init_net, &rt, &fl)) {
269 reqsk_free(req);
270 goto out;
271 }
272 }
273
274 /* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
275 req->window_clamp = dst_metric(&rt->u.dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
276 tcp_select_initial_window(tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss,
277 &req->rcv_wnd, &req->window_clamp,
278 0, &rcv_wscale);
279 /* BTW win scale with syncookies is 0 by definition */
280 ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
281
282 ret = get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->u.dst);
283 out: return ret;
284 }
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