mac80111: Add BIP-CMAC-256 cipher
[deliverable/linux.git] / net / mac80211 / wpa.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 */
9
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
18 #include <crypto/aes.h>
19
20 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
21 #include "michael.h"
22 #include "tkip.h"
23 #include "aes_ccm.h"
24 #include "aes_cmac.h"
25 #include "aes_gcm.h"
26 #include "wpa.h"
27
28 ieee80211_tx_result
29 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
30 {
31 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
32 size_t data_len;
33 unsigned int hdrlen;
34 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
35 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
36 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
37 int tail;
38
39 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
40 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
41 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
42 return TX_CONTINUE;
43
44 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
45 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
46 return TX_DROP;
47
48 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
49 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
50
51 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
52 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
53 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
54 }
55
56 if (info->control.hw_key &&
57 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
58 tx->local->ops->set_frag_threshold) &&
59 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
60 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
61 return TX_CONTINUE;
62 }
63
64 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
65 if (!info->control.hw_key)
66 tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
67
68 if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
69 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
70 "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n",
71 skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
72 skb_tailroom(skb), tail))
73 return TX_DROP;
74
75 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
76 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
77 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
78 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
79 mic[0]++;
80
81 return TX_CONTINUE;
82 }
83
84
85 ieee80211_rx_result
86 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
87 {
88 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
89 size_t data_len;
90 unsigned int hdrlen;
91 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
92 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
93 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
94 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
95
96 /*
97 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
98 * than data frames.
99 */
100 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
101 return RX_CONTINUE;
102
103 /*
104 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
105 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
106 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
107 * MIC failure report.
108 */
109 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
110 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
111 goto mic_fail_no_key;
112
113 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
114 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
115 goto update_iv;
116
117 return RX_CONTINUE;
118 }
119
120 /*
121 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
122 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
123 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
124 */
125 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
126 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
127 return RX_CONTINUE;
128
129 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
130 /*
131 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
132 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
133 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
134 * frames in the BSS.
135 */
136 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
137 }
138
139 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
140 goto mic_fail;
141
142 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
143 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
144 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
145
146 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
147 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
148 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
149
150 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
151 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
152 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
153 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
154 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
155 goto mic_fail;
156
157 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
158 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
159
160 update_iv:
161 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
162 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
163 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
164
165 return RX_CONTINUE;
166
167 mic_fail:
168 rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
169
170 mic_fail_no_key:
171 /*
172 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
173 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
174 * the key is set.
175 */
176 mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
177 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
178 (void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
179 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
180 }
181
182
183 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
184 {
185 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
186 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
187 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
188 unsigned int hdrlen;
189 int len, tail;
190 u8 *pos;
191
192 if (info->control.hw_key &&
193 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
194 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
195 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
196 return 0;
197 }
198
199 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
200 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
201
202 if (info->control.hw_key)
203 tail = 0;
204 else
205 tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
206
207 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
208 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
209 return -1;
210
211 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
212 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
213 pos += hdrlen;
214
215 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
216 if (info->control.hw_key &&
217 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
218 return 0;
219
220 /* Increase IV for the frame */
221 spin_lock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
222 key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
223 if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
224 key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
225 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
226 spin_unlock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
227
228 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
229 if (info->control.hw_key)
230 return 0;
231
232 /* Add room for ICV */
233 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
234
235 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
236 key, skb, pos, len);
237 }
238
239
240 ieee80211_tx_result
241 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
242 {
243 struct sk_buff *skb;
244
245 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
246
247 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
248 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
249 return TX_DROP;
250 }
251
252 return TX_CONTINUE;
253 }
254
255
256 ieee80211_rx_result
257 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
258 {
259 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
260 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
261 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
262 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
263 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
264
265 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
266
267 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
268 return RX_CONTINUE;
269
270 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
271 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
272
273 /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
274 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
275 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
276 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
277
278 /*
279 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
280 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
281 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
282 */
283 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
284 hwaccel = 1;
285
286 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
287 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
288 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
289 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
290 &rx->tkip_iv32,
291 &rx->tkip_iv16);
292 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
293 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
294
295 /* Trim ICV */
296 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
297
298 /* Remove IV */
299 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
300 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
301
302 return RX_CONTINUE;
303 }
304
305
306 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
307 {
308 __le16 mask_fc;
309 int a4_included, mgmt;
310 u8 qos_tid;
311 u16 len_a;
312 unsigned int hdrlen;
313 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
314
315 /*
316 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
317 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
318 */
319 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
320 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
321 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
322 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
323 if (!mgmt)
324 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
325 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
326
327 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
328 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
329 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
330
331 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
332 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
333 else
334 qos_tid = 0;
335
336 /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
337 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
338 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
339 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
340 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
341 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
342 */
343 b_0[0] = 0x1;
344
345 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
346 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
347 */
348 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
349 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
350 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
351
352 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
353 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
354 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
355 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
356 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
357
358 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
359 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
360 aad[23] = 0;
361
362 if (a4_included) {
363 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
364 aad[30] = qos_tid;
365 aad[31] = 0;
366 } else {
367 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
368 aad[24] = qos_tid;
369 }
370 }
371
372
373 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
374 {
375 hdr[0] = pn[5];
376 hdr[1] = pn[4];
377 hdr[2] = 0;
378 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
379 hdr[4] = pn[3];
380 hdr[5] = pn[2];
381 hdr[6] = pn[1];
382 hdr[7] = pn[0];
383 }
384
385
386 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
387 {
388 pn[0] = hdr[7];
389 pn[1] = hdr[6];
390 pn[2] = hdr[5];
391 pn[3] = hdr[4];
392 pn[4] = hdr[1];
393 pn[5] = hdr[0];
394 }
395
396
397 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
398 unsigned int mic_len)
399 {
400 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
401 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
402 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
403 int hdrlen, len, tail;
404 u8 *pos;
405 u8 pn[6];
406 u64 pn64;
407 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
408 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
409
410 if (info->control.hw_key &&
411 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
412 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
413 !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
414 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
415 ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
416 /*
417 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
418 * header or MIC fields
419 */
420 return 0;
421 }
422
423 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
424 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
425
426 if (info->control.hw_key)
427 tail = 0;
428 else
429 tail = mic_len;
430
431 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
432 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
433 return -1;
434
435 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
436 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
437
438 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
439 if (info->control.hw_key &&
440 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
441 return 0;
442
443 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
444 pos += hdrlen;
445
446 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
447
448 pn[5] = pn64;
449 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
450 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
451 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
452 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
453 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
454
455 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
456
457 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
458 if (info->control.hw_key)
459 return 0;
460
461 pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
462 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
463 ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
464 skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len);
465
466 return 0;
467 }
468
469
470 ieee80211_tx_result
471 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
472 unsigned int mic_len)
473 {
474 struct sk_buff *skb;
475
476 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
477
478 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
479 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0)
480 return TX_DROP;
481 }
482
483 return TX_CONTINUE;
484 }
485
486
487 ieee80211_rx_result
488 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
489 unsigned int mic_len)
490 {
491 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
492 int hdrlen;
493 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
494 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
495 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
496 u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
497 int data_len;
498 int queue;
499
500 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
501
502 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
503 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
504 return RX_CONTINUE;
505
506 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
507 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
508 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
509
510 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
511 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
512 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
513 } else {
514 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
515 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
516 }
517
518 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
519
520 queue = rx->security_idx;
521
522 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
523 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
524 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
525 }
526
527 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
528 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
529 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
530 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
531 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
532
533 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
534 key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
535 skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
536 data_len,
537 skb->data + skb->len - mic_len, mic_len))
538 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
539 }
540
541 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
542
543 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
544 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
545 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
546 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
547 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
548
549 return RX_CONTINUE;
550 }
551
552 static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
553 {
554 __le16 mask_fc;
555 u8 qos_tid;
556 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
557
558 memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
559 memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
560 j_0[13] = 0;
561 j_0[14] = 0;
562 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01;
563
564 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
565 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC]
566 */
567 put_unaligned_be16(ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2, &aad[0]);
568 /* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
569 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
570 */
571 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
572 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
573 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
574 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
575 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
576 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
577
578 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
579 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
580
581 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
582 aad[22] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
583 aad[23] = 0;
584
585 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
586 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
587 IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
588 else
589 qos_tid = 0;
590
591 if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control)) {
592 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
593 aad[30] = qos_tid;
594 aad[31] = 0;
595 } else {
596 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
597 aad[24] = qos_tid;
598 }
599 }
600
601 static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id)
602 {
603 hdr[0] = pn[5];
604 hdr[1] = pn[4];
605 hdr[2] = 0;
606 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
607 hdr[4] = pn[3];
608 hdr[5] = pn[2];
609 hdr[6] = pn[1];
610 hdr[7] = pn[0];
611 }
612
613 static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr)
614 {
615 pn[0] = hdr[7];
616 pn[1] = hdr[6];
617 pn[2] = hdr[5];
618 pn[3] = hdr[4];
619 pn[4] = hdr[1];
620 pn[5] = hdr[0];
621 }
622
623 static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
624 {
625 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
626 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
627 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
628 int hdrlen, len, tail;
629 u8 *pos;
630 u8 pn[6];
631 u64 pn64;
632 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
633 u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
634
635 if (info->control.hw_key &&
636 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
637 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
638 !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
639 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
640 ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
641 /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP
642 * header or MIC fields
643 */
644 return 0;
645 }
646
647 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
648 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
649
650 if (info->control.hw_key)
651 tail = 0;
652 else
653 tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
654
655 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
656 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
657 return -1;
658
659 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
660 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
661 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
662 IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
663
664 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
665 if (info->control.hw_key &&
666 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
667 return 0;
668
669 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)pos;
670 pos += hdrlen;
671
672 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.gcmp.tx_pn);
673
674 pn[5] = pn64;
675 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
676 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
677 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
678 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
679 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
680
681 gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
682
683 /* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */
684 if (info->control.hw_key)
685 return 0;
686
687 pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
688 gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
689 ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len,
690 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN));
691
692 return 0;
693 }
694
695 ieee80211_tx_result
696 ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
697 {
698 struct sk_buff *skb;
699
700 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
701
702 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
703 if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
704 return TX_DROP;
705 }
706
707 return TX_CONTINUE;
708 }
709
710 ieee80211_rx_result
711 ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
712 {
713 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
714 int hdrlen;
715 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
716 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
717 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
718 u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN];
719 int data_len;
720 int queue;
721
722 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
723
724 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
725 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
726 return RX_CONTINUE;
727
728 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN -
729 IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
730 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
731 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
732
733 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
734 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
735 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
736 } else {
737 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
738 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
739 }
740
741 gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
742
743 queue = rx->security_idx;
744
745 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
746 key->u.gcmp.replays++;
747 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
748 }
749
750 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
751 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
752 u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
753 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
754 gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
755
756 if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(
757 key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad,
758 skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN,
759 data_len,
760 skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN))
761 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
762 }
763
764 memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
765
766 /* Remove GCMP header and MIC */
767 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN))
768 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
769 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
770 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
771
772 return RX_CONTINUE;
773 }
774
775 static ieee80211_tx_result
776 ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
777 struct sk_buff *skb)
778 {
779 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
780 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
781 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
782 const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = key->sta->cipher_scheme;
783 int hdrlen;
784 u8 *pos;
785
786 if (info->control.hw_key &&
787 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
788 /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */
789 return TX_CONTINUE;
790 }
791
792 if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < cs->hdr_len &&
793 pskb_expand_head(skb, cs->hdr_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)))
794 return TX_DROP;
795
796 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
797
798 pos = skb_push(skb, cs->hdr_len);
799 memmove(pos, pos + cs->hdr_len, hdrlen);
800
801 return TX_CONTINUE;
802 }
803
804 static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len)
805 {
806 int i;
807
808 /* pn is little endian */
809 for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
810 if (pn1[i] < pn2[i])
811 return -1;
812 else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i])
813 return 1;
814 }
815
816 return 0;
817 }
818
819 static ieee80211_rx_result
820 ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
821 {
822 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
823 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
824 const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL;
825 int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
826 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
827 int data_len;
828 u8 *rx_pn;
829 u8 *skb_pn;
830 u8 qos_tid;
831
832 if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme ||
833 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
834 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
835
836 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
837 return RX_CONTINUE;
838
839 cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme;
840
841 data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len;
842
843 if (data_len < 0)
844 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
845
846 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
847 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
848 IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
849 else
850 qos_tid = 0;
851
852 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
853 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
854
855 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
856
857 rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid];
858 skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off;
859
860 if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0)
861 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
862
863 memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len);
864
865 /* remove security header and MIC */
866 if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len))
867 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
868
869 memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen);
870 skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len);
871
872 return RX_CONTINUE;
873 }
874
875 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
876 {
877 __le16 mask_fc;
878 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
879
880 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
881
882 /* FC type/subtype */
883 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
884 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
885 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
886 IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
887 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
888 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
889 memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
890 }
891
892
893 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
894 {
895 *d++ = pn;
896 *d++ = pn >> 8;
897 *d++ = pn >> 16;
898 *d++ = pn >> 24;
899 *d++ = pn >> 32;
900 *d = pn >> 40;
901 }
902
903 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
904 {
905 *d++ = s[5];
906 *d++ = s[4];
907 *d++ = s[3];
908 *d++ = s[2];
909 *d++ = s[1];
910 *d = s[0];
911 }
912
913
914 ieee80211_tx_result
915 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
916 {
917 struct sk_buff *skb;
918 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
919 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
920 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
921 u8 aad[20];
922 u64 pn64;
923
924 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
925 return TX_DROP;
926
927 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
928
929 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
930
931 if (info->control.hw_key)
932 return TX_CONTINUE;
933
934 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
935 return TX_DROP;
936
937 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
938 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
939 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
940 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
941
942 /* PN = PN + 1 */
943 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
944
945 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
946
947 bip_aad(skb, aad);
948
949 /*
950 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
951 */
952 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
953 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
954
955 return TX_CONTINUE;
956 }
957
958 ieee80211_tx_result
959 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
960 {
961 struct sk_buff *skb;
962 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
963 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
964 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
965 u8 aad[20];
966 u64 pn64;
967
968 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
969 return TX_DROP;
970
971 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
972
973 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
974
975 if (info->control.hw_key)
976 return TX_CONTINUE;
977
978 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
979 return TX_DROP;
980
981 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
982 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
983 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
984 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
985
986 /* PN = PN + 1 */
987 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
988
989 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
990
991 bip_aad(skb, aad);
992
993 /* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128)
994 */
995 ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
996 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
997
998 return TX_CONTINUE;
999 }
1000
1001 ieee80211_rx_result
1002 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
1003 {
1004 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
1005 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
1006 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
1007 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
1008 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
1009 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
1010
1011 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
1012 return RX_CONTINUE;
1013
1014 /* management frames are already linear */
1015
1016 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
1017 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1018
1019 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
1020 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1021 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
1022 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
1023 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
1024
1025 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
1026
1027 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
1028 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
1029 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1030 }
1031
1032 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
1033 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
1034 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1035 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
1036 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
1037 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
1038 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
1039 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1040 }
1041 }
1042
1043 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
1044
1045 /* Remove MMIE */
1046 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1047
1048 return RX_CONTINUE;
1049 }
1050
1051 ieee80211_rx_result
1052 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
1053 {
1054 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
1055 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
1056 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
1057 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
1058 u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6];
1059 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
1060
1061 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
1062 return RX_CONTINUE;
1063
1064 /* management frames are already linear */
1065
1066 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
1067 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1068
1069 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
1070 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1071 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
1072 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
1073 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
1074
1075 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
1076
1077 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
1078 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
1079 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1080 }
1081
1082 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
1083 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
1084 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1085 ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
1086 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
1087 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
1088 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
1089 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1090 }
1091 }
1092
1093 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
1094
1095 /* Remove MMIE */
1096 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1097
1098 return RX_CONTINUE;
1099 }
1100
1101 ieee80211_tx_result
1102 ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
1103 {
1104 struct sk_buff *skb;
1105 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
1106 ieee80211_tx_result res;
1107
1108 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
1109 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
1110
1111 /* handle hw-only algorithm */
1112 if (!info->control.hw_key)
1113 return TX_DROP;
1114
1115 if (tx->key->sta->cipher_scheme) {
1116 res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb);
1117 if (res != TX_CONTINUE)
1118 return res;
1119 }
1120 }
1121
1122 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
1123
1124 return TX_CONTINUE;
1125 }
1126
1127 ieee80211_rx_result
1128 ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
1129 {
1130 if (rx->sta && rx->sta->cipher_scheme)
1131 return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx);
1132
1133 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1134 }
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