Merge tag 'master-2014-10-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linvil...
[deliverable/linux.git] / net / mac80211 / wpa.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 */
9
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
18 #include <crypto/aes.h>
19
20 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
21 #include "michael.h"
22 #include "tkip.h"
23 #include "aes_ccm.h"
24 #include "aes_cmac.h"
25 #include "wpa.h"
26
27 ieee80211_tx_result
28 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
29 {
30 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
31 size_t data_len;
32 unsigned int hdrlen;
33 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
34 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
35 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
36 int tail;
37
38 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
39 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
40 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
41 return TX_CONTINUE;
42
43 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
44 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
45 return TX_DROP;
46
47 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
48 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
49
50 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
51 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
52 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
53 }
54
55 if (info->control.hw_key &&
56 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
57 tx->local->ops->set_frag_threshold) &&
58 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
59 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
60 return TX_CONTINUE;
61 }
62
63 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
64 if (!info->control.hw_key)
65 tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
66
67 if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
68 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
69 "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n",
70 skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
71 skb_tailroom(skb), tail))
72 return TX_DROP;
73
74 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
75 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
76 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
77 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
78 mic[0]++;
79
80 return TX_CONTINUE;
81 }
82
83
84 ieee80211_rx_result
85 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
86 {
87 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
88 size_t data_len;
89 unsigned int hdrlen;
90 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
91 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
92 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
93 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
94
95 /*
96 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
97 * than data frames.
98 */
99 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
100 return RX_CONTINUE;
101
102 /*
103 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
104 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
105 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
106 * MIC failure report.
107 */
108 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
109 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
110 goto mic_fail_no_key;
111
112 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
113 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
114 goto update_iv;
115
116 return RX_CONTINUE;
117 }
118
119 /*
120 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
121 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
122 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
123 */
124 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
125 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
126 return RX_CONTINUE;
127
128 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
129 /*
130 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
131 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
132 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
133 * frames in the BSS.
134 */
135 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
136 }
137
138 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
139 goto mic_fail;
140
141 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
142 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
143 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
144
145 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
146 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
147 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
148
149 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
150 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
151 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
152 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
153 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
154 goto mic_fail;
155
156 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
157 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
158
159 update_iv:
160 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
161 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
162 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
163
164 return RX_CONTINUE;
165
166 mic_fail:
167 rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
168
169 mic_fail_no_key:
170 /*
171 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
172 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
173 * the key is set.
174 */
175 mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
176 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
177 (void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
178 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
179 }
180
181
182 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
183 {
184 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
185 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
186 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
187 unsigned int hdrlen;
188 int len, tail;
189 u8 *pos;
190
191 if (info->control.hw_key &&
192 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
193 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
194 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
195 return 0;
196 }
197
198 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
199 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
200
201 if (info->control.hw_key)
202 tail = 0;
203 else
204 tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
205
206 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
207 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
208 return -1;
209
210 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
211 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
212 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
213 IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
214 pos += hdrlen;
215
216 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
217 if (info->control.hw_key &&
218 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
219 return 0;
220
221 /* Increase IV for the frame */
222 spin_lock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
223 key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
224 if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
225 key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
226 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
227 spin_unlock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
228
229 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
230 if (info->control.hw_key)
231 return 0;
232
233 /* Add room for ICV */
234 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
235
236 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
237 key, skb, pos, len);
238 }
239
240
241 ieee80211_tx_result
242 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
243 {
244 struct sk_buff *skb;
245
246 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
247
248 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
249 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
250 return TX_DROP;
251 }
252
253 return TX_CONTINUE;
254 }
255
256
257 ieee80211_rx_result
258 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
259 {
260 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
261 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
262 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
263 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
264 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
265
266 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
267
268 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
269 return RX_CONTINUE;
270
271 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
272 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
273
274 /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
275 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
276 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
277 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
278
279 /*
280 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
281 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
282 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
283 */
284 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
285 hwaccel = 1;
286
287 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
288 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
289 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
290 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
291 &rx->tkip_iv32,
292 &rx->tkip_iv16);
293 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
294 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
295
296 /* Trim ICV */
297 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
298
299 /* Remove IV */
300 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
301 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
302
303 return RX_CONTINUE;
304 }
305
306
307 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
308 {
309 __le16 mask_fc;
310 int a4_included, mgmt;
311 u8 qos_tid;
312 u16 len_a;
313 unsigned int hdrlen;
314 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
315
316 /*
317 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
318 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
319 */
320 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
321 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
322 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
323 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
324 if (!mgmt)
325 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
326 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
327
328 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
329 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
330 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
331
332 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
333 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
334 else
335 qos_tid = 0;
336
337 /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
338 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
339 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
340 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
341 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
342 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
343 */
344 b_0[0] = 0x1;
345
346 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
347 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
348 */
349 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
350 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
351 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
352
353 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
354 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
355 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
356 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
357 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
358
359 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
360 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
361 aad[23] = 0;
362
363 if (a4_included) {
364 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
365 aad[30] = qos_tid;
366 aad[31] = 0;
367 } else {
368 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
369 aad[24] = qos_tid;
370 }
371 }
372
373
374 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
375 {
376 hdr[0] = pn[5];
377 hdr[1] = pn[4];
378 hdr[2] = 0;
379 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
380 hdr[4] = pn[3];
381 hdr[5] = pn[2];
382 hdr[6] = pn[1];
383 hdr[7] = pn[0];
384 }
385
386
387 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
388 {
389 pn[0] = hdr[7];
390 pn[1] = hdr[6];
391 pn[2] = hdr[5];
392 pn[3] = hdr[4];
393 pn[4] = hdr[1];
394 pn[5] = hdr[0];
395 }
396
397
398 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
399 {
400 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
401 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
402 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
403 int hdrlen, len, tail;
404 u8 *pos;
405 u8 pn[6];
406 u64 pn64;
407 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
408 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
409
410 if (info->control.hw_key &&
411 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
412 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
413 !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
414 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
415 ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
416 /*
417 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
418 * header or MIC fields
419 */
420 return 0;
421 }
422
423 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
424 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
425
426 if (info->control.hw_key)
427 tail = 0;
428 else
429 tail = IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
430
431 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
432 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
433 return -1;
434
435 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
436 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
437 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
438 IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
439
440 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
441 if (info->control.hw_key &&
442 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
443 return 0;
444
445 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
446 pos += hdrlen;
447
448 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
449
450 pn[5] = pn64;
451 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
452 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
453 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
454 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
455 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
456
457 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
458
459 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
460 if (info->control.hw_key)
461 return 0;
462
463 pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
464 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
465 ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
466 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
467
468 return 0;
469 }
470
471
472 ieee80211_tx_result
473 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
474 {
475 struct sk_buff *skb;
476
477 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
478
479 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
480 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
481 return TX_DROP;
482 }
483
484 return TX_CONTINUE;
485 }
486
487
488 ieee80211_rx_result
489 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
490 {
491 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
492 int hdrlen;
493 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
494 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
495 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
496 u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
497 int data_len;
498 int queue;
499
500 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
501
502 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
503 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
504 return RX_CONTINUE;
505
506 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN -
507 IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
508 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
509 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
510
511 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
512 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
513 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
514 } else {
515 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
516 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
517 }
518
519 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
520
521 queue = rx->security_idx;
522
523 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
524 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
525 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
526 }
527
528 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
529 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
530 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
531 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
532 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
533
534 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
535 key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
536 skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
537 data_len,
538 skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
539 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
540 }
541
542 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
543
544 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
545 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
546 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
547 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
548 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
549
550 return RX_CONTINUE;
551 }
552
553 static ieee80211_tx_result
554 ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
555 struct sk_buff *skb)
556 {
557 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
558 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
559 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
560 const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = key->sta->cipher_scheme;
561 int hdrlen;
562 u8 *pos;
563
564 if (info->control.hw_key &&
565 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
566 /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */
567 return TX_CONTINUE;
568 }
569
570 if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < cs->hdr_len &&
571 pskb_expand_head(skb, cs->hdr_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)))
572 return TX_DROP;
573
574 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
575
576 pos = skb_push(skb, cs->hdr_len);
577 memmove(pos, pos + cs->hdr_len, hdrlen);
578 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + cs->hdr_len);
579
580 return TX_CONTINUE;
581 }
582
583 static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len)
584 {
585 int i;
586
587 /* pn is little endian */
588 for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
589 if (pn1[i] < pn2[i])
590 return -1;
591 else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i])
592 return 1;
593 }
594
595 return 0;
596 }
597
598 static ieee80211_rx_result
599 ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
600 {
601 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
602 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
603 const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL;
604 int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
605 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
606 int data_len;
607 u8 *rx_pn;
608 u8 *skb_pn;
609 u8 qos_tid;
610
611 if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme ||
612 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
613 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
614
615 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
616 return RX_CONTINUE;
617
618 cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme;
619
620 data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len;
621
622 if (data_len < 0)
623 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
624
625 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
626 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
627 IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
628 else
629 qos_tid = 0;
630
631 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
632 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
633
634 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
635
636 rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid];
637 skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off;
638
639 if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0)
640 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
641
642 memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len);
643
644 /* remove security header and MIC */
645 if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len))
646 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
647
648 memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen);
649 skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len);
650
651 return RX_CONTINUE;
652 }
653
654 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
655 {
656 __le16 mask_fc;
657 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
658
659 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
660
661 /* FC type/subtype */
662 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
663 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
664 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
665 IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
666 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
667 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
668 memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
669 }
670
671
672 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
673 {
674 *d++ = pn;
675 *d++ = pn >> 8;
676 *d++ = pn >> 16;
677 *d++ = pn >> 24;
678 *d++ = pn >> 32;
679 *d = pn >> 40;
680 }
681
682 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
683 {
684 *d++ = s[5];
685 *d++ = s[4];
686 *d++ = s[3];
687 *d++ = s[2];
688 *d++ = s[1];
689 *d = s[0];
690 }
691
692
693 ieee80211_tx_result
694 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
695 {
696 struct sk_buff *skb;
697 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
698 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
699 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
700 u8 aad[20];
701 u64 pn64;
702
703 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
704 return TX_DROP;
705
706 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
707
708 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
709
710 if (info->control.hw_key)
711 return TX_CONTINUE;
712
713 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
714 return TX_DROP;
715
716 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
717 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
718 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
719 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
720
721 /* PN = PN + 1 */
722 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
723
724 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
725
726 bip_aad(skb, aad);
727
728 /*
729 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
730 */
731 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
732 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
733
734 return TX_CONTINUE;
735 }
736
737
738 ieee80211_rx_result
739 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
740 {
741 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
742 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
743 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
744 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
745 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
746 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
747
748 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
749 return RX_CONTINUE;
750
751 /* management frames are already linear */
752
753 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
754 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
755
756 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
757 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
758 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
759 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
760 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
761
762 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
763
764 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
765 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
766 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
767 }
768
769 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
770 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
771 bip_aad(skb, aad);
772 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
773 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
774 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
775 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
776 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
777 }
778 }
779
780 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
781
782 /* Remove MMIE */
783 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
784
785 return RX_CONTINUE;
786 }
787
788 ieee80211_tx_result
789 ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
790 {
791 struct sk_buff *skb;
792 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
793 ieee80211_tx_result res;
794
795 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
796 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
797
798 /* handle hw-only algorithm */
799 if (!info->control.hw_key)
800 return TX_DROP;
801
802 if (tx->key->sta->cipher_scheme) {
803 res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb);
804 if (res != TX_CONTINUE)
805 return res;
806 }
807 }
808
809 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
810
811 return TX_CONTINUE;
812 }
813
814 ieee80211_rx_result
815 ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
816 {
817 if (rx->sta && rx->sta->cipher_scheme)
818 return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx);
819
820 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
821 }
This page took 0.078338 seconds and 5 git commands to generate.