2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing
;
103 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
105 unsigned long enforcing
;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
107 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
116 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
118 unsigned long enabled
;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
120 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
125 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
128 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
131 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
134 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
135 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
136 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
137 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
138 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
141 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
));
147 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
150 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
151 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
152 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
153 * is always considered enabled.
156 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
158 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
161 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event
)
163 if (event
== AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
) {
173 * initialise the security for the init task
175 static void cred_init_security(void)
177 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
178 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
180 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
182 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
184 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
185 cred
->security
= tsec
;
189 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
191 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
193 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
195 tsec
= cred
->security
;
200 * get the objective security ID of a task
202 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
207 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
213 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
215 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
217 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
222 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
224 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
226 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
227 u32 sid
= current_sid();
229 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
233 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
234 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
236 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
237 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
238 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
239 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
244 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head
*head
)
246 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
248 isec
= container_of(head
, struct inode_security_struct
, rcu
);
249 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
252 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
254 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
255 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
257 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
258 if (!list_empty(&isec
->list
))
259 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
260 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
263 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
264 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
265 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
266 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
267 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
268 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
269 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
271 call_rcu(&isec
->rcu
, inode_free_rcu
);
274 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
276 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
277 u32 sid
= current_sid();
279 fsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
284 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
285 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
290 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
292 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
293 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
297 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
299 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
301 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
305 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
306 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
307 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
309 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
310 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
311 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
312 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
317 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
319 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
320 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
324 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
326 static const char *labeling_behaviors
[7] = {
328 "uses transition SIDs",
330 "uses genfs_contexts",
331 "not configured for labeling",
332 "uses mountpoint labeling",
333 "uses native labeling",
336 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
338 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
340 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
349 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
353 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
355 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
356 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
357 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
358 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
359 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
360 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
364 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
366 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
367 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
368 const struct cred
*cred
)
370 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
373 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
374 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
378 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
379 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
383 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
384 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
385 const struct cred
*cred
)
387 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
389 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
390 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
394 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
395 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
399 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block
*sb
)
401 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
403 return sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
||
404 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
||
405 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
||
406 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
||
407 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
408 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
409 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore") ||
410 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
411 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "rootfs");
414 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
416 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
417 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
418 struct inode
*root_inode
= d_backing_inode(root
);
421 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
422 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
423 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
424 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
425 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
426 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
427 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
428 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
429 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
433 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
434 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
435 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
436 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
437 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
438 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
440 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
441 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
442 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
447 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
448 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
449 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
451 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBINITIALIZED
;
452 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb
))
453 sbsec
->flags
|= SBLABEL_MNT
;
455 /* Initialize the root inode. */
456 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
458 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
459 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
460 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
462 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
464 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
465 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
466 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
467 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
468 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
469 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
470 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
471 inode
= igrab(inode
);
473 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
477 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
480 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
486 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
487 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
488 * mount options, or whatever.
490 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
491 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
494 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
495 char *context
= NULL
;
499 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
501 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
507 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
508 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK
>= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
));
510 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
511 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
512 for (i
= 0; i
< NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
; i
++) {
514 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
517 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
518 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)
519 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
521 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
522 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
527 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
528 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
534 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
535 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
538 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
539 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
541 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
542 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
545 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
546 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
548 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
549 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
552 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
553 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
555 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
556 struct inode
*root
= d_backing_inode(sbsec
->sb
->s_root
);
557 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= root
->i_security
;
559 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
562 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
563 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
565 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) {
566 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
567 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SBLABEL_MNT
;
570 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
575 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
579 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
580 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
582 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
584 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
585 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
586 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
587 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
590 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
591 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
593 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
594 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
600 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
601 * labeling information.
603 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
604 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
,
605 unsigned long kern_flags
,
606 unsigned long *set_kern_flags
)
608 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
610 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
611 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
612 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(sbsec
->sb
->s_root
);
613 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= inode
->i_security
;
614 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
615 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
616 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
617 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
618 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
620 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
622 if (!ss_initialized
) {
624 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
625 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
626 server is ready to handle calls. */
630 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
631 "before the security server is initialized\n");
634 if (kern_flags
&& !set_kern_flags
) {
635 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
636 * place the results is not allowed */
642 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
643 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
644 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
645 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
647 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
648 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
649 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
650 * will be used for both mounts)
652 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
657 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
658 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
659 * than once with different security options.
661 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
664 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
666 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
],
667 strlen(mount_options
[i
]), &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
669 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
670 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
671 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
678 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
680 goto out_double_mount
;
682 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
687 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
689 goto out_double_mount
;
691 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
693 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
694 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
698 goto out_double_mount
;
700 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
704 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
706 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
708 goto out_double_mount
;
710 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
719 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
720 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
721 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
722 goto out_double_mount
;
727 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
728 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
| SE_SBGENFS
;
730 if (!strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
731 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
732 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore"))
733 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBGENFS
;
735 if (!sbsec
->behavior
) {
737 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
740 rc
= security_fs_use(sb
);
743 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
744 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
748 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
750 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
754 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
758 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
759 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
760 * the superblock context if not already set.
762 if (kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
&& !context_sid
) {
763 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
;
764 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
768 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
769 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
773 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
775 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
780 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
781 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
783 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
784 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
787 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
788 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
793 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
794 root_isec
->initialized
= 1;
797 if (defcontext_sid
) {
798 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
&&
799 sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
) {
801 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
802 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
806 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
807 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
813 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
816 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
818 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
822 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
823 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
827 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
828 const struct super_block
*newsb
)
830 struct superblock_security_struct
*old
= oldsb
->s_security
;
831 struct superblock_security_struct
*new = newsb
->s_security
;
832 char oldflags
= old
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
833 char newflags
= new->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
835 if (oldflags
!= newflags
)
837 if ((oldflags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->sid
!= new->sid
)
839 if ((oldflags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->mntpoint_sid
!= new->mntpoint_sid
)
841 if ((oldflags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->def_sid
!= new->def_sid
)
843 if (oldflags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
844 struct inode_security_struct
*oldroot
= d_backing_inode(oldsb
->s_root
)->i_security
;
845 struct inode_security_struct
*newroot
= d_backing_inode(newsb
->s_root
)->i_security
;
846 if (oldroot
->sid
!= newroot
->sid
)
851 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
852 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
853 "type %s)\n", newsb
->s_id
, newsb
->s_type
->name
);
857 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
858 struct super_block
*newsb
)
860 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
861 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
863 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
864 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
865 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
868 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
869 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
874 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
875 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
877 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
878 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
879 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb
, newsb
);
881 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
883 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
885 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
886 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
887 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
890 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
894 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
895 struct inode
*newinode
= d_backing_inode(newsb
->s_root
);
896 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
899 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
901 if (set_rootcontext
) {
902 const struct inode
*oldinode
= d_backing_inode(oldsb
->s_root
);
903 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= oldinode
->i_security
;
904 struct inode
*newinode
= d_backing_inode(newsb
->s_root
);
905 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
907 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
910 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
911 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
915 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
916 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
919 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
920 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
921 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
923 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
925 /* Standard string-based options. */
926 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
928 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
933 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
937 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
939 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
942 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
952 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
955 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
962 case Opt_rootcontext
:
965 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
968 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
976 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
978 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
981 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
987 case Opt_labelsupport
:
991 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
998 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
1002 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
1003 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
1004 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
1009 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
1010 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
1013 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
1014 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
1017 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
1018 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
1021 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
1022 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
1025 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
1036 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1038 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
1041 char *options
= data
;
1042 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1044 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1049 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
1051 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
1056 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
, 0, NULL
);
1059 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1063 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
1064 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1069 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
1072 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
1073 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
1077 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
1079 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
1082 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
1084 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
1085 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
1087 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
1088 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
1092 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
1098 /* we need a comma before each option */
1100 seq_puts(m
, prefix
);
1103 seq_puts(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
]);
1109 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1111 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1114 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1116 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1122 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1124 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1129 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1131 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1133 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1135 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1137 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1139 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1141 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1143 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1145 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1149 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1152 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1154 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1157 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1159 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1162 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1168 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1169 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1171 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1178 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1179 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1181 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1183 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1184 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1186 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1188 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1190 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1196 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1197 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG
:
1198 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1200 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1202 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1203 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET
;
1208 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1209 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP
:
1210 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET
;
1211 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR
:
1212 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET
;
1213 case NETLINK_NETFILTER
:
1214 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET
;
1215 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1216 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1217 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1218 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1219 case NETLINK_GENERIC
:
1220 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET
;
1221 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT
:
1222 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET
;
1224 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET
;
1225 case NETLINK_CRYPTO
:
1226 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET
;
1228 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1231 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1233 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1235 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1238 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1241 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1247 struct super_block
*sb
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_sb
;
1248 char *buffer
, *path
;
1250 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1254 path
= dentry_path_raw(dentry
, buffer
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1258 if (flags
& SE_SBPROC
) {
1259 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1260 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1261 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1262 while (path
[1] >= '0' && path
[1] <= '9') {
1267 rc
= security_genfs_sid(sb
->s_type
->name
, path
, tclass
, sid
);
1269 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1273 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1274 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1276 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1277 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1279 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1280 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1281 char *context
= NULL
;
1285 if (isec
->initialized
)
1288 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1289 if (isec
->initialized
)
1292 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1293 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1294 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1295 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1296 server is ready to handle calls. */
1297 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1298 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1299 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1300 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1304 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1305 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
:
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1308 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1309 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1313 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1314 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1316 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1317 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1319 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1320 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1324 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1325 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1326 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1327 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1328 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1329 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1330 * be used again by userspace.
1335 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1336 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1342 context
[len
] = '\0';
1343 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1345 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1348 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1349 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1356 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1362 context
[len
] = '\0';
1363 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1369 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1370 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1371 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1372 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1376 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1377 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1380 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1384 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1385 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1387 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1388 if (printk_ratelimit())
1389 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1390 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1391 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1393 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1394 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1395 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1398 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1406 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1407 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1409 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1410 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1411 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1413 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1414 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1415 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1416 isec
->sclass
, NULL
, &sid
);
1421 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1422 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1425 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1426 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1428 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBGENFS
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1429 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1432 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1433 * d_splice_alias. */
1434 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1436 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1438 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1440 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1441 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1442 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1443 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1444 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1445 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1446 * could be used again by userspace.
1450 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1451 rc
= selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry
, isec
->sclass
,
1452 sbsec
->flags
, &sid
);
1461 isec
->initialized
= 1;
1464 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1466 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1467 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1471 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1472 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1478 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1479 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1482 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1483 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1486 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1487 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1490 /* All other signals. */
1491 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1499 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1500 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1502 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1503 const struct cred
*target
,
1506 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1508 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1512 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1513 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1514 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1515 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1517 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1518 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1521 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1525 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1526 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1528 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1532 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1533 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1534 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1535 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1537 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1542 sid
= current_sid();
1543 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1544 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1547 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1548 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1551 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1552 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred
*cred
,
1555 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1556 struct av_decision avd
;
1558 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1559 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1562 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP
;
1565 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1567 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1570 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1574 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1579 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1580 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
) {
1581 int rc2
= avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
, 0);
1588 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1589 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1592 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1594 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1595 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1598 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1599 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1600 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1601 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1602 struct inode
*inode
,
1604 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1606 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1609 validate_creds(cred
);
1611 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1614 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1615 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1617 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1620 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1621 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1622 pathname if needed. */
1623 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1624 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1627 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
1628 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1630 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1631 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1632 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1635 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1636 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1637 pathname if needed. */
1638 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1639 const struct path
*path
,
1642 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(path
->dentry
);
1643 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1645 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1647 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1650 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1651 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1655 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1657 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1658 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1659 return inode_has_perm(cred
, file_inode(file
), av
, &ad
);
1662 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1663 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1664 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1665 check a particular permission to the file.
1666 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1667 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1668 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1669 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1670 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1674 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1675 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
1676 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1677 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1680 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1681 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1683 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1684 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1692 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1695 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1701 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1702 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1703 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1706 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1707 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1708 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1710 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1713 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1714 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1717 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1719 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1720 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1722 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1723 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1728 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)) {
1729 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
,
1730 &dentry
->d_name
, &newsid
);
1735 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1739 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1740 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1741 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1744 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1745 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1746 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1748 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1750 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1754 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1757 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1758 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1759 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1763 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1764 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1765 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1769 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1770 isec
= d_backing_inode(dentry
)->i_security
;
1772 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1773 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1776 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1777 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1792 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1797 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1801 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1802 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1803 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1804 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1806 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1807 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1808 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1810 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1813 old_dsec
= old_dir
->i_security
;
1814 old_isec
= d_backing_inode(old_dentry
)->i_security
;
1815 old_is_dir
= d_is_dir(old_dentry
);
1816 new_dsec
= new_dir
->i_security
;
1818 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1820 ad
.u
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1821 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1822 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1825 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1826 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1829 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1830 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1831 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1836 ad
.u
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1837 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1838 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
))
1839 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1840 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1843 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
)) {
1844 new_isec
= d_backing_inode(new_dentry
)->i_security
;
1845 new_is_dir
= d_is_dir(new_dentry
);
1846 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1848 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1856 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1857 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1858 struct super_block
*sb
,
1860 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1862 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1863 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1865 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1866 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1869 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1870 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1874 if (!S_ISDIR(mode
)) {
1875 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1876 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1877 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1880 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1882 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1886 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1888 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1890 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1897 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1898 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1902 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1904 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1905 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1912 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1921 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1924 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1926 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1928 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
)
1934 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1936 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct
*mgr
)
1938 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
1939 u32 mgrsid
= task_sid(mgr
);
1941 return avc_has_perm(mysid
, mgrsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
1942 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR
, NULL
);
1945 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct
*from
,
1946 struct task_struct
*to
)
1948 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
1949 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
1950 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
1953 if (mysid
!= fromsid
) {
1954 rc
= avc_has_perm(mysid
, fromsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
1955 BINDER__IMPERSONATE
, NULL
);
1960 return avc_has_perm(fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__CALL
,
1964 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct
*from
,
1965 struct task_struct
*to
)
1967 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
1968 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
1970 return avc_has_perm(fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__TRANSFER
,
1974 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct
*from
,
1975 struct task_struct
*to
,
1978 u32 sid
= task_sid(to
);
1979 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1980 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(file
->f_path
.dentry
);
1981 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1982 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1985 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1986 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1988 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1989 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1997 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
2000 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, file_to_av(file
),
2004 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
2007 if (mode
& PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
2008 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2009 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
2010 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
2013 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
2016 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
2018 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
2021 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2022 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2024 return current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
2027 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
2028 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2029 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
2030 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2032 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
2036 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2037 * which was removed).
2039 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2040 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2041 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2042 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2045 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred
*cred
, struct user_namespace
*ns
,
2048 return cred_has_capability(cred
, cap
, audit
);
2051 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
2053 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2065 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
2070 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
2073 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2079 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2081 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2083 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
2086 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
2091 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
2092 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2093 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
2095 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
2096 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
2097 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2098 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
2099 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
2101 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE
: /* Close log */
2102 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN
: /* Open log */
2103 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ
: /* Read from log */
2104 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR
: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2105 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR
: /* Clear ring buffer */
2107 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
2114 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2115 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2116 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2118 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2119 * processes that allocate mappings.
2121 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2123 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2125 rc
= cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2126 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2130 return cap_sys_admin
;
2133 /* binprm security operations */
2135 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2136 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
,
2137 const struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
)
2139 int nnp
= (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
);
2140 int nosuid
= (bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
);
2143 if (!nnp
&& !nosuid
)
2144 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2146 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
)
2147 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2150 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2151 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2152 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2153 * of the current SID.
2155 rc
= security_bounded_transition(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
);
2158 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2159 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2160 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2170 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2172 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2173 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2174 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2175 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2176 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(bprm
->file
);
2179 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2180 * the script interpreter */
2181 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2184 old_tsec
= current_security();
2185 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2186 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2188 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2189 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2190 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2192 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2193 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2194 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2195 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2197 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2198 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2199 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2200 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2202 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2203 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2207 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2208 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2209 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, NULL
,
2215 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2218 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2220 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2223 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2224 ad
.u
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2226 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2227 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2228 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2232 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2233 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2234 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2238 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2239 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2243 /* Check for shared state */
2244 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2245 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2246 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2252 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2253 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2255 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2256 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2257 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2261 tracer
= ptrace_parent(current
);
2262 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2263 sec
= __task_cred(tracer
)->security
;
2269 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2271 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2277 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2278 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2284 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2286 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2294 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2295 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2296 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2297 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2299 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2305 static int match_file(const void *p
, struct file
*file
, unsigned fd
)
2307 return file_has_perm(p
, file
, file_to_av(file
)) ? fd
+ 1 : 0;
2310 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2311 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2312 struct files_struct
*files
)
2314 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2315 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2319 tty
= get_current_tty();
2321 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock
);
2322 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2323 struct tty_file_private
*file_priv
;
2325 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2326 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2327 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2328 open file may belong to another process and we are
2329 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2330 file_priv
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
,
2331 struct tty_file_private
, list
);
2332 file
= file_priv
->file
;
2333 if (file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
))
2336 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock
);
2339 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2343 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2344 n
= iterate_fd(files
, 0, match_file
, cred
);
2345 if (!n
) /* none found? */
2348 devnull
= dentry_open(&selinux_null
, O_RDWR
, cred
);
2349 if (IS_ERR(devnull
))
2351 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2353 replace_fd(n
- 1, devnull
, 0);
2354 } while ((n
= iterate_fd(files
, n
, match_file
, cred
)) != 0);
2360 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2362 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2364 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2365 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2368 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2369 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2372 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2373 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2375 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2376 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2378 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2379 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2380 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2382 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2383 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2384 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2385 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2386 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2388 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2389 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2391 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2393 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2394 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2395 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2396 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2398 task_unlock(current
);
2399 update_rlimit_cpu(current
, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU
));
2404 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2407 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2409 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2410 struct itimerval itimer
;
2420 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2421 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2422 * flush and unblock signals.
2424 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2425 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2427 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2429 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2430 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2431 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2432 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2433 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current
)) {
2434 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->pending
);
2435 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->signal
->shared_pending
);
2436 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2437 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2438 recalc_sigpending();
2440 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2443 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2444 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2445 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2446 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2447 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2450 /* superblock security operations */
2452 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2454 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2457 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2459 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2462 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2467 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2470 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2472 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2473 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2474 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2475 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2476 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2479 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2486 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2490 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2493 int current_size
= 0;
2501 while (current_size
< len
) {
2511 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2513 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2514 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2515 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2521 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2529 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2533 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2534 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2536 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2538 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2539 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2541 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2543 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2545 } while (*in_end
++);
2547 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2548 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2553 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
2556 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
2557 char *secdata
, **mount_options
;
2558 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2560 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
2566 if (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
2569 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2570 secdata
= alloc_secdata();
2573 rc
= selinux_sb_copy_data(data
, secdata
);
2575 goto out_free_secdata
;
2577 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata
, &opts
);
2579 goto out_free_secdata
;
2581 mount_options
= opts
.mnt_opts
;
2582 flags
= opts
.mnt_opts_flags
;
2584 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
.num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
2588 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
2590 len
= strlen(mount_options
[i
]);
2591 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], len
, &sid
,
2594 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2595 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2596 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
2602 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
, sid
))
2603 goto out_bad_option
;
2606 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, sid
))
2607 goto out_bad_option
;
2609 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
: {
2610 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
2611 root_isec
= d_backing_inode(sb
->s_root
)->i_security
;
2613 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
, sid
))
2614 goto out_bad_option
;
2617 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
2618 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
, sid
))
2619 goto out_bad_option
;
2628 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2630 free_secdata(secdata
);
2633 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unable to change security options "
2634 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb
->s_id
,
2639 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2641 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2642 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2645 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2649 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2650 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2653 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2654 ad
.u
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2655 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2658 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2660 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2661 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2663 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2664 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2665 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2668 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name
,
2671 unsigned long flags
,
2674 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2676 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2677 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->dentry
->d_sb
,
2678 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2680 return path_has_perm(cred
, path
, FILE__MOUNTON
);
2683 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2685 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2687 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2688 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2691 /* inode security operations */
2693 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2695 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2698 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2700 inode_free_security(inode
);
2703 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
,
2704 struct qstr
*name
, void **ctx
,
2707 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2708 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
2709 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2710 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2711 struct inode
*dir
= d_backing_inode(dentry
->d_parent
);
2715 tsec
= cred
->security
;
2716 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2717 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2719 if (tsec
->create_sid
&& sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
) {
2720 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2722 rc
= security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2723 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
),
2728 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2734 return security_sid_to_context(newsid
, (char **)ctx
, ctxlen
);
2737 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2738 const struct qstr
*qstr
,
2740 void **value
, size_t *len
)
2742 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2743 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2744 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2745 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2749 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2750 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2753 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2755 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) &&
2756 (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
))
2757 newsid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
2758 else if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)) {
2759 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2760 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2763 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: "
2764 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2767 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
2772 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2773 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2774 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2775 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2777 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2780 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2784 *name
= XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
;
2787 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2797 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
)
2799 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2802 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2804 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2807 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2809 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2812 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2814 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2817 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mask
)
2819 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2822 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2824 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2827 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
, dev_t dev
)
2829 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2832 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2833 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2835 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2838 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2840 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2842 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2845 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
,
2848 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2849 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2850 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2853 validate_creds(cred
);
2855 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2856 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
2857 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2858 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2860 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, FILE__READ
, &ad
,
2861 rcu
? MAY_NOT_BLOCK
: 0);
2864 static noinline
int audit_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
,
2865 u32 perms
, u32 audited
, u32 denied
,
2869 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2870 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2873 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE
;
2876 rc
= slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
,
2877 audited
, denied
, result
, &ad
, flags
);
2883 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2885 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2888 unsigned flags
= mask
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
;
2889 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2891 struct av_decision avd
;
2893 u32 audited
, denied
;
2895 from_access
= mask
& MAY_ACCESS
;
2896 mask
&= (MAY_READ
|MAY_WRITE
|MAY_EXEC
|MAY_APPEND
);
2898 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2902 validate_creds(cred
);
2904 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
2907 perms
= file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
);
2909 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2910 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2912 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, 0, &avd
);
2913 audited
= avc_audit_required(perms
, &avd
, rc
,
2914 from_access
? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS
: 0,
2916 if (likely(!audited
))
2919 rc2
= audit_inode_permission(inode
, perms
, audited
, denied
, rc
, flags
);
2925 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2927 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2928 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
2929 __u32 av
= FILE__WRITE
;
2931 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2932 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
2933 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
2939 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2940 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
2941 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2943 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
&& (ia_valid
& ATTR_SIZE
))
2946 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, av
);
2949 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path
*path
)
2951 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2954 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2956 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2958 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2959 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2960 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2961 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2963 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2964 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2965 Restrict to administrator. */
2970 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2971 ordinary setattr permission. */
2972 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2975 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2976 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2978 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
2979 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2980 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2981 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2982 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
2985 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2986 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2988 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2989 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2992 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode
))
2995 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2996 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
2998 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
2999 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
3003 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
3004 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
3005 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
3006 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
3010 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3011 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3014 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
3015 audit_size
= size
- 1;
3022 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
3023 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3024 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
3029 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
3034 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
3035 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
3039 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
3044 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
3046 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
3047 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
3051 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
3052 const void *value
, size_t size
,
3055 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
3056 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3060 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
3061 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3065 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
3067 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3068 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3069 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
3073 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3075 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3080 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3082 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3084 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3087 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
3089 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3091 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3094 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3096 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
3097 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
3099 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3100 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3105 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3107 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3109 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
3113 char *context
= NULL
;
3114 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3116 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3120 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3121 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3122 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3123 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3124 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3125 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3126 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3128 error
= cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
3129 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
3131 error
= cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
3132 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
3134 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
3137 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
3150 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
3151 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
3153 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3157 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3160 if (!value
|| !size
)
3163 rc
= security_context_to_sid((void *)value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
3167 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3169 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3173 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
3175 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
3176 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
3177 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
3181 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
3183 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3187 /* file security operations */
3189 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3191 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3192 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3194 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3195 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
3198 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
3199 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
3202 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3204 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3205 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3206 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3207 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3210 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3213 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
3214 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
3215 /* No change since file_open check. */
3218 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
3221 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
3223 return file_alloc_security(file
);
3226 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
3228 file_free_security(file
);
3231 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3234 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3244 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
:
3246 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION
:
3247 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3250 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
:
3252 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION
:
3253 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3256 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3260 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3265 error
= cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
,
3266 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
);
3269 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3270 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3273 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__IOCTL
);
3278 static int default_noexec
;
3280 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3282 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3285 if (default_noexec
&&
3286 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3288 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3289 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3290 * This has an additional check.
3292 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
3298 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3299 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3301 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3302 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3305 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3306 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3308 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3315 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr
)
3319 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3320 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3321 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3322 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3328 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3329 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
)
3331 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3334 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3335 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3338 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3339 unsigned long reqprot
,
3342 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3344 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3347 if (default_noexec
&&
3348 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3350 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3351 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3352 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3353 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3354 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3355 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3356 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3357 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3359 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3360 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3361 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3362 * modified content. This typically should only
3363 * occur for text relocations.
3365 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3371 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3374 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3376 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3378 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3381 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3384 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3389 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3390 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3399 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS
:
3400 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3401 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3409 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3414 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3421 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3423 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3425 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3426 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3429 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3430 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3433 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3435 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3437 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3438 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3440 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3443 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3445 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3447 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3448 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3451 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3453 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3455 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3458 static int selinux_file_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3460 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3461 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3463 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3464 isec
= file_inode(file
)->i_security
;
3466 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3467 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3468 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3469 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3470 * struct as its SID.
3472 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3473 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3475 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3476 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3477 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3478 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3479 * new inode label or new policy.
3480 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3482 return file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, open_file_to_av(file
));
3485 /* task security operations */
3487 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3489 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3493 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3495 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3497 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3499 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3503 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3508 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3510 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3512 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3515 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3516 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3518 BUG_ON(cred
->security
&& (unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3519 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3524 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3526 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3529 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3530 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3532 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3534 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3538 new->security
= tsec
;
3543 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3545 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3547 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3548 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3554 * set the security data for a kernel service
3555 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3557 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3559 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3560 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3563 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3564 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3565 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3569 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3570 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3571 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3577 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3578 * objective context of the specified inode
3580 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3582 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3583 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3584 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3587 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3588 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3589 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3593 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3597 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3600 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3602 sid
= task_sid(current
);
3604 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD
;
3605 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3607 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3608 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3611 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3613 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3616 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3618 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3621 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3623 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3626 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3628 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3631 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3633 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3636 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3638 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3641 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3643 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3646 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
*p
, unsigned int resource
,
3647 struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3649 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= p
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3651 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3652 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3653 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3654 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3655 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3656 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3661 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3663 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3666 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3668 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3671 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3673 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3676 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3683 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3685 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3687 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3688 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3690 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3694 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3696 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3699 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3700 struct inode
*inode
)
3702 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3703 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3706 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3709 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3710 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3711 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3713 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3714 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3716 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3717 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3721 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3722 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3725 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3726 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3730 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3732 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3734 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3736 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3740 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3744 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3745 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3750 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3752 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3756 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3760 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3761 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3765 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3766 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3768 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3772 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3776 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3777 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3788 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3790 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3791 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3792 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3795 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3796 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3799 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3800 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3804 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= ip6
->saddr
;
3805 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
= ip6
->daddr
;
3808 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3809 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3810 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
, &frag_off
);
3819 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3821 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3825 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3826 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3831 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3833 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3837 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3838 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3842 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3843 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3845 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3849 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3850 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3854 /* includes fragments */
3864 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
3865 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3870 switch (ad
->u
.net
->family
) {
3872 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3875 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
:
3876 &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
);
3879 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3881 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3884 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
:
3885 &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
);
3895 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3896 " unable to parse packet\n");
3906 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3908 * @family: protocol family
3909 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3912 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3913 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3914 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3915 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3916 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3920 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3927 err
= selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3930 err
= selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3934 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3935 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3937 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3938 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3946 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3947 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3948 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3949 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3951 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3952 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3953 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3954 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3957 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid
, u32 skb_sid
, u32
*conn_sid
)
3961 if (skb_sid
!= SECSID_NULL
)
3962 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid
, skb_sid
, conn_sid
);
3969 /* socket security operations */
3971 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
3972 u16 secclass
, u32
*socksid
)
3974 if (tsec
->sockcreate_sid
> SECSID_NULL
) {
3975 *socksid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
3979 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
, secclass
, NULL
,
3983 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
3985 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3986 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3987 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
3988 u32 tsid
= task_sid(task
);
3990 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
3993 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3997 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
4000 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
4001 int protocol
, int kern
)
4003 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
4011 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4012 rc
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, secclass
, &newsid
);
4016 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
4019 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
4020 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
4022 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
4023 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4024 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4027 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4030 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4032 err
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, isec
->sclass
, &(isec
->sid
));
4037 isec
->initialized
= 1;
4040 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4041 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4042 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4043 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
4049 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4050 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4051 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4053 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4055 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4059 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
4064 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4065 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4066 * check the first address now.
4068 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4069 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
4071 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4072 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4073 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4074 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4075 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4076 unsigned short snum
;
4079 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
4080 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4081 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4082 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4084 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4085 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4086 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
4092 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk
), &low
, &high
);
4094 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
4095 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
4099 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4101 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4102 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4103 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4105 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
4111 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
4112 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
4113 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4116 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
4117 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4120 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
4121 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4125 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4129 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
4133 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4135 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4136 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4138 if (family
== PF_INET
)
4139 ad
.u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4141 ad
.u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= addr6
->sin6_addr
;
4143 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4144 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
4152 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4154 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4155 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4158 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
4163 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4165 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
4166 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
4167 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4168 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4169 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4170 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4171 unsigned short snum
;
4174 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
4175 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4176 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
4178 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4180 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4181 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
4183 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4186 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
4190 perm
= (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
4191 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
4193 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4195 ad
.u
.net
->dport
= htons(snum
);
4196 ad
.u
.net
->family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4197 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
4202 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
4208 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
4210 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
4213 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
4216 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4217 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
4219 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
4223 newisec
= SOCK_INODE(newsock
)->i_security
;
4225 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4226 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4227 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4228 newisec
->initialized
= 1;
4233 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4236 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
4239 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4240 int size
, int flags
)
4242 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
4245 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
4247 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4250 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
4252 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4255 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
4259 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
4263 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
4266 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
4269 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
4272 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
4274 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
4277 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock
,
4281 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk_security
;
4282 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk_security
;
4283 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4284 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4285 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4288 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4290 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
;
4292 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
4293 sksec_other
->sclass
,
4294 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4298 /* server child socket */
4299 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
4300 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other
->sid
, sksec_sock
->sid
,
4305 /* connecting socket */
4306 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
4311 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4312 struct socket
*other
)
4314 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4315 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
4316 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4317 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4319 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4321 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
->sk
;
4323 return avc_has_perm(ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
4327 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net
*ns
, int ifindex
,
4328 char *addrp
, u16 family
, u32 peer_sid
,
4329 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4335 err
= sel_netif_sid(ns
, ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4338 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4339 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4343 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4346 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4347 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4350 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4354 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4355 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4356 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4357 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4360 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4362 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4363 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4364 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4368 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4369 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4375 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4378 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4383 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4386 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4387 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4388 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4389 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4390 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4395 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4398 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4399 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4402 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4403 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4404 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4405 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4406 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4407 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4409 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4410 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4411 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4414 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4416 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4417 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4418 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4422 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4425 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4428 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk
), skb
->skb_iif
,
4429 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
4431 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4434 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4437 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4442 if (secmark_active
) {
4443 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4452 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4453 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4458 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4459 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4461 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4462 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
)
4463 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4464 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4465 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
4467 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4471 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4476 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4480 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4486 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4488 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4491 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4493 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4496 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4500 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4501 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4503 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4506 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4507 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4512 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4514 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4516 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
4520 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4521 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4522 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
4523 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
4528 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4530 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4532 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
4533 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
4537 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4539 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4540 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4542 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4543 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4544 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
4546 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
4549 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4552 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4554 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4556 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4560 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4562 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(parent
)->i_security
;
4563 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4565 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4566 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4567 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4568 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4571 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4572 struct request_sock
*req
)
4574 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4576 u16 family
= req
->rsk_ops
->family
;
4580 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4583 err
= selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &connsid
);
4586 req
->secid
= connsid
;
4587 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4589 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4592 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4593 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4595 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4597 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4598 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4599 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4600 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4601 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4602 time it will have been created and available. */
4604 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4605 * thread with access to newsksec */
4606 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4609 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4611 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4612 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4614 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4615 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4618 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4621 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid
)
4623 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
4626 __tsec
= current_security();
4629 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4632 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4634 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4637 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4639 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4642 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4645 fl
->flowi_secid
= req
->secid
;
4648 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security
)
4650 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
;
4652 tunsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4655 tunsec
->sid
= current_sid();
4661 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security
)
4666 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4668 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4670 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4671 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4672 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4673 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4674 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4675 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4677 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4681 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security
)
4683 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4685 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4686 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE
, NULL
);
4689 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
, void *security
)
4691 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4692 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4694 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4695 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4696 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4697 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4698 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4699 * protocols were being used */
4701 sksec
->sid
= tunsec
->sid
;
4702 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4707 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security
)
4709 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4710 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4713 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4714 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4717 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4718 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4726 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4730 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4731 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4733 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_HDRLEN
) {
4737 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4739 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4741 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4743 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4744 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n",
4745 sk
->sk_protocol
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
,
4746 secclass_map
[sksec
->sclass
- 1].name
);
4747 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4757 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, perm
);
4762 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4764 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4765 const struct net_device
*indev
,
4771 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4772 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4777 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4780 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4781 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4782 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4783 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4786 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4789 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4791 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= indev
->ifindex
;
4792 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4793 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4796 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4797 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev
), indev
->ifindex
,
4798 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
4800 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4806 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4807 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4811 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4812 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4813 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4815 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
4821 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4822 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4823 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
4825 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET
);
4828 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4829 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4830 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4831 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
4833 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET6
);
4837 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4843 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4846 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4847 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4848 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4851 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4853 if (sk
->sk_state
== TCP_LISTEN
)
4854 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4855 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4856 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4857 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4858 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4859 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4860 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4861 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4862 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4863 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4864 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4865 * best we can do. */
4868 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4869 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4872 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4873 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
4879 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4880 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4881 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
4883 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
4886 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4890 struct sock
*sk
= skb
->sk
;
4891 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4892 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4893 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4899 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4901 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4903 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4904 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4905 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4908 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4909 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4910 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4911 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4913 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4914 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4919 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4920 const struct net_device
*outdev
,
4925 int ifindex
= outdev
->ifindex
;
4927 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4928 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4933 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4934 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4935 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4936 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4937 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4938 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4940 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4941 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4942 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4948 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4949 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4950 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4951 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4952 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4953 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4954 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4955 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4956 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4957 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4959 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
&&
4960 !(sk
!= NULL
&& sk
->sk_state
== TCP_LISTEN
))
4965 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4966 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4967 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4968 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4970 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4971 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
4974 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4975 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4977 } else if (sk
->sk_state
== TCP_LISTEN
) {
4978 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
4979 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
4980 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
4981 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
4982 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
4983 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
4984 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
4985 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
4986 * for similar problems. */
4988 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4989 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &skb_sid
))
4991 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
4992 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
4993 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
4994 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
4995 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
4996 * pass the packet. */
4997 if (skb_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
5000 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
5004 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
5008 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5011 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, skb_sid
, &peer_sid
))
5013 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5015 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5016 * associated socket. */
5017 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5018 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
5019 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5022 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5024 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
5025 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5026 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
5030 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
5031 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
5032 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5034 if (peerlbl_active
) {
5038 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev
), ifindex
, &if_sid
))
5040 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
5041 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
5042 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5044 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
5046 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
5047 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
5048 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5054 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
5055 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5056 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5058 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET
);
5061 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5062 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
5063 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5064 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5066 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET6
);
5070 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5072 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
5074 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
5077 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
5078 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
5081 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5084 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5088 sid
= task_sid(task
);
5089 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
5091 perm
->security
= isec
;
5096 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
5098 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
5099 perm
->security
= NULL
;
5103 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5105 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5107 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5111 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
5112 msg
->security
= msec
;
5117 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5119 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
5121 msg
->security
= NULL
;
5125 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
5128 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5129 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5130 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5132 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
5134 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5135 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
5137 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
5140 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5142 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
5145 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5147 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
5150 /* message queue security operations */
5151 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5153 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5154 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5155 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5158 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
5162 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5164 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5165 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5167 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5170 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5176 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5178 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5181 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
5183 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5184 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5185 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5187 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5189 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5190 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5192 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5193 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5196 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
5204 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5205 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5208 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
5211 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
5214 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
5220 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
5224 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
5226 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5227 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5228 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5229 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5232 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5233 msec
= msg
->security
;
5236 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5238 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
5240 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5241 * message queue this message will be stored in
5243 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5249 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5250 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5252 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5253 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5256 /* Can this process send the message */
5257 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5260 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5261 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5262 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
5267 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
5268 struct task_struct
*target
,
5269 long type
, int mode
)
5271 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5272 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5273 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5274 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
5277 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5278 msec
= msg
->security
;
5280 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5281 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5283 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
5284 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
5286 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
5287 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
5291 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5292 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5294 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5295 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5296 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5299 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
5303 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5305 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5306 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5308 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5311 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5317 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5319 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5322 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
5324 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5325 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5326 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5328 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5330 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5331 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5333 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5334 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5337 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5338 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
5346 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5347 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5350 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
5353 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
5360 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5366 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5370 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5371 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5375 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5378 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5380 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5383 /* Semaphore security operations */
5384 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5386 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5387 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5388 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5391 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5395 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5397 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5398 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5400 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5403 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5409 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5411 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5414 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5416 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5417 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5418 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5420 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5422 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5423 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5425 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5426 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5429 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5430 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5438 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5439 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5443 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5454 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5457 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5461 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5467 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5471 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5472 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5477 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5481 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5484 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5490 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5492 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5497 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5500 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5502 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5506 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5509 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5512 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5513 char *name
, char **value
)
5515 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5521 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5527 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5529 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5531 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5533 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5534 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5535 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5536 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5537 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5538 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5539 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5540 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5548 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5558 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5559 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5561 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5562 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5569 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5570 security attributes. */
5575 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5576 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5577 * above restriction is ever removed.
5579 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5580 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5581 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5582 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5583 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5584 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5585 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5586 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5587 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5588 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5594 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5595 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5596 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5600 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
5601 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5602 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
5603 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
5606 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5607 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5608 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
5609 audit_size
= size
- 1;
5612 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
5613 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5614 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
5619 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5626 new = prepare_creds();
5630 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5631 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5632 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5633 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5634 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5635 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5636 tsec
= new->security
;
5637 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5638 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5639 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5640 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5641 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5642 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5645 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5646 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5647 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5648 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5653 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5655 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5656 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5661 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5662 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5663 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5667 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5668 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5671 tracer
= ptrace_parent(p
);
5673 ptsid
= task_sid(tracer
);
5677 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5678 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5697 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name
)
5699 return (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
) == 0);
5702 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5704 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5707 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5709 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
5712 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5718 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5720 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5722 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5726 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5728 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5730 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5733 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5736 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5745 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5746 unsigned long flags
)
5748 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5749 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5751 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5755 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5756 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5757 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5759 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5765 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5767 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5773 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5774 const struct cred
*cred
,
5778 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5781 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5782 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5783 appear to be created. */
5787 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5789 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5790 ksec
= key
->security
;
5792 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5795 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5797 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5798 char *context
= NULL
;
5802 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5811 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks
[] = {
5812 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr
, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr
),
5813 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction
, selinux_binder_transaction
),
5814 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder
, selinux_binder_transfer_binder
),
5815 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file
, selinux_binder_transfer_file
),
5817 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check
, selinux_ptrace_access_check
),
5818 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme
, selinux_ptrace_traceme
),
5819 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget
, selinux_capget
),
5820 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset
, selinux_capset
),
5821 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable
, selinux_capable
),
5822 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl
, selinux_quotactl
),
5823 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on
, selinux_quota_on
),
5824 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog
, selinux_syslog
),
5825 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory
, selinux_vm_enough_memory
),
5827 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send
, selinux_netlink_send
),
5829 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds
, selinux_bprm_set_creds
),
5830 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds
, selinux_bprm_committing_creds
),
5831 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds
, selinux_bprm_committed_creds
),
5832 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec
, selinux_bprm_secureexec
),
5834 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security
, selinux_sb_alloc_security
),
5835 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security
, selinux_sb_free_security
),
5836 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data
, selinux_sb_copy_data
),
5837 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount
, selinux_sb_remount
),
5838 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount
, selinux_sb_kern_mount
),
5839 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options
, selinux_sb_show_options
),
5840 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs
, selinux_sb_statfs
),
5841 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount
, selinux_mount
),
5842 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount
, selinux_umount
),
5843 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts
, selinux_set_mnt_opts
),
5844 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts
, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
),
5845 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str
, selinux_parse_opts_str
),
5847 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security
, selinux_dentry_init_security
),
5849 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security
, selinux_inode_alloc_security
),
5850 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security
, selinux_inode_free_security
),
5851 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security
, selinux_inode_init_security
),
5852 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create
, selinux_inode_create
),
5853 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link
, selinux_inode_link
),
5854 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink
, selinux_inode_unlink
),
5855 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink
, selinux_inode_symlink
),
5856 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir
, selinux_inode_mkdir
),
5857 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir
, selinux_inode_rmdir
),
5858 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod
, selinux_inode_mknod
),
5859 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename
, selinux_inode_rename
),
5860 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink
, selinux_inode_readlink
),
5861 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link
, selinux_inode_follow_link
),
5862 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission
, selinux_inode_permission
),
5863 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr
, selinux_inode_setattr
),
5864 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr
, selinux_inode_getattr
),
5865 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr
, selinux_inode_setxattr
),
5866 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr
, selinux_inode_post_setxattr
),
5867 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr
, selinux_inode_getxattr
),
5868 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr
, selinux_inode_listxattr
),
5869 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr
, selinux_inode_removexattr
),
5870 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity
, selinux_inode_getsecurity
),
5871 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity
, selinux_inode_setsecurity
),
5872 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity
, selinux_inode_listsecurity
),
5873 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid
, selinux_inode_getsecid
),
5875 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission
, selinux_file_permission
),
5876 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security
, selinux_file_alloc_security
),
5877 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security
, selinux_file_free_security
),
5878 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl
, selinux_file_ioctl
),
5879 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file
, selinux_mmap_file
),
5880 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr
, selinux_mmap_addr
),
5881 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect
, selinux_file_mprotect
),
5882 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock
, selinux_file_lock
),
5883 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl
, selinux_file_fcntl
),
5884 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner
, selinux_file_set_fowner
),
5885 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask
, selinux_file_send_sigiotask
),
5886 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive
, selinux_file_receive
),
5888 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open
, selinux_file_open
),
5890 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create
, selinux_task_create
),
5891 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank
, selinux_cred_alloc_blank
),
5892 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free
, selinux_cred_free
),
5893 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare
, selinux_cred_prepare
),
5894 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer
, selinux_cred_transfer
),
5895 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as
, selinux_kernel_act_as
),
5896 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as
, selinux_kernel_create_files_as
),
5897 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request
, selinux_kernel_module_request
),
5898 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid
, selinux_task_setpgid
),
5899 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid
, selinux_task_getpgid
),
5900 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid
, selinux_task_getsid
),
5901 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid
, selinux_task_getsecid
),
5902 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice
, selinux_task_setnice
),
5903 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio
, selinux_task_setioprio
),
5904 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio
, selinux_task_getioprio
),
5905 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit
, selinux_task_setrlimit
),
5906 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler
, selinux_task_setscheduler
),
5907 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler
, selinux_task_getscheduler
),
5908 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory
, selinux_task_movememory
),
5909 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill
, selinux_task_kill
),
5910 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait
, selinux_task_wait
),
5911 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode
, selinux_task_to_inode
),
5913 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission
, selinux_ipc_permission
),
5914 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid
, selinux_ipc_getsecid
),
5916 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security
, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
),
5917 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security
, selinux_msg_msg_free_security
),
5919 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5920 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
),
5921 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security
, selinux_msg_queue_free_security
),
5922 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate
, selinux_msg_queue_associate
),
5923 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl
, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
),
5924 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd
, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
),
5925 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv
, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
),
5927 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security
, selinux_shm_alloc_security
),
5928 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security
, selinux_shm_free_security
),
5929 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate
, selinux_shm_associate
),
5930 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl
, selinux_shm_shmctl
),
5931 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat
, selinux_shm_shmat
),
5933 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security
, selinux_sem_alloc_security
),
5934 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security
, selinux_sem_free_security
),
5935 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate
, selinux_sem_associate
),
5936 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl
, selinux_sem_semctl
),
5937 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop
, selinux_sem_semop
),
5939 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate
, selinux_d_instantiate
),
5941 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr
, selinux_getprocattr
),
5942 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr
, selinux_setprocattr
),
5944 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel
, selinux_ismaclabel
),
5945 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx
, selinux_secid_to_secctx
),
5946 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid
, selinux_secctx_to_secid
),
5947 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx
, selinux_release_secctx
),
5948 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx
, selinux_inode_notifysecctx
),
5949 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx
, selinux_inode_setsecctx
),
5950 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx
, selinux_inode_getsecctx
),
5952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect
, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
),
5953 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send
, selinux_socket_unix_may_send
),
5955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create
, selinux_socket_create
),
5956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create
, selinux_socket_post_create
),
5957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind
, selinux_socket_bind
),
5958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect
, selinux_socket_connect
),
5959 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen
, selinux_socket_listen
),
5960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept
, selinux_socket_accept
),
5961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg
, selinux_socket_sendmsg
),
5962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg
, selinux_socket_recvmsg
),
5963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname
, selinux_socket_getsockname
),
5964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername
, selinux_socket_getpeername
),
5965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt
, selinux_socket_getsockopt
),
5966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt
, selinux_socket_setsockopt
),
5967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown
, selinux_socket_shutdown
),
5968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb
, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
),
5969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream
,
5970 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
),
5971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram
, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
),
5972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security
, selinux_sk_alloc_security
),
5973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security
, selinux_sk_free_security
),
5974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security
, selinux_sk_clone_security
),
5975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid
, selinux_sk_getsecid
),
5976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft
, selinux_sock_graft
),
5977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request
, selinux_inet_conn_request
),
5978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone
, selinux_inet_csk_clone
),
5979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established
, selinux_inet_conn_established
),
5980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet
, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet
),
5981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc
, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc
),
5982 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec
, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec
),
5983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow
, selinux_req_classify_flow
),
5984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security
, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security
),
5985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security
, selinux_tun_dev_free_security
),
5986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create
, selinux_tun_dev_create
),
5987 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue
, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue
),
5988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach
, selinux_tun_dev_attach
),
5989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open
, selinux_tun_dev_open
),
5991 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
),
5993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
),
5994 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_free
),
5995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
),
5996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc
, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
),
5997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
,
5998 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
),
5999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_free
),
6000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_delete
),
6001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup
, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
),
6002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
6003 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
),
6004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session
, selinux_xfrm_decode_session
),
6008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc
, selinux_key_alloc
),
6009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free
, selinux_key_free
),
6010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission
, selinux_key_permission
),
6011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity
, selinux_key_getsecurity
),
6015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init
, selinux_audit_rule_init
),
6016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known
, selinux_audit_rule_known
),
6017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match
, selinux_audit_rule_match
),
6018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free
, selinux_audit_rule_free
),
6022 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
6024 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
6025 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6029 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
6030 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6034 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6036 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6037 cred_init_security();
6039 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
6041 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6042 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
6043 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
6046 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
));
6048 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback
, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
))
6049 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6051 if (selinux_enforcing
)
6052 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6054 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6059 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
6061 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
6064 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6066 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6068 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6069 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6070 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
6073 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6074 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6075 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
6077 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6079 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops
[] = {
6081 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
6082 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6084 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6085 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6088 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
6089 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6091 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6092 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6095 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
6096 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6098 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
6099 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6101 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6103 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
6104 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6106 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6107 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6110 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
6111 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6113 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6114 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6119 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6123 if (!selinux_enabled
)
6126 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6128 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
6130 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err
);
6135 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
6137 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6138 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6140 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6142 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
6146 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6148 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6149 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6152 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6154 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6155 static int selinux_disabled
;
6157 int selinux_disable(void)
6159 if (ss_initialized
) {
6160 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6164 if (selinux_disabled
) {
6165 /* Only do this once. */
6169 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6171 selinux_disabled
= 1;
6172 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6174 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
));
6176 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6179 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6180 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6182 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */