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calipso: Allow the lsm to label the skbuff directly.
[deliverable/linux.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
24 */
25
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kd.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mm.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
52 #include <net/icmp.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73 #include <net/ipv6.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
86
87 #include "avc.h"
88 #include "objsec.h"
89 #include "netif.h"
90 #include "netnode.h"
91 #include "netport.h"
92 #include "xfrm.h"
93 #include "netlabel.h"
94 #include "audit.h"
95 #include "avc_ss.h"
96
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
99
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing;
102
103 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
104 {
105 unsigned long enforcing;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
107 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
108 return 1;
109 }
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
111 #endif
112
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
115
116 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
117 {
118 unsigned long enabled;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
120 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
121 return 1;
122 }
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
124 #else
125 int selinux_enabled = 1;
126 #endif
127
128 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
129 static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
130
131 /**
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
133 *
134 * Description:
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
139 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
140 *
141 */
142 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 {
144 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
145 }
146
147 /**
148 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
149 *
150 * Description:
151 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
152 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
153 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
154 * is always considered enabled.
155 *
156 */
157 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
158 {
159 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
160 }
161
162 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
163 {
164 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
165 sel_netif_flush();
166 sel_netnode_flush();
167 sel_netport_flush();
168 synchronize_net();
169 }
170 return 0;
171 }
172
173 /*
174 * initialise the security for the init task
175 */
176 static void cred_init_security(void)
177 {
178 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
179 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
180
181 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
182 if (!tsec)
183 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
184
185 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
186 cred->security = tsec;
187 }
188
189 /*
190 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
191 */
192 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
193 {
194 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
195
196 tsec = cred->security;
197 return tsec->sid;
198 }
199
200 /*
201 * get the objective security ID of a task
202 */
203 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
204 {
205 u32 sid;
206
207 rcu_read_lock();
208 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
209 rcu_read_unlock();
210 return sid;
211 }
212
213 /*
214 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
215 */
216 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
217 {
218 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
219
220 return tsec->sid;
221 }
222
223 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
224
225 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
226 {
227 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
228 u32 sid = current_sid();
229
230 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
231 if (!isec)
232 return -ENOMEM;
233
234 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
235 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
236 isec->inode = inode;
237 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
238 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
239 isec->task_sid = sid;
240 inode->i_security = isec;
241
242 return 0;
243 }
244
245 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
246
247 /*
248 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
249 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
250 * allowed; when set to false, returns ERR_PTR(-ECHILD) when the label is
251 * invalid. The @opt_dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode;
252 * when no dentry is available, set it to NULL instead.
253 */
254 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
255 struct dentry *opt_dentry,
256 bool may_sleep)
257 {
258 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
259
260 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
261
262 if (ss_initialized && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
263 if (!may_sleep)
264 return -ECHILD;
265
266 /*
267 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
268 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
269 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
270 */
271 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, opt_dentry);
272 }
273 return 0;
274 }
275
276 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
277 {
278 return inode->i_security;
279 }
280
281 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
282 {
283 int error;
284
285 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
286 if (error)
287 return ERR_PTR(error);
288 return inode->i_security;
289 }
290
291 /*
292 * Get the security label of an inode.
293 */
294 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
295 {
296 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
297 return inode->i_security;
298 }
299
300 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
301 {
302 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
303
304 return inode->i_security;
305 }
306
307 /*
308 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
309 */
310 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
311 {
312 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
313
314 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
315 return inode->i_security;
316 }
317
318 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
319 {
320 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
321
322 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
323 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
324 }
325
326 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
327 {
328 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
329 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
330
331 /*
332 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
333 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
334 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
335 *
336 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
337 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
338 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
339 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
340 */
341 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
342 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
343 list_del_init(&isec->list);
344 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
345 }
346
347 /*
348 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
349 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
350 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
351 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
352 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
353 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
354 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
355 */
356 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
357 }
358
359 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
360 {
361 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
362 u32 sid = current_sid();
363
364 fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
365 if (!fsec)
366 return -ENOMEM;
367
368 fsec->sid = sid;
369 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
370 file->f_security = fsec;
371
372 return 0;
373 }
374
375 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
376 {
377 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
378 file->f_security = NULL;
379 kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
380 }
381
382 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
383 {
384 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
385
386 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
387 if (!sbsec)
388 return -ENOMEM;
389
390 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
391 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
392 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
393 sbsec->sb = sb;
394 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
395 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
396 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
397 sb->s_security = sbsec;
398
399 return 0;
400 }
401
402 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
403 {
404 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
405 sb->s_security = NULL;
406 kfree(sbsec);
407 }
408
409 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
410
411 static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
412 "uses xattr",
413 "uses transition SIDs",
414 "uses task SIDs",
415 "uses genfs_contexts",
416 "not configured for labeling",
417 "uses mountpoint labeling",
418 "uses native labeling",
419 };
420
421 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
422 {
423 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
424 }
425
426 enum {
427 Opt_error = -1,
428 Opt_context = 1,
429 Opt_fscontext = 2,
430 Opt_defcontext = 3,
431 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
432 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
433 Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
434 };
435
436 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
437
438 static const match_table_t tokens = {
439 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
440 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
441 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
442 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
443 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
444 {Opt_error, NULL},
445 };
446
447 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
448
449 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
450 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
451 const struct cred *cred)
452 {
453 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
454 int rc;
455
456 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
457 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
458 if (rc)
459 return rc;
460
461 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
462 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
463 return rc;
464 }
465
466 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
467 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
468 const struct cred *cred)
469 {
470 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
471 int rc;
472 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
473 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
474 if (rc)
475 return rc;
476
477 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
478 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
479 return rc;
480 }
481
482 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
483 {
484 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
485
486 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
487 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
488 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
489 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
490 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
491 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
492 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
493 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
494 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
495 }
496
497 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
498 {
499 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
500 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
501 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
502 int rc = 0;
503
504 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
505 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
506 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
507 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
508 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
509 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
510 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
511 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
512 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
513 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
514 goto out;
515 }
516 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
517 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
518 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
519 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
520 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
521 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
522 else
523 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
524 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
525 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
526 goto out;
527 }
528 }
529
530 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
531 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
532 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
533
534 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
535 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
536 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
537
538 /* Initialize the root inode. */
539 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
540
541 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
542 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
543 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
544 populates itself. */
545 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
546 next_inode:
547 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
548 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
549 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
550 struct inode_security_struct, list);
551 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
552 list_del_init(&isec->list);
553 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
554 inode = igrab(inode);
555 if (inode) {
556 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
557 inode_doinit(inode);
558 iput(inode);
559 }
560 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
561 goto next_inode;
562 }
563 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
564 out:
565 return rc;
566 }
567
568 /*
569 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
570 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
571 * mount options, or whatever.
572 */
573 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
574 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
575 {
576 int rc = 0, i;
577 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
578 char *context = NULL;
579 u32 len;
580 char tmp;
581
582 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
583
584 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
585 return -EINVAL;
586
587 if (!ss_initialized)
588 return -EINVAL;
589
590 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
591 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
592
593 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
594 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
595 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
596 if (tmp & 0x01)
597 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
598 tmp >>= 1;
599 }
600 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
601 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
602 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
603
604 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
605 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
606 rc = -ENOMEM;
607 goto out_free;
608 }
609
610 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
611 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
612 rc = -ENOMEM;
613 goto out_free;
614 }
615
616 i = 0;
617 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
618 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
619 if (rc)
620 goto out_free;
621 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
622 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
623 }
624 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
625 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
626 if (rc)
627 goto out_free;
628 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
629 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
630 }
631 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
632 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
633 if (rc)
634 goto out_free;
635 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
636 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
637 }
638 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
639 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
640 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
641
642 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
643 if (rc)
644 goto out_free;
645 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
646 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
647 }
648 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
649 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
650 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
651 }
652
653 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
654
655 return 0;
656
657 out_free:
658 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
659 return rc;
660 }
661
662 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
663 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
664 {
665 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
666
667 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
668 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
669 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
670 (old_sid != new_sid))
671 return 1;
672
673 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
674 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
675 */
676 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
677 if (mnt_flags & flag)
678 return 1;
679 return 0;
680 }
681
682 /*
683 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
684 * labeling information.
685 */
686 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
687 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
688 unsigned long kern_flags,
689 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
690 {
691 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
692 int rc = 0, i;
693 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
694 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
695 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
696 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
697 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
698 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
699 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
700 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
701 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
702
703 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
704
705 if (!ss_initialized) {
706 if (!num_opts) {
707 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
708 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
709 server is ready to handle calls. */
710 goto out;
711 }
712 rc = -EINVAL;
713 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
714 "before the security server is initialized\n");
715 goto out;
716 }
717 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
718 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
719 * place the results is not allowed */
720 rc = -EINVAL;
721 goto out;
722 }
723
724 /*
725 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
726 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
727 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
728 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
729 *
730 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
731 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
732 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
733 * will be used for both mounts)
734 */
735 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
736 && (num_opts == 0))
737 goto out;
738
739 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
740
741 /*
742 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
743 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
744 * than once with different security options.
745 */
746 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
747 u32 sid;
748
749 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
750 continue;
751 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
752 if (rc) {
753 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
754 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
755 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
756 goto out;
757 }
758 switch (flags[i]) {
759 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
760 fscontext_sid = sid;
761
762 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
763 fscontext_sid))
764 goto out_double_mount;
765
766 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
767 break;
768 case CONTEXT_MNT:
769 context_sid = sid;
770
771 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
772 context_sid))
773 goto out_double_mount;
774
775 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
776 break;
777 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
778 rootcontext_sid = sid;
779
780 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
781 rootcontext_sid))
782 goto out_double_mount;
783
784 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
785
786 break;
787 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
788 defcontext_sid = sid;
789
790 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
791 defcontext_sid))
792 goto out_double_mount;
793
794 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
795
796 break;
797 default:
798 rc = -EINVAL;
799 goto out;
800 }
801 }
802
803 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
804 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
805 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
806 goto out_double_mount;
807 rc = 0;
808 goto out;
809 }
810
811 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
812 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
813
814 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
815 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
816 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
817 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
818
819 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
820 /*
821 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
822 * filesystem type.
823 */
824 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
825 if (rc) {
826 printk(KERN_WARNING
827 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
828 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
829 goto out;
830 }
831 }
832 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
833 if (fscontext_sid) {
834 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
835 if (rc)
836 goto out;
837
838 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
839 }
840
841 /*
842 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
843 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
844 * the superblock context if not already set.
845 */
846 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
847 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
848 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
849 }
850
851 if (context_sid) {
852 if (!fscontext_sid) {
853 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
854 cred);
855 if (rc)
856 goto out;
857 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
858 } else {
859 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
860 cred);
861 if (rc)
862 goto out;
863 }
864 if (!rootcontext_sid)
865 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
866
867 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
868 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
869 }
870
871 if (rootcontext_sid) {
872 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
873 cred);
874 if (rc)
875 goto out;
876
877 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
878 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
879 }
880
881 if (defcontext_sid) {
882 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
883 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
884 rc = -EINVAL;
885 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
886 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
887 goto out;
888 }
889
890 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
891 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
892 sbsec, cred);
893 if (rc)
894 goto out;
895 }
896
897 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
898 }
899
900 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
901 out:
902 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
903 return rc;
904 out_double_mount:
905 rc = -EINVAL;
906 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
907 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
908 goto out;
909 }
910
911 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
912 const struct super_block *newsb)
913 {
914 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
915 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
916 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
917 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
918
919 if (oldflags != newflags)
920 goto mismatch;
921 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
922 goto mismatch;
923 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
924 goto mismatch;
925 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
926 goto mismatch;
927 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
928 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
929 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
930 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
931 goto mismatch;
932 }
933 return 0;
934 mismatch:
935 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
936 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
937 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
938 return -EBUSY;
939 }
940
941 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
942 struct super_block *newsb)
943 {
944 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
945 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
946
947 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
948 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
949 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
950
951 /*
952 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
953 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
954 */
955 if (!ss_initialized)
956 return 0;
957
958 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
959 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
960
961 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
962 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
963 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
964
965 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
966
967 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
968
969 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
970 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
971 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
972
973 if (set_context) {
974 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
975
976 if (!set_fscontext)
977 newsbsec->sid = sid;
978 if (!set_rootcontext) {
979 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
980 newisec->sid = sid;
981 }
982 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
983 }
984 if (set_rootcontext) {
985 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
986 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
987
988 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
989 }
990
991 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
992 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
993 return 0;
994 }
995
996 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
997 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
998 {
999 char *p;
1000 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
1001 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
1002 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
1003
1004 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
1005
1006 /* Standard string-based options. */
1007 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
1008 int token;
1009 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
1010
1011 if (!*p)
1012 continue;
1013
1014 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
1015
1016 switch (token) {
1017 case Opt_context:
1018 if (context || defcontext) {
1019 rc = -EINVAL;
1020 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1021 goto out_err;
1022 }
1023 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1024 if (!context) {
1025 rc = -ENOMEM;
1026 goto out_err;
1027 }
1028 break;
1029
1030 case Opt_fscontext:
1031 if (fscontext) {
1032 rc = -EINVAL;
1033 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1034 goto out_err;
1035 }
1036 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1037 if (!fscontext) {
1038 rc = -ENOMEM;
1039 goto out_err;
1040 }
1041 break;
1042
1043 case Opt_rootcontext:
1044 if (rootcontext) {
1045 rc = -EINVAL;
1046 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1047 goto out_err;
1048 }
1049 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1050 if (!rootcontext) {
1051 rc = -ENOMEM;
1052 goto out_err;
1053 }
1054 break;
1055
1056 case Opt_defcontext:
1057 if (context || defcontext) {
1058 rc = -EINVAL;
1059 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1060 goto out_err;
1061 }
1062 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1063 if (!defcontext) {
1064 rc = -ENOMEM;
1065 goto out_err;
1066 }
1067 break;
1068 case Opt_labelsupport:
1069 break;
1070 default:
1071 rc = -EINVAL;
1072 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
1073 goto out_err;
1074
1075 }
1076 }
1077
1078 rc = -ENOMEM;
1079 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
1080 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
1081 goto out_err;
1082
1083 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
1084 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
1085 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1086 goto out_err;
1087 }
1088
1089 if (fscontext) {
1090 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1091 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1092 }
1093 if (context) {
1094 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1095 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1096 }
1097 if (rootcontext) {
1098 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1099 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1100 }
1101 if (defcontext) {
1102 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1103 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1104 }
1105
1106 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1107 return 0;
1108
1109 out_err:
1110 kfree(context);
1111 kfree(defcontext);
1112 kfree(fscontext);
1113 kfree(rootcontext);
1114 return rc;
1115 }
1116 /*
1117 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1118 */
1119 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1120 {
1121 int rc = 0;
1122 char *options = data;
1123 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1124
1125 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1126
1127 if (!data)
1128 goto out;
1129
1130 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1131
1132 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1133 if (rc)
1134 goto out_err;
1135
1136 out:
1137 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1138
1139 out_err:
1140 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1141 return rc;
1142 }
1143
1144 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1145 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1146 {
1147 int i;
1148 char *prefix;
1149
1150 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1151 char *has_comma;
1152
1153 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1154 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1155 else
1156 has_comma = NULL;
1157
1158 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1159 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1160 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1161 break;
1162 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1163 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1164 break;
1165 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1166 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1167 break;
1168 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1169 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1170 break;
1171 case SBLABEL_MNT:
1172 seq_putc(m, ',');
1173 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1174 continue;
1175 default:
1176 BUG();
1177 return;
1178 };
1179 /* we need a comma before each option */
1180 seq_putc(m, ',');
1181 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1182 if (has_comma)
1183 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1184 seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
1185 if (has_comma)
1186 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1187 }
1188 }
1189
1190 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1191 {
1192 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1193 int rc;
1194
1195 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1196 if (rc) {
1197 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1198 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1199 rc = 0;
1200 return rc;
1201 }
1202
1203 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1204
1205 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1206
1207 return rc;
1208 }
1209
1210 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1211 {
1212 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1213 case S_IFSOCK:
1214 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1215 case S_IFLNK:
1216 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1217 case S_IFREG:
1218 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1219 case S_IFBLK:
1220 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1221 case S_IFDIR:
1222 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1223 case S_IFCHR:
1224 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1225 case S_IFIFO:
1226 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1227
1228 }
1229
1230 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1231 }
1232
1233 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1234 {
1235 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1236 }
1237
1238 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1239 {
1240 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1241 }
1242
1243 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1244 {
1245 switch (family) {
1246 case PF_UNIX:
1247 switch (type) {
1248 case SOCK_STREAM:
1249 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1250 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1251 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1252 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1253 }
1254 break;
1255 case PF_INET:
1256 case PF_INET6:
1257 switch (type) {
1258 case SOCK_STREAM:
1259 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1260 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1261 else
1262 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1263 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1264 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1265 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1266 else
1267 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1268 case SOCK_DCCP:
1269 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1270 default:
1271 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1272 }
1273 break;
1274 case PF_NETLINK:
1275 switch (protocol) {
1276 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1277 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1278 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1279 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1280 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1281 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1282 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1283 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1284 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1285 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1286 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1287 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1288 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1289 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1290 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1291 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1292 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1293 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1294 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1295 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1296 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1297 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1298 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1299 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1300 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1301 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1302 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1303 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1304 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1305 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1306 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1307 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1308 default:
1309 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1310 }
1311 case PF_PACKET:
1312 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1313 case PF_KEY:
1314 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1315 case PF_APPLETALK:
1316 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1317 }
1318
1319 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1320 }
1321
1322 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1323 u16 tclass,
1324 u16 flags,
1325 u32 *sid)
1326 {
1327 int rc;
1328 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_inode->i_sb;
1329 char *buffer, *path;
1330
1331 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1332 if (!buffer)
1333 return -ENOMEM;
1334
1335 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1336 if (IS_ERR(path))
1337 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1338 else {
1339 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1340 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1341 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1342 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1343 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1344 path[1] = '/';
1345 path++;
1346 }
1347 }
1348 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid);
1349 }
1350 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1351 return rc;
1352 }
1353
1354 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1355 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1356 {
1357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1358 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1359 u32 sid;
1360 struct dentry *dentry;
1361 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1362 char *context = NULL;
1363 unsigned len = 0;
1364 int rc = 0;
1365
1366 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1367 goto out;
1368
1369 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1370 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1371 goto out_unlock;
1372
1373 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1374 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1375 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1376 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1377 server is ready to handle calls. */
1378 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1379 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1380 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1381 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1382 goto out_unlock;
1383 }
1384
1385 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1386 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1387 break;
1388 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1389 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1390 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1391 break;
1392 }
1393
1394 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1395 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1396 if (opt_dentry) {
1397 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1398 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1399 } else {
1400 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1401 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1402 }
1403 if (!dentry) {
1404 /*
1405 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1406 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1407 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1408 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1409 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1410 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1411 * be used again by userspace.
1412 */
1413 goto out_unlock;
1414 }
1415
1416 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1417 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1418 if (!context) {
1419 rc = -ENOMEM;
1420 dput(dentry);
1421 goto out_unlock;
1422 }
1423 context[len] = '\0';
1424 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1425 context, len);
1426 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1427 kfree(context);
1428
1429 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1430 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1431 NULL, 0);
1432 if (rc < 0) {
1433 dput(dentry);
1434 goto out_unlock;
1435 }
1436 len = rc;
1437 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1438 if (!context) {
1439 rc = -ENOMEM;
1440 dput(dentry);
1441 goto out_unlock;
1442 }
1443 context[len] = '\0';
1444 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1445 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1446 context, len);
1447 }
1448 dput(dentry);
1449 if (rc < 0) {
1450 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1451 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1452 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1453 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1454 kfree(context);
1455 goto out_unlock;
1456 }
1457 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1458 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1459 rc = 0;
1460 } else {
1461 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1462 sbsec->def_sid,
1463 GFP_NOFS);
1464 if (rc) {
1465 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1466 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1467
1468 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1469 if (printk_ratelimit())
1470 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1471 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1472 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1473 } else {
1474 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1475 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1476 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1477 }
1478 kfree(context);
1479 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1480 rc = 0;
1481 break;
1482 }
1483 }
1484 kfree(context);
1485 isec->sid = sid;
1486 break;
1487 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1488 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1489 break;
1490 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1491 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1492 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1493
1494 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1495 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1496 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1497 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1498 if (rc)
1499 goto out_unlock;
1500 isec->sid = sid;
1501 break;
1502 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1503 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1504 break;
1505 default:
1506 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1507 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1508
1509 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1510 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1511 * procfs inodes */
1512 if (opt_dentry)
1513 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1514 * d_splice_alias. */
1515 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1516 else
1517 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1518 * find a dentry. */
1519 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1520 /*
1521 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1522 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1523 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1524 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1525 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1526 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1527 * could be used again by userspace.
1528 */
1529 if (!dentry)
1530 goto out_unlock;
1531 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1532 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass,
1533 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1534 dput(dentry);
1535 if (rc)
1536 goto out_unlock;
1537 isec->sid = sid;
1538 }
1539 break;
1540 }
1541
1542 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1543
1544 out_unlock:
1545 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1546 out:
1547 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1548 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1549 return rc;
1550 }
1551
1552 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1553 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1554 {
1555 u32 perm = 0;
1556
1557 switch (sig) {
1558 case SIGCHLD:
1559 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1560 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1561 break;
1562 case SIGKILL:
1563 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1564 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1565 break;
1566 case SIGSTOP:
1567 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1568 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1569 break;
1570 default:
1571 /* All other signals. */
1572 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1573 break;
1574 }
1575
1576 return perm;
1577 }
1578
1579 /*
1580 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1581 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1582 */
1583 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1584 const struct cred *target,
1585 u32 perms)
1586 {
1587 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1588
1589 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1590 }
1591
1592 /*
1593 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1594 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1595 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1596 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1597 */
1598 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1599 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1600 u32 perms)
1601 {
1602 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1603 u32 sid1, sid2;
1604
1605 rcu_read_lock();
1606 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1607 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1608 rcu_read_unlock();
1609 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1610 }
1611
1612 /*
1613 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1614 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1615 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1616 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1617 */
1618 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1619 u32 perms)
1620 {
1621 u32 sid, tsid;
1622
1623 sid = current_sid();
1624 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1625 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1626 }
1627
1628 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1629 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1630 #endif
1631
1632 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1633 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1634 int cap, int audit, bool initns)
1635 {
1636 struct common_audit_data ad;
1637 struct av_decision avd;
1638 u16 sclass;
1639 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1640 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1641 int rc;
1642
1643 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1644 ad.u.cap = cap;
1645
1646 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1647 case 0:
1648 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1649 break;
1650 case 1:
1651 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1652 break;
1653 default:
1654 printk(KERN_ERR
1655 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1656 BUG();
1657 return -EINVAL;
1658 }
1659
1660 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1661 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1662 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1663 if (rc2)
1664 return rc2;
1665 }
1666 return rc;
1667 }
1668
1669 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1670 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1671 u32 perms)
1672 {
1673 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1674
1675 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1676 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1677 }
1678
1679 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1680 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1681 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1682 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1683 struct inode *inode,
1684 u32 perms,
1685 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1686 {
1687 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1688 u32 sid;
1689
1690 validate_creds(cred);
1691
1692 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1693 return 0;
1694
1695 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1696 isec = inode->i_security;
1697
1698 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1699 }
1700
1701 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1702 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1703 pathname if needed. */
1704 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1705 struct dentry *dentry,
1706 u32 av)
1707 {
1708 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1709 struct common_audit_data ad;
1710
1711 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1712 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1713 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1714 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1715 }
1716
1717 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1718 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1719 pathname if needed. */
1720 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1721 const struct path *path,
1722 u32 av)
1723 {
1724 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1725 struct common_audit_data ad;
1726
1727 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1728 ad.u.path = *path;
1729 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1730 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1731 }
1732
1733 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1734 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1735 struct file *file,
1736 u32 av)
1737 {
1738 struct common_audit_data ad;
1739
1740 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1741 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1742 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1743 }
1744
1745 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1746 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1747 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1748 check a particular permission to the file.
1749 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1750 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1751 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1752 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1753 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1754 struct file *file,
1755 u32 av)
1756 {
1757 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1758 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1759 struct common_audit_data ad;
1760 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1761 int rc;
1762
1763 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1764 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1765
1766 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1767 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1768 SECCLASS_FD,
1769 FD__USE,
1770 &ad);
1771 if (rc)
1772 goto out;
1773 }
1774
1775 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1776 rc = 0;
1777 if (av)
1778 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1779
1780 out:
1781 return rc;
1782 }
1783
1784 /*
1785 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1786 */
1787 static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
1788 const struct qstr *name,
1789 u16 tclass,
1790 u32 *_new_isid)
1791 {
1792 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1793 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1794
1795 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1796 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1797 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1798 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1799 tsec->create_sid) {
1800 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1801 } else {
1802 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1803 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1804 name, _new_isid);
1805 }
1806
1807 return 0;
1808 }
1809
1810 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1811 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1812 struct dentry *dentry,
1813 u16 tclass)
1814 {
1815 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1816 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1817 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1818 u32 sid, newsid;
1819 struct common_audit_data ad;
1820 int rc;
1821
1822 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1823 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1824
1825 sid = tsec->sid;
1826
1827 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1828 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1829
1830 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1831 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1832 &ad);
1833 if (rc)
1834 return rc;
1835
1836 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1837 &newsid);
1838 if (rc)
1839 return rc;
1840
1841 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1842 if (rc)
1843 return rc;
1844
1845 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1846 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1847 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1848 }
1849
1850 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1851 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1852 struct task_struct *ctx)
1853 {
1854 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1855
1856 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1857 }
1858
1859 #define MAY_LINK 0
1860 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1861 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1862
1863 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1864 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1865 struct dentry *dentry,
1866 int kind)
1867
1868 {
1869 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1870 struct common_audit_data ad;
1871 u32 sid = current_sid();
1872 u32 av;
1873 int rc;
1874
1875 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1876 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1877
1878 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1879 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1880
1881 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1882 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1883 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1884 if (rc)
1885 return rc;
1886
1887 switch (kind) {
1888 case MAY_LINK:
1889 av = FILE__LINK;
1890 break;
1891 case MAY_UNLINK:
1892 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1893 break;
1894 case MAY_RMDIR:
1895 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1896 break;
1897 default:
1898 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1899 __func__, kind);
1900 return 0;
1901 }
1902
1903 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1904 return rc;
1905 }
1906
1907 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1908 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1909 struct inode *new_dir,
1910 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1911 {
1912 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1913 struct common_audit_data ad;
1914 u32 sid = current_sid();
1915 u32 av;
1916 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1917 int rc;
1918
1919 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1920 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1921 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1922 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1923
1924 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1925
1926 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1927 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1928 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1929 if (rc)
1930 return rc;
1931 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1932 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1933 if (rc)
1934 return rc;
1935 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1936 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1937 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1938 if (rc)
1939 return rc;
1940 }
1941
1942 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1943 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1944 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1945 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1946 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1947 if (rc)
1948 return rc;
1949 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1950 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1951 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1952 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1953 new_isec->sclass,
1954 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1955 if (rc)
1956 return rc;
1957 }
1958
1959 return 0;
1960 }
1961
1962 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1963 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1964 struct super_block *sb,
1965 u32 perms,
1966 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1967 {
1968 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1969 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1970
1971 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1972 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1973 }
1974
1975 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1976 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1977 {
1978 u32 av = 0;
1979
1980 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1981 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1982 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1983 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1984 av |= FILE__READ;
1985
1986 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1987 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1988 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1989 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1990
1991 } else {
1992 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1993 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1994 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1995 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1996 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1997 av |= DIR__READ;
1998 }
1999
2000 return av;
2001 }
2002
2003 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2004 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
2005 {
2006 u32 av = 0;
2007
2008 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2009 av |= FILE__READ;
2010 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
2011 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
2012 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2013 else
2014 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2015 }
2016 if (!av) {
2017 /*
2018 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2019 */
2020 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2021 }
2022
2023 return av;
2024 }
2025
2026 /*
2027 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
2028 * open permission.
2029 */
2030 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2031 {
2032 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2033
2034 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
2035 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2036
2037 return av;
2038 }
2039
2040 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2041
2042 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2043 {
2044 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2045 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
2046
2047 return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2048 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2049 }
2050
2051 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2052 struct task_struct *to)
2053 {
2054 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2055 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2056 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2057 int rc;
2058
2059 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2060 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2061 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2062 if (rc)
2063 return rc;
2064 }
2065
2066 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
2067 NULL);
2068 }
2069
2070 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2071 struct task_struct *to)
2072 {
2073 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2074 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2075
2076 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2077 NULL);
2078 }
2079
2080 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2081 struct task_struct *to,
2082 struct file *file)
2083 {
2084 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
2085 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2086 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2087 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2088 struct common_audit_data ad;
2089 int rc;
2090
2091 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2092 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2093
2094 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2095 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
2096 SECCLASS_FD,
2097 FD__USE,
2098 &ad);
2099 if (rc)
2100 return rc;
2101 }
2102
2103 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2104 return 0;
2105
2106 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2107 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2108 &ad);
2109 }
2110
2111 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2112 unsigned int mode)
2113 {
2114 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
2115 u32 sid = current_sid();
2116 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2117 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2118 }
2119
2120 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2121 }
2122
2123 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2124 {
2125 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2126 }
2127
2128 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2129 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2130 {
2131 return current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
2132 }
2133
2134 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2135 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2136 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2137 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2138 {
2139 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
2140 }
2141
2142 /*
2143 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2144 * which was removed).
2145 *
2146 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2147 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2148 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2149 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2150 */
2151
2152 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2153 int cap, int audit)
2154 {
2155 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns);
2156 }
2157
2158 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2159 {
2160 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2161 int rc = 0;
2162
2163 if (!sb)
2164 return 0;
2165
2166 switch (cmds) {
2167 case Q_SYNC:
2168 case Q_QUOTAON:
2169 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2170 case Q_SETINFO:
2171 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2172 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2173 break;
2174 case Q_GETFMT:
2175 case Q_GETINFO:
2176 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2177 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2178 break;
2179 default:
2180 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2181 break;
2182 }
2183 return rc;
2184 }
2185
2186 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2187 {
2188 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2189
2190 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2191 }
2192
2193 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2194 {
2195 int rc;
2196
2197 switch (type) {
2198 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2199 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2200 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2201 break;
2202 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2203 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2204 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2205 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2206 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2207 break;
2208 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2209 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2210 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2211 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2212 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2213 default:
2214 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2215 break;
2216 }
2217 return rc;
2218 }
2219
2220 /*
2221 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2222 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2223 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2224 *
2225 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2226 * processes that allocate mappings.
2227 */
2228 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2229 {
2230 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2231
2232 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2233 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
2234 if (rc == 0)
2235 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2236
2237 return cap_sys_admin;
2238 }
2239
2240 /* binprm security operations */
2241
2242 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(struct task_struct *task)
2243 {
2244 u32 sid = 0;
2245 struct task_struct *tracer;
2246
2247 rcu_read_lock();
2248 tracer = ptrace_parent(task);
2249 if (tracer)
2250 sid = task_sid(tracer);
2251 rcu_read_unlock();
2252
2253 return sid;
2254 }
2255
2256 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2257 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2258 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2259 {
2260 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2261 int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2262 int rc;
2263
2264 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2265 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2266
2267 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2268 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2269
2270 /*
2271 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2272 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2273 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2274 * of the current SID.
2275 */
2276 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2277 if (rc) {
2278 /*
2279 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2280 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2281 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2282 */
2283 if (nnp)
2284 return -EPERM;
2285 else
2286 return -EACCES;
2287 }
2288 return 0;
2289 }
2290
2291 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2292 {
2293 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2294 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2295 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2296 struct common_audit_data ad;
2297 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2298 int rc;
2299
2300 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2301 * the script interpreter */
2302 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2303 return 0;
2304
2305 old_tsec = current_security();
2306 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2307 isec = inode_security(inode);
2308
2309 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2310 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2311 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2312
2313 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2314 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2315 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2316 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2317
2318 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2319 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2320 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2321 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2322
2323 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2324 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2325 if (rc)
2326 return rc;
2327 } else {
2328 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2329 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2330 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2331 &new_tsec->sid);
2332 if (rc)
2333 return rc;
2334
2335 /*
2336 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2337 * transition.
2338 */
2339 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2340 if (rc)
2341 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2342 }
2343
2344 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2345 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2346
2347 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2348 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2349 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2350 if (rc)
2351 return rc;
2352 } else {
2353 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2354 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2355 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2356 if (rc)
2357 return rc;
2358
2359 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2360 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2361 if (rc)
2362 return rc;
2363
2364 /* Check for shared state */
2365 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2366 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2367 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2368 NULL);
2369 if (rc)
2370 return -EPERM;
2371 }
2372
2373 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2374 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2375 if (bprm->unsafe &
2376 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2377 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(current);
2378 if (ptsid != 0) {
2379 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2380 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2381 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2382 if (rc)
2383 return -EPERM;
2384 }
2385 }
2386
2387 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2388 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2389 }
2390
2391 return 0;
2392 }
2393
2394 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2395 {
2396 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2397 u32 sid, osid;
2398 int atsecure = 0;
2399
2400 sid = tsec->sid;
2401 osid = tsec->osid;
2402
2403 if (osid != sid) {
2404 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2405 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2406 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2407 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2408 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2409 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2410 }
2411
2412 return !!atsecure;
2413 }
2414
2415 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2416 {
2417 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2418 }
2419
2420 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2421 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2422 struct files_struct *files)
2423 {
2424 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2425 struct tty_struct *tty;
2426 int drop_tty = 0;
2427 unsigned n;
2428
2429 tty = get_current_tty();
2430 if (tty) {
2431 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2432 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2433 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2434
2435 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2436 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2437 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2438 open file may belong to another process and we are
2439 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2440 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2441 struct tty_file_private, list);
2442 file = file_priv->file;
2443 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2444 drop_tty = 1;
2445 }
2446 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2447 tty_kref_put(tty);
2448 }
2449 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2450 if (drop_tty)
2451 no_tty();
2452
2453 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2454 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2455 if (!n) /* none found? */
2456 return;
2457
2458 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2459 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2460 devnull = NULL;
2461 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2462 do {
2463 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2464 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2465 if (devnull)
2466 fput(devnull);
2467 }
2468
2469 /*
2470 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2471 */
2472 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2473 {
2474 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2475 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2476 int rc, i;
2477
2478 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2479 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2480 return;
2481
2482 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2483 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2484
2485 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2486 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2487
2488 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2489 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2490 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2491 *
2492 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2493 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2494 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2495 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2496 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2497 */
2498 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2499 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2500 if (rc) {
2501 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2502 task_lock(current);
2503 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2504 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2505 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2506 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2507 }
2508 task_unlock(current);
2509 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2510 }
2511 }
2512
2513 /*
2514 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2515 * due to exec
2516 */
2517 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2518 {
2519 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2520 struct itimerval itimer;
2521 u32 osid, sid;
2522 int rc, i;
2523
2524 osid = tsec->osid;
2525 sid = tsec->sid;
2526
2527 if (sid == osid)
2528 return;
2529
2530 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2531 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2532 * flush and unblock signals.
2533 *
2534 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2535 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2536 */
2537 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2538 if (rc) {
2539 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2540 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2541 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2542 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2543 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2544 flush_sigqueue(&current->pending);
2545 flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending);
2546 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2547 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2548 recalc_sigpending();
2549 }
2550 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2551 }
2552
2553 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2554 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2555 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2556 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2557 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2558 }
2559
2560 /* superblock security operations */
2561
2562 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2563 {
2564 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2565 }
2566
2567 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2568 {
2569 superblock_free_security(sb);
2570 }
2571
2572 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2573 {
2574 if (plen > olen)
2575 return 0;
2576
2577 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2578 }
2579
2580 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2581 {
2582 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2583 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2584 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2585 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2586 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2587 }
2588
2589 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2590 {
2591 if (!*first) {
2592 **to = ',';
2593 *to += 1;
2594 } else
2595 *first = 0;
2596 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2597 *to += len;
2598 }
2599
2600 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2601 int len)
2602 {
2603 int current_size = 0;
2604
2605 if (!*first) {
2606 **to = '|';
2607 *to += 1;
2608 } else
2609 *first = 0;
2610
2611 while (current_size < len) {
2612 if (*from != '"') {
2613 **to = *from;
2614 *to += 1;
2615 }
2616 from += 1;
2617 current_size += 1;
2618 }
2619 }
2620
2621 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2622 {
2623 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2624 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2625 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2626 int open_quote = 0;
2627
2628 in_curr = orig;
2629 sec_curr = copy;
2630
2631 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2632 if (!nosec) {
2633 rc = -ENOMEM;
2634 goto out;
2635 }
2636
2637 nosec_save = nosec;
2638 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2639 in_save = in_end = orig;
2640
2641 do {
2642 if (*in_end == '"')
2643 open_quote = !open_quote;
2644 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2645 *in_end == '\0') {
2646 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2647
2648 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2649 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2650 else
2651 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2652
2653 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2654 }
2655 } while (*in_end++);
2656
2657 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2658 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2659 out:
2660 return rc;
2661 }
2662
2663 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2664 {
2665 int rc, i, *flags;
2666 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2667 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2668 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2669
2670 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2671 return 0;
2672
2673 if (!data)
2674 return 0;
2675
2676 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2677 return 0;
2678
2679 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2680 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2681 if (!secdata)
2682 return -ENOMEM;
2683 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2684 if (rc)
2685 goto out_free_secdata;
2686
2687 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2688 if (rc)
2689 goto out_free_secdata;
2690
2691 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2692 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2693
2694 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2695 u32 sid;
2696
2697 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2698 continue;
2699 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
2700 if (rc) {
2701 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
2702 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2703 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2704 goto out_free_opts;
2705 }
2706 rc = -EINVAL;
2707 switch (flags[i]) {
2708 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
2709 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2710 goto out_bad_option;
2711 break;
2712 case CONTEXT_MNT:
2713 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2714 goto out_bad_option;
2715 break;
2716 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2717 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2718 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2719
2720 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2721 goto out_bad_option;
2722 break;
2723 }
2724 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2725 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2726 goto out_bad_option;
2727 break;
2728 default:
2729 goto out_free_opts;
2730 }
2731 }
2732
2733 rc = 0;
2734 out_free_opts:
2735 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2736 out_free_secdata:
2737 free_secdata(secdata);
2738 return rc;
2739 out_bad_option:
2740 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2741 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2742 sb->s_type->name);
2743 goto out_free_opts;
2744 }
2745
2746 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2747 {
2748 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2749 struct common_audit_data ad;
2750 int rc;
2751
2752 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2753 if (rc)
2754 return rc;
2755
2756 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2757 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2758 return 0;
2759
2760 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2761 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2762 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2763 }
2764
2765 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2766 {
2767 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2768 struct common_audit_data ad;
2769
2770 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2771 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2772 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2773 }
2774
2775 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2776 struct path *path,
2777 const char *type,
2778 unsigned long flags,
2779 void *data)
2780 {
2781 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2782
2783 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2784 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2785 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2786 else
2787 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2788 }
2789
2790 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2791 {
2792 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2793
2794 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2795 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2796 }
2797
2798 /* inode security operations */
2799
2800 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2801 {
2802 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2803 }
2804
2805 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2806 {
2807 inode_free_security(inode);
2808 }
2809
2810 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2811 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2812 u32 *ctxlen)
2813 {
2814 u32 newsid;
2815 int rc;
2816
2817 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2818 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2819 &newsid);
2820 if (rc)
2821 return rc;
2822
2823 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2824 }
2825
2826 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2827 const struct qstr *qstr,
2828 const char **name,
2829 void **value, size_t *len)
2830 {
2831 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2832 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2833 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2834 int rc;
2835 char *context;
2836
2837 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2838
2839 sid = tsec->sid;
2840 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2841
2842 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(
2843 dir, qstr,
2844 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2845 &newsid);
2846 if (rc)
2847 return rc;
2848
2849 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2850 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2851 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2852 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2853 isec->sid = newsid;
2854 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2855 }
2856
2857 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2858 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2859
2860 if (name)
2861 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2862
2863 if (value && len) {
2864 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2865 if (rc)
2866 return rc;
2867 *value = context;
2868 *len = clen;
2869 }
2870
2871 return 0;
2872 }
2873
2874 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2875 {
2876 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2877 }
2878
2879 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2880 {
2881 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2882 }
2883
2884 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2885 {
2886 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2887 }
2888
2889 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2890 {
2891 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2892 }
2893
2894 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2895 {
2896 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2897 }
2898
2899 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2900 {
2901 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2902 }
2903
2904 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2905 {
2906 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2907 }
2908
2909 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2910 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2911 {
2912 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2913 }
2914
2915 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2916 {
2917 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2918
2919 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2920 }
2921
2922 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
2923 bool rcu)
2924 {
2925 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2926 struct common_audit_data ad;
2927 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2928 u32 sid;
2929
2930 validate_creds(cred);
2931
2932 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2933 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2934 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2935 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
2936 if (IS_ERR(isec))
2937 return PTR_ERR(isec);
2938
2939 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
2940 rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
2941 }
2942
2943 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2944 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2945 int result,
2946 unsigned flags)
2947 {
2948 struct common_audit_data ad;
2949 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2950 int rc;
2951
2952 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2953 ad.u.inode = inode;
2954
2955 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2956 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2957 if (rc)
2958 return rc;
2959 return 0;
2960 }
2961
2962 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2963 {
2964 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2965 u32 perms;
2966 bool from_access;
2967 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2968 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2969 u32 sid;
2970 struct av_decision avd;
2971 int rc, rc2;
2972 u32 audited, denied;
2973
2974 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2975 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2976
2977 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2978 if (!mask)
2979 return 0;
2980
2981 validate_creds(cred);
2982
2983 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2984 return 0;
2985
2986 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2987
2988 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2989 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
2990 if (IS_ERR(isec))
2991 return PTR_ERR(isec);
2992
2993 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2994 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2995 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2996 &denied);
2997 if (likely(!audited))
2998 return rc;
2999
3000 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
3001 if (rc2)
3002 return rc2;
3003 return rc;
3004 }
3005
3006 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3007 {
3008 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3009 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3010 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3011
3012 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3013 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3014 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3015 ATTR_FORCE);
3016 if (!ia_valid)
3017 return 0;
3018 }
3019
3020 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3021 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3022 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3023
3024 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
3025 && !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3026 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3027
3028 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3029 }
3030
3031 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3032 {
3033 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3034 }
3035
3036 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3037 {
3038 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3039
3040 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
3041 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
3042 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
3043 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
3044 return -EPERM;
3045 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
3046 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
3047 Restrict to administrator. */
3048 return -EPERM;
3049 }
3050 }
3051
3052 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3053 ordinary setattr permission. */
3054 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3055 }
3056
3057 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3058 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3059 {
3060 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3061 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3062 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3063 struct common_audit_data ad;
3064 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3065 int rc = 0;
3066
3067 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3068 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3069
3070 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3071 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3072 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3073
3074 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3075 return -EPERM;
3076
3077 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3078 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3079
3080 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3081 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3082 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3083 if (rc)
3084 return rc;
3085
3086 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3087 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3088 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3089 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3090 size_t audit_size;
3091 const char *str;
3092
3093 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3094 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3095 if (value) {
3096 str = value;
3097 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3098 audit_size = size - 1;
3099 else
3100 audit_size = size;
3101 } else {
3102 str = "";
3103 audit_size = 0;
3104 }
3105 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3106 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3107 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3108 audit_log_end(ab);
3109
3110 return rc;
3111 }
3112 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3113 }
3114 if (rc)
3115 return rc;
3116
3117 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3118 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3119 if (rc)
3120 return rc;
3121
3122 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
3123 isec->sclass);
3124 if (rc)
3125 return rc;
3126
3127 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3128 sbsec->sid,
3129 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3130 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3131 &ad);
3132 }
3133
3134 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3135 const void *value, size_t size,
3136 int flags)
3137 {
3138 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3139 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3140 u32 newsid;
3141 int rc;
3142
3143 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3144 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3145 return;
3146 }
3147
3148 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3149 if (rc) {
3150 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3151 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3152 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3153 return;
3154 }
3155
3156 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3157 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3158 isec->sid = newsid;
3159 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3160
3161 return;
3162 }
3163
3164 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3165 {
3166 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3167
3168 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3169 }
3170
3171 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3172 {
3173 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3174
3175 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3176 }
3177
3178 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3179 {
3180 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3181 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3182
3183 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3184 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3185 return -EACCES;
3186 }
3187
3188 /*
3189 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3190 *
3191 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3192 */
3193 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3194 {
3195 u32 size;
3196 int error;
3197 char *context = NULL;
3198 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3199
3200 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3201 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3202
3203 /*
3204 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3205 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3206 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3207 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3208 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3209 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3210 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3211 */
3212 error = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3213 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3214 if (!error)
3215 error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3216 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
3217 isec = inode_security(inode);
3218 if (!error)
3219 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3220 &size);
3221 else
3222 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3223 if (error)
3224 return error;
3225 error = size;
3226 if (alloc) {
3227 *buffer = context;
3228 goto out_nofree;
3229 }
3230 kfree(context);
3231 out_nofree:
3232 return error;
3233 }
3234
3235 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3236 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3237 {
3238 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3239 u32 newsid;
3240 int rc;
3241
3242 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3243 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3244
3245 if (!value || !size)
3246 return -EACCES;
3247
3248 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3249 if (rc)
3250 return rc;
3251
3252 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3253 isec->sid = newsid;
3254 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3255 return 0;
3256 }
3257
3258 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3259 {
3260 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3261 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3262 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3263 return len;
3264 }
3265
3266 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3267 {
3268 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3269 *secid = isec->sid;
3270 }
3271
3272 /* file security operations */
3273
3274 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3275 {
3276 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3277 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3278
3279 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3280 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3281 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3282
3283 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3284 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3285 }
3286
3287 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3288 {
3289 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3290 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3291 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3292 u32 sid = current_sid();
3293
3294 if (!mask)
3295 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3296 return 0;
3297
3298 isec = inode_security(inode);
3299 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3300 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3301 /* No change since file_open check. */
3302 return 0;
3303
3304 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3305 }
3306
3307 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3308 {
3309 return file_alloc_security(file);
3310 }
3311
3312 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3313 {
3314 file_free_security(file);
3315 }
3316
3317 /*
3318 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3319 * operation to an inode.
3320 */
3321 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3322 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3323 {
3324 struct common_audit_data ad;
3325 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3326 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3327 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3328 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3329 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3330 int rc;
3331 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3332 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3333
3334 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3335 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3336 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3337 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3338
3339 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3340 rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
3341 SECCLASS_FD,
3342 FD__USE,
3343 &ad);
3344 if (rc)
3345 goto out;
3346 }
3347
3348 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3349 return 0;
3350
3351 isec = inode_security(inode);
3352 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3353 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3354 out:
3355 return rc;
3356 }
3357
3358 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3359 unsigned long arg)
3360 {
3361 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3362 int error = 0;
3363
3364 switch (cmd) {
3365 case FIONREAD:
3366 /* fall through */
3367 case FIBMAP:
3368 /* fall through */
3369 case FIGETBSZ:
3370 /* fall through */
3371 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3372 /* fall through */
3373 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3374 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3375 break;
3376
3377 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3378 /* fall through */
3379 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3380 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3381 break;
3382
3383 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3384 case FIONBIO:
3385 /* fall through */
3386 case FIOASYNC:
3387 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3388 break;
3389
3390 case KDSKBENT:
3391 case KDSKBSENT:
3392 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3393 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true);
3394 break;
3395
3396 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3397 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3398 */
3399 default:
3400 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3401 }
3402 return error;
3403 }
3404
3405 static int default_noexec;
3406
3407 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3408 {
3409 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3410 int rc = 0;
3411
3412 if (default_noexec &&
3413 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3414 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3415 /*
3416 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3417 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3418 * This has an additional check.
3419 */
3420 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3421 if (rc)
3422 goto error;
3423 }
3424
3425 if (file) {
3426 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3427 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3428
3429 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3430 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3431 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3432
3433 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3434 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3435
3436 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3437 }
3438
3439 error:
3440 return rc;
3441 }
3442
3443 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3444 {
3445 int rc = 0;
3446
3447 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3448 u32 sid = current_sid();
3449 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3450 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3451 }
3452
3453 return rc;
3454 }
3455
3456 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3457 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3458 {
3459 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3460 prot = reqprot;
3461
3462 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3463 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3464 }
3465
3466 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3467 unsigned long reqprot,
3468 unsigned long prot)
3469 {
3470 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3471
3472 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3473 prot = reqprot;
3474
3475 if (default_noexec &&
3476 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3477 int rc = 0;
3478 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3479 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3480 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3481 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3482 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3483 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3484 vma_is_stack_for_task(vma, current))) {
3485 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3486 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3487 /*
3488 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3489 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3490 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3491 * modified content. This typically should only
3492 * occur for text relocations.
3493 */
3494 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3495 }
3496 if (rc)
3497 return rc;
3498 }
3499
3500 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3501 }
3502
3503 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3504 {
3505 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3506
3507 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3508 }
3509
3510 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3511 unsigned long arg)
3512 {
3513 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3514 int err = 0;
3515
3516 switch (cmd) {
3517 case F_SETFL:
3518 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3519 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3520 break;
3521 }
3522 /* fall through */
3523 case F_SETOWN:
3524 case F_SETSIG:
3525 case F_GETFL:
3526 case F_GETOWN:
3527 case F_GETSIG:
3528 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3529 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3530 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3531 break;
3532 case F_GETLK:
3533 case F_SETLK:
3534 case F_SETLKW:
3535 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3536 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3537 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3538 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3539 case F_GETLK64:
3540 case F_SETLK64:
3541 case F_SETLKW64:
3542 #endif
3543 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3544 break;
3545 }
3546
3547 return err;
3548 }
3549
3550 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3551 {
3552 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3553
3554 fsec = file->f_security;
3555 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3556 }
3557
3558 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3559 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3560 {
3561 struct file *file;
3562 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3563 u32 perm;
3564 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3565
3566 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3567 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3568
3569 fsec = file->f_security;
3570
3571 if (!signum)
3572 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3573 else
3574 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3575
3576 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3577 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3578 }
3579
3580 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3581 {
3582 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3583
3584 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3585 }
3586
3587 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3588 {
3589 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3590 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3591
3592 fsec = file->f_security;
3593 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3594 /*
3595 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3596 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3597 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3598 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3599 * struct as its SID.
3600 */
3601 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3602 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3603 /*
3604 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3605 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3606 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3607 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3608 * new inode label or new policy.
3609 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3610 */
3611 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3612 }
3613
3614 /* task security operations */
3615
3616 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3617 {
3618 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3619 }
3620
3621 /*
3622 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3623 */
3624 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3625 {
3626 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3627
3628 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3629 if (!tsec)
3630 return -ENOMEM;
3631
3632 cred->security = tsec;
3633 return 0;
3634 }
3635
3636 /*
3637 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3638 */
3639 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3640 {
3641 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3642
3643 /*
3644 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3645 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3646 */
3647 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3648 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3649 kfree(tsec);
3650 }
3651
3652 /*
3653 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3654 */
3655 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3656 gfp_t gfp)
3657 {
3658 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3659 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3660
3661 old_tsec = old->security;
3662
3663 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3664 if (!tsec)
3665 return -ENOMEM;
3666
3667 new->security = tsec;
3668 return 0;
3669 }
3670
3671 /*
3672 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3673 */
3674 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3675 {
3676 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3677 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3678
3679 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3680 }
3681
3682 /*
3683 * set the security data for a kernel service
3684 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3685 */
3686 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3687 {
3688 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3689 u32 sid = current_sid();
3690 int ret;
3691
3692 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3693 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3694 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3695 NULL);
3696 if (ret == 0) {
3697 tsec->sid = secid;
3698 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3699 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3700 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3701 }
3702 return ret;
3703 }
3704
3705 /*
3706 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3707 * objective context of the specified inode
3708 */
3709 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3710 {
3711 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3712 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3713 u32 sid = current_sid();
3714 int ret;
3715
3716 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3717 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3718 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3719 NULL);
3720
3721 if (ret == 0)
3722 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3723 return ret;
3724 }
3725
3726 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3727 {
3728 u32 sid;
3729 struct common_audit_data ad;
3730
3731 sid = task_sid(current);
3732
3733 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3734 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3735
3736 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3737 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3738 }
3739
3740 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
3741 {
3742 struct common_audit_data ad;
3743 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3744 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3745 u32 sid = current_sid();
3746 int rc;
3747
3748 /* init_module */
3749 if (file == NULL)
3750 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3751 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
3752
3753 /* finit_module */
3754
3755 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3756 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
3757
3758 fsec = file->f_security;
3759 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
3760 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
3761 if (rc)
3762 return rc;
3763 }
3764
3765 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3766 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3767 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
3768 }
3769
3770 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
3771 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
3772 {
3773 int rc = 0;
3774
3775 switch (id) {
3776 case READING_MODULE:
3777 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
3778 break;
3779 default:
3780 break;
3781 }
3782
3783 return rc;
3784 }
3785
3786 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3787 {
3788 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3789 }
3790
3791 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3792 {
3793 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3794 }
3795
3796 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3797 {
3798 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3799 }
3800
3801 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3802 {
3803 *secid = task_sid(p);
3804 }
3805
3806 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3807 {
3808 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3809 }
3810
3811 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3812 {
3813 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3814 }
3815
3816 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3817 {
3818 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3819 }
3820
3821 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3822 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3823 {
3824 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3825
3826 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3827 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3828 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3829 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3830 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3831 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3832
3833 return 0;
3834 }
3835
3836 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3837 {
3838 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3839 }
3840
3841 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3842 {
3843 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3844 }
3845
3846 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3847 {
3848 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3849 }
3850
3851 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3852 int sig, u32 secid)
3853 {
3854 u32 perm;
3855 int rc;
3856
3857 if (!sig)
3858 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3859 else
3860 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3861 if (secid)
3862 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3863 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3864 else
3865 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3866 return rc;
3867 }
3868
3869 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3870 {
3871 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3872 }
3873
3874 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3875 struct inode *inode)
3876 {
3877 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3878 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3879
3880 isec->sid = sid;
3881 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3882 }
3883
3884 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3885 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3886 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3887 {
3888 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3889 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3890
3891 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3892 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3893 if (ih == NULL)
3894 goto out;
3895
3896 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3897 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3898 goto out;
3899
3900 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3901 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3902 ret = 0;
3903
3904 if (proto)
3905 *proto = ih->protocol;
3906
3907 switch (ih->protocol) {
3908 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3909 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3910
3911 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3912 break;
3913
3914 offset += ihlen;
3915 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3916 if (th == NULL)
3917 break;
3918
3919 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3920 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3921 break;
3922 }
3923
3924 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3925 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3926
3927 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3928 break;
3929
3930 offset += ihlen;
3931 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3932 if (uh == NULL)
3933 break;
3934
3935 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3936 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3937 break;
3938 }
3939
3940 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3941 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3942
3943 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3944 break;
3945
3946 offset += ihlen;
3947 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3948 if (dh == NULL)
3949 break;
3950
3951 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3952 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3953 break;
3954 }
3955
3956 default:
3957 break;
3958 }
3959 out:
3960 return ret;
3961 }
3962
3963 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3964
3965 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3966 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3967 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3968 {
3969 u8 nexthdr;
3970 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3971 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3972 __be16 frag_off;
3973
3974 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3975 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3976 if (ip6 == NULL)
3977 goto out;
3978
3979 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3980 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3981 ret = 0;
3982
3983 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3984 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3985 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3986 if (offset < 0)
3987 goto out;
3988
3989 if (proto)
3990 *proto = nexthdr;
3991
3992 switch (nexthdr) {
3993 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3994 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3995
3996 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3997 if (th == NULL)
3998 break;
3999
4000 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4001 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4002 break;
4003 }
4004
4005 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4006 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4007
4008 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4009 if (uh == NULL)
4010 break;
4011
4012 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4013 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4014 break;
4015 }
4016
4017 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4018 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4019
4020 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4021 if (dh == NULL)
4022 break;
4023
4024 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4025 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4026 break;
4027 }
4028
4029 /* includes fragments */
4030 default:
4031 break;
4032 }
4033 out:
4034 return ret;
4035 }
4036
4037 #endif /* IPV6 */
4038
4039 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4040 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4041 {
4042 char *addrp;
4043 int ret;
4044
4045 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4046 case PF_INET:
4047 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4048 if (ret)
4049 goto parse_error;
4050 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4051 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4052 goto okay;
4053
4054 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4055 case PF_INET6:
4056 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4057 if (ret)
4058 goto parse_error;
4059 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4060 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4061 goto okay;
4062 #endif /* IPV6 */
4063 default:
4064 addrp = NULL;
4065 goto okay;
4066 }
4067
4068 parse_error:
4069 printk(KERN_WARNING
4070 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4071 " unable to parse packet\n");
4072 return ret;
4073
4074 okay:
4075 if (_addrp)
4076 *_addrp = addrp;
4077 return 0;
4078 }
4079
4080 /**
4081 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4082 * @skb: the packet
4083 * @family: protocol family
4084 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4085 *
4086 * Description:
4087 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4088 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4089 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4090 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4091 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4092 * peer labels.
4093 *
4094 */
4095 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4096 {
4097 int err;
4098 u32 xfrm_sid;
4099 u32 nlbl_sid;
4100 u32 nlbl_type;
4101
4102 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4103 if (unlikely(err))
4104 return -EACCES;
4105 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4106 if (unlikely(err))
4107 return -EACCES;
4108
4109 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4110 if (unlikely(err)) {
4111 printk(KERN_WARNING
4112 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4113 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4114 return -EACCES;
4115 }
4116
4117 return 0;
4118 }
4119
4120 /**
4121 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4122 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4123 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4124 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4125 *
4126 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4127 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4128 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4129 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4130 *
4131 */
4132 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4133 {
4134 int err = 0;
4135
4136 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4137 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
4138 else
4139 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4140
4141 return err;
4142 }
4143
4144 /* socket security operations */
4145
4146 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4147 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4148 {
4149 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4150 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4151 return 0;
4152 }
4153
4154 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
4155 socksid);
4156 }
4157
4158 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4159 {
4160 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4161 struct common_audit_data ad;
4162 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4163 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
4164
4165 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4166 return 0;
4167
4168 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4169 ad.u.net = &net;
4170 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4171
4172 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4173 }
4174
4175 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4176 int protocol, int kern)
4177 {
4178 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4179 u32 newsid;
4180 u16 secclass;
4181 int rc;
4182
4183 if (kern)
4184 return 0;
4185
4186 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4187 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4188 if (rc)
4189 return rc;
4190
4191 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4192 }
4193
4194 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4195 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4196 {
4197 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4198 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4199 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4200 int err = 0;
4201
4202 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4203
4204 if (kern)
4205 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4206 else {
4207 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4208 if (err)
4209 return err;
4210 }
4211
4212 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4213
4214 if (sock->sk) {
4215 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4216 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4217 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4218 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4219 }
4220
4221 return err;
4222 }
4223
4224 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4225 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4226 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4227
4228 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4229 {
4230 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4231 u16 family;
4232 int err;
4233
4234 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4235 if (err)
4236 goto out;
4237
4238 /*
4239 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4240 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4241 * check the first address now.
4242 */
4243 family = sk->sk_family;
4244 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4245 char *addrp;
4246 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4247 struct common_audit_data ad;
4248 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4249 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4250 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4251 unsigned short snum;
4252 u32 sid, node_perm;
4253
4254 if (family == PF_INET) {
4255 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4256 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4257 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4258 } else {
4259 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4260 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4261 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4262 }
4263
4264 if (snum) {
4265 int low, high;
4266
4267 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4268
4269 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4270 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4271 snum, &sid);
4272 if (err)
4273 goto out;
4274 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4275 ad.u.net = &net;
4276 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4277 ad.u.net->family = family;
4278 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4279 sksec->sclass,
4280 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4281 if (err)
4282 goto out;
4283 }
4284 }
4285
4286 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4287 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4288 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4289 break;
4290
4291 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4292 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4293 break;
4294
4295 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4296 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4297 break;
4298
4299 default:
4300 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4301 break;
4302 }
4303
4304 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4305 if (err)
4306 goto out;
4307
4308 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4309 ad.u.net = &net;
4310 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4311 ad.u.net->family = family;
4312
4313 if (family == PF_INET)
4314 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4315 else
4316 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4317
4318 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4319 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4320 if (err)
4321 goto out;
4322 }
4323 out:
4324 return err;
4325 }
4326
4327 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4328 {
4329 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4330 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4331 int err;
4332
4333 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4334 if (err)
4335 return err;
4336
4337 /*
4338 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4339 */
4340 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4341 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4342 struct common_audit_data ad;
4343 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4344 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4345 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4346 unsigned short snum;
4347 u32 sid, perm;
4348
4349 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4350 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4351 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4352 return -EINVAL;
4353 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4354 } else {
4355 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4356 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4357 return -EINVAL;
4358 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4359 }
4360
4361 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4362 if (err)
4363 goto out;
4364
4365 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4366 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4367
4368 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4369 ad.u.net = &net;
4370 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4371 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4372 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4373 if (err)
4374 goto out;
4375 }
4376
4377 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4378
4379 out:
4380 return err;
4381 }
4382
4383 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4384 {
4385 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4386 }
4387
4388 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4389 {
4390 int err;
4391 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4392 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4393
4394 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4395 if (err)
4396 return err;
4397
4398 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4399
4400 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4401 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4402 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4403 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4404
4405 return 0;
4406 }
4407
4408 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4409 int size)
4410 {
4411 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4412 }
4413
4414 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4415 int size, int flags)
4416 {
4417 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4418 }
4419
4420 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4421 {
4422 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4423 }
4424
4425 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4426 {
4427 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4428 }
4429
4430 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4431 {
4432 int err;
4433
4434 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4435 if (err)
4436 return err;
4437
4438 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4439 }
4440
4441 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4442 int optname)
4443 {
4444 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4445 }
4446
4447 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4448 {
4449 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4450 }
4451
4452 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4453 struct sock *other,
4454 struct sock *newsk)
4455 {
4456 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4457 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4458 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4459 struct common_audit_data ad;
4460 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4461 int err;
4462
4463 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4464 ad.u.net = &net;
4465 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4466
4467 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4468 sksec_other->sclass,
4469 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4470 if (err)
4471 return err;
4472
4473 /* server child socket */
4474 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4475 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4476 &sksec_new->sid);
4477 if (err)
4478 return err;
4479
4480 /* connecting socket */
4481 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4482
4483 return 0;
4484 }
4485
4486 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4487 struct socket *other)
4488 {
4489 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4490 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4491 struct common_audit_data ad;
4492 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4493
4494 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4495 ad.u.net = &net;
4496 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4497
4498 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4499 &ad);
4500 }
4501
4502 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4503 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4504 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4505 {
4506 int err;
4507 u32 if_sid;
4508 u32 node_sid;
4509
4510 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4511 if (err)
4512 return err;
4513 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4514 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4515 if (err)
4516 return err;
4517
4518 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4519 if (err)
4520 return err;
4521 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4522 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4523 }
4524
4525 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4526 u16 family)
4527 {
4528 int err = 0;
4529 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4530 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4531 struct common_audit_data ad;
4532 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4533 char *addrp;
4534
4535 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4536 ad.u.net = &net;
4537 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4538 ad.u.net->family = family;
4539 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4540 if (err)
4541 return err;
4542
4543 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4544 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4545 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4546 if (err)
4547 return err;
4548 }
4549
4550 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4551 if (err)
4552 return err;
4553 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4554
4555 return err;
4556 }
4557
4558 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4559 {
4560 int err;
4561 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4562 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4563 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4564 struct common_audit_data ad;
4565 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4566 char *addrp;
4567 u8 secmark_active;
4568 u8 peerlbl_active;
4569
4570 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4571 return 0;
4572
4573 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4574 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4575 family = PF_INET;
4576
4577 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4578 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4579 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4580 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4581 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4582 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4583
4584 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4585 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4586 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4587 return 0;
4588
4589 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4590 ad.u.net = &net;
4591 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4592 ad.u.net->family = family;
4593 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4594 if (err)
4595 return err;
4596
4597 if (peerlbl_active) {
4598 u32 peer_sid;
4599
4600 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4601 if (err)
4602 return err;
4603 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4604 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4605 if (err) {
4606 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4607 return err;
4608 }
4609 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4610 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4611 if (err) {
4612 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4613 return err;
4614 }
4615 }
4616
4617 if (secmark_active) {
4618 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4619 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4620 if (err)
4621 return err;
4622 }
4623
4624 return err;
4625 }
4626
4627 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4628 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4629 {
4630 int err = 0;
4631 char *scontext;
4632 u32 scontext_len;
4633 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4634 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4635
4636 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4637 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4638 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4639 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4640 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4641
4642 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4643 if (err)
4644 return err;
4645
4646 if (scontext_len > len) {
4647 err = -ERANGE;
4648 goto out_len;
4649 }
4650
4651 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4652 err = -EFAULT;
4653
4654 out_len:
4655 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4656 err = -EFAULT;
4657 kfree(scontext);
4658 return err;
4659 }
4660
4661 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4662 {
4663 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4664 u16 family;
4665 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4666
4667 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4668 family = PF_INET;
4669 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4670 family = PF_INET6;
4671 else if (sock)
4672 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4673 else
4674 goto out;
4675
4676 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
4677 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4678 peer_secid = isec->sid;
4679 } else if (skb)
4680 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4681
4682 out:
4683 *secid = peer_secid;
4684 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4685 return -EINVAL;
4686 return 0;
4687 }
4688
4689 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4690 {
4691 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4692
4693 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4694 if (!sksec)
4695 return -ENOMEM;
4696
4697 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4698 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4699 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
4700 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4701 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4702
4703 return 0;
4704 }
4705
4706 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4707 {
4708 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4709
4710 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4711 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4712 kfree(sksec);
4713 }
4714
4715 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4716 {
4717 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4718 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4719
4720 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4721 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4722 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4723
4724 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4725 }
4726
4727 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4728 {
4729 if (!sk)
4730 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4731 else {
4732 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4733
4734 *secid = sksec->sid;
4735 }
4736 }
4737
4738 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4739 {
4740 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
4741 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
4742 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4743
4744 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4745 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4746 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4747 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4748 }
4749
4750 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4751 struct request_sock *req)
4752 {
4753 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4754 int err;
4755 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4756 u32 connsid;
4757 u32 peersid;
4758
4759 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4760 if (err)
4761 return err;
4762 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4763 if (err)
4764 return err;
4765 req->secid = connsid;
4766 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4767
4768 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4769 }
4770
4771 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4772 const struct request_sock *req)
4773 {
4774 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4775
4776 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4777 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4778 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4779 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4780 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4781 time it will have been created and available. */
4782
4783 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4784 * thread with access to newsksec */
4785 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4786 }
4787
4788 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4789 {
4790 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4791 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4792
4793 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4794 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4795 family = PF_INET;
4796
4797 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4798 }
4799
4800 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4801 {
4802 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4803 u32 tsid;
4804
4805 __tsec = current_security();
4806 tsid = __tsec->sid;
4807
4808 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4809 }
4810
4811 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4812 {
4813 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4814 }
4815
4816 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4817 {
4818 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4819 }
4820
4821 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4822 struct flowi *fl)
4823 {
4824 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4825 }
4826
4827 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4828 {
4829 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4830
4831 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4832 if (!tunsec)
4833 return -ENOMEM;
4834 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4835
4836 *security = tunsec;
4837 return 0;
4838 }
4839
4840 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4841 {
4842 kfree(security);
4843 }
4844
4845 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4846 {
4847 u32 sid = current_sid();
4848
4849 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4850 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4851 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4852 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4853 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4854 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4855
4856 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4857 NULL);
4858 }
4859
4860 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4861 {
4862 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4863
4864 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4865 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4866 }
4867
4868 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4869 {
4870 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4871 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4872
4873 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4874 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4875 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4876 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4877 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4878 * protocols were being used */
4879
4880 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4881 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4882
4883 return 0;
4884 }
4885
4886 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4887 {
4888 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4889 u32 sid = current_sid();
4890 int err;
4891
4892 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4893 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4894 if (err)
4895 return err;
4896 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4897 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4898 if (err)
4899 return err;
4900 tunsec->sid = sid;
4901
4902 return 0;
4903 }
4904
4905 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4906 {
4907 int err = 0;
4908 u32 perm;
4909 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4910 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4911
4912 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4913 err = -EINVAL;
4914 goto out;
4915 }
4916 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4917
4918 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4919 if (err) {
4920 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4921 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
4922 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
4923 " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
4924 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
4925 secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
4926 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
4927 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4928 err = 0;
4929 }
4930
4931 /* Ignore */
4932 if (err == -ENOENT)
4933 err = 0;
4934 goto out;
4935 }
4936
4937 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4938 out:
4939 return err;
4940 }
4941
4942 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4943
4944 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4945 const struct net_device *indev,
4946 u16 family)
4947 {
4948 int err;
4949 char *addrp;
4950 u32 peer_sid;
4951 struct common_audit_data ad;
4952 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4953 u8 secmark_active;
4954 u8 netlbl_active;
4955 u8 peerlbl_active;
4956
4957 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4958 return NF_ACCEPT;
4959
4960 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4961 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4962 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4963 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4964 return NF_ACCEPT;
4965
4966 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4967 return NF_DROP;
4968
4969 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4970 ad.u.net = &net;
4971 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4972 ad.u.net->family = family;
4973 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4974 return NF_DROP;
4975
4976 if (peerlbl_active) {
4977 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4978 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4979 if (err) {
4980 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4981 return NF_DROP;
4982 }
4983 }
4984
4985 if (secmark_active)
4986 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4987 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4988 return NF_DROP;
4989
4990 if (netlbl_active)
4991 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4992 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4993 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4994 * protection */
4995 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4996 return NF_DROP;
4997
4998 return NF_ACCEPT;
4999 }
5000
5001 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5002 struct sk_buff *skb,
5003 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5004 {
5005 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5006 }
5007
5008 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5009 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5010 struct sk_buff *skb,
5011 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5012 {
5013 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5014 }
5015 #endif /* IPV6 */
5016
5017 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5018 u16 family)
5019 {
5020 struct sock *sk;
5021 u32 sid;
5022
5023 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5024 return NF_ACCEPT;
5025
5026 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5027 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5028 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5029 sk = skb->sk;
5030 if (sk) {
5031 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5032
5033 if (sk_listener(sk))
5034 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5035 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5036 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5037 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5038 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5039 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5040 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5041 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5042 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5043 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5044 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5045 * best we can do. */
5046 return NF_ACCEPT;
5047
5048 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5049 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5050 sid = sksec->sid;
5051 } else
5052 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5053 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5054 return NF_DROP;
5055
5056 return NF_ACCEPT;
5057 }
5058
5059 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5060 struct sk_buff *skb,
5061 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5062 {
5063 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5064 }
5065
5066 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5067 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5068 struct sk_buff *skb,
5069 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5070 {
5071 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5072 }
5073 #endif /* IPV6 */
5074
5075 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5076 int ifindex,
5077 u16 family)
5078 {
5079 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5080 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5081 struct common_audit_data ad;
5082 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5083 char *addrp;
5084 u8 proto;
5085
5086 if (sk == NULL)
5087 return NF_ACCEPT;
5088 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5089
5090 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5091 ad.u.net = &net;
5092 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5093 ad.u.net->family = family;
5094 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5095 return NF_DROP;
5096
5097 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5098 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5099 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5100 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5101
5102 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5103 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5104
5105 return NF_ACCEPT;
5106 }
5107
5108 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5109 const struct net_device *outdev,
5110 u16 family)
5111 {
5112 u32 secmark_perm;
5113 u32 peer_sid;
5114 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5115 struct sock *sk;
5116 struct common_audit_data ad;
5117 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5118 char *addrp;
5119 u8 secmark_active;
5120 u8 peerlbl_active;
5121
5122 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5123 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5124 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5125 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5126 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
5127 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5128
5129 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5130 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5131 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5132 return NF_ACCEPT;
5133
5134 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5135
5136 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5137 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5138 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5139 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5140 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5141 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5142 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5143 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5144 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5145 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5146 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5147 * connection. */
5148 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5149 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5150 return NF_ACCEPT;
5151 #endif
5152
5153 if (sk == NULL) {
5154 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5155 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5156 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5157 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5158 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5159 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5160 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5161 return NF_DROP;
5162 } else {
5163 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5164 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5165 }
5166 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5167 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5168 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5169 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5170 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5171 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5172 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5173 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5174 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5175 * for similar problems. */
5176 u32 skb_sid;
5177 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5178
5179 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5180 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5181 return NF_DROP;
5182 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5183 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5184 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5185 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5186 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5187 * pass the packet. */
5188 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5189 switch (family) {
5190 case PF_INET:
5191 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5192 return NF_ACCEPT;
5193 break;
5194 case PF_INET6:
5195 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5196 return NF_ACCEPT;
5197 break;
5198 default:
5199 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5200 }
5201 }
5202 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5203 return NF_DROP;
5204 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5205 } else {
5206 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5207 * associated socket. */
5208 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5209 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5210 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5211 }
5212
5213 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5214 ad.u.net = &net;
5215 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5216 ad.u.net->family = family;
5217 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5218 return NF_DROP;
5219
5220 if (secmark_active)
5221 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5222 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5223 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5224
5225 if (peerlbl_active) {
5226 u32 if_sid;
5227 u32 node_sid;
5228
5229 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5230 return NF_DROP;
5231 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5232 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5233 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5234
5235 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5236 return NF_DROP;
5237 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5238 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5239 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5240 }
5241
5242 return NF_ACCEPT;
5243 }
5244
5245 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5246 struct sk_buff *skb,
5247 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5248 {
5249 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5250 }
5251
5252 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5253 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5254 struct sk_buff *skb,
5255 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5256 {
5257 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5258 }
5259 #endif /* IPV6 */
5260
5261 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5262
5263 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5264 {
5265 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5266 }
5267
5268 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5269 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5270 u16 sclass)
5271 {
5272 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5273 u32 sid;
5274
5275 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5276 if (!isec)
5277 return -ENOMEM;
5278
5279 sid = task_sid(task);
5280 isec->sclass = sclass;
5281 isec->sid = sid;
5282 perm->security = isec;
5283
5284 return 0;
5285 }
5286
5287 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5288 {
5289 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5290 perm->security = NULL;
5291 kfree(isec);
5292 }
5293
5294 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5295 {
5296 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5297
5298 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5299 if (!msec)
5300 return -ENOMEM;
5301
5302 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5303 msg->security = msec;
5304
5305 return 0;
5306 }
5307
5308 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5309 {
5310 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5311
5312 msg->security = NULL;
5313 kfree(msec);
5314 }
5315
5316 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5317 u32 perms)
5318 {
5319 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5320 struct common_audit_data ad;
5321 u32 sid = current_sid();
5322
5323 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5324
5325 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5326 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5327
5328 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5329 }
5330
5331 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5332 {
5333 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5334 }
5335
5336 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5337 {
5338 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5339 }
5340
5341 /* message queue security operations */
5342 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5343 {
5344 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5345 struct common_audit_data ad;
5346 u32 sid = current_sid();
5347 int rc;
5348
5349 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5350 if (rc)
5351 return rc;
5352
5353 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5354
5355 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5356 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5357
5358 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5359 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
5360 if (rc) {
5361 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5362 return rc;
5363 }
5364 return 0;
5365 }
5366
5367 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5368 {
5369 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5370 }
5371
5372 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5373 {
5374 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5375 struct common_audit_data ad;
5376 u32 sid = current_sid();
5377
5378 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5379
5380 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5381 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5382
5383 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5384 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5385 }
5386
5387 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5388 {
5389 int err;
5390 int perms;
5391
5392 switch (cmd) {
5393 case IPC_INFO:
5394 case MSG_INFO:
5395 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5396 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5397 case IPC_STAT:
5398 case MSG_STAT:
5399 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5400 break;
5401 case IPC_SET:
5402 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5403 break;
5404 case IPC_RMID:
5405 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5406 break;
5407 default:
5408 return 0;
5409 }
5410
5411 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5412 return err;
5413 }
5414
5415 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5416 {
5417 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5418 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5419 struct common_audit_data ad;
5420 u32 sid = current_sid();
5421 int rc;
5422
5423 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5424 msec = msg->security;
5425
5426 /*
5427 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5428 */
5429 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5430 /*
5431 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5432 * message queue this message will be stored in
5433 */
5434 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5435 NULL, &msec->sid);
5436 if (rc)
5437 return rc;
5438 }
5439
5440 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5441 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5442
5443 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5444 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5445 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
5446 if (!rc)
5447 /* Can this process send the message */
5448 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5449 MSG__SEND, &ad);
5450 if (!rc)
5451 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5452 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5453 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5454
5455 return rc;
5456 }
5457
5458 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5459 struct task_struct *target,
5460 long type, int mode)
5461 {
5462 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5463 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5464 struct common_audit_data ad;
5465 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5466 int rc;
5467
5468 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5469 msec = msg->security;
5470
5471 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5472 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5473
5474 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5475 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5476 if (!rc)
5477 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5478 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5479 return rc;
5480 }
5481
5482 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5483 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5484 {
5485 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5486 struct common_audit_data ad;
5487 u32 sid = current_sid();
5488 int rc;
5489
5490 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5491 if (rc)
5492 return rc;
5493
5494 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5495
5496 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5497 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5498
5499 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5500 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
5501 if (rc) {
5502 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5503 return rc;
5504 }
5505 return 0;
5506 }
5507
5508 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5509 {
5510 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5511 }
5512
5513 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5514 {
5515 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5516 struct common_audit_data ad;
5517 u32 sid = current_sid();
5518
5519 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5520
5521 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5522 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5523
5524 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5525 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5526 }
5527
5528 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5529 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5530 {
5531 int perms;
5532 int err;
5533
5534 switch (cmd) {
5535 case IPC_INFO:
5536 case SHM_INFO:
5537 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5538 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5539 case IPC_STAT:
5540 case SHM_STAT:
5541 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5542 break;
5543 case IPC_SET:
5544 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5545 break;
5546 case SHM_LOCK:
5547 case SHM_UNLOCK:
5548 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5549 break;
5550 case IPC_RMID:
5551 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5552 break;
5553 default:
5554 return 0;
5555 }
5556
5557 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5558 return err;
5559 }
5560
5561 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5562 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5563 {
5564 u32 perms;
5565
5566 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5567 perms = SHM__READ;
5568 else
5569 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5570
5571 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5572 }
5573
5574 /* Semaphore security operations */
5575 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5576 {
5577 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5578 struct common_audit_data ad;
5579 u32 sid = current_sid();
5580 int rc;
5581
5582 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5583 if (rc)
5584 return rc;
5585
5586 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5587
5588 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5589 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5590
5591 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5592 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5593 if (rc) {
5594 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5595 return rc;
5596 }
5597 return 0;
5598 }
5599
5600 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5601 {
5602 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5603 }
5604
5605 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5606 {
5607 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5608 struct common_audit_data ad;
5609 u32 sid = current_sid();
5610
5611 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5612
5613 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5614 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5615
5616 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5617 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5618 }
5619
5620 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5621 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5622 {
5623 int err;
5624 u32 perms;
5625
5626 switch (cmd) {
5627 case IPC_INFO:
5628 case SEM_INFO:
5629 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5630 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5631 case GETPID:
5632 case GETNCNT:
5633 case GETZCNT:
5634 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5635 break;
5636 case GETVAL:
5637 case GETALL:
5638 perms = SEM__READ;
5639 break;
5640 case SETVAL:
5641 case SETALL:
5642 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5643 break;
5644 case IPC_RMID:
5645 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5646 break;
5647 case IPC_SET:
5648 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5649 break;
5650 case IPC_STAT:
5651 case SEM_STAT:
5652 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5653 break;
5654 default:
5655 return 0;
5656 }
5657
5658 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5659 return err;
5660 }
5661
5662 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5663 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5664 {
5665 u32 perms;
5666
5667 if (alter)
5668 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5669 else
5670 perms = SEM__READ;
5671
5672 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5673 }
5674
5675 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5676 {
5677 u32 av = 0;
5678
5679 av = 0;
5680 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5681 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5682 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5683 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5684
5685 if (av == 0)
5686 return 0;
5687
5688 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5689 }
5690
5691 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5692 {
5693 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5694 *secid = isec->sid;
5695 }
5696
5697 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5698 {
5699 if (inode)
5700 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5701 }
5702
5703 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5704 char *name, char **value)
5705 {
5706 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5707 u32 sid;
5708 int error;
5709 unsigned len;
5710
5711 if (current != p) {
5712 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5713 if (error)
5714 return error;
5715 }
5716
5717 rcu_read_lock();
5718 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5719
5720 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5721 sid = __tsec->sid;
5722 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5723 sid = __tsec->osid;
5724 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5725 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5726 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5727 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5728 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5729 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5730 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5731 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5732 else
5733 goto invalid;
5734 rcu_read_unlock();
5735
5736 if (!sid)
5737 return 0;
5738
5739 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5740 if (error)
5741 return error;
5742 return len;
5743
5744 invalid:
5745 rcu_read_unlock();
5746 return -EINVAL;
5747 }
5748
5749 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5750 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5751 {
5752 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5753 struct cred *new;
5754 u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5755 int error;
5756 char *str = value;
5757
5758 if (current != p) {
5759 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5760 security attributes. */
5761 return -EACCES;
5762 }
5763
5764 /*
5765 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5766 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5767 * above restriction is ever removed.
5768 */
5769 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5770 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5771 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5772 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5773 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5774 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5775 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5776 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5777 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5778 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5779 else
5780 error = -EINVAL;
5781 if (error)
5782 return error;
5783
5784 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5785 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5786 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5787 str[size-1] = 0;
5788 size--;
5789 }
5790 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5791 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5792 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5793 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5794 size_t audit_size;
5795
5796 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5797 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5798 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5799 audit_size = size - 1;
5800 else
5801 audit_size = size;
5802 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5803 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5804 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5805 audit_log_end(ab);
5806
5807 return error;
5808 }
5809 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5810 &sid);
5811 }
5812 if (error)
5813 return error;
5814 }
5815
5816 new = prepare_creds();
5817 if (!new)
5818 return -ENOMEM;
5819
5820 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5821 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5822 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5823 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5824 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5825 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5826 tsec = new->security;
5827 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5828 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5829 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5830 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5831 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5832 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5833 if (error)
5834 goto abort_change;
5835 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5836 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5837 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5838 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5839 error = -EINVAL;
5840 if (sid == 0)
5841 goto abort_change;
5842
5843 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5844 error = -EPERM;
5845 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5846 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5847 if (error)
5848 goto abort_change;
5849 }
5850
5851 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5852 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5853 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5854 if (error)
5855 goto abort_change;
5856
5857 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5858 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5859 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(p);
5860 if (ptsid != 0) {
5861 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5862 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5863 if (error)
5864 goto abort_change;
5865 }
5866
5867 tsec->sid = sid;
5868 } else {
5869 error = -EINVAL;
5870 goto abort_change;
5871 }
5872
5873 commit_creds(new);
5874 return size;
5875
5876 abort_change:
5877 abort_creds(new);
5878 return error;
5879 }
5880
5881 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5882 {
5883 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5884 }
5885
5886 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5887 {
5888 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5889 }
5890
5891 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5892 {
5893 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5894 }
5895
5896 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5897 {
5898 kfree(secdata);
5899 }
5900
5901 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
5902 {
5903 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
5904
5905 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
5906 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
5907 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
5908 }
5909
5910 /*
5911 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5912 */
5913 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5914 {
5915 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5916 }
5917
5918 /*
5919 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5920 */
5921 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5922 {
5923 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5924 }
5925
5926 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5927 {
5928 int len = 0;
5929 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5930 ctx, true);
5931 if (len < 0)
5932 return len;
5933 *ctxlen = len;
5934 return 0;
5935 }
5936 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5937
5938 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5939 unsigned long flags)
5940 {
5941 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5942 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5943
5944 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5945 if (!ksec)
5946 return -ENOMEM;
5947
5948 tsec = cred->security;
5949 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5950 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5951 else
5952 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5953
5954 k->security = ksec;
5955 return 0;
5956 }
5957
5958 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5959 {
5960 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5961
5962 k->security = NULL;
5963 kfree(ksec);
5964 }
5965
5966 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5967 const struct cred *cred,
5968 unsigned perm)
5969 {
5970 struct key *key;
5971 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5972 u32 sid;
5973
5974 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5975 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5976 appear to be created. */
5977 if (perm == 0)
5978 return 0;
5979
5980 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5981
5982 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5983 ksec = key->security;
5984
5985 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5986 }
5987
5988 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5989 {
5990 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5991 char *context = NULL;
5992 unsigned len;
5993 int rc;
5994
5995 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5996 if (!rc)
5997 rc = len;
5998 *_buffer = context;
5999 return rc;
6000 }
6001
6002 #endif
6003
6004 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
6005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6009
6010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6019
6020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6021
6022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
6023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, selinux_bprm_secureexec),
6026
6027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
6028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
6029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
6030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6032 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
6039
6040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6041
6042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
6043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
6044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
6045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
6046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
6047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
6048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
6049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
6050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
6051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
6052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
6053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
6054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
6055 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
6056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
6057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
6058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
6059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
6060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
6061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
6062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
6063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
6064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
6065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
6066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
6067
6068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
6069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
6070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
6071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
6072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
6073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
6074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
6075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
6076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
6077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
6078 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
6079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
6080
6081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
6082
6083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create, selinux_task_create),
6084 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
6085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
6086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
6087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
6088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
6089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
6090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
6091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
6092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
6093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
6094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
6095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
6096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
6097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
6098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
6099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
6100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
6101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
6102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
6103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
6104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait),
6105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
6106
6107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
6108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
6109
6110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
6111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
6112
6113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
6114 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
6115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
6116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
6117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
6118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
6119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
6120
6121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
6122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
6123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
6124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
6125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
6126
6127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
6128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
6129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
6130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
6131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
6132
6133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
6134
6135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
6136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
6137
6138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
6139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
6140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
6141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
6142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
6143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
6144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
6145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
6146
6147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
6148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
6149
6150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
6151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
6152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
6153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
6154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
6155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
6156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
6157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
6158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
6159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
6160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
6161 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
6162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
6163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
6164 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
6165 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
6166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
6167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
6168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
6169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
6170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
6171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
6172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
6173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
6174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
6175 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
6176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
6177 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
6178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
6179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
6180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
6181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
6182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
6183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
6184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
6185
6186 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
6188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
6189 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
6190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
6191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
6192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
6193 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
6194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
6195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
6196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
6197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
6198 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
6199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
6200 #endif
6201
6202 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
6204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
6205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
6206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
6207 #endif
6208
6209 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
6210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
6211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
6212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
6213 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
6214 #endif
6215 };
6216
6217 static __init int selinux_init(void)
6218 {
6219 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
6220 selinux_enabled = 0;
6221 return 0;
6222 }
6223
6224 if (!selinux_enabled) {
6225 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6226 return 0;
6227 }
6228
6229 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6230
6231 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6232 cred_init_security();
6233
6234 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6235
6236 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6237 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6238 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6239 file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
6240 sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6241 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6242 avc_init();
6243
6244 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
6245
6246 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6247 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6248
6249 if (selinux_enforcing)
6250 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6251 else
6252 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6253
6254 return 0;
6255 }
6256
6257 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6258 {
6259 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6260 }
6261
6262 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6263 {
6264 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6265
6266 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6267 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6268 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6269 }
6270
6271 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6272 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6273 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6274
6275 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6276
6277 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6278 {
6279 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6280 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
6281 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6282 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6283 },
6284 {
6285 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6286 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
6287 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6288 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6289 },
6290 {
6291 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6292 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
6293 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6294 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6295 },
6296 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6297 {
6298 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6299 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
6300 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6301 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6302 },
6303 {
6304 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6305 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
6306 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6307 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6308 },
6309 {
6310 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
6311 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
6312 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6313 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6314 },
6315 #endif /* IPV6 */
6316 };
6317
6318 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6319 {
6320 int err;
6321
6322 if (!selinux_enabled)
6323 return 0;
6324
6325 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6326
6327 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6328 if (err)
6329 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6330
6331 return 0;
6332 }
6333
6334 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6335
6336 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6337 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6338 {
6339 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6340
6341 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6342 }
6343 #endif
6344
6345 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6346
6347 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6348 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6349 #endif
6350
6351 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6352
6353 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6354 static int selinux_disabled;
6355
6356 int selinux_disable(void)
6357 {
6358 if (ss_initialized) {
6359 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6360 return -EINVAL;
6361 }
6362
6363 if (selinux_disabled) {
6364 /* Only do this once. */
6365 return -EINVAL;
6366 }
6367
6368 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6369
6370 selinux_disabled = 1;
6371 selinux_enabled = 0;
6372
6373 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
6374
6375 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6376 avc_disable();
6377
6378 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6379 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6380
6381 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
6382 exit_sel_fs();
6383
6384 return 0;
6385 }
6386 #endif
Linux kernel - Deliverables
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