2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
31 * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
33 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
34 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
35 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
36 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
37 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
38 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
39 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
40 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
43 #include <linux/slab.h>
44 #include <linux/string.h>
45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
47 #include <linux/errno.h>
49 #include <linux/sched.h>
50 #include <linux/audit.h>
51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
53 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
54 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
65 #include "conditional.h"
73 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno
);
75 int selinux_policycap_netpeer
;
76 int selinux_policycap_openperm
;
78 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock
);
80 static struct sidtab sidtab
;
81 struct policydb policydb
;
85 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
86 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
87 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
90 static u32 latest_granting
;
92 /* Forward declaration. */
93 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context
*context
, char **scontext
,
96 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context
*scontext
,
97 struct context
*tcontext
,
99 struct av_decision
*avd
);
101 struct selinux_mapping
{
102 u16 value
; /* policy value */
104 u32 perms
[sizeof(u32
) * 8];
107 static struct selinux_mapping
*current_mapping
;
108 static u16 current_mapping_size
;
110 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb
*pol
,
111 struct security_class_mapping
*map
,
112 struct selinux_mapping
**out_map_p
,
115 struct selinux_mapping
*out_map
= NULL
;
116 size_t size
= sizeof(struct selinux_mapping
);
119 bool print_unknown_handle
= false;
121 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
128 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
129 out_map
= kcalloc(++i
, size
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
133 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
135 while (map
[j
].name
) {
136 struct security_class_mapping
*p_in
= map
+ (j
++);
137 struct selinux_mapping
*p_out
= out_map
+ j
;
139 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
140 if (!strcmp(p_in
->name
, "")) {
141 p_out
->num_perms
= 0;
145 p_out
->value
= string_to_security_class(pol
, p_in
->name
);
148 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
150 if (pol
->reject_unknown
)
152 p_out
->num_perms
= 0;
153 print_unknown_handle
= true;
158 while (p_in
->perms
&& p_in
->perms
[k
]) {
159 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
160 if (!*p_in
->perms
[k
]) {
164 p_out
->perms
[k
] = string_to_av_perm(pol
, p_out
->value
,
166 if (!p_out
->perms
[k
]) {
168 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
169 p_in
->perms
[k
], p_in
->name
);
170 if (pol
->reject_unknown
)
172 print_unknown_handle
= true;
177 p_out
->num_perms
= k
;
180 if (print_unknown_handle
)
181 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
182 pol
->allow_unknown
? "allowed" : "denied");
184 *out_map_p
= out_map
;
193 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
196 static u16
unmap_class(u16 tclass
)
198 if (tclass
< current_mapping_size
)
199 return current_mapping
[tclass
].value
;
204 static void map_decision(u16 tclass
, struct av_decision
*avd
,
207 if (tclass
< current_mapping_size
) {
208 unsigned i
, n
= current_mapping
[tclass
].num_perms
;
211 for (i
= 0, result
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
212 if (avd
->allowed
& current_mapping
[tclass
].perms
[i
])
214 if (allow_unknown
&& !current_mapping
[tclass
].perms
[i
])
217 avd
->allowed
= result
;
219 for (i
= 0, result
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
220 if (avd
->auditallow
& current_mapping
[tclass
].perms
[i
])
222 avd
->auditallow
= result
;
224 for (i
= 0, result
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
225 if (avd
->auditdeny
& current_mapping
[tclass
].perms
[i
])
227 if (!allow_unknown
&& !current_mapping
[tclass
].perms
[i
])
231 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
232 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
233 * should audit that denial
235 for (; i
< (sizeof(u32
)*8); i
++)
237 avd
->auditdeny
= result
;
241 int security_mls_enabled(void)
243 return policydb
.mls_enabled
;
247 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
248 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
251 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
252 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
253 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
254 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
255 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
257 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context
*scontext
,
258 struct context
*tcontext
,
259 struct context
*xcontext
,
260 struct constraint_expr
*cexpr
)
264 struct role_datum
*r1
, *r2
;
265 struct mls_level
*l1
, *l2
;
266 struct constraint_expr
*e
;
267 int s
[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH
];
270 for (e
= cexpr
; e
; e
= e
->next
) {
271 switch (e
->expr_type
) {
287 if (sp
== (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH
- 1))
291 val1
= scontext
->user
;
292 val2
= tcontext
->user
;
295 val1
= scontext
->type
;
296 val2
= tcontext
->type
;
299 val1
= scontext
->role
;
300 val2
= tcontext
->role
;
301 r1
= policydb
.role_val_to_struct
[val1
- 1];
302 r2
= policydb
.role_val_to_struct
[val2
- 1];
305 s
[++sp
] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1
->dominates
,
309 s
[++sp
] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2
->dominates
,
313 s
[++sp
] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1
->dominates
,
315 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2
->dominates
,
323 l1
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[0]);
324 l2
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[0]);
327 l1
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[0]);
328 l2
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[1]);
331 l1
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[1]);
332 l2
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[0]);
335 l1
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[1]);
336 l2
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[1]);
339 l1
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[0]);
340 l2
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[1]);
343 l1
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[0]);
344 l2
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[1]);
349 s
[++sp
] = mls_level_eq(l1
, l2
);
352 s
[++sp
] = !mls_level_eq(l1
, l2
);
355 s
[++sp
] = mls_level_dom(l1
, l2
);
358 s
[++sp
] = mls_level_dom(l2
, l1
);
361 s
[++sp
] = mls_level_incomp(l2
, l1
);
375 s
[++sp
] = (val1
== val2
);
378 s
[++sp
] = (val1
!= val2
);
386 if (sp
== (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH
-1))
389 if (e
->attr
& CEXPR_TARGET
)
391 else if (e
->attr
& CEXPR_XTARGET
) {
398 if (e
->attr
& CEXPR_USER
)
400 else if (e
->attr
& CEXPR_ROLE
)
402 else if (e
->attr
& CEXPR_TYPE
)
411 s
[++sp
] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e
->names
, val1
- 1);
414 s
[++sp
] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e
->names
, val1
- 1);
432 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
433 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
435 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k
, void *d
, void *args
)
437 struct perm_datum
*pdatum
= d
;
438 char **permission_names
= args
;
440 BUG_ON(pdatum
->value
< 1 || pdatum
->value
> 32);
442 permission_names
[pdatum
->value
- 1] = (char *)k
;
447 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context
*scontext
,
448 struct context
*tcontext
,
453 struct common_datum
*common_dat
;
454 struct class_datum
*tclass_dat
;
455 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
457 char *scontext_name
= NULL
;
458 char *tcontext_name
= NULL
;
459 char *permission_names
[32];
462 bool need_comma
= false;
467 tclass_name
= policydb
.p_class_val_to_name
[tclass
- 1];
468 tclass_dat
= policydb
.class_val_to_struct
[tclass
- 1];
469 common_dat
= tclass_dat
->comdatum
;
471 /* init permission_names */
473 hashtab_map(common_dat
->permissions
.table
,
474 dump_masked_av_helper
, permission_names
) < 0)
477 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat
->permissions
.table
,
478 dump_masked_av_helper
, permission_names
) < 0)
481 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
482 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext
,
483 &scontext_name
, &length
) < 0)
486 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext
,
487 &tcontext_name
, &length
) < 0)
490 /* audit a message */
491 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
,
492 GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
496 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
497 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
498 reason
, scontext_name
, tcontext_name
, tclass_name
);
500 for (index
= 0; index
< 32; index
++) {
501 u32 mask
= (1 << index
);
503 if ((mask
& permissions
) == 0)
506 audit_log_format(ab
, "%s%s",
507 need_comma
? "," : "",
508 permission_names
[index
]
509 ? permission_names
[index
] : "????");
514 /* release scontext/tcontext */
515 kfree(tcontext_name
);
516 kfree(scontext_name
);
522 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
523 * on boundary constraint.
525 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context
*scontext
,
526 struct context
*tcontext
,
528 struct av_decision
*avd
)
530 struct context lo_scontext
;
531 struct context lo_tcontext
;
532 struct av_decision lo_avd
;
533 struct type_datum
*source
534 = policydb
.type_val_to_struct
[scontext
->type
- 1];
535 struct type_datum
*target
536 = policydb
.type_val_to_struct
[tcontext
->type
- 1];
539 if (source
->bounds
) {
540 memset(&lo_avd
, 0, sizeof(lo_avd
));
542 memcpy(&lo_scontext
, scontext
, sizeof(lo_scontext
));
543 lo_scontext
.type
= source
->bounds
;
545 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext
,
549 if ((lo_avd
.allowed
& avd
->allowed
) == avd
->allowed
)
550 return; /* no masked permission */
551 masked
= ~lo_avd
.allowed
& avd
->allowed
;
554 if (target
->bounds
) {
555 memset(&lo_avd
, 0, sizeof(lo_avd
));
557 memcpy(&lo_tcontext
, tcontext
, sizeof(lo_tcontext
));
558 lo_tcontext
.type
= target
->bounds
;
560 context_struct_compute_av(scontext
,
564 if ((lo_avd
.allowed
& avd
->allowed
) == avd
->allowed
)
565 return; /* no masked permission */
566 masked
= ~lo_avd
.allowed
& avd
->allowed
;
569 if (source
->bounds
&& target
->bounds
) {
570 memset(&lo_avd
, 0, sizeof(lo_avd
));
572 * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
576 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext
,
580 if ((lo_avd
.allowed
& avd
->allowed
) == avd
->allowed
)
581 return; /* no masked permission */
582 masked
= ~lo_avd
.allowed
& avd
->allowed
;
586 /* mask violated permissions */
587 avd
->allowed
&= ~masked
;
589 /* audit masked permissions */
590 security_dump_masked_av(scontext
, tcontext
,
591 tclass
, masked
, "bounds");
596 * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
597 * the permissions in a particular class.
599 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context
*scontext
,
600 struct context
*tcontext
,
602 struct av_decision
*avd
)
604 struct constraint_node
*constraint
;
605 struct role_allow
*ra
;
606 struct avtab_key avkey
;
607 struct avtab_node
*node
;
608 struct class_datum
*tclass_datum
;
609 struct ebitmap
*sattr
, *tattr
;
610 struct ebitmap_node
*snode
, *tnode
;
615 avd
->auditdeny
= 0xffffffff;
617 if (unlikely(!tclass
|| tclass
> policydb
.p_classes
.nprim
)) {
618 if (printk_ratelimit())
619 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass
);
623 tclass_datum
= policydb
.class_val_to_struct
[tclass
- 1];
626 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
627 * this permission check, then use it.
629 avkey
.target_class
= tclass
;
630 avkey
.specified
= AVTAB_AV
;
631 sattr
= flex_array_get(policydb
.type_attr_map_array
, scontext
->type
- 1);
633 tattr
= flex_array_get(policydb
.type_attr_map_array
, tcontext
->type
- 1);
635 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr
, snode
, i
) {
636 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr
, tnode
, j
) {
637 avkey
.source_type
= i
+ 1;
638 avkey
.target_type
= j
+ 1;
639 for (node
= avtab_search_node(&policydb
.te_avtab
, &avkey
);
641 node
= avtab_search_node_next(node
, avkey
.specified
)) {
642 if (node
->key
.specified
== AVTAB_ALLOWED
)
643 avd
->allowed
|= node
->datum
.data
;
644 else if (node
->key
.specified
== AVTAB_AUDITALLOW
)
645 avd
->auditallow
|= node
->datum
.data
;
646 else if (node
->key
.specified
== AVTAB_AUDITDENY
)
647 avd
->auditdeny
&= node
->datum
.data
;
650 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
651 cond_compute_av(&policydb
.te_cond_avtab
, &avkey
, avd
);
657 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
660 constraint
= tclass_datum
->constraints
;
662 if ((constraint
->permissions
& (avd
->allowed
)) &&
663 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext
, tcontext
, NULL
,
665 avd
->allowed
&= ~(constraint
->permissions
);
667 constraint
= constraint
->next
;
671 * If checking process transition permission and the
672 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
675 if (tclass
== policydb
.process_class
&&
676 (avd
->allowed
& policydb
.process_trans_perms
) &&
677 scontext
->role
!= tcontext
->role
) {
678 for (ra
= policydb
.role_allow
; ra
; ra
= ra
->next
) {
679 if (scontext
->role
== ra
->role
&&
680 tcontext
->role
== ra
->new_role
)
684 avd
->allowed
&= ~policydb
.process_trans_perms
;
688 * If the given source and target types have boundary
689 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
690 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
692 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext
, tcontext
,
696 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context
*ocontext
,
697 struct context
*ncontext
,
698 struct context
*tcontext
,
701 char *o
= NULL
, *n
= NULL
, *t
= NULL
;
702 u32 olen
, nlen
, tlen
;
704 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext
, &o
, &olen
) < 0)
706 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext
, &n
, &nlen
) < 0)
708 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext
, &t
, &tlen
) < 0)
710 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
711 "security_validate_transition: denied for"
712 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
713 o
, n
, t
, policydb
.p_class_val_to_name
[tclass
-1]);
719 if (!selinux_enforcing
)
724 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid
, u32 newsid
, u32 tasksid
,
727 struct context
*ocontext
;
728 struct context
*ncontext
;
729 struct context
*tcontext
;
730 struct class_datum
*tclass_datum
;
731 struct constraint_node
*constraint
;
738 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
740 tclass
= unmap_class(orig_tclass
);
742 if (!tclass
|| tclass
> policydb
.p_classes
.nprim
) {
743 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n",
748 tclass_datum
= policydb
.class_val_to_struct
[tclass
- 1];
750 ocontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, oldsid
);
752 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
758 ncontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, newsid
);
760 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
766 tcontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, tasksid
);
768 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
774 constraint
= tclass_datum
->validatetrans
;
776 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext
, ncontext
, tcontext
,
778 rc
= security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext
, ncontext
,
782 constraint
= constraint
->next
;
786 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
791 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
792 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
793 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
794 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
796 * @oldsid : current security identifier
797 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
799 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
801 struct context
*old_context
, *new_context
;
802 struct type_datum
*type
;
806 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
808 old_context
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, old_sid
);
810 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
815 new_context
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, new_sid
);
817 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
822 /* type/domain unchanged */
823 if (old_context
->type
== new_context
->type
) {
828 index
= new_context
->type
;
830 type
= policydb
.type_val_to_struct
[index
- 1];
833 /* not bounded anymore */
839 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
840 if (type
->bounds
== old_context
->type
) {
844 index
= type
->bounds
;
848 char *old_name
= NULL
;
849 char *new_name
= NULL
;
852 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context
,
853 &old_name
, &length
) &&
854 !context_struct_to_string(new_context
,
855 &new_name
, &length
)) {
856 audit_log(current
->audit_context
,
857 GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
858 "op=security_bounded_transition "
860 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
867 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
872 static void avd_init(struct av_decision
*avd
)
876 avd
->auditdeny
= 0xffffffff;
877 avd
->seqno
= latest_granting
;
883 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
884 * @ssid: source security identifier
885 * @tsid: target security identifier
886 * @tclass: target security class
887 * @avd: access vector decisions
889 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
890 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
892 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid
,
895 struct av_decision
*avd
)
898 struct context
*scontext
= NULL
, *tcontext
= NULL
;
900 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
905 scontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, ssid
);
907 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
912 /* permissive domain? */
913 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb
.permissive_map
, scontext
->type
))
914 avd
->flags
|= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE
;
916 tcontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, tsid
);
918 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
923 tclass
= unmap_class(orig_tclass
);
924 if (unlikely(orig_tclass
&& !tclass
)) {
925 if (policydb
.allow_unknown
)
929 context_struct_compute_av(scontext
, tcontext
, tclass
, avd
);
930 map_decision(orig_tclass
, avd
, policydb
.allow_unknown
);
932 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
935 avd
->allowed
= 0xffffffff;
939 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid
,
942 struct av_decision
*avd
)
944 struct context
*scontext
= NULL
, *tcontext
= NULL
;
946 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
951 scontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, ssid
);
953 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
958 /* permissive domain? */
959 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb
.permissive_map
, scontext
->type
))
960 avd
->flags
|= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE
;
962 tcontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, tsid
);
964 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
969 if (unlikely(!tclass
)) {
970 if (policydb
.allow_unknown
)
975 context_struct_compute_av(scontext
, tcontext
, tclass
, avd
);
977 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
980 avd
->allowed
= 0xffffffff;
985 * Write the security context string representation of
986 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
987 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
988 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
989 * the length of the string.
991 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context
*context
, char **scontext
, u32
*scontext_len
)
1000 *scontext_len
= context
->len
;
1001 *scontext
= kstrdup(context
->str
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
1007 /* Compute the size of the context. */
1008 *scontext_len
+= strlen(policydb
.p_user_val_to_name
[context
->user
- 1]) + 1;
1009 *scontext_len
+= strlen(policydb
.p_role_val_to_name
[context
->role
- 1]) + 1;
1010 *scontext_len
+= strlen(policydb
.p_type_val_to_name
[context
->type
- 1]) + 1;
1011 *scontext_len
+= mls_compute_context_len(context
);
1016 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1017 scontextp
= kmalloc(*scontext_len
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
1020 *scontext
= scontextp
;
1023 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1025 sprintf(scontextp
, "%s:%s:%s",
1026 policydb
.p_user_val_to_name
[context
->user
- 1],
1027 policydb
.p_role_val_to_name
[context
->role
- 1],
1028 policydb
.p_type_val_to_name
[context
->type
- 1]);
1029 scontextp
+= strlen(policydb
.p_user_val_to_name
[context
->user
- 1]) +
1030 1 + strlen(policydb
.p_role_val_to_name
[context
->role
- 1]) +
1031 1 + strlen(policydb
.p_type_val_to_name
[context
->type
- 1]);
1033 mls_sid_to_context(context
, &scontextp
);
1040 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1042 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid
)
1044 if (unlikely(sid
> SECINITSID_NUM
))
1046 return initial_sid_to_string
[sid
];
1049 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid
, char **scontext
,
1050 u32
*scontext_len
, int force
)
1052 struct context
*context
;
1059 if (!ss_initialized
) {
1060 if (sid
<= SECINITSID_NUM
) {
1063 *scontext_len
= strlen(initial_sid_to_string
[sid
]) + 1;
1066 scontextp
= kmalloc(*scontext_len
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
1071 strcpy(scontextp
, initial_sid_to_string
[sid
]);
1072 *scontext
= scontextp
;
1075 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1076 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__
, sid
);
1080 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1082 context
= sidtab_search_force(&sidtab
, sid
);
1084 context
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, sid
);
1086 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1091 rc
= context_struct_to_string(context
, scontext
, scontext_len
);
1093 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1100 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1101 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1102 * @scontext: security context
1103 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1105 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1106 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1107 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1109 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid
, char **scontext
, u32
*scontext_len
)
1111 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid
, scontext
, scontext_len
, 0);
1114 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid
, char **scontext
, u32
*scontext_len
)
1116 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid
, scontext
, scontext_len
, 1);
1120 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1122 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb
*pol
,
1123 struct sidtab
*sidtabp
,
1126 struct context
*ctx
,
1129 struct role_datum
*role
;
1130 struct type_datum
*typdatum
;
1131 struct user_datum
*usrdatum
;
1132 char *scontextp
, *p
, oldc
;
1137 /* Parse the security context. */
1140 scontextp
= (char *) scontext
;
1142 /* Extract the user. */
1144 while (*p
&& *p
!= ':')
1152 usrdatum
= hashtab_search(pol
->p_users
.table
, scontextp
);
1156 ctx
->user
= usrdatum
->value
;
1160 while (*p
&& *p
!= ':')
1168 role
= hashtab_search(pol
->p_roles
.table
, scontextp
);
1171 ctx
->role
= role
->value
;
1175 while (*p
&& *p
!= ':')
1180 typdatum
= hashtab_search(pol
->p_types
.table
, scontextp
);
1181 if (!typdatum
|| typdatum
->attribute
)
1184 ctx
->type
= typdatum
->value
;
1186 rc
= mls_context_to_sid(pol
, oldc
, &p
, ctx
, sidtabp
, def_sid
);
1190 if ((p
- scontext
) < scontext_len
) {
1195 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1196 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol
, ctx
)) {
1203 context_destroy(ctx
);
1207 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext
, u32 scontext_len
,
1208 u32
*sid
, u32 def_sid
, gfp_t gfp_flags
,
1211 char *scontext2
, *str
= NULL
;
1212 struct context context
;
1215 if (!ss_initialized
) {
1218 for (i
= 1; i
< SECINITSID_NUM
; i
++) {
1219 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string
[i
], scontext
)) {
1224 *sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
1229 /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
1230 scontext2
= kmalloc(scontext_len
+ 1, gfp_flags
);
1233 memcpy(scontext2
, scontext
, scontext_len
);
1234 scontext2
[scontext_len
] = 0;
1237 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1238 str
= kstrdup(scontext2
, gfp_flags
);
1245 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1246 rc
= string_to_context_struct(&policydb
, &sidtab
,
1247 scontext2
, scontext_len
,
1249 if (rc
== -EINVAL
&& force
) {
1251 context
.len
= scontext_len
;
1255 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &context
, sid
);
1256 context_destroy(&context
);
1258 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1265 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1266 * @scontext: security context
1267 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1268 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1270 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1271 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1272 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1273 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1275 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext
, u32 scontext_len
, u32
*sid
)
1277 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext
, scontext_len
,
1278 sid
, SECSID_NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, 0);
1282 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1283 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1285 * @scontext: security context
1286 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1287 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1288 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1290 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1291 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1292 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1293 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1294 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1295 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1296 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1297 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1299 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext
, u32 scontext_len
,
1300 u32
*sid
, u32 def_sid
, gfp_t gfp_flags
)
1302 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext
, scontext_len
,
1303 sid
, def_sid
, gfp_flags
, 1);
1306 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext
, u32 scontext_len
,
1309 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext
, scontext_len
,
1310 sid
, SECSID_NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, 1);
1313 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1314 struct context
*scontext
,
1315 struct context
*tcontext
,
1317 struct context
*newcontext
)
1319 char *s
= NULL
, *t
= NULL
, *n
= NULL
;
1320 u32 slen
, tlen
, nlen
;
1322 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext
, &s
, &slen
) < 0)
1324 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext
, &t
, &tlen
) < 0)
1326 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext
, &n
, &nlen
) < 0)
1328 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
1329 "security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
1333 n
, s
, t
, policydb
.p_class_val_to_name
[tclass
-1]);
1338 if (!selinux_enforcing
)
1343 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid
,
1350 struct context
*scontext
= NULL
, *tcontext
= NULL
, newcontext
;
1351 struct role_trans
*roletr
= NULL
;
1352 struct avtab_key avkey
;
1353 struct avtab_datum
*avdatum
;
1354 struct avtab_node
*node
;
1358 if (!ss_initialized
) {
1359 switch (orig_tclass
) {
1360 case SECCLASS_PROCESS
: /* kernel value */
1370 context_init(&newcontext
);
1372 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1375 tclass
= unmap_class(orig_tclass
);
1377 tclass
= orig_tclass
;
1379 scontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, ssid
);
1381 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1386 tcontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, tsid
);
1388 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1394 /* Set the user identity. */
1395 switch (specified
) {
1396 case AVTAB_TRANSITION
:
1398 /* Use the process user identity. */
1399 newcontext
.user
= scontext
->user
;
1402 /* Use the related object owner. */
1403 newcontext
.user
= tcontext
->user
;
1407 /* Set the role and type to default values. */
1408 if (tclass
== policydb
.process_class
) {
1409 /* Use the current role and type of process. */
1410 newcontext
.role
= scontext
->role
;
1411 newcontext
.type
= scontext
->type
;
1413 /* Use the well-defined object role. */
1414 newcontext
.role
= OBJECT_R_VAL
;
1415 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1416 newcontext
.type
= tcontext
->type
;
1419 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1420 avkey
.source_type
= scontext
->type
;
1421 avkey
.target_type
= tcontext
->type
;
1422 avkey
.target_class
= tclass
;
1423 avkey
.specified
= specified
;
1424 avdatum
= avtab_search(&policydb
.te_avtab
, &avkey
);
1426 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1428 node
= avtab_search_node(&policydb
.te_cond_avtab
, &avkey
);
1429 for (; node
; node
= avtab_search_node_next(node
, specified
)) {
1430 if (node
->key
.specified
& AVTAB_ENABLED
) {
1431 avdatum
= &node
->datum
;
1438 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1439 newcontext
.type
= avdatum
->data
;
1442 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1443 if (tclass
== policydb
.process_class
) {
1444 if (specified
& AVTAB_TRANSITION
) {
1445 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1446 for (roletr
= policydb
.role_tr
; roletr
;
1447 roletr
= roletr
->next
) {
1448 if (roletr
->role
== scontext
->role
&&
1449 roletr
->type
== tcontext
->type
) {
1450 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1451 newcontext
.role
= roletr
->new_role
;
1458 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1459 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1460 rc
= mls_compute_sid(scontext
, tcontext
, tclass
, specified
, &newcontext
);
1464 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1465 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb
, &newcontext
)) {
1466 rc
= compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext
,
1473 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1474 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &newcontext
, out_sid
);
1476 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1477 context_destroy(&newcontext
);
1483 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1484 * @ssid: source security identifier
1485 * @tsid: target security identifier
1486 * @tclass: target security class
1487 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1489 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1490 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1491 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1492 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1493 * computed successfully.
1495 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid
,
1500 return security_compute_sid(ssid
, tsid
, tclass
, AVTAB_TRANSITION
,
1504 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid
,
1509 return security_compute_sid(ssid
, tsid
, tclass
, AVTAB_TRANSITION
,
1514 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1515 * @ssid: source security identifier
1516 * @tsid: target security identifier
1517 * @tclass: target security class
1518 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1520 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1521 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1522 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1523 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1524 * computed successfully.
1526 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid
,
1531 return security_compute_sid(ssid
, tsid
, tclass
, AVTAB_MEMBER
, out_sid
,
1536 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1537 * @ssid: source security identifier
1538 * @tsid: target security identifier
1539 * @tclass: target security class
1540 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1542 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1543 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1544 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1545 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1546 * computed successfully.
1548 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid
,
1553 return security_compute_sid(ssid
, tsid
, tclass
, AVTAB_CHANGE
, out_sid
,
1557 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1558 static int clone_sid(u32 sid
,
1559 struct context
*context
,
1562 struct sidtab
*s
= arg
;
1564 if (sid
> SECINITSID_NUM
)
1565 return sidtab_insert(s
, sid
, context
);
1570 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context
*context
)
1574 if (selinux_enforcing
) {
1580 if (!context_struct_to_string(context
, &s
, &len
)) {
1582 "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
1590 struct convert_context_args
{
1591 struct policydb
*oldp
;
1592 struct policydb
*newp
;
1596 * Convert the values in the security context
1597 * structure `c' from the values specified
1598 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1599 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1600 * context is valid under the new policy.
1602 static int convert_context(u32 key
,
1606 struct convert_context_args
*args
;
1607 struct context oldc
;
1608 struct ocontext
*oc
;
1609 struct mls_range
*range
;
1610 struct role_datum
*role
;
1611 struct type_datum
*typdatum
;
1612 struct user_datum
*usrdatum
;
1617 if (key
<= SECINITSID_NUM
)
1624 s
= kstrdup(c
->str
, GFP_KERNEL
);
1629 rc
= string_to_context_struct(args
->newp
, NULL
, s
,
1630 c
->len
, &ctx
, SECSID_NULL
);
1634 "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1636 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1638 memcpy(c
, &ctx
, sizeof(*c
));
1640 } else if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1641 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1645 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1647 "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1653 rc
= context_cpy(&oldc
, c
);
1659 /* Convert the user. */
1660 usrdatum
= hashtab_search(args
->newp
->p_users
.table
,
1661 args
->oldp
->p_user_val_to_name
[c
->user
- 1]);
1664 c
->user
= usrdatum
->value
;
1666 /* Convert the role. */
1667 role
= hashtab_search(args
->newp
->p_roles
.table
,
1668 args
->oldp
->p_role_val_to_name
[c
->role
- 1]);
1671 c
->role
= role
->value
;
1673 /* Convert the type. */
1674 typdatum
= hashtab_search(args
->newp
->p_types
.table
,
1675 args
->oldp
->p_type_val_to_name
[c
->type
- 1]);
1678 c
->type
= typdatum
->value
;
1680 /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
1681 if (args
->oldp
->mls_enabled
&& args
->newp
->mls_enabled
) {
1682 rc
= mls_convert_context(args
->oldp
, args
->newp
, c
);
1685 } else if (args
->oldp
->mls_enabled
&& !args
->newp
->mls_enabled
) {
1687 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
1688 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
1689 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
1691 mls_context_destroy(c
);
1692 } else if (!args
->oldp
->mls_enabled
&& args
->newp
->mls_enabled
) {
1694 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
1695 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
1696 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
1697 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
1700 oc
= args
->newp
->ocontexts
[OCON_ISID
];
1701 while (oc
&& oc
->sid
[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED
)
1704 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to look up"
1705 " the initial SIDs list\n");
1708 range
= &oc
->context
[0].range
;
1709 rc
= mls_range_set(c
, range
);
1714 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1715 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args
->newp
, c
)) {
1716 rc
= convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc
);
1721 context_destroy(&oldc
);
1726 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1727 if (context_struct_to_string(&oldc
, &s
, &len
))
1729 context_destroy(&oldc
);
1734 "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1740 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
1742 selinux_policycap_netpeer
= ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb
.policycaps
,
1743 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER
);
1744 selinux_policycap_openperm
= ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb
.policycaps
,
1745 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM
);
1748 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
1749 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb
*p
);
1752 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
1753 * @data: binary policy data
1754 * @len: length of data in bytes
1756 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
1757 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
1758 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
1759 * loading the new policy.
1761 int security_load_policy(void *data
, size_t len
)
1763 struct policydb oldpolicydb
, newpolicydb
;
1764 struct sidtab oldsidtab
, newsidtab
;
1765 struct selinux_mapping
*oldmap
, *map
= NULL
;
1766 struct convert_context_args args
;
1770 struct policy_file file
= { data
, len
}, *fp
= &file
;
1772 if (!ss_initialized
) {
1774 rc
= policydb_read(&policydb
, fp
);
1776 avtab_cache_destroy();
1781 rc
= selinux_set_mapping(&policydb
, secclass_map
,
1783 ¤t_mapping_size
);
1785 policydb_destroy(&policydb
);
1786 avtab_cache_destroy();
1790 rc
= policydb_load_isids(&policydb
, &sidtab
);
1792 policydb_destroy(&policydb
);
1793 avtab_cache_destroy();
1797 security_load_policycaps();
1799 seqno
= ++latest_granting
;
1800 selinux_complete_init();
1801 avc_ss_reset(seqno
);
1802 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno
);
1803 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno
);
1804 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1805 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1810 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab
, "sids");
1813 rc
= policydb_read(&newpolicydb
, fp
);
1817 newpolicydb
.len
= len
;
1818 /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
1819 if (policydb
.mls_enabled
&& !newpolicydb
.mls_enabled
)
1820 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
1821 else if (!policydb
.mls_enabled
&& newpolicydb
.mls_enabled
)
1822 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
1824 rc
= policydb_load_isids(&newpolicydb
, &newsidtab
);
1826 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
1827 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb
);
1831 rc
= selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb
, secclass_map
, &map
, &map_size
);
1835 rc
= security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb
);
1837 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
1841 /* Clone the SID table. */
1842 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab
);
1844 rc
= sidtab_map(&sidtab
, clone_sid
, &newsidtab
);
1849 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
1850 * in the new SID table.
1852 args
.oldp
= &policydb
;
1853 args
.newp
= &newpolicydb
;
1854 rc
= sidtab_map(&newsidtab
, convert_context
, &args
);
1856 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
1857 " representation of contexts in the new SID"
1862 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
1863 memcpy(&oldpolicydb
, &policydb
, sizeof policydb
);
1864 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab
, &sidtab
);
1866 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
1867 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock
);
1868 memcpy(&policydb
, &newpolicydb
, sizeof policydb
);
1869 sidtab_set(&sidtab
, &newsidtab
);
1870 security_load_policycaps();
1871 oldmap
= current_mapping
;
1872 current_mapping
= map
;
1873 current_mapping_size
= map_size
;
1874 seqno
= ++latest_granting
;
1875 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock
);
1877 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
1878 policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb
);
1879 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab
);
1882 avc_ss_reset(seqno
);
1883 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno
);
1884 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno
);
1885 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1886 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1892 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab
);
1893 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb
);
1898 size_t security_policydb_len(void)
1902 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1904 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1910 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
1911 * @protocol: protocol number
1912 * @port: port number
1913 * @out_sid: security identifier
1915 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol
, u16 port
, u32
*out_sid
)
1920 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1922 c
= policydb
.ocontexts
[OCON_PORT
];
1924 if (c
->u
.port
.protocol
== protocol
&&
1925 c
->u
.port
.low_port
<= port
&&
1926 c
->u
.port
.high_port
>= port
)
1933 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
,
1939 *out_sid
= c
->sid
[0];
1941 *out_sid
= SECINITSID_PORT
;
1945 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1950 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
1951 * @name: interface name
1952 * @if_sid: interface SID
1954 int security_netif_sid(char *name
, u32
*if_sid
)
1959 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1961 c
= policydb
.ocontexts
[OCON_NETIF
];
1963 if (strcmp(name
, c
->u
.name
) == 0)
1969 if (!c
->sid
[0] || !c
->sid
[1]) {
1970 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
,
1975 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
,
1981 *if_sid
= c
->sid
[0];
1983 *if_sid
= SECINITSID_NETIF
;
1986 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1990 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32
*input
, u32
*addr
, u32
*mask
)
1994 for (i
= 0; i
< 4; i
++)
1995 if (addr
[i
] != (input
[i
] & mask
[i
])) {
2004 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
2005 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
2007 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
2008 * @out_sid: security identifier
2010 int security_node_sid(u16 domain
,
2018 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2024 if (addrlen
!= sizeof(u32
)) {
2029 addr
= *((u32
*)addrp
);
2031 c
= policydb
.ocontexts
[OCON_NODE
];
2033 if (c
->u
.node
.addr
== (addr
& c
->u
.node
.mask
))
2041 if (addrlen
!= sizeof(u64
) * 2) {
2045 c
= policydb
.ocontexts
[OCON_NODE6
];
2047 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp
, c
->u
.node6
.addr
,
2055 *out_sid
= SECINITSID_NODE
;
2061 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
,
2067 *out_sid
= c
->sid
[0];
2069 *out_sid
= SECINITSID_NODE
;
2073 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2080 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2081 * @fromsid: starting SID
2082 * @username: username
2083 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2084 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2086 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2087 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2088 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2089 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2090 * number of elements in the array.
2093 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid
,
2098 struct context
*fromcon
, usercon
;
2099 u32
*mysids
= NULL
, *mysids2
, sid
;
2100 u32 mynel
= 0, maxnel
= SIDS_NEL
;
2101 struct user_datum
*user
;
2102 struct role_datum
*role
;
2103 struct ebitmap_node
*rnode
, *tnode
;
2109 if (!ss_initialized
)
2112 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2114 context_init(&usercon
);
2116 fromcon
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, fromsid
);
2122 user
= hashtab_search(policydb
.p_users
.table
, username
);
2127 usercon
.user
= user
->value
;
2129 mysids
= kcalloc(maxnel
, sizeof(*mysids
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2135 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user
->roles
, rnode
, i
) {
2136 role
= policydb
.role_val_to_struct
[i
];
2137 usercon
.role
= i
+ 1;
2138 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role
->types
, tnode
, j
) {
2139 usercon
.type
= j
+ 1;
2141 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon
, user
, &usercon
))
2144 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &usercon
, &sid
);
2147 if (mynel
< maxnel
) {
2148 mysids
[mynel
++] = sid
;
2151 mysids2
= kcalloc(maxnel
, sizeof(*mysids2
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2156 memcpy(mysids2
, mysids
, mynel
* sizeof(*mysids2
));
2159 mysids
[mynel
++] = sid
;
2165 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2171 mysids2
= kcalloc(mynel
, sizeof(*mysids2
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2177 for (i
= 0, j
= 0; i
< mynel
; i
++) {
2178 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid
, mysids
[i
],
2179 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, /* kernel value */
2180 PROCESS__TRANSITION
, AVC_STRICT
,
2183 mysids2
[j
++] = mysids
[i
];
2195 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2196 * @fstype: filesystem type
2197 * @path: path from root of mount
2198 * @sclass: file security class
2199 * @sid: SID for path
2201 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2202 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2203 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2205 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype
,
2212 struct genfs
*genfs
;
2214 int rc
= 0, cmp
= 0;
2216 while (path
[0] == '/' && path
[1] == '/')
2219 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2221 sclass
= unmap_class(orig_sclass
);
2223 for (genfs
= policydb
.genfs
; genfs
; genfs
= genfs
->next
) {
2224 cmp
= strcmp(fstype
, genfs
->fstype
);
2229 if (!genfs
|| cmp
) {
2230 *sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
2235 for (c
= genfs
->head
; c
; c
= c
->next
) {
2236 len
= strlen(c
->u
.name
);
2237 if ((!c
->v
.sclass
|| sclass
== c
->v
.sclass
) &&
2238 (strncmp(c
->u
.name
, path
, len
) == 0))
2243 *sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
2249 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
,
2258 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2263 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2264 * @fstype: filesystem type
2265 * @behavior: labeling behavior
2266 * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
2268 int security_fs_use(
2270 unsigned int *behavior
,
2276 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2278 c
= policydb
.ocontexts
[OCON_FSUSE
];
2280 if (strcmp(fstype
, c
->u
.name
) == 0)
2286 *behavior
= c
->v
.behavior
;
2288 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
,
2296 rc
= security_genfs_sid(fstype
, "/", SECCLASS_DIR
, sid
);
2298 *behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE
;
2301 *behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS
;
2306 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2310 int security_get_bools(int *len
, char ***names
, int **values
)
2312 int i
, rc
= -ENOMEM
;
2314 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2318 *len
= policydb
.p_bools
.nprim
;
2324 *names
= kcalloc(*len
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2328 *values
= kcalloc(*len
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2332 for (i
= 0; i
< *len
; i
++) {
2334 (*values
)[i
] = policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[i
]->state
;
2335 name_len
= strlen(policydb
.p_bool_val_to_name
[i
]) + 1;
2336 (*names
)[i
] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
2339 strncpy((*names
)[i
], policydb
.p_bool_val_to_name
[i
], name_len
);
2340 (*names
)[i
][name_len
- 1] = 0;
2344 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2348 for (i
= 0; i
< *len
; i
++)
2356 int security_set_bools(int len
, int *values
)
2359 int lenp
, seqno
= 0;
2360 struct cond_node
*cur
;
2362 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock
);
2364 lenp
= policydb
.p_bools
.nprim
;
2370 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++) {
2371 if (!!values
[i
] != policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[i
]->state
) {
2372 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
,
2373 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE
,
2374 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2375 policydb
.p_bool_val_to_name
[i
],
2377 policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[i
]->state
,
2378 audit_get_loginuid(current
),
2379 audit_get_sessionid(current
));
2382 policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[i
]->state
= 1;
2384 policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[i
]->state
= 0;
2387 for (cur
= policydb
.cond_list
; cur
; cur
= cur
->next
) {
2388 rc
= evaluate_cond_node(&policydb
, cur
);
2393 seqno
= ++latest_granting
;
2396 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock
);
2398 avc_ss_reset(seqno
);
2399 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno
);
2400 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno
);
2401 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2406 int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
2411 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2413 len
= policydb
.p_bools
.nprim
;
2419 rc
= policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[bool]->state
;
2421 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2425 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb
*p
)
2427 int rc
, nbools
= 0, *bvalues
= NULL
, i
;
2428 char **bnames
= NULL
;
2429 struct cond_bool_datum
*booldatum
;
2430 struct cond_node
*cur
;
2432 rc
= security_get_bools(&nbools
, &bnames
, &bvalues
);
2435 for (i
= 0; i
< nbools
; i
++) {
2436 booldatum
= hashtab_search(p
->p_bools
.table
, bnames
[i
]);
2438 booldatum
->state
= bvalues
[i
];
2440 for (cur
= p
->cond_list
; cur
; cur
= cur
->next
) {
2441 rc
= evaluate_cond_node(p
, cur
);
2448 for (i
= 0; i
< nbools
; i
++)
2457 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2458 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2460 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid
, u32 mls_sid
, u32
*new_sid
)
2462 struct context
*context1
;
2463 struct context
*context2
;
2464 struct context newcon
;
2469 if (!ss_initialized
|| !policydb
.mls_enabled
) {
2474 context_init(&newcon
);
2476 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2477 context1
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, sid
);
2479 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2485 context2
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, mls_sid
);
2487 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2493 newcon
.user
= context1
->user
;
2494 newcon
.role
= context1
->role
;
2495 newcon
.type
= context1
->type
;
2496 rc
= mls_context_cpy(&newcon
, context2
);
2500 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2501 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb
, &newcon
)) {
2502 rc
= convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon
);
2507 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &newcon
, new_sid
);
2511 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon
, &s
, &len
)) {
2512 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
2513 "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s
);
2518 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2519 context_destroy(&newcon
);
2525 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2526 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2527 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2528 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2531 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2532 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2533 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2534 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2536 * | function return | @sid
2537 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2538 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
2539 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
2540 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
2541 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
2544 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid
, u32 nlbl_type
,
2549 struct context
*nlbl_ctx
;
2550 struct context
*xfrm_ctx
;
2552 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2553 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2554 * single or absent peer SID/label */
2555 if (xfrm_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
2556 *peer_sid
= nlbl_sid
;
2559 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2560 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2562 if (nlbl_sid
== SECSID_NULL
|| nlbl_type
== NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED
) {
2563 *peer_sid
= xfrm_sid
;
2567 /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2568 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2569 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2570 if (!policydb
.mls_enabled
) {
2571 *peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
2575 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2577 nlbl_ctx
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, nlbl_sid
);
2579 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2580 __func__
, nlbl_sid
);
2584 xfrm_ctx
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, xfrm_sid
);
2586 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2587 __func__
, xfrm_sid
);
2591 rc
= (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx
, xfrm_ctx
) ? 0 : -EACCES
);
2594 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2596 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2597 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2598 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2599 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2601 *peer_sid
= xfrm_sid
;
2603 *peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
2607 static int get_classes_callback(void *k
, void *d
, void *args
)
2609 struct class_datum
*datum
= d
;
2610 char *name
= k
, **classes
= args
;
2611 int value
= datum
->value
- 1;
2613 classes
[value
] = kstrdup(name
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
2614 if (!classes
[value
])
2620 int security_get_classes(char ***classes
, int *nclasses
)
2624 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2626 *nclasses
= policydb
.p_classes
.nprim
;
2627 *classes
= kcalloc(*nclasses
, sizeof(**classes
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2631 rc
= hashtab_map(policydb
.p_classes
.table
, get_classes_callback
,
2635 for (i
= 0; i
< *nclasses
; i
++)
2636 kfree((*classes
)[i
]);
2641 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2645 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k
, void *d
, void *args
)
2647 struct perm_datum
*datum
= d
;
2648 char *name
= k
, **perms
= args
;
2649 int value
= datum
->value
- 1;
2651 perms
[value
] = kstrdup(name
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
2658 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms
, int *nperms
)
2660 int rc
= -ENOMEM
, i
;
2661 struct class_datum
*match
;
2663 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2665 match
= hashtab_search(policydb
.p_classes
.table
, class);
2667 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
2673 *nperms
= match
->permissions
.nprim
;
2674 *perms
= kcalloc(*nperms
, sizeof(**perms
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2678 if (match
->comdatum
) {
2679 rc
= hashtab_map(match
->comdatum
->permissions
.table
,
2680 get_permissions_callback
, *perms
);
2685 rc
= hashtab_map(match
->permissions
.table
, get_permissions_callback
,
2691 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2695 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2696 for (i
= 0; i
< *nperms
; i
++)
2702 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
2704 return policydb
.reject_unknown
;
2707 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
2709 return policydb
.allow_unknown
;
2713 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
2714 * @req_cap: capability
2717 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
2718 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
2719 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
2722 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap
)
2726 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2727 rc
= ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb
.policycaps
, req_cap
);
2728 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2733 struct selinux_audit_rule
{
2735 struct context au_ctxt
;
2738 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule
)
2740 struct selinux_audit_rule
*rule
= vrule
;
2743 context_destroy(&rule
->au_ctxt
);
2748 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field
, u32 op
, char *rulestr
, void **vrule
)
2750 struct selinux_audit_rule
*tmprule
;
2751 struct role_datum
*roledatum
;
2752 struct type_datum
*typedatum
;
2753 struct user_datum
*userdatum
;
2754 struct selinux_audit_rule
**rule
= (struct selinux_audit_rule
**)vrule
;
2759 if (!ss_initialized
)
2763 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
2764 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
2765 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
2766 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER
:
2767 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE
:
2768 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE
:
2769 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
2770 if (op
!= Audit_equal
&& op
!= Audit_not_equal
)
2773 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN
:
2774 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
:
2775 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
2776 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
2777 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
2778 if (strchr(rulestr
, '-'))
2782 /* only the above fields are valid */
2786 tmprule
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2790 context_init(&tmprule
->au_ctxt
);
2792 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2794 tmprule
->au_seqno
= latest_granting
;
2797 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
2798 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER
:
2799 userdatum
= hashtab_search(policydb
.p_users
.table
, rulestr
);
2803 tmprule
->au_ctxt
.user
= userdatum
->value
;
2805 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
2806 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE
:
2807 roledatum
= hashtab_search(policydb
.p_roles
.table
, rulestr
);
2811 tmprule
->au_ctxt
.role
= roledatum
->value
;
2813 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
2814 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE
:
2815 typedatum
= hashtab_search(policydb
.p_types
.table
, rulestr
);
2819 tmprule
->au_ctxt
.type
= typedatum
->value
;
2821 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN
:
2822 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
:
2823 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
2824 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
2825 rc
= mls_from_string(rulestr
, &tmprule
->au_ctxt
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
2829 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2832 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule
);
2841 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
2842 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule
*rule
)
2846 for (i
= 0; i
< rule
->field_count
; i
++) {
2847 struct audit_field
*f
= &rule
->fields
[i
];
2849 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
2850 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
2851 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
2852 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN
:
2853 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
:
2854 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER
:
2855 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE
:
2856 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE
:
2857 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
2858 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
2866 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid
, u32 field
, u32 op
, void *vrule
,
2867 struct audit_context
*actx
)
2869 struct context
*ctxt
;
2870 struct mls_level
*level
;
2871 struct selinux_audit_rule
*rule
= vrule
;
2875 audit_log(actx
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
2876 "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
2880 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2882 if (rule
->au_seqno
< latest_granting
) {
2883 audit_log(actx
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
2884 "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
2889 ctxt
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, sid
);
2891 audit_log(actx
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
2892 "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2898 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
2901 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
2902 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER
:
2905 match
= (ctxt
->user
== rule
->au_ctxt
.user
);
2907 case Audit_not_equal
:
2908 match
= (ctxt
->user
!= rule
->au_ctxt
.user
);
2912 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
2913 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE
:
2916 match
= (ctxt
->role
== rule
->au_ctxt
.role
);
2918 case Audit_not_equal
:
2919 match
= (ctxt
->role
!= rule
->au_ctxt
.role
);
2923 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
2924 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE
:
2927 match
= (ctxt
->type
== rule
->au_ctxt
.type
);
2929 case Audit_not_equal
:
2930 match
= (ctxt
->type
!= rule
->au_ctxt
.type
);
2934 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN
:
2935 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
:
2936 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
2937 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
2938 level
= ((field
== AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN
||
2939 field
== AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
) ?
2940 &ctxt
->range
.level
[0] : &ctxt
->range
.level
[1]);
2943 match
= mls_level_eq(&rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0],
2946 case Audit_not_equal
:
2947 match
= !mls_level_eq(&rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0],
2951 match
= (mls_level_dom(&rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0],
2953 !mls_level_eq(&rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0],
2957 match
= mls_level_dom(&rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0],
2961 match
= (mls_level_dom(level
,
2962 &rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0]) &&
2963 !mls_level_eq(level
,
2964 &rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0]));
2967 match
= mls_level_dom(level
,
2968 &rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0]);
2974 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2978 static int (*aurule_callback
)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules
;
2980 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event
, u32 ssid
, u32 tsid
,
2981 u16
class, u32 perms
, u32
*retained
)
2985 if (event
== AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
&& aurule_callback
)
2986 err
= aurule_callback();
2990 static int __init
aurule_init(void)
2994 err
= avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback
, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
,
2995 SECSID_NULL
, SECSID_NULL
, SECCLASS_NULL
, 0);
2997 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err
);
3001 __initcall(aurule_init
);
3003 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
3005 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
3006 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3007 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3010 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
3011 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
3012 * already been initialized.
3015 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr
*secattr
,
3020 sid_cache
= kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
3021 if (sid_cache
== NULL
)
3023 secattr
->cache
= netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC
);
3024 if (secattr
->cache
== NULL
) {
3030 secattr
->cache
->free
= kfree
;
3031 secattr
->cache
->data
= sid_cache
;
3032 secattr
->flags
|= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE
;
3036 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
3037 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3038 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3041 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
3042 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
3043 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possibile the
3044 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
3045 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
3046 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
3050 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr
*secattr
,
3054 struct context
*ctx
;
3055 struct context ctx_new
;
3057 if (!ss_initialized
) {
3062 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
3064 if (secattr
->flags
& NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE
) {
3065 *sid
= *(u32
*)secattr
->cache
->data
;
3067 } else if (secattr
->flags
& NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID
) {
3068 *sid
= secattr
->attr
.secid
;
3070 } else if (secattr
->flags
& NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL
) {
3071 ctx
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, SECINITSID_NETMSG
);
3073 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return
;
3075 context_init(&ctx_new
);
3076 ctx_new
.user
= ctx
->user
;
3077 ctx_new
.role
= ctx
->role
;
3078 ctx_new
.type
= ctx
->type
;
3079 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new
, secattr
);
3080 if (secattr
->flags
& NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT
) {
3081 if (ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new
.range
.level
[0].cat
,
3082 secattr
->attr
.mls
.cat
) != 0)
3083 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return
;
3084 memcpy(&ctx_new
.range
.level
[1].cat
,
3085 &ctx_new
.range
.level
[0].cat
,
3086 sizeof(ctx_new
.range
.level
[0].cat
));
3088 if (mls_context_isvalid(&policydb
, &ctx_new
) != 1)
3089 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup
;
3091 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &ctx_new
, sid
);
3093 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup
;
3095 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr
, *sid
);
3097 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new
.range
.level
[0].cat
);
3103 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return
:
3104 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
3106 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup
:
3107 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new
.range
.level
[0].cat
);
3108 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return
;
3112 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3113 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3114 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3117 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3118 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3121 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid
, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr
*secattr
)
3124 struct context
*ctx
;
3126 if (!ss_initialized
)
3129 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
3130 ctx
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, sid
);
3133 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure
;
3135 secattr
->domain
= kstrdup(policydb
.p_type_val_to_name
[ctx
->type
- 1],
3137 if (secattr
->domain
== NULL
) {
3139 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure
;
3141 secattr
->attr
.secid
= sid
;
3142 secattr
->flags
|= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY
| NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID
;
3143 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx
, secattr
);
3144 rc
= mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx
, secattr
);
3146 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure
;
3147 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
3151 netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure
:
3152 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
3155 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
3158 * security_read_policy - read the policy.
3159 * @data: binary policy data
3160 * @len: length of data in bytes
3163 int security_read_policy(void **data
, ssize_t
*len
)
3166 struct policy_file fp
;
3168 if (!ss_initialized
)
3171 *len
= security_policydb_len();
3173 *data
= vmalloc_user(*len
);
3180 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
3181 rc
= policydb_write(&policydb
, &fp
);
3182 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
3187 *len
= (unsigned long)fp
.data
- (unsigned long)*data
;