[MLSXFRM]: Default labeling of socket specific IPSec policies
[deliverable/linux.git] / security / selinux / xfrm.c
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
7 * Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
8 *
9 * Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
10 *
11 * Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
12 *
13 * Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
14 * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 *
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19 */
20
21 /*
22 * USAGE:
23 * NOTES:
24 * 1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config:
25 * CONFIG_SECURITY=y
26 * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
27 * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
28 * CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y
29 * ISSUES:
30 * 1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation
31 * 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
32 * 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
33 */
34 #include <linux/module.h>
35 #include <linux/kernel.h>
36 #include <linux/init.h>
37 #include <linux/security.h>
38 #include <linux/types.h>
39 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
40 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
41 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
42 #include <linux/ip.h>
43 #include <linux/tcp.h>
44 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
45 #include <linux/xfrm.h>
46 #include <net/xfrm.h>
47 #include <net/checksum.h>
48 #include <net/udp.h>
49 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
50
51 #include "avc.h"
52 #include "objsec.h"
53 #include "xfrm.h"
54
55
56 /*
57 * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context
58 */
59 static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
60 {
61 return (ctx &&
62 (ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) &&
63 (ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX));
64 }
65
66 /*
67 * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux
68 */
69 static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
70 {
71 return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security);
72 }
73
74 /*
75 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
76 * a xfrm policy rule.
77 */
78 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
79 {
80 int rc = 0;
81 u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
82 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
83
84 /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
85 if ((ctx = xp->security)) {
86 if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
87 return -EINVAL;
88
89 sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
90 }
91
92 rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
93 ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
94 NULL);
95
96 return rc;
97 }
98
99 /*
100 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
101 * the given policy, flow combo.
102 */
103
104 int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
105 struct flowi *fl)
106 {
107 u32 state_sid;
108 u32 pol_sid;
109 int err;
110
111 if (x->security)
112 state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
113 else
114 state_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
115
116 if (xp->security)
117 pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid;
118 else
119 pol_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
120
121 err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
122 ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
123 NULL);
124
125 if (err)
126 return 0;
127
128 return selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, x);
129 }
130
131 /*
132 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow
133 * can use a given security association.
134 */
135
136 int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm)
137 {
138 int rc = 0;
139 u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
140 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
141
142 /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
143 if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) {
144 if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
145 return 0;
146
147 sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
148 }
149
150 rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
151 ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
152 NULL)? 0:1;
153
154 return rc;
155 }
156
157 /*
158 * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
159 */
160
161 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
162 {
163 struct sec_path *sp;
164
165 *sid = SECSID_NULL;
166
167 if (skb == NULL)
168 return 0;
169
170 sp = skb->sp;
171 if (sp) {
172 int i, sid_set = 0;
173
174 for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
175 struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
176 if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
177 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
178
179 if (!sid_set) {
180 *sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
181 sid_set = 1;
182
183 if (!ckall)
184 break;
185 }
186 else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
187 return -EINVAL;
188 }
189 }
190 }
191
192 return 0;
193 }
194
195 /*
196 * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
197 * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
198 */
199 static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
200 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid)
201 {
202 int rc = 0;
203 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
204 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
205 char *ctx_str = NULL;
206 u32 str_len;
207 u32 ctx_sid;
208
209 BUG_ON(uctx && pol);
210
211 if (!uctx)
212 goto not_from_user;
213
214 if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
215 return -EINVAL;
216
217 if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
218 return -ENOMEM;
219
220 *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
221 uctx->ctx_len,
222 GFP_KERNEL);
223
224 if (!ctx)
225 return -ENOMEM;
226
227 ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi;
228 ctx->ctx_len = uctx->ctx_len;
229 ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg;
230
231 memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
232 uctx+1,
233 ctx->ctx_len);
234 rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str,
235 ctx->ctx_len,
236 &ctx->ctx_sid);
237
238 if (rc)
239 goto out;
240
241 /*
242 * Does the subject have permission to set security context?
243 */
244 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
245 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
246 ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
247 if (rc)
248 goto out;
249
250 return rc;
251
252 not_from_user:
253 if (pol) {
254 rc = security_sid_mls_copy(pol->ctx_sid, sid, &ctx_sid);
255 if (rc)
256 goto out;
257 }
258 else
259 ctx_sid = sid;
260
261 rc = security_sid_to_context(ctx_sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
262 if (rc)
263 goto out;
264
265 *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
266 str_len,
267 GFP_ATOMIC);
268
269 if (!ctx) {
270 rc = -ENOMEM;
271 goto out;
272 }
273
274
275 ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
276 ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
277 ctx->ctx_sid = ctx_sid;
278 ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
279 memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
280 ctx_str,
281 str_len);
282
283 goto out2;
284
285 out:
286 *ctxp = NULL;
287 kfree(ctx);
288 out2:
289 kfree(ctx_str);
290 return rc;
291 }
292
293 /*
294 * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
295 * xfrm_policy.
296 */
297 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
298 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct sock *sk)
299 {
300 int err;
301 u32 sid;
302
303 BUG_ON(!xp);
304 BUG_ON(uctx && sk);
305
306 if (sk) {
307 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
308 sid = ssec->sid;
309 }
310 else
311 sid = SECSID_NULL;
312
313 err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, NULL, sid);
314 return err;
315 }
316
317
318 /*
319 * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to
320 * new for policy cloning.
321 */
322 int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new)
323 {
324 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, *new_ctx;
325
326 old_ctx = old->security;
327
328 if (old_ctx) {
329 new_ctx = new->security = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ctx) +
330 old_ctx->ctx_len,
331 GFP_KERNEL);
332
333 if (!new_ctx)
334 return -ENOMEM;
335
336 memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx));
337 memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len);
338 }
339 return 0;
340 }
341
342 /*
343 * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_policy security information.
344 */
345 void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
346 {
347 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
348 if (ctx)
349 kfree(ctx);
350 }
351
352 /*
353 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
354 */
355 int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
356 {
357 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
358 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
359 int rc = 0;
360
361 if (ctx)
362 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
363 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
364 ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
365
366 return rc;
367 }
368
369 /*
370 * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
371 * xfrm_state.
372 */
373 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
374 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid)
375 {
376 int err;
377
378 BUG_ON(!x);
379
380 err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, pol, secid);
381 return err;
382 }
383
384 /*
385 * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
386 */
387 void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
388 {
389 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
390 if (ctx)
391 kfree(ctx);
392 }
393
394 /*
395 * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a connected
396 * (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket based on its security
397 * association used to connect to the remote socket.
398 *
399 * Retrieve via getsockopt SO_PEERSEC.
400 */
401 u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
402 {
403 struct dst_entry *dst, *dst_test;
404 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
405
406 if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
407 goto out;
408
409 dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
410 if (!dst)
411 goto out;
412
413 for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
414 dst_test = dst_test->child) {
415 struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
416
417 if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
418 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
419 peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
420 break;
421 }
422 }
423 dst_release(dst);
424
425 out:
426 return peer_sid;
427 }
428
429 /*
430 * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a UDP packet
431 * based on its security association used to connect to the remote socket.
432 *
433 * Retrieve via setsockopt IP_PASSSEC and recvmsg with control message
434 * type SCM_SECURITY.
435 */
436 u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
437 {
438 struct sec_path *sp;
439
440 if (skb == NULL)
441 return SECSID_NULL;
442
443 if (skb->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
444 return SECSID_NULL;
445
446 sp = skb->sp;
447 if (sp) {
448 int i;
449
450 for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
451 struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
452 if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
453 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
454 return ctx->ctx_sid;
455 }
456 }
457 }
458
459 return SECSID_NULL;
460 }
461
462 /*
463 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
464 */
465 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
466 {
467 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
468 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
469 int rc = 0;
470
471 if (ctx)
472 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
473 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
474 ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
475
476 return rc;
477 }
478
479 /*
480 * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets. If
481 * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
482 * already authorized by the IPSec process. If not, then
483 * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
484 * gone thru the IPSec process.
485 */
486 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
487 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
488 {
489 int i, rc = 0;
490 struct sec_path *sp;
491 u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
492
493 sp = skb->sp;
494
495 if (sp) {
496 for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
497 struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
498
499 if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
500 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
501 sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
502 break;
503 }
504 }
505 }
506
507 rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
508 ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
509
510 return rc;
511 }
512
513 /*
514 * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing:
515 * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
516 * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
517 * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
518 * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
519 */
520 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
521 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
522 {
523 struct dst_entry *dst;
524 int rc = 0;
525
526 dst = skb->dst;
527
528 if (dst) {
529 struct dst_entry *dst_test;
530
531 for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
532 dst_test = dst_test->child) {
533 struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
534
535 if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
536 goto out;
537 }
538 }
539
540 rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
541 ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
542 out:
543 return rc;
544 }
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