ACPICA: iASL: Fix some typos with the name strtoul64
[deliverable/linux.git] / security / smack / smack_lsm.c
1 /*
2 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors:
7 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
8 * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
9 *
10 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
14 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
15 *
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19 */
20
21 #include <linux/xattr.h>
22 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
23 #include <linux/mount.h>
24 #include <linux/stat.h>
25 #include <linux/kd.h>
26 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
27 #include <linux/ip.h>
28 #include <linux/tcp.h>
29 #include <linux/udp.h>
30 #include <linux/dccp.h>
31 #include <linux/slab.h>
32 #include <linux/mutex.h>
33 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
34 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
35 #include <net/ip.h>
36 #include <net/ipv6.h>
37 #include <linux/audit.h>
38 #include <linux/magic.h>
39 #include <linux/dcache.h>
40 #include <linux/personality.h>
41 #include <linux/msg.h>
42 #include <linux/shm.h>
43 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
44 #include <linux/parser.h>
45 #include "smack.h"
46
47 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
48 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
49
50 #define SMK_CONNECTING 0
51 #define SMK_RECEIVING 1
52 #define SMK_SENDING 2
53
54 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
55 static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
56 #endif
57 static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
58 int smack_enabled;
59
60 static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = {
61 {Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"},
62 {Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"},
63 {Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"},
64 {Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"},
65 {Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"},
66 {Opt_error, NULL},
67 };
68
69 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
70 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
71 "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
72 "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
73 "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
74 "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
75 };
76
77 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
78 {
79 int i = 0;
80
81 if (mode & MAY_READ)
82 s[i++] = 'r';
83 if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
84 s[i++] = 'w';
85 if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
86 s[i++] = 'x';
87 if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
88 s[i++] = 'a';
89 if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
90 s[i++] = 't';
91 if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
92 s[i++] = 'l';
93 if (i == 0)
94 s[i++] = '-';
95 s[i] = '\0';
96 }
97 #endif
98
99 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
100 static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
101 struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
102 {
103 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
104
105 if (rc <= 0)
106 return rc;
107 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
108 rc = 0;
109
110 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
111 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
112 sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
113 return 0;
114 }
115 #else
116 #define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
117 #endif
118
119 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
120 static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
121 int mode, int rc)
122 {
123 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
124 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
125
126 if (rc <= 0)
127 return rc;
128 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
129 rc = 0;
130
131 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
132 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
133 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
134 acc, current->comm, note);
135 return 0;
136 }
137 #else
138 #define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
139 #endif
140
141 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
142 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
143 {
144 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
145 struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
146 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
147
148 if (rc <= 0)
149 return rc;
150 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
151 rc = 0;
152
153 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
154 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
155 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
156 current->comm, otp->comm);
157 return 0;
158 }
159 #else
160 #define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
161 #endif
162
163 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
164 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
165 {
166 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
167 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
168 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
169
170 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
171 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
172 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
173
174 if (rc <= 0)
175 return rc;
176 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
177 rc = 0;
178 if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
179 (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
180 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
181
182 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
183
184 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
185 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
186 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
187 return 0;
188 }
189 #else
190 #define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
191 #endif
192
193 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
194 static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
195 {
196 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
197 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
198 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
199 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
200 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
201
202 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
203 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
204 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
205
206 if (rc <= 0)
207 return rc;
208 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
209 rc = 0;
210
211 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
212 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
213 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
214 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
215 current->comm);
216 return 0;
217 }
218 #else
219 #define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
220 #endif
221
222 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
223 static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
224 int mode, int rc)
225 {
226 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
227 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
228 struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
229 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
230 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
231
232 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
233 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
234 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
235
236 if (rc <= 0)
237 return rc;
238 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
239 rc = 0;
240
241 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
242 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
243 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
244 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
245 current->comm);
246 return 0;
247 }
248 #else
249 #define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
250 #endif
251
252 /**
253 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
254 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
255 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
256 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
257 *
258 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
259 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
260 */
261 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
262 struct dentry *dp)
263 {
264 int rc;
265 char *buffer;
266 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
267
268 if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
269 return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
270
271 buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
272 if (buffer == NULL)
273 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
274
275 rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
276 if (rc < 0)
277 skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
278 else if (rc == 0)
279 skp = NULL;
280 else
281 skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
282
283 kfree(buffer);
284
285 return skp;
286 }
287
288 /**
289 * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
290 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
291 *
292 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
293 */
294 static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
295 {
296 struct inode_smack *isp;
297
298 isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
299 if (isp == NULL)
300 return NULL;
301
302 isp->smk_inode = skp;
303 isp->smk_flags = 0;
304 mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
305
306 return isp;
307 }
308
309 /**
310 * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
311 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
312 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
313 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
314 *
315 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
316 */
317 static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
318 struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
319 {
320 struct task_smack *tsp;
321
322 tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
323 if (tsp == NULL)
324 return NULL;
325
326 tsp->smk_task = task;
327 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
328 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
329 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
330 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
331
332 return tsp;
333 }
334
335 /**
336 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
337 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
338 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
339 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
340 *
341 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
342 */
343 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
344 gfp_t gfp)
345 {
346 struct smack_rule *nrp;
347 struct smack_rule *orp;
348 int rc = 0;
349
350 INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
351
352 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
353 nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
354 if (nrp == NULL) {
355 rc = -ENOMEM;
356 break;
357 }
358 *nrp = *orp;
359 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
360 }
361 return rc;
362 }
363
364 /**
365 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
366 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
367 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
368 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
369 *
370 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
371 */
372 static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
373 gfp_t gfp)
374 {
375 struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
376 struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
377
378 INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
379
380 list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
381 nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
382 if (nklep == NULL) {
383 smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
384 return -ENOMEM;
385 }
386 nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
387 list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
388 }
389
390 return 0;
391 }
392
393 /**
394 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
395 * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
396 *
397 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
398 */
399 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
400 {
401 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
402 return MAY_READWRITE;
403 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
404 return MAY_READ;
405
406 return 0;
407 }
408
409 /**
410 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
411 * @tracer: tracer process
412 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
413 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
414 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
415 *
416 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
417 */
418 static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
419 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
420 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
421 {
422 int rc;
423 struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
424 struct task_smack *tsp;
425 struct smack_known *tracer_known;
426
427 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
428 smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
429 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
430 saip = &ad;
431 }
432
433 rcu_read_lock();
434 tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
435 tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
436
437 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
438 (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
439 smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
440 if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
441 rc = 0;
442 else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
443 rc = -EACCES;
444 else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
445 rc = 0;
446 else
447 rc = -EACCES;
448
449 if (saip)
450 smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
451 tracee_known->smk_known,
452 0, rc, saip);
453
454 rcu_read_unlock();
455 return rc;
456 }
457
458 /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
459 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
460
461 rcu_read_unlock();
462 return rc;
463 }
464
465 /*
466 * LSM hooks.
467 * We he, that is fun!
468 */
469
470 /**
471 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
472 * @ctp: child task pointer
473 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
474 *
475 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
476 *
477 * Do the capability checks.
478 */
479 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
480 {
481 struct smack_known *skp;
482
483 skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
484
485 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
486 }
487
488 /**
489 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
490 * @ptp: parent task pointer
491 *
492 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
493 *
494 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
495 */
496 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
497 {
498 int rc;
499 struct smack_known *skp;
500
501 skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
502
503 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
504 return rc;
505 }
506
507 /**
508 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
509 * @type: message type
510 *
511 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
512 */
513 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
514 {
515 int rc = 0;
516 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
517
518 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
519 return 0;
520
521 if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
522 rc = -EACCES;
523
524 return rc;
525 }
526
527
528 /*
529 * Superblock Hooks.
530 */
531
532 /**
533 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
534 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
535 *
536 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
537 */
538 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
539 {
540 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
541
542 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
543
544 if (sbsp == NULL)
545 return -ENOMEM;
546
547 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
548 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
549 sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
550 sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
551 /*
552 * smk_initialized will be zero from kzalloc.
553 */
554 sb->s_security = sbsp;
555
556 return 0;
557 }
558
559 /**
560 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
561 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
562 *
563 */
564 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
565 {
566 kfree(sb->s_security);
567 sb->s_security = NULL;
568 }
569
570 /**
571 * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
572 * @orig: where to start
573 * @smackopts: mount options string
574 *
575 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
576 *
577 * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
578 * options list.
579 */
580 static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
581 {
582 char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
583
584 otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
585 if (otheropts == NULL)
586 return -ENOMEM;
587
588 for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
589 if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
590 dp = smackopts;
591 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
592 dp = smackopts;
593 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
594 dp = smackopts;
595 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
596 dp = smackopts;
597 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp)
598 dp = smackopts;
599 else
600 dp = otheropts;
601
602 commap = strchr(cp, ',');
603 if (commap != NULL)
604 *commap = '\0';
605
606 if (*dp != '\0')
607 strcat(dp, ",");
608 strcat(dp, cp);
609 }
610
611 strcpy(orig, otheropts);
612 free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
613
614 return 0;
615 }
616
617 /**
618 * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options
619 * @options: mount options string
620 * @opts: where to store converted mount opts
621 *
622 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
623 *
624 * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format
625 */
626 static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
627 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
628 {
629 char *p;
630 char *fsdefault = NULL;
631 char *fsfloor = NULL;
632 char *fshat = NULL;
633 char *fsroot = NULL;
634 char *fstransmute = NULL;
635 int rc = -ENOMEM;
636 int num_mnt_opts = 0;
637 int token;
638
639 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
640
641 if (!options)
642 return 0;
643
644 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
645 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
646
647 if (!*p)
648 continue;
649
650 token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
651
652 switch (token) {
653 case Opt_fsdefault:
654 if (fsdefault)
655 goto out_opt_err;
656 fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
657 if (!fsdefault)
658 goto out_err;
659 break;
660 case Opt_fsfloor:
661 if (fsfloor)
662 goto out_opt_err;
663 fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
664 if (!fsfloor)
665 goto out_err;
666 break;
667 case Opt_fshat:
668 if (fshat)
669 goto out_opt_err;
670 fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
671 if (!fshat)
672 goto out_err;
673 break;
674 case Opt_fsroot:
675 if (fsroot)
676 goto out_opt_err;
677 fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
678 if (!fsroot)
679 goto out_err;
680 break;
681 case Opt_fstransmute:
682 if (fstransmute)
683 goto out_opt_err;
684 fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
685 if (!fstransmute)
686 goto out_err;
687 break;
688 default:
689 rc = -EINVAL;
690 pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n");
691 goto out_err;
692 }
693 }
694
695 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
696 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
697 goto out_err;
698
699 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
700 GFP_ATOMIC);
701 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
702 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
703 goto out_err;
704 }
705
706 if (fsdefault) {
707 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
708 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
709 }
710 if (fsfloor) {
711 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
712 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
713 }
714 if (fshat) {
715 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
716 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
717 }
718 if (fsroot) {
719 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
720 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
721 }
722 if (fstransmute) {
723 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
724 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
725 }
726
727 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
728 return 0;
729
730 out_opt_err:
731 rc = -EINVAL;
732 pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
733
734 out_err:
735 kfree(fsdefault);
736 kfree(fsfloor);
737 kfree(fshat);
738 kfree(fsroot);
739 kfree(fstransmute);
740 return rc;
741 }
742
743 /**
744 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
745 * @sb: the file system superblock
746 * @opts: Smack mount options
747 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
748 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
749 *
750 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
751 *
752 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
753 * labels.
754 */
755 static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
756 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
757 unsigned long kern_flags,
758 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
759 {
760 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
761 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
762 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
763 struct inode_smack *isp;
764 struct smack_known *skp;
765 int i;
766 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
767 int transmute = 0;
768
769 if (sp->smk_initialized)
770 return 0;
771
772 sp->smk_initialized = 1;
773
774 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
775 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
776 case FSDEFAULT_MNT:
777 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
778 if (IS_ERR(skp))
779 return PTR_ERR(skp);
780 sp->smk_default = skp;
781 break;
782 case FSFLOOR_MNT:
783 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
784 if (IS_ERR(skp))
785 return PTR_ERR(skp);
786 sp->smk_floor = skp;
787 break;
788 case FSHAT_MNT:
789 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
790 if (IS_ERR(skp))
791 return PTR_ERR(skp);
792 sp->smk_hat = skp;
793 break;
794 case FSROOT_MNT:
795 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
796 if (IS_ERR(skp))
797 return PTR_ERR(skp);
798 sp->smk_root = skp;
799 break;
800 case FSTRANS_MNT:
801 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
802 if (IS_ERR(skp))
803 return PTR_ERR(skp);
804 sp->smk_root = skp;
805 transmute = 1;
806 break;
807 default:
808 break;
809 }
810 }
811
812 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
813 /*
814 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
815 */
816 if (num_opts)
817 return -EPERM;
818 /*
819 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
820 */
821 skp = smk_of_current();
822 sp->smk_root = skp;
823 sp->smk_default = skp;
824 }
825
826 /*
827 * Initialize the root inode.
828 */
829 isp = inode->i_security;
830 if (isp == NULL) {
831 isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
832 if (isp == NULL)
833 return -ENOMEM;
834 inode->i_security = isp;
835 } else
836 isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
837
838 if (transmute)
839 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
840
841 return 0;
842 }
843
844 /**
845 * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
846 * @sb: the file system superblock
847 * @flags: the mount flags
848 * @data: the smack mount options
849 *
850 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
851 */
852 static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
853 {
854 int rc = 0;
855 char *options = data;
856 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
857
858 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
859
860 if (!options)
861 goto out;
862
863 rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
864 if (rc)
865 goto out_err;
866
867 out:
868 rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
869
870 out_err:
871 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
872 return rc;
873 }
874
875 /**
876 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
877 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
878 *
879 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
880 * and error code otherwise
881 */
882 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
883 {
884 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
885 int rc;
886 struct smk_audit_info ad;
887
888 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
889 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
890
891 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
892 rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
893 return rc;
894 }
895
896 /*
897 * BPRM hooks
898 */
899
900 /**
901 * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
902 * @bprm: the exec information
903 *
904 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
905 */
906 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
907 {
908 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
909 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
910 struct inode_smack *isp;
911 int rc;
912
913 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
914 return 0;
915
916 isp = inode->i_security;
917 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
918 return 0;
919
920 if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
921 struct task_struct *tracer;
922 rc = 0;
923
924 rcu_read_lock();
925 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
926 if (likely(tracer != NULL))
927 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
928 isp->smk_task,
929 PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
930 __func__);
931 rcu_read_unlock();
932
933 if (rc != 0)
934 return rc;
935 } else if (bprm->unsafe)
936 return -EPERM;
937
938 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
939 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
940
941 return 0;
942 }
943
944 /**
945 * smack_bprm_committing_creds - Prepare to install the new credentials
946 * from bprm.
947 *
948 * @bprm: binprm for exec
949 */
950 static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
951 {
952 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
953
954 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
955 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
956 }
957
958 /**
959 * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec.
960 * @bprm: binprm for exec
961 *
962 * Returns 0 on success.
963 */
964 static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
965 {
966 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
967
968 if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
969 return 1;
970
971 return 0;
972 }
973
974 /*
975 * Inode hooks
976 */
977
978 /**
979 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
980 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
981 *
982 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
983 */
984 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
985 {
986 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
987
988 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
989 if (inode->i_security == NULL)
990 return -ENOMEM;
991 return 0;
992 }
993
994 /**
995 * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
996 * @inode: the inode with a blob
997 *
998 * Clears the blob pointer in inode
999 */
1000 static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1001 {
1002 kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, inode->i_security);
1003 inode->i_security = NULL;
1004 }
1005
1006 /**
1007 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
1008 * @inode: the newly created inode
1009 * @dir: containing directory object
1010 * @qstr: unused
1011 * @name: where to put the attribute name
1012 * @value: where to put the attribute value
1013 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
1014 *
1015 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
1016 */
1017 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1018 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
1019 void **value, size_t *len)
1020 {
1021 struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
1022 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1023 struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1024 struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
1025 int may;
1026
1027 if (name)
1028 *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
1029
1030 if (value && len) {
1031 rcu_read_lock();
1032 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
1033 &skp->smk_rules);
1034 rcu_read_unlock();
1035
1036 /*
1037 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
1038 * the directory requests transmutation then
1039 * by all means transmute.
1040 * Mark the inode as changed.
1041 */
1042 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
1043 smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
1044 isp = dsp;
1045 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
1046 }
1047
1048 *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1049 if (*value == NULL)
1050 return -ENOMEM;
1051
1052 *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1053 }
1054
1055 return 0;
1056 }
1057
1058 /**
1059 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1060 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1061 * @dir: unused
1062 * @new_dentry: the new object
1063 *
1064 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1065 */
1066 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1067 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1068 {
1069 struct smack_known *isp;
1070 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1071 int rc;
1072
1073 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1074 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1075
1076 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1077 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1078 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1079
1080 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1081 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1082 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1083 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1084 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1085 }
1086
1087 return rc;
1088 }
1089
1090 /**
1091 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1092 * @dir: containing directory object
1093 * @dentry: file to unlink
1094 *
1095 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1096 * and the object, error code otherwise
1097 */
1098 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1099 {
1100 struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1101 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1102 int rc;
1103
1104 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1105 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1106
1107 /*
1108 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1109 */
1110 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1111 rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1112 if (rc == 0) {
1113 /*
1114 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1115 */
1116 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1117 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1118 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1119 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1120 }
1121 return rc;
1122 }
1123
1124 /**
1125 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1126 * @dir: containing directory object
1127 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1128 *
1129 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1130 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1131 */
1132 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1133 {
1134 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1135 int rc;
1136
1137 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1138 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1139
1140 /*
1141 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1142 */
1143 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1144 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1145 if (rc == 0) {
1146 /*
1147 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1148 */
1149 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1150 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1151 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1152 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1153 }
1154
1155 return rc;
1156 }
1157
1158 /**
1159 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1160 * @old_inode: unused
1161 * @old_dentry: the old object
1162 * @new_inode: unused
1163 * @new_dentry: the new object
1164 *
1165 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1166 * new directories.
1167 *
1168 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1169 */
1170 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1171 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1172 struct inode *new_inode,
1173 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1174 {
1175 int rc;
1176 struct smack_known *isp;
1177 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1178
1179 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1180 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1181
1182 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1183 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1184 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1185
1186 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1187 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1188 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1189 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1190 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1191 }
1192 return rc;
1193 }
1194
1195 /**
1196 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1197 * @inode: the inode in question
1198 * @mask: the access requested
1199 *
1200 * This is the important Smack hook.
1201 *
1202 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
1203 */
1204 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1205 {
1206 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1207 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1208 int rc;
1209
1210 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1211 /*
1212 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1213 */
1214 if (mask == 0)
1215 return 0;
1216
1217 /* May be droppable after audit */
1218 if (no_block)
1219 return -ECHILD;
1220 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1221 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1222 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1223 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1224 return rc;
1225 }
1226
1227 /**
1228 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1229 * @dentry: the object
1230 * @iattr: for the force flag
1231 *
1232 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1233 */
1234 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
1235 {
1236 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1237 int rc;
1238
1239 /*
1240 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1241 */
1242 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1243 return 0;
1244 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1245 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1246
1247 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1248 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1249 return rc;
1250 }
1251
1252 /**
1253 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1254 * @mnt: vfsmount of the object
1255 * @dentry: the object
1256 *
1257 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1258 */
1259 static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1260 {
1261 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1262 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1263 int rc;
1264
1265 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1266 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1267 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1268 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1269 return rc;
1270 }
1271
1272 /**
1273 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1274 * @dentry: the object
1275 * @name: name of the attribute
1276 * @value: value of the attribute
1277 * @size: size of the value
1278 * @flags: unused
1279 *
1280 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1281 *
1282 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1283 */
1284 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1285 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1286 {
1287 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1288 struct smack_known *skp;
1289 int check_priv = 0;
1290 int check_import = 0;
1291 int check_star = 0;
1292 int rc = 0;
1293
1294 /*
1295 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1296 */
1297 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1298 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1299 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1300 check_priv = 1;
1301 check_import = 1;
1302 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1303 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1304 check_priv = 1;
1305 check_import = 1;
1306 check_star = 1;
1307 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1308 check_priv = 1;
1309 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1310 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1311 rc = -EINVAL;
1312 } else
1313 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1314
1315 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1316 rc = -EPERM;
1317
1318 if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1319 skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1320 if (IS_ERR(skp))
1321 rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
1322 else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1323 (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1324 rc = -EINVAL;
1325 }
1326
1327 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1328 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1329
1330 if (rc == 0) {
1331 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1332 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1333 }
1334
1335 return rc;
1336 }
1337
1338 /**
1339 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1340 * @dentry: object
1341 * @name: attribute name
1342 * @value: attribute value
1343 * @size: attribute size
1344 * @flags: unused
1345 *
1346 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1347 * in the master label list.
1348 */
1349 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1350 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1351 {
1352 struct smack_known *skp;
1353 struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1354
1355 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1356 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1357 return;
1358 }
1359
1360 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1361 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1362 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1363 isp->smk_inode = skp;
1364 else
1365 isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid;
1366 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1367 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1368 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1369 isp->smk_task = skp;
1370 else
1371 isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
1372 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1373 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1374 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1375 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1376 else
1377 isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
1378 }
1379
1380 return;
1381 }
1382
1383 /**
1384 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1385 * @dentry: the object
1386 * @name: unused
1387 *
1388 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1389 */
1390 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1391 {
1392 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1393 int rc;
1394
1395 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1396 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1397
1398 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1399 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1400 return rc;
1401 }
1402
1403 /**
1404 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1405 * @dentry: the object
1406 * @name: name of the attribute
1407 *
1408 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1409 *
1410 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1411 */
1412 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1413 {
1414 struct inode_smack *isp;
1415 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1416 int rc = 0;
1417
1418 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1419 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1420 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1421 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1422 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1423 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1424 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1425 rc = -EPERM;
1426 } else
1427 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
1428
1429 if (rc != 0)
1430 return rc;
1431
1432 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1433 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1434
1435 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1436 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1437 if (rc != 0)
1438 return rc;
1439
1440 isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1441 /*
1442 * Don't do anything special for these.
1443 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1444 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1445 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC
1446 */
1447 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
1448 isp->smk_task = NULL;
1449 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1450 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1451 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1452 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1453
1454 return 0;
1455 }
1456
1457 /**
1458 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1459 * @inode: the object
1460 * @name: attribute name
1461 * @buffer: where to put the result
1462 * @alloc: unused
1463 *
1464 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1465 */
1466 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
1467 const char *name, void **buffer,
1468 bool alloc)
1469 {
1470 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1471 struct socket *sock;
1472 struct super_block *sbp;
1473 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
1474 struct smack_known *isp;
1475 int ilen;
1476 int rc = 0;
1477
1478 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
1479 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1480 ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1481 *buffer = isp->smk_known;
1482 return ilen;
1483 }
1484
1485 /*
1486 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1487 */
1488 sbp = ip->i_sb;
1489 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1490 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1491
1492 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1493 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1494 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1495
1496 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1497
1498 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1499 isp = ssp->smk_in;
1500 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1501 isp = ssp->smk_out;
1502 else
1503 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1504
1505 ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1506 if (rc == 0) {
1507 *buffer = isp->smk_known;
1508 rc = ilen;
1509 }
1510
1511 return rc;
1512 }
1513
1514
1515 /**
1516 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1517 * @inode: the object
1518 * @buffer: where they go
1519 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1520 */
1521 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1522 size_t buffer_size)
1523 {
1524 int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1525
1526 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1527 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1528
1529 return len;
1530 }
1531
1532 /**
1533 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1534 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1535 * @secid: where result will be saved
1536 */
1537 static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1538 {
1539 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1540
1541 *secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
1542 }
1543
1544 /*
1545 * File Hooks
1546 */
1547
1548 /**
1549 * smack_file_permission - Smack check on file operations
1550 * @file: unused
1551 * @mask: unused
1552 *
1553 * Returns 0
1554 *
1555 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1556 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1557 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1558 *
1559 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1560 * label changing that SELinux does.
1561 */
1562 static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
1563 {
1564 return 0;
1565 }
1566
1567 /**
1568 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1569 * @file: the object
1570 *
1571 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1572 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1573 *
1574 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1575 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1576 *
1577 * Returns 0
1578 */
1579 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1580 {
1581 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1582
1583 file->f_security = skp;
1584 return 0;
1585 }
1586
1587 /**
1588 * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
1589 * @file: the object
1590 *
1591 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1592 * label list, so no memory is freed.
1593 */
1594 static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
1595 {
1596 file->f_security = NULL;
1597 }
1598
1599 /**
1600 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1601 * @file: the object
1602 * @cmd: what to do
1603 * @arg: unused
1604 *
1605 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1606 *
1607 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1608 */
1609 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1610 unsigned long arg)
1611 {
1612 int rc = 0;
1613 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1614 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1615
1616 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1617 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1618
1619 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1620 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1621 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1622 }
1623
1624 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1625 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1626 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1627 }
1628
1629 return rc;
1630 }
1631
1632 /**
1633 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1634 * @file: the object
1635 * @cmd: unused
1636 *
1637 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1638 */
1639 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1640 {
1641 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1642 int rc;
1643 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1644
1645 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1646 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1647 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1648 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1649 return rc;
1650 }
1651
1652 /**
1653 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1654 * @file: the object
1655 * @cmd: what action to check
1656 * @arg: unused
1657 *
1658 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1659 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1660 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1661 *
1662 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1663 */
1664 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1665 unsigned long arg)
1666 {
1667 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1668 int rc = 0;
1669 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1670
1671 switch (cmd) {
1672 case F_GETLK:
1673 break;
1674 case F_SETLK:
1675 case F_SETLKW:
1676 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1677 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1678 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1679 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1680 break;
1681 case F_SETOWN:
1682 case F_SETSIG:
1683 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1684 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1685 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1686 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1687 break;
1688 default:
1689 break;
1690 }
1691
1692 return rc;
1693 }
1694
1695 /**
1696 * smack_mmap_file :
1697 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1698 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1699 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1700 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1701 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1702 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1703 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1704 */
1705 static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1706 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1707 unsigned long flags)
1708 {
1709 struct smack_known *skp;
1710 struct smack_known *mkp;
1711 struct smack_rule *srp;
1712 struct task_smack *tsp;
1713 struct smack_known *okp;
1714 struct inode_smack *isp;
1715 int may;
1716 int mmay;
1717 int tmay;
1718 int rc;
1719
1720 if (file == NULL)
1721 return 0;
1722
1723 isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
1724 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1725 return 0;
1726 mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1727
1728 tsp = current_security();
1729 skp = smk_of_current();
1730 rc = 0;
1731
1732 rcu_read_lock();
1733 /*
1734 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1735 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1736 * to that rule's object label.
1737 */
1738 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1739 okp = srp->smk_object;
1740 /*
1741 * Matching labels always allows access.
1742 */
1743 if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1744 continue;
1745 /*
1746 * If there is a matching local rule take
1747 * that into account as well.
1748 */
1749 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1750 okp->smk_known,
1751 &tsp->smk_rules);
1752 if (may == -ENOENT)
1753 may = srp->smk_access;
1754 else
1755 may &= srp->smk_access;
1756 /*
1757 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1758 * possibly have less access.
1759 */
1760 if (may == 0)
1761 continue;
1762
1763 /*
1764 * Fetch the global list entry.
1765 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1766 * can't have as much access as current.
1767 */
1768 mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1769 &mkp->smk_rules);
1770 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1771 rc = -EACCES;
1772 break;
1773 }
1774 /*
1775 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1776 * potential access, too.
1777 */
1778 tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1779 &tsp->smk_rules);
1780 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1781 mmay &= tmay;
1782
1783 /*
1784 * If there is any access available to current that is
1785 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1786 * deny access.
1787 */
1788 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1789 rc = -EACCES;
1790 break;
1791 }
1792 }
1793
1794 rcu_read_unlock();
1795
1796 return rc;
1797 }
1798
1799 /**
1800 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1801 * @file: object in question
1802 *
1803 */
1804 static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1805 {
1806 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1807 }
1808
1809 /**
1810 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1811 * @tsk: The target task
1812 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1813 * @signum: unused
1814 *
1815 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1816 *
1817 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1818 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1819 */
1820 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1821 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1822 {
1823 struct smack_known *skp;
1824 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
1825 struct file *file;
1826 int rc;
1827 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1828
1829 /*
1830 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1831 */
1832 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1833
1834 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1835 skp = file->f_security;
1836 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
1837 rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1838 if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1839 rc = 0;
1840
1841 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1842 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1843 smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
1844 return rc;
1845 }
1846
1847 /**
1848 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1849 * @file: the object
1850 *
1851 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1852 */
1853 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1854 {
1855 int rc;
1856 int may = 0;
1857 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1858 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1859 struct socket *sock;
1860 struct task_smack *tsp;
1861 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1862
1863 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1864 return 0;
1865
1866 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1867 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1868
1869 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
1870 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1871 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1872 tsp = current_security();
1873 /*
1874 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1875 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
1876 * write to the receiving process don't accept
1877 * the passed socket.
1878 */
1879 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1880 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1881 if (rc < 0)
1882 return rc;
1883 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1884 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1885 return rc;
1886 }
1887 /*
1888 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1889 */
1890 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1891 may = MAY_READ;
1892 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1893 may |= MAY_WRITE;
1894
1895 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
1896 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1897 return rc;
1898 }
1899
1900 /**
1901 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
1902 * @file: the object
1903 * @cred: task credential
1904 *
1905 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1906 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
1907 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
1908 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
1909 *
1910 * Returns 0
1911 */
1912 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
1913 {
1914 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1915 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1916 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1917 int rc;
1918
1919 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1920 return 0;
1921
1922 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1923 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1924 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1925 rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
1926
1927 return rc;
1928 }
1929
1930 /*
1931 * Task hooks
1932 */
1933
1934 /**
1935 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1936 * @new: the new credentials
1937 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1938 *
1939 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1940 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1941 * complete without error.
1942 */
1943 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1944 {
1945 struct task_smack *tsp;
1946
1947 tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
1948 if (tsp == NULL)
1949 return -ENOMEM;
1950
1951 cred->security = tsp;
1952
1953 return 0;
1954 }
1955
1956
1957 /**
1958 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1959 * @cred: the credentials in question
1960 *
1961 */
1962 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1963 {
1964 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1965 struct smack_rule *rp;
1966 struct list_head *l;
1967 struct list_head *n;
1968
1969 if (tsp == NULL)
1970 return;
1971 cred->security = NULL;
1972
1973 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
1974
1975 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
1976 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
1977 list_del(&rp->list);
1978 kfree(rp);
1979 }
1980 kfree(tsp);
1981 }
1982
1983 /**
1984 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
1985 * @new: the new credentials
1986 * @old: the original credentials
1987 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1988 *
1989 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
1990 */
1991 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1992 gfp_t gfp)
1993 {
1994 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
1995 struct task_smack *new_tsp;
1996 int rc;
1997
1998 new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
1999 if (new_tsp == NULL)
2000 return -ENOMEM;
2001
2002 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
2003 if (rc != 0)
2004 return rc;
2005
2006 rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
2007 gfp);
2008 if (rc != 0)
2009 return rc;
2010
2011 new->security = new_tsp;
2012 return 0;
2013 }
2014
2015 /**
2016 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
2017 * @new: the new credentials
2018 * @old: the original credentials
2019 *
2020 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
2021 */
2022 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2023 {
2024 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2025 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2026
2027 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
2028 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
2029 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
2030 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
2031
2032
2033 /* cbs copy rule list */
2034 }
2035
2036 /**
2037 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
2038 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
2039 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
2040 *
2041 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
2042 */
2043 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
2044 {
2045 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2046 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2047
2048 if (skp == NULL)
2049 return -EINVAL;
2050
2051 new_tsp->smk_task = skp;
2052 return 0;
2053 }
2054
2055 /**
2056 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2057 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2058 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2059 *
2060 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2061 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2062 */
2063 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2064 struct inode *inode)
2065 {
2066 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2067 struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
2068
2069 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2070 tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2071 return 0;
2072 }
2073
2074 /**
2075 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2076 * @p: the task object
2077 * @access: the access requested
2078 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2079 *
2080 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2081 */
2082 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2083 const char *caller)
2084 {
2085 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2086 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2087 int rc;
2088
2089 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2090 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2091 rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2092 rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2093 return rc;
2094 }
2095
2096 /**
2097 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2098 * @p: the task object
2099 * @pgid: unused
2100 *
2101 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2102 */
2103 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2104 {
2105 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2106 }
2107
2108 /**
2109 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2110 * @p: the object task
2111 *
2112 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2113 */
2114 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2115 {
2116 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2117 }
2118
2119 /**
2120 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2121 * @p: the object task
2122 *
2123 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2124 */
2125 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2126 {
2127 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2128 }
2129
2130 /**
2131 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
2132 * @p: the object task
2133 * @secid: where to put the result
2134 *
2135 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2136 */
2137 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2138 {
2139 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2140
2141 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2142 }
2143
2144 /**
2145 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2146 * @p: the task object
2147 * @nice: unused
2148 *
2149 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2150 */
2151 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2152 {
2153 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2154 }
2155
2156 /**
2157 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2158 * @p: the task object
2159 * @ioprio: unused
2160 *
2161 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2162 */
2163 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2164 {
2165 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2166 }
2167
2168 /**
2169 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2170 * @p: the task object
2171 *
2172 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2173 */
2174 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2175 {
2176 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2177 }
2178
2179 /**
2180 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2181 * @p: the task object
2182 * @policy: unused
2183 * @lp: unused
2184 *
2185 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2186 */
2187 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2188 {
2189 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2190 }
2191
2192 /**
2193 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2194 * @p: the task object
2195 *
2196 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2197 */
2198 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2199 {
2200 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2201 }
2202
2203 /**
2204 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2205 * @p: the task object
2206 *
2207 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2208 */
2209 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2210 {
2211 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2212 }
2213
2214 /**
2215 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2216 * @p: the task object
2217 * @info: unused
2218 * @sig: unused
2219 * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
2220 *
2221 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2222 *
2223 * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
2224 * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
2225 */
2226 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2227 int sig, u32 secid)
2228 {
2229 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2230 struct smack_known *skp;
2231 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2232 int rc;
2233
2234 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2235 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2236 /*
2237 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2238 * can write the receiver.
2239 */
2240 if (secid == 0) {
2241 rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2242 rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2243 return rc;
2244 }
2245 /*
2246 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
2247 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2248 * we can't take privilege into account.
2249 */
2250 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2251 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2252 rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2253 return rc;
2254 }
2255
2256 /**
2257 * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
2258 * @p: task to wait for
2259 *
2260 * Returns 0
2261 */
2262 static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2263 {
2264 /*
2265 * Allow the operation to succeed.
2266 * Zombies are bad.
2267 * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs
2268 * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent
2269 * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still
2270 * may expect to know when the child exits.
2271 */
2272 return 0;
2273 }
2274
2275 /**
2276 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2277 * @p: task to copy from
2278 * @inode: inode to copy to
2279 *
2280 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2281 */
2282 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2283 {
2284 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2285 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2286
2287 isp->smk_inode = skp;
2288 }
2289
2290 /*
2291 * Socket hooks.
2292 */
2293
2294 /**
2295 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2296 * @sk: the socket
2297 * @family: unused
2298 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2299 *
2300 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2301 *
2302 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2303 */
2304 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2305 {
2306 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2307 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2308
2309 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2310 if (ssp == NULL)
2311 return -ENOMEM;
2312
2313 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2314 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2315 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2316
2317 sk->sk_security = ssp;
2318
2319 return 0;
2320 }
2321
2322 /**
2323 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2324 * @sk: the socket
2325 *
2326 * Clears the blob pointer
2327 */
2328 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2329 {
2330 kfree(sk->sk_security);
2331 }
2332
2333 /**
2334 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2335 * @sip: the object end
2336 *
2337 * looks for host based access restrictions
2338 *
2339 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2340 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2341 * taken before calling this function.
2342 *
2343 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2344 */
2345 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2346 {
2347 struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2348 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2349
2350 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2351 return NULL;
2352
2353 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2354 /*
2355 * we break after finding the first match because
2356 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2357 * so we have found the most specific match
2358 */
2359 if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2360 (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2361 return snp->smk_label;
2362
2363 return NULL;
2364 }
2365
2366 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2367 /*
2368 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2369 * @sip: the address
2370 *
2371 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2372 */
2373 static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2374 {
2375 __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2376 __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2377
2378 if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2379 ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2380 return true;
2381 return false;
2382 }
2383
2384 /**
2385 * smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2386 * @sip: the object end
2387 *
2388 * looks for host based access restrictions
2389 *
2390 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2391 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2392 * taken before calling this function.
2393 *
2394 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2395 */
2396 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2397 {
2398 struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2399 struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2400 int i;
2401 int found = 0;
2402
2403 /*
2404 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2405 */
2406 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2407 return NULL;
2408
2409 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2410 /*
2411 * we break after finding the first match because
2412 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2413 * so we have found the most specific match
2414 */
2415 for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2416 /*
2417 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2418 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2419 */
2420 if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2421 continue;
2422 if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2423 snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2424 found = 0;
2425 break;
2426 }
2427 }
2428 if (found)
2429 return snp->smk_label;
2430 }
2431
2432 return NULL;
2433 }
2434 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2435
2436 /**
2437 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
2438 * @sk: the socket
2439 * @labeled: socket label scheme
2440 *
2441 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
2442 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
2443 *
2444 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2445 */
2446 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
2447 {
2448 struct smack_known *skp;
2449 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2450 int rc = 0;
2451
2452 /*
2453 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
2454 * packet labeling based on the label.
2455 * The case of a single label host is different, because
2456 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
2457 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
2458 * label.
2459 */
2460 local_bh_disable();
2461 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2462
2463 if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
2464 labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
2465 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2466 else {
2467 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2468 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
2469 }
2470
2471 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2472 local_bh_enable();
2473
2474 return rc;
2475 }
2476
2477 /**
2478 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
2479 * @sk: the socket
2480 * @sap: the destination address
2481 *
2482 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2483 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2484 *
2485 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2486 *
2487 */
2488 static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2489 {
2490 struct smack_known *skp;
2491 int rc;
2492 int sk_lbl;
2493 struct smack_known *hkp;
2494 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2495 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2496
2497 rcu_read_lock();
2498 hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2499 if (hkp != NULL) {
2500 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2501 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2502
2503 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2504 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2505 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2506 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2507 #endif
2508 sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
2509 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2510 rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2511 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2512 } else {
2513 sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
2514 rc = 0;
2515 }
2516 rcu_read_unlock();
2517 if (rc != 0)
2518 return rc;
2519
2520 return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
2521 }
2522
2523 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2524 /**
2525 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2526 * @subject: subject Smack label
2527 * @object: object Smack label
2528 * @address: address
2529 * @act: the action being taken
2530 *
2531 * Check an IPv6 access
2532 */
2533 static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2534 struct smack_known *object,
2535 struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2536 {
2537 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2538 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2539 #endif
2540 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2541 int rc;
2542
2543 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2544 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2545 ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2546 ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2547 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2548 ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2549 else
2550 ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2551 #endif
2552 rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2553 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2554 return rc;
2555 }
2556 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2557
2558 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2559 /**
2560 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2561 * @sock: socket
2562 * @address: address
2563 *
2564 * Create or update the port list entry
2565 */
2566 static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2567 {
2568 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2569 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2570 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2571 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2572 unsigned short port = 0;
2573
2574 if (address == NULL) {
2575 /*
2576 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2577 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2578 * as well.
2579 */
2580 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2581 if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2582 continue;
2583 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2584 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2585 return;
2586 }
2587 /*
2588 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2589 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2590 */
2591 return;
2592 }
2593
2594 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2595 port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2596 /*
2597 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2598 */
2599 if (port == 0)
2600 return;
2601
2602 /*
2603 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2604 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2605 */
2606 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2607 if (spp->smk_port != port)
2608 continue;
2609 spp->smk_port = port;
2610 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2611 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2612 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2613 return;
2614 }
2615
2616 /*
2617 * A new port entry is required.
2618 */
2619 spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2620 if (spp == NULL)
2621 return;
2622
2623 spp->smk_port = port;
2624 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2625 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2626 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2627
2628 list_add(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2629 return;
2630 }
2631
2632 /**
2633 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2634 * @sock: socket
2635 * @address: address
2636 *
2637 * Create or update the port list entry
2638 */
2639 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2640 int act)
2641 {
2642 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2643 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2644 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2645 unsigned short port;
2646 struct smack_known *object;
2647
2648 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2649 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2650 object = ssp->smk_in;
2651 } else {
2652 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2653 object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2654 }
2655
2656 /*
2657 * The other end is a single label host.
2658 */
2659 if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2660 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2661 if (skp == NULL)
2662 skp = smack_net_ambient;
2663 if (object == NULL)
2664 object = smack_net_ambient;
2665
2666 /*
2667 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2668 */
2669 if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2670 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2671
2672 /*
2673 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2674 */
2675 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2676 return 0;
2677
2678 port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2679 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2680 if (spp->smk_port != port)
2681 continue;
2682 object = spp->smk_in;
2683 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2684 ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2685 break;
2686 }
2687
2688 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2689 }
2690 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2691
2692 /**
2693 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2694 * @inode: the object
2695 * @name: attribute name
2696 * @value: attribute value
2697 * @size: size of the attribute
2698 * @flags: unused
2699 *
2700 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2701 *
2702 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2703 */
2704 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2705 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2706 {
2707 struct smack_known *skp;
2708 struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
2709 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2710 struct socket *sock;
2711 int rc = 0;
2712
2713 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2714 return -EINVAL;
2715
2716 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2717 if (IS_ERR(skp))
2718 return PTR_ERR(skp);
2719
2720 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2721 nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2722 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2723 return 0;
2724 }
2725 /*
2726 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2727 */
2728 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2729 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2730
2731 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2732 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2733 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2734
2735 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2736
2737 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2738 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2739 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2740 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2741 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2742 rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2743 if (rc != 0)
2744 printk(KERN_WARNING
2745 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2746 __func__, -rc);
2747 }
2748 } else
2749 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2750
2751 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2752 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2753 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2754 #endif
2755
2756 return 0;
2757 }
2758
2759 /**
2760 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2761 * @sock: the socket
2762 * @family: protocol family
2763 * @type: unused
2764 * @protocol: unused
2765 * @kern: unused
2766 *
2767 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2768 *
2769 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2770 */
2771 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2772 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2773 {
2774 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2775
2776 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2777 return 0;
2778
2779 /*
2780 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2781 */
2782 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2783 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2784 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2785 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2786 }
2787
2788 if (family != PF_INET)
2789 return 0;
2790 /*
2791 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2792 */
2793 return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2794 }
2795
2796 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2797 /**
2798 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
2799 * @sock: the socket
2800 * @address: the port address
2801 * @addrlen: size of the address
2802 *
2803 * Records the label bound to a port.
2804 *
2805 * Returns 0
2806 */
2807 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
2808 int addrlen)
2809 {
2810 if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2811 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
2812 return 0;
2813 }
2814 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2815
2816 /**
2817 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2818 * @sock: the socket
2819 * @sap: the other end
2820 * @addrlen: size of sap
2821 *
2822 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2823 *
2824 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2825 */
2826 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2827 int addrlen)
2828 {
2829 int rc = 0;
2830 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2831 struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
2832 #endif
2833 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2834 struct smack_known *rsp;
2835 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2836 #endif
2837
2838 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2839 return 0;
2840
2841 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
2842 case PF_INET:
2843 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2844 return -EINVAL;
2845 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2846 break;
2847 case PF_INET6:
2848 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
2849 return -EINVAL;
2850 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2851 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
2852 if (rsp != NULL)
2853 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
2854 SMK_CONNECTING);
2855 #endif
2856 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2857 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
2858 #endif
2859 break;
2860 }
2861 return rc;
2862 }
2863
2864 /**
2865 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2866 * @flags: the S_ value
2867 *
2868 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2869 */
2870 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2871 {
2872 int may = 0;
2873
2874 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2875 may |= MAY_READ;
2876 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2877 may |= MAY_WRITE;
2878 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2879 may |= MAY_EXEC;
2880
2881 return may;
2882 }
2883
2884 /**
2885 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2886 * @msg: the object
2887 *
2888 * Returns 0
2889 */
2890 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2891 {
2892 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2893
2894 msg->security = skp;
2895 return 0;
2896 }
2897
2898 /**
2899 * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
2900 * @msg: the object
2901 *
2902 * Clears the blob pointer
2903 */
2904 static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2905 {
2906 msg->security = NULL;
2907 }
2908
2909 /**
2910 * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
2911 * @shp: the object
2912 *
2913 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2914 */
2915 static struct smack_known *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2916 {
2917 return (struct smack_known *)shp->shm_perm.security;
2918 }
2919
2920 /**
2921 * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
2922 * @shp: the object
2923 *
2924 * Returns 0
2925 */
2926 static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2927 {
2928 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2929 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2930
2931 isp->security = skp;
2932 return 0;
2933 }
2934
2935 /**
2936 * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
2937 * @shp: the object
2938 *
2939 * Clears the blob pointer
2940 */
2941 static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2942 {
2943 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2944
2945 isp->security = NULL;
2946 }
2947
2948 /**
2949 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2950 * @shp : the object
2951 * @access : access requested
2952 *
2953 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2954 */
2955 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
2956 {
2957 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
2958 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2959 int rc;
2960
2961 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2962 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2963 ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
2964 #endif
2965 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2966 rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
2967 return rc;
2968 }
2969
2970 /**
2971 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
2972 * @shp: the object
2973 * @shmflg: access requested
2974 *
2975 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2976 */
2977 static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
2978 {
2979 int may;
2980
2981 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2982 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2983 }
2984
2985 /**
2986 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
2987 * @shp: the object
2988 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2989 *
2990 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2991 */
2992 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
2993 {
2994 int may;
2995
2996 switch (cmd) {
2997 case IPC_STAT:
2998 case SHM_STAT:
2999 may = MAY_READ;
3000 break;
3001 case IPC_SET:
3002 case SHM_LOCK:
3003 case SHM_UNLOCK:
3004 case IPC_RMID:
3005 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3006 break;
3007 case IPC_INFO:
3008 case SHM_INFO:
3009 /*
3010 * System level information.
3011 */
3012 return 0;
3013 default:
3014 return -EINVAL;
3015 }
3016 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3017 }
3018
3019 /**
3020 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3021 * @shp: the object
3022 * @shmaddr: unused
3023 * @shmflg: access requested
3024 *
3025 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3026 */
3027 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
3028 int shmflg)
3029 {
3030 int may;
3031
3032 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3033 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3034 }
3035
3036 /**
3037 * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
3038 * @sma: the object
3039 *
3040 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
3041 */
3042 static struct smack_known *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
3043 {
3044 return (struct smack_known *)sma->sem_perm.security;
3045 }
3046
3047 /**
3048 * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
3049 * @sma: the object
3050 *
3051 * Returns 0
3052 */
3053 static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3054 {
3055 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3056 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3057
3058 isp->security = skp;
3059 return 0;
3060 }
3061
3062 /**
3063 * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
3064 * @sma: the object
3065 *
3066 * Clears the blob pointer
3067 */
3068 static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3069 {
3070 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3071
3072 isp->security = NULL;
3073 }
3074
3075 /**
3076 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3077 * @sma : the object
3078 * @access : access requested
3079 *
3080 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3081 */
3082 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
3083 {
3084 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
3085 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3086 int rc;
3087
3088 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3089 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3090 ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
3091 #endif
3092 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3093 rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3094 return rc;
3095 }
3096
3097 /**
3098 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3099 * @sma: the object
3100 * @semflg: access requested
3101 *
3102 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3103 */
3104 static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3105 {
3106 int may;
3107
3108 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3109 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3110 }
3111
3112 /**
3113 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
3114 * @sma: the object
3115 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3116 *
3117 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3118 */
3119 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3120 {
3121 int may;
3122
3123 switch (cmd) {
3124 case GETPID:
3125 case GETNCNT:
3126 case GETZCNT:
3127 case GETVAL:
3128 case GETALL:
3129 case IPC_STAT:
3130 case SEM_STAT:
3131 may = MAY_READ;
3132 break;
3133 case SETVAL:
3134 case SETALL:
3135 case IPC_RMID:
3136 case IPC_SET:
3137 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3138 break;
3139 case IPC_INFO:
3140 case SEM_INFO:
3141 /*
3142 * System level information
3143 */
3144 return 0;
3145 default:
3146 return -EINVAL;
3147 }
3148
3149 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3150 }
3151
3152 /**
3153 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3154 * @sma: the object
3155 * @sops: unused
3156 * @nsops: unused
3157 * @alter: unused
3158 *
3159 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3160 *
3161 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3162 */
3163 static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
3164 unsigned nsops, int alter)
3165 {
3166 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
3167 }
3168
3169 /**
3170 * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
3171 * @msq: the object
3172 *
3173 * Returns 0
3174 */
3175 static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3176 {
3177 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3178 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3179
3180 kisp->security = skp;
3181 return 0;
3182 }
3183
3184 /**
3185 * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
3186 * @msq: the object
3187 *
3188 * Clears the blob pointer
3189 */
3190 static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3191 {
3192 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3193
3194 kisp->security = NULL;
3195 }
3196
3197 /**
3198 * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
3199 * @msq: the object
3200 *
3201 * Returns a pointer to the smack label entry
3202 */
3203 static struct smack_known *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
3204 {
3205 return (struct smack_known *)msq->q_perm.security;
3206 }
3207
3208 /**
3209 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3210 * @msq : the msq
3211 * @access : access requested
3212 *
3213 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3214 */
3215 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
3216 {
3217 struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
3218 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3219 int rc;
3220
3221 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3222 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3223 ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
3224 #endif
3225 rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3226 rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3227 return rc;
3228 }
3229
3230 /**
3231 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3232 * @msq: the object
3233 * @msqflg: access requested
3234 *
3235 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3236 */
3237 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3238 {
3239 int may;
3240
3241 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3242 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3243 }
3244
3245 /**
3246 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3247 * @msq: the object
3248 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3249 *
3250 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3251 */
3252 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3253 {
3254 int may;
3255
3256 switch (cmd) {
3257 case IPC_STAT:
3258 case MSG_STAT:
3259 may = MAY_READ;
3260 break;
3261 case IPC_SET:
3262 case IPC_RMID:
3263 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3264 break;
3265 case IPC_INFO:
3266 case MSG_INFO:
3267 /*
3268 * System level information
3269 */
3270 return 0;
3271 default:
3272 return -EINVAL;
3273 }
3274
3275 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3276 }
3277
3278 /**
3279 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3280 * @msq: the object
3281 * @msg: unused
3282 * @msqflg: access requested
3283 *
3284 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3285 */
3286 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3287 int msqflg)
3288 {
3289 int may;
3290
3291 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3292 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3293 }
3294
3295 /**
3296 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3297 * @msq: the object
3298 * @msg: unused
3299 * @target: unused
3300 * @type: unused
3301 * @mode: unused
3302 *
3303 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3304 */
3305 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3306 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
3307 {
3308 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
3309 }
3310
3311 /**
3312 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3313 * @ipp: the object permissions
3314 * @flag: access requested
3315 *
3316 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3317 */
3318 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3319 {
3320 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3321 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3322 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3323 int rc;
3324
3325 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3326 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3327 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3328 #endif
3329 rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3330 rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3331 return rc;
3332 }
3333
3334 /**
3335 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3336 * @ipp: the object permissions
3337 * @secid: where result will be saved
3338 */
3339 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3340 {
3341 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3342
3343 *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3344 }
3345
3346 /**
3347 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3348 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3349 * @inode: the object
3350 *
3351 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3352 */
3353 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3354 {
3355 struct super_block *sbp;
3356 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3357 struct inode_smack *isp;
3358 struct smack_known *skp;
3359 struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3360 struct smack_known *final;
3361 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3362 int transflag = 0;
3363 int rc;
3364 struct dentry *dp;
3365
3366 if (inode == NULL)
3367 return;
3368
3369 isp = inode->i_security;
3370
3371 mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
3372 /*
3373 * If the inode is already instantiated
3374 * take the quick way out
3375 */
3376 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3377 goto unlockandout;
3378
3379 sbp = inode->i_sb;
3380 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
3381 /*
3382 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3383 * if there's no label on the file.
3384 */
3385 final = sbsp->smk_default;
3386
3387 /*
3388 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3389 * may be in the process of initialization.
3390 * If that is the case use the root value out
3391 * of the superblock.
3392 */
3393 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3394 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3395 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3396 /*
3397 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3398 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3399 * options.
3400 */
3401 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3402 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3403 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3404 break;
3405 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3406 /*
3407 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3408 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3409 */
3410 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3411 break;
3412 case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3413 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3414 break;
3415 default:
3416 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3417 break;
3418 }
3419 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3420 goto unlockandout;
3421 }
3422
3423 /*
3424 * This is pretty hackish.
3425 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3426 * file system specific code, but it does help
3427 * with keeping it simple.
3428 */
3429 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3430 case SMACK_MAGIC:
3431 case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3432 case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
3433 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3434 /*
3435 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3436 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3437 * extended attributes.
3438 *
3439 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
3440 *
3441 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3442 * structures associated with the task involved.
3443 *
3444 * Cgroupfs is special
3445 */
3446 final = &smack_known_star;
3447 break;
3448 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3449 /*
3450 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3451 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3452 * pty with respect.
3453 */
3454 final = ckp;
3455 break;
3456 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3457 /*
3458 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3459 * The superblock default suffices.
3460 */
3461 break;
3462 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3463 /*
3464 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3465 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3466 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3467 */
3468 final = &smack_known_star;
3469 /*
3470 * No break.
3471 *
3472 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3473 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3474 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3475 * superblock default.
3476 */
3477 default:
3478 /*
3479 * This isn't an understood special case.
3480 * Get the value from the xattr.
3481 */
3482
3483 /*
3484 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3485 */
3486 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3487 final = &smack_known_star;
3488 break;
3489 }
3490 /*
3491 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3492 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3493 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3494 * does not match that assigned.
3495 */
3496 if (inode->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
3497 break;
3498 /*
3499 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3500 */
3501 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3502 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3503 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3504 final = skp;
3505
3506 /*
3507 * Transmuting directory
3508 */
3509 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3510 /*
3511 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3512 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3513 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3514 * and mark the inode.
3515 *
3516 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3517 * directory mark the inode.
3518 */
3519 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
3520 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
3521 rc = inode->i_op->setxattr(dp,
3522 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
3523 TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
3524 0);
3525 } else {
3526 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dp,
3527 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3528 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
3529 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3530 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3531 rc = -EINVAL;
3532 }
3533 if (rc >= 0)
3534 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3535 }
3536 /*
3537 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3538 */
3539 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3540 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3541 skp == &smack_known_web)
3542 skp = NULL;
3543 isp->smk_task = skp;
3544
3545 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3546 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3547 skp == &smack_known_web)
3548 skp = NULL;
3549 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3550
3551 dput(dp);
3552 break;
3553 }
3554
3555 if (final == NULL)
3556 isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3557 else
3558 isp->smk_inode = final;
3559
3560 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3561
3562 unlockandout:
3563 mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
3564 return;
3565 }
3566
3567 /**
3568 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3569 * @p: the object task
3570 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3571 * @value: where to put the result
3572 *
3573 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3574 *
3575 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3576 */
3577 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
3578 {
3579 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
3580 char *cp;
3581 int slen;
3582
3583 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3584 return -EINVAL;
3585
3586 cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3587 if (cp == NULL)
3588 return -ENOMEM;
3589
3590 slen = strlen(cp);
3591 *value = cp;
3592 return slen;
3593 }
3594
3595 /**
3596 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3597 * @p: the object task
3598 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3599 * @value: the value to set
3600 * @size: the size of the value
3601 *
3602 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3603 * is permitted and only with privilege
3604 *
3605 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3606 */
3607 static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
3608 void *value, size_t size)
3609 {
3610 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
3611 struct cred *new;
3612 struct smack_known *skp;
3613 struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3614 int rc;
3615
3616 /*
3617 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
3618 * and supports no sane use case.
3619 */
3620 if (p != current)
3621 return -EPERM;
3622
3623 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3624 return -EPERM;
3625
3626 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3627 return -EINVAL;
3628
3629 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3630 return -EINVAL;
3631
3632 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3633 if (IS_ERR(skp))
3634 return PTR_ERR(skp);
3635
3636 /*
3637 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
3638 */
3639 if (skp == &smack_known_web)
3640 return -EPERM;
3641
3642 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3643 rc = -EPERM;
3644 list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3645 if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3646 rc = 0;
3647 break;
3648 }
3649 if (rc)
3650 return rc;
3651 }
3652
3653 new = prepare_creds();
3654 if (new == NULL)
3655 return -ENOMEM;
3656
3657 tsp = new->security;
3658 tsp->smk_task = skp;
3659 /*
3660 * process can change its label only once
3661 */
3662 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3663
3664 commit_creds(new);
3665 return size;
3666 }
3667
3668 /**
3669 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3670 * @sock: one sock
3671 * @other: the other sock
3672 * @newsk: unused
3673 *
3674 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3675 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3676 */
3677 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3678 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3679 {
3680 struct smack_known *skp;
3681 struct smack_known *okp;
3682 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3683 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3684 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3685 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3686 int rc = 0;
3687 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3688 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3689 #endif
3690
3691 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3692 skp = ssp->smk_out;
3693 okp = osp->smk_in;
3694 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3695 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3696 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3697 #endif
3698 rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3699 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3700 if (rc == 0) {
3701 okp = osp->smk_out;
3702 skp = ssp->smk_in;
3703 rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3704 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3705 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3706 }
3707 }
3708
3709 /*
3710 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3711 */
3712 if (rc == 0) {
3713 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3714 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3715 }
3716
3717 return rc;
3718 }
3719
3720 /**
3721 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3722 * @sock: one socket
3723 * @other: the other socket
3724 *
3725 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3726 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3727 */
3728 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3729 {
3730 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3731 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3732 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3733 int rc;
3734
3735 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3736 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3737
3738 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3739 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3740 #endif
3741
3742 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3743 return 0;
3744
3745 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3746 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3747 return rc;
3748 }
3749
3750 /**
3751 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3752 * @sock: the socket
3753 * @msg: the message
3754 * @size: the size of the message
3755 *
3756 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3757 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3758 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3759 */
3760 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3761 int size)
3762 {
3763 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3764 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3765 struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3766 #endif
3767 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3768 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3769 struct smack_known *rsp;
3770 #endif
3771 int rc = 0;
3772
3773 /*
3774 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3775 */
3776 if (sip == NULL)
3777 return 0;
3778
3779 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3780 case AF_INET:
3781 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
3782 break;
3783 case AF_INET6:
3784 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3785 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3786 if (rsp != NULL)
3787 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3788 SMK_CONNECTING);
3789 #endif
3790 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3791 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3792 #endif
3793 break;
3794 }
3795 return rc;
3796 }
3797
3798 /**
3799 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3800 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3801 * @ssp: socket security information
3802 *
3803 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3804 */
3805 static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3806 struct socket_smack *ssp)
3807 {
3808 struct smack_known *skp;
3809 int found = 0;
3810 int acat;
3811 int kcat;
3812
3813 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
3814 /*
3815 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
3816 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
3817 * behaving the way we expect it to.
3818 *
3819 * Look it up in the label table
3820 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3821 * for the packet fall back on the network
3822 * ambient value.
3823 */
3824 rcu_read_lock();
3825 list_for_each_entry(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
3826 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
3827 continue;
3828 /*
3829 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
3830 */
3831 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
3832 if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
3833 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
3834 found = 1;
3835 break;
3836 }
3837 for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
3838 acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
3839 acat + 1);
3840 kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
3841 skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
3842 kcat + 1);
3843 if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
3844 break;
3845 }
3846 if (acat == kcat) {
3847 found = 1;
3848 break;
3849 }
3850 }
3851 rcu_read_unlock();
3852
3853 if (found)
3854 return skp;
3855
3856 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
3857 return &smack_known_web;
3858 return &smack_known_star;
3859 }
3860 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
3861 /*
3862 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
3863 */
3864 skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
3865 /*
3866 * This has got to be a bug because it is
3867 * impossible to specify a fallback without
3868 * specifying the label, which will ensure
3869 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
3870 * secid is from a fallback.
3871 */
3872 BUG_ON(skp == NULL);
3873 return skp;
3874 }
3875 /*
3876 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3877 * for the packet fall back on the network
3878 * ambient value.
3879 */
3880 return smack_net_ambient;
3881 }
3882
3883 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3884 static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
3885 {
3886 u8 nexthdr;
3887 int offset;
3888 int proto = -EINVAL;
3889 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
3890 struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
3891 __be16 frag_off;
3892 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3893 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3894 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3895
3896 sip->sin6_port = 0;
3897
3898 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3899 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3900 if (ip6 == NULL)
3901 return -EINVAL;
3902 sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
3903
3904 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3905 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3906 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3907 if (offset < 0)
3908 return -EINVAL;
3909
3910 proto = nexthdr;
3911 switch (proto) {
3912 case IPPROTO_TCP:
3913 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3914 if (th != NULL)
3915 sip->sin6_port = th->source;
3916 break;
3917 case IPPROTO_UDP:
3918 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3919 if (uh != NULL)
3920 sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
3921 break;
3922 case IPPROTO_DCCP:
3923 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3924 if (dh != NULL)
3925 sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
3926 break;
3927 }
3928 return proto;
3929 }
3930 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3931
3932 /**
3933 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3934 * @sk: socket
3935 * @skb: packet
3936 *
3937 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3938 */
3939 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3940 {
3941 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3942 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3943 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3944 int rc = 0;
3945 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3946 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3947 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3948 #endif
3949 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3950 struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
3951 int proto;
3952 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3953
3954 switch (sk->sk_family) {
3955 case PF_INET:
3956 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3957 /*
3958 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
3959 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
3960 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
3961 */
3962 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
3963 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
3964 goto access_check;
3965 }
3966 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
3967 /*
3968 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3969 */
3970 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3971
3972 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
3973 if (rc == 0)
3974 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3975 else
3976 skp = smack_net_ambient;
3977
3978 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3979
3980 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3981 access_check:
3982 #endif
3983 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3984 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3985 ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
3986 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
3987 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3988 #endif
3989 /*
3990 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
3991 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
3992 * This is the simplist possible security model
3993 * for networking.
3994 */
3995 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3996 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
3997 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3998 if (rc != 0)
3999 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
4000 break;
4001 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4002 case PF_INET6:
4003 proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
4004 if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
4005 break;
4006 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4007 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
4008 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4009 else
4010 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
4011 if (skp == NULL)
4012 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4013 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4014 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4015 ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4016 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4017 ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4018 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4019 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4020 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4021 MAY_WRITE, rc);
4022 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
4023 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4024 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
4025 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
4026 break;
4027 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4028 }
4029
4030 return rc;
4031 }
4032
4033 /**
4034 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
4035 * @sock: the socket
4036 * @optval: user's destination
4037 * @optlen: size thereof
4038 * @len: max thereof
4039 *
4040 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
4041 */
4042 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
4043 char __user *optval,
4044 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4045 {
4046 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4047 char *rcp = "";
4048 int slen = 1;
4049 int rc = 0;
4050
4051 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4052 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4053 rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4054 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4055 }
4056
4057 if (slen > len)
4058 rc = -ERANGE;
4059 else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
4060 rc = -EFAULT;
4061
4062 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
4063 rc = -EFAULT;
4064
4065 return rc;
4066 }
4067
4068
4069 /**
4070 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4071 * @sock: the peer socket
4072 * @skb: packet data
4073 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4074 *
4075 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4076 */
4077 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4078 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4079
4080 {
4081 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4082 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4083 struct smack_known *skp;
4084 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4085 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
4086 int rc;
4087
4088 if (skb != NULL) {
4089 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4090 family = PF_INET;
4091 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4092 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4093 family = PF_INET6;
4094 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4095 }
4096 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4097 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4098
4099 switch (family) {
4100 case PF_UNIX:
4101 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4102 s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4103 break;
4104 case PF_INET:
4105 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4106 s = skb->secmark;
4107 if (s != 0)
4108 break;
4109 #endif
4110 /*
4111 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4112 */
4113 if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
4114 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4115 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4116 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4117 if (rc == 0) {
4118 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4119 s = skp->smk_secid;
4120 }
4121 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4122 break;
4123 case PF_INET6:
4124 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4125 s = skb->secmark;
4126 #endif
4127 break;
4128 }
4129 *secid = s;
4130 if (s == 0)
4131 return -EINVAL;
4132 return 0;
4133 }
4134
4135 /**
4136 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4137 * @sk: child sock
4138 * @parent: parent socket
4139 *
4140 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4141 * is creating the new socket.
4142 */
4143 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4144 {
4145 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4146 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4147
4148 if (sk == NULL ||
4149 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4150 return;
4151
4152 ssp = sk->sk_security;
4153 ssp->smk_in = skp;
4154 ssp->smk_out = skp;
4155 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4156 }
4157
4158 /**
4159 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4160 * @sk: socket involved
4161 * @skb: packet
4162 * @req: unused
4163 *
4164 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4165 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4166 */
4167 static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4168 struct request_sock *req)
4169 {
4170 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4171 struct smack_known *skp;
4172 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4173 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4174 struct sockaddr_in addr;
4175 struct iphdr *hdr;
4176 struct smack_known *hskp;
4177 int rc;
4178 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4179 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4180 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4181 #endif
4182
4183 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4184 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4185 /*
4186 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4187 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4188 * processing on IPv6.
4189 */
4190 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4191 family = PF_INET;
4192 else
4193 return 0;
4194 }
4195 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4196
4197 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4198 /*
4199 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4200 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4201 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4202 */
4203 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
4204 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4205 goto access_check;
4206 }
4207 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
4208
4209 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4210 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4211 if (rc == 0)
4212 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4213 else
4214 skp = &smack_known_huh;
4215 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4216
4217 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4218 access_check:
4219 #endif
4220
4221 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4222 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4223 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4224 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4225 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4226 #endif
4227 /*
4228 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4229 * here. Read access is not required.
4230 */
4231 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4232 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4233 if (rc != 0)
4234 return rc;
4235
4236 /*
4237 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4238 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4239 */
4240 req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4241
4242 /*
4243 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4244 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4245 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4246 */
4247 hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
4248 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4249 rcu_read_lock();
4250 hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4251 rcu_read_unlock();
4252
4253 if (hskp == NULL)
4254 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4255 else
4256 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4257
4258 return rc;
4259 }
4260
4261 /**
4262 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4263 * @sk: the new socket
4264 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4265 *
4266 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4267 */
4268 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4269 const struct request_sock *req)
4270 {
4271 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4272 struct smack_known *skp;
4273
4274 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4275 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4276 ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4277 } else
4278 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4279 }
4280
4281 /*
4282 * Key management security hooks
4283 *
4284 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4285 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4286 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4287 */
4288 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4289
4290 /**
4291 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4292 * @key: object
4293 * @cred: the credentials to use
4294 * @flags: unused
4295 *
4296 * No allocation required
4297 *
4298 * Returns 0
4299 */
4300 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4301 unsigned long flags)
4302 {
4303 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4304
4305 key->security = skp;
4306 return 0;
4307 }
4308
4309 /**
4310 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4311 * @key: the object
4312 *
4313 * Clear the blob pointer
4314 */
4315 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4316 {
4317 key->security = NULL;
4318 }
4319
4320 /**
4321 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4322 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4323 * @cred: the credentials to use
4324 * @perm: requested key permissions
4325 *
4326 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4327 * an error code otherwise
4328 */
4329 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4330 const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
4331 {
4332 struct key *keyp;
4333 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4334 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4335 int request = 0;
4336 int rc;
4337
4338 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4339 if (keyp == NULL)
4340 return -EINVAL;
4341 /*
4342 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4343 * it may do so.
4344 */
4345 if (keyp->security == NULL)
4346 return 0;
4347 /*
4348 * This should not occur
4349 */
4350 if (tkp == NULL)
4351 return -EACCES;
4352 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4353 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4354 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4355 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4356 #endif
4357 if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ)
4358 request = MAY_READ;
4359 if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
4360 request = MAY_WRITE;
4361 rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4362 rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4363 return rc;
4364 }
4365
4366 /*
4367 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4368 * @key points to the key to be queried
4369 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4370 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4371 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4372 * an error.
4373 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4374 */
4375 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4376 {
4377 struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4378 size_t length;
4379 char *copy;
4380
4381 if (key->security == NULL) {
4382 *_buffer = NULL;
4383 return 0;
4384 }
4385
4386 copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4387 if (copy == NULL)
4388 return -ENOMEM;
4389 length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4390
4391 *_buffer = copy;
4392 return length;
4393 }
4394
4395 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4396
4397 /*
4398 * Smack Audit hooks
4399 *
4400 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4401 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4402 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4403 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4404 *
4405 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4406 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4407 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4408 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4409 */
4410 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4411
4412 /**
4413 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4414 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4415 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4416 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4417 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4418 *
4419 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4420 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4421 */
4422 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
4423 {
4424 struct smack_known *skp;
4425 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4426 *rule = NULL;
4427
4428 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4429 return -EINVAL;
4430
4431 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4432 return -EINVAL;
4433
4434 skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4435 if (IS_ERR(skp))
4436 return PTR_ERR(skp);
4437
4438 *rule = skp->smk_known;
4439
4440 return 0;
4441 }
4442
4443 /**
4444 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4445 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4446 *
4447 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4448 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4449 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4450 */
4451 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4452 {
4453 struct audit_field *f;
4454 int i;
4455
4456 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4457 f = &krule->fields[i];
4458
4459 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4460 return 1;
4461 }
4462
4463 return 0;
4464 }
4465
4466 /**
4467 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4468 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4469 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4470 * @op: required testing operator
4471 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4472 * @actx: audit context associated with the check
4473 *
4474 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4475 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4476 */
4477 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
4478 struct audit_context *actx)
4479 {
4480 struct smack_known *skp;
4481 char *rule = vrule;
4482
4483 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4484 WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4485 return -ENOENT;
4486 }
4487
4488 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4489 return 0;
4490
4491 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4492
4493 /*
4494 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4495 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4496 * label.
4497 */
4498 if (op == Audit_equal)
4499 return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4500 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4501 return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4502
4503 return 0;
4504 }
4505
4506 /**
4507 * smack_audit_rule_free - free smack rule representation
4508 * @vrule: rule to be freed.
4509 *
4510 * No memory was allocated.
4511 */
4512 static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
4513 {
4514 /* No-op */
4515 }
4516
4517 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4518
4519 /**
4520 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4521 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4522 */
4523 static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4524 {
4525 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4526 }
4527
4528
4529 /**
4530 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4531 * @secid: incoming integer
4532 * @secdata: destination
4533 * @seclen: how long it is
4534 *
4535 * Exists for networking code.
4536 */
4537 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4538 {
4539 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4540
4541 if (secdata)
4542 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4543 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4544 return 0;
4545 }
4546
4547 /**
4548 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4549 * @secdata: smack label
4550 * @seclen: how long result is
4551 * @secid: outgoing integer
4552 *
4553 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4554 */
4555 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4556 {
4557 struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4558
4559 if (skp)
4560 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4561 else
4562 *secid = 0;
4563 return 0;
4564 }
4565
4566 /**
4567 * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
4568 * @secdata: unused
4569 * @seclen: unused
4570 *
4571 * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
4572 */
4573 static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4574 {
4575 }
4576
4577 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4578 {
4579 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4580 }
4581
4582 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4583 {
4584 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4585 }
4586
4587 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4588 {
4589 int len = 0;
4590 len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
4591
4592 if (len < 0)
4593 return len;
4594 *ctxlen = len;
4595 return 0;
4596 }
4597
4598 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
4599 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
4600 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
4601 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
4602
4603 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
4604 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
4605 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
4606 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
4607 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
4608 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
4609 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
4610
4611 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
4612 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
4613 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
4614
4615 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
4616 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
4617 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
4618 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
4619 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
4620 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
4621 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
4622 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
4623 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
4624 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
4625 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
4626 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
4627 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
4628 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
4629 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
4630 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
4631 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
4632 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
4633
4634 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, smack_file_permission),
4635 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
4636 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
4637 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
4638 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
4639 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
4640 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
4641 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
4642 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
4643 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
4644 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
4645
4646 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
4647
4648 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
4649 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
4650 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
4651 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
4652 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
4653 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
4654 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
4655 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
4656 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
4657 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
4658 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
4659 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
4660 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
4661 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
4662 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
4663 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
4664 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
4665 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait),
4666 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
4667
4668 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
4669 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
4670
4671 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
4672 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
4673
4674 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security),
4675 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security),
4676 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
4677 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
4678 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
4679 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
4680
4681 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security),
4682 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security),
4683 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
4684 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
4685 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
4686
4687 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security),
4688 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security),
4689 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
4690 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
4691 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
4692
4693 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
4694
4695 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
4696 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
4697
4698 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
4699 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
4700
4701 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
4702 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4703 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
4704 #endif
4705 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
4706 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
4707 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
4708 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
4709 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
4710 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
4711 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
4712 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
4713 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
4714 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
4715
4716 /* key management security hooks */
4717 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4718 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
4719 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
4720 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
4721 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
4722 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4723
4724 /* Audit hooks */
4725 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4726 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
4727 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
4728 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
4729 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, smack_audit_rule_free),
4730 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4731
4732 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
4733 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
4734 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
4735 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
4736 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
4737 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
4738 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
4739 };
4740
4741
4742 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
4743 {
4744 /*
4745 * Initialize rule list locks
4746 */
4747 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
4748 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
4749 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
4750 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
4751 mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock);
4752 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
4753 /*
4754 * Initialize rule lists
4755 */
4756 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
4757 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
4758 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
4759 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
4760 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules);
4761 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
4762 /*
4763 * Create the known labels list
4764 */
4765 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
4766 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
4767 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
4768 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
4769 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_invalid);
4770 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
4771 }
4772
4773 /**
4774 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
4775 *
4776 * Returns 0
4777 */
4778 static __init int smack_init(void)
4779 {
4780 struct cred *cred;
4781 struct task_smack *tsp;
4782
4783 if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
4784 return 0;
4785
4786 smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
4787 if (!smack_inode_cache)
4788 return -ENOMEM;
4789
4790 tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
4791 GFP_KERNEL);
4792 if (tsp == NULL) {
4793 kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
4794 return -ENOMEM;
4795 }
4796
4797 smack_enabled = 1;
4798
4799 pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
4800 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4801 pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
4802 #endif
4803 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4804 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
4805 #endif
4806 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4807 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
4808 #endif
4809
4810 /*
4811 * Set the security state for the initial task.
4812 */
4813 cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
4814 cred->security = tsp;
4815
4816 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
4817 init_smack_known_list();
4818
4819 /*
4820 * Register with LSM
4821 */
4822 security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks));
4823
4824 return 0;
4825 }
4826
4827 /*
4828 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
4829 * all processes and objects when they are created.
4830 */
4831 security_initcall(smack_init);
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