Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi...
[deliverable/linux.git] / security / smack / smack_lsm.c
1 /*
2 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors:
7 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
8 * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
9 *
10 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
14 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
15 *
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19 */
20
21 #include <linux/xattr.h>
22 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
23 #include <linux/mount.h>
24 #include <linux/stat.h>
25 #include <linux/kd.h>
26 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
27 #include <linux/ip.h>
28 #include <linux/tcp.h>
29 #include <linux/udp.h>
30 #include <linux/dccp.h>
31 #include <linux/slab.h>
32 #include <linux/mutex.h>
33 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
34 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
35 #include <net/ip.h>
36 #include <net/ipv6.h>
37 #include <linux/audit.h>
38 #include <linux/magic.h>
39 #include <linux/dcache.h>
40 #include <linux/personality.h>
41 #include <linux/msg.h>
42 #include <linux/shm.h>
43 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
44 #include <linux/parser.h>
45 #include "smack.h"
46
47 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
48 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
49
50 #define SMK_CONNECTING 0
51 #define SMK_RECEIVING 1
52 #define SMK_SENDING 2
53
54 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
55 static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
56 #endif
57 static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
58 int smack_enabled;
59
60 static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = {
61 {Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"},
62 {Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"},
63 {Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"},
64 {Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"},
65 {Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"},
66 {Opt_error, NULL},
67 };
68
69 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
70 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
71 "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
72 "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
73 "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
74 "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
75 };
76
77 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
78 {
79 int i = 0;
80
81 if (mode & MAY_READ)
82 s[i++] = 'r';
83 if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
84 s[i++] = 'w';
85 if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
86 s[i++] = 'x';
87 if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
88 s[i++] = 'a';
89 if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
90 s[i++] = 't';
91 if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
92 s[i++] = 'l';
93 if (i == 0)
94 s[i++] = '-';
95 s[i] = '\0';
96 }
97 #endif
98
99 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
100 static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
101 struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
102 {
103 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
104
105 if (rc <= 0)
106 return rc;
107 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
108 rc = 0;
109
110 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
111 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
112 sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
113 return 0;
114 }
115 #else
116 #define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
117 #endif
118
119 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
120 static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
121 int mode, int rc)
122 {
123 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
124 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
125
126 if (rc <= 0)
127 return rc;
128 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
129 rc = 0;
130
131 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
132 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
133 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
134 acc, current->comm, note);
135 return 0;
136 }
137 #else
138 #define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
139 #endif
140
141 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
142 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
143 {
144 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
145 struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
146 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
147
148 if (rc <= 0)
149 return rc;
150 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
151 rc = 0;
152
153 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
154 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
155 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
156 current->comm, otp->comm);
157 return 0;
158 }
159 #else
160 #define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
161 #endif
162
163 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
164 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
165 {
166 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
167 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
168 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
169
170 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
171 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
172 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
173
174 if (rc <= 0)
175 return rc;
176 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
177 rc = 0;
178 if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
179 (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
180 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
181
182 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
183
184 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
185 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
186 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
187 return 0;
188 }
189 #else
190 #define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
191 #endif
192
193 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
194 static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
195 {
196 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
197 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
198 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
199 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
200 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
201
202 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
203 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
204 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
205
206 if (rc <= 0)
207 return rc;
208 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
209 rc = 0;
210
211 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
212 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
213 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
214 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
215 current->comm);
216 return 0;
217 }
218 #else
219 #define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
220 #endif
221
222 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
223 static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
224 int mode, int rc)
225 {
226 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
227 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
228 struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
229 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
230 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
231
232 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
233 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
234 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
235
236 if (rc <= 0)
237 return rc;
238 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
239 rc = 0;
240
241 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
242 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
243 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
244 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
245 current->comm);
246 return 0;
247 }
248 #else
249 #define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
250 #endif
251
252 /**
253 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
254 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
255 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
256 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
257 *
258 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
259 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
260 */
261 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
262 struct dentry *dp)
263 {
264 int rc;
265 char *buffer;
266 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
267
268 if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
269 return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
270
271 buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
272 if (buffer == NULL)
273 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
274
275 rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
276 if (rc < 0)
277 skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
278 else if (rc == 0)
279 skp = NULL;
280 else
281 skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
282
283 kfree(buffer);
284
285 return skp;
286 }
287
288 /**
289 * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
290 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
291 *
292 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
293 */
294 static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
295 {
296 struct inode_smack *isp;
297
298 isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
299 if (isp == NULL)
300 return NULL;
301
302 isp->smk_inode = skp;
303 isp->smk_flags = 0;
304 mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
305
306 return isp;
307 }
308
309 /**
310 * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
311 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
312 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
313 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
314 *
315 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
316 */
317 static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
318 struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
319 {
320 struct task_smack *tsp;
321
322 tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
323 if (tsp == NULL)
324 return NULL;
325
326 tsp->smk_task = task;
327 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
328 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
329 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
330 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
331
332 return tsp;
333 }
334
335 /**
336 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
337 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
338 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
339 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
340 *
341 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
342 */
343 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
344 gfp_t gfp)
345 {
346 struct smack_rule *nrp;
347 struct smack_rule *orp;
348 int rc = 0;
349
350 INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
351
352 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
353 nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
354 if (nrp == NULL) {
355 rc = -ENOMEM;
356 break;
357 }
358 *nrp = *orp;
359 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
360 }
361 return rc;
362 }
363
364 /**
365 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
366 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
367 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
368 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
369 *
370 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
371 */
372 static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
373 gfp_t gfp)
374 {
375 struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
376 struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
377
378 INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
379
380 list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
381 nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
382 if (nklep == NULL) {
383 smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
384 return -ENOMEM;
385 }
386 nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
387 list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
388 }
389
390 return 0;
391 }
392
393 /**
394 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
395 * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
396 *
397 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
398 */
399 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
400 {
401 switch (mode) {
402 case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
403 return MAY_READ;
404 case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
405 return MAY_READWRITE;
406 }
407
408 return 0;
409 }
410
411 /**
412 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
413 * @tracer: tracer process
414 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
415 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
416 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
417 *
418 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
419 */
420 static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
421 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
422 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
423 {
424 int rc;
425 struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
426 struct task_smack *tsp;
427 struct smack_known *tracer_known;
428
429 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
430 smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
431 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
432 saip = &ad;
433 }
434
435 rcu_read_lock();
436 tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
437 tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
438
439 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
440 (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
441 smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
442 if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
443 rc = 0;
444 else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
445 rc = -EACCES;
446 else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
447 rc = 0;
448 else
449 rc = -EACCES;
450
451 if (saip)
452 smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
453 tracee_known->smk_known,
454 0, rc, saip);
455
456 rcu_read_unlock();
457 return rc;
458 }
459
460 /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
461 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
462
463 rcu_read_unlock();
464 return rc;
465 }
466
467 /*
468 * LSM hooks.
469 * We he, that is fun!
470 */
471
472 /**
473 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
474 * @ctp: child task pointer
475 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
476 *
477 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
478 *
479 * Do the capability checks.
480 */
481 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
482 {
483 struct smack_known *skp;
484
485 skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
486
487 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
488 }
489
490 /**
491 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
492 * @ptp: parent task pointer
493 *
494 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
495 *
496 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
497 */
498 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
499 {
500 int rc;
501 struct smack_known *skp;
502
503 skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
504
505 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
506 return rc;
507 }
508
509 /**
510 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
511 * @type: message type
512 *
513 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
514 */
515 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
516 {
517 int rc = 0;
518 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
519
520 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
521 return 0;
522
523 if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
524 rc = -EACCES;
525
526 return rc;
527 }
528
529
530 /*
531 * Superblock Hooks.
532 */
533
534 /**
535 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
536 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
537 *
538 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
539 */
540 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
541 {
542 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
543
544 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
545
546 if (sbsp == NULL)
547 return -ENOMEM;
548
549 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
550 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
551 sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
552 sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
553 /*
554 * smk_initialized will be zero from kzalloc.
555 */
556 sb->s_security = sbsp;
557
558 return 0;
559 }
560
561 /**
562 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
563 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
564 *
565 */
566 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
567 {
568 kfree(sb->s_security);
569 sb->s_security = NULL;
570 }
571
572 /**
573 * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
574 * @orig: where to start
575 * @smackopts: mount options string
576 *
577 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
578 *
579 * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
580 * options list.
581 */
582 static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
583 {
584 char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
585
586 otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
587 if (otheropts == NULL)
588 return -ENOMEM;
589
590 for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
591 if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
592 dp = smackopts;
593 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
594 dp = smackopts;
595 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
596 dp = smackopts;
597 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
598 dp = smackopts;
599 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp)
600 dp = smackopts;
601 else
602 dp = otheropts;
603
604 commap = strchr(cp, ',');
605 if (commap != NULL)
606 *commap = '\0';
607
608 if (*dp != '\0')
609 strcat(dp, ",");
610 strcat(dp, cp);
611 }
612
613 strcpy(orig, otheropts);
614 free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
615
616 return 0;
617 }
618
619 /**
620 * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options
621 * @options: mount options string
622 * @opts: where to store converted mount opts
623 *
624 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
625 *
626 * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format
627 */
628 static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
629 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
630 {
631 char *p;
632 char *fsdefault = NULL;
633 char *fsfloor = NULL;
634 char *fshat = NULL;
635 char *fsroot = NULL;
636 char *fstransmute = NULL;
637 int rc = -ENOMEM;
638 int num_mnt_opts = 0;
639 int token;
640
641 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
642
643 if (!options)
644 return 0;
645
646 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
647 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
648
649 if (!*p)
650 continue;
651
652 token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
653
654 switch (token) {
655 case Opt_fsdefault:
656 if (fsdefault)
657 goto out_opt_err;
658 fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
659 if (!fsdefault)
660 goto out_err;
661 break;
662 case Opt_fsfloor:
663 if (fsfloor)
664 goto out_opt_err;
665 fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
666 if (!fsfloor)
667 goto out_err;
668 break;
669 case Opt_fshat:
670 if (fshat)
671 goto out_opt_err;
672 fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
673 if (!fshat)
674 goto out_err;
675 break;
676 case Opt_fsroot:
677 if (fsroot)
678 goto out_opt_err;
679 fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
680 if (!fsroot)
681 goto out_err;
682 break;
683 case Opt_fstransmute:
684 if (fstransmute)
685 goto out_opt_err;
686 fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
687 if (!fstransmute)
688 goto out_err;
689 break;
690 default:
691 rc = -EINVAL;
692 pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n");
693 goto out_err;
694 }
695 }
696
697 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
698 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
699 goto out_err;
700
701 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
702 GFP_ATOMIC);
703 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
704 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
705 goto out_err;
706 }
707
708 if (fsdefault) {
709 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
710 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
711 }
712 if (fsfloor) {
713 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
714 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
715 }
716 if (fshat) {
717 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
718 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
719 }
720 if (fsroot) {
721 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
722 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
723 }
724 if (fstransmute) {
725 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
726 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
727 }
728
729 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
730 return 0;
731
732 out_opt_err:
733 rc = -EINVAL;
734 pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
735
736 out_err:
737 kfree(fsdefault);
738 kfree(fsfloor);
739 kfree(fshat);
740 kfree(fsroot);
741 kfree(fstransmute);
742 return rc;
743 }
744
745 /**
746 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
747 * @sb: the file system superblock
748 * @opts: Smack mount options
749 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
750 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
751 *
752 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
753 *
754 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
755 * labels.
756 */
757 static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
758 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
759 unsigned long kern_flags,
760 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
761 {
762 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
763 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
764 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
765 struct inode_smack *isp;
766 struct smack_known *skp;
767 int i;
768 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
769 int transmute = 0;
770
771 if (sp->smk_initialized)
772 return 0;
773
774 sp->smk_initialized = 1;
775
776 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
777 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
778 case FSDEFAULT_MNT:
779 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
780 if (IS_ERR(skp))
781 return PTR_ERR(skp);
782 sp->smk_default = skp;
783 break;
784 case FSFLOOR_MNT:
785 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
786 if (IS_ERR(skp))
787 return PTR_ERR(skp);
788 sp->smk_floor = skp;
789 break;
790 case FSHAT_MNT:
791 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
792 if (IS_ERR(skp))
793 return PTR_ERR(skp);
794 sp->smk_hat = skp;
795 break;
796 case FSROOT_MNT:
797 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
798 if (IS_ERR(skp))
799 return PTR_ERR(skp);
800 sp->smk_root = skp;
801 break;
802 case FSTRANS_MNT:
803 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
804 if (IS_ERR(skp))
805 return PTR_ERR(skp);
806 sp->smk_root = skp;
807 transmute = 1;
808 break;
809 default:
810 break;
811 }
812 }
813
814 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
815 /*
816 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
817 */
818 if (num_opts)
819 return -EPERM;
820 /*
821 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
822 */
823 skp = smk_of_current();
824 sp->smk_root = skp;
825 sp->smk_default = skp;
826 }
827
828 /*
829 * Initialize the root inode.
830 */
831 isp = inode->i_security;
832 if (isp == NULL) {
833 isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
834 if (isp == NULL)
835 return -ENOMEM;
836 inode->i_security = isp;
837 } else
838 isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
839
840 if (transmute)
841 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
842
843 return 0;
844 }
845
846 /**
847 * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
848 * @sb: the file system superblock
849 * @flags: the mount flags
850 * @data: the smack mount options
851 *
852 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
853 */
854 static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
855 {
856 int rc = 0;
857 char *options = data;
858 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
859
860 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
861
862 if (!options)
863 goto out;
864
865 rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
866 if (rc)
867 goto out_err;
868
869 out:
870 rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
871
872 out_err:
873 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
874 return rc;
875 }
876
877 /**
878 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
879 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
880 *
881 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
882 * and error code otherwise
883 */
884 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
885 {
886 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
887 int rc;
888 struct smk_audit_info ad;
889
890 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
891 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
892
893 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
894 rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
895 return rc;
896 }
897
898 /*
899 * BPRM hooks
900 */
901
902 /**
903 * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
904 * @bprm: the exec information
905 *
906 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
907 */
908 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
909 {
910 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
911 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
912 struct inode_smack *isp;
913 int rc;
914
915 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
916 return 0;
917
918 isp = inode->i_security;
919 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
920 return 0;
921
922 if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
923 struct task_struct *tracer;
924 rc = 0;
925
926 rcu_read_lock();
927 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
928 if (likely(tracer != NULL))
929 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
930 isp->smk_task,
931 PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
932 __func__);
933 rcu_read_unlock();
934
935 if (rc != 0)
936 return rc;
937 } else if (bprm->unsafe)
938 return -EPERM;
939
940 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
941 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
942
943 return 0;
944 }
945
946 /**
947 * smack_bprm_committing_creds - Prepare to install the new credentials
948 * from bprm.
949 *
950 * @bprm: binprm for exec
951 */
952 static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
953 {
954 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
955
956 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
957 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
958 }
959
960 /**
961 * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec.
962 * @bprm: binprm for exec
963 *
964 * Returns 0 on success.
965 */
966 static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
967 {
968 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
969
970 if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
971 return 1;
972
973 return 0;
974 }
975
976 /*
977 * Inode hooks
978 */
979
980 /**
981 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
982 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
983 *
984 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
985 */
986 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
987 {
988 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
989
990 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
991 if (inode->i_security == NULL)
992 return -ENOMEM;
993 return 0;
994 }
995
996 /**
997 * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
998 * @inode: the inode with a blob
999 *
1000 * Clears the blob pointer in inode
1001 */
1002 static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1003 {
1004 kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, inode->i_security);
1005 inode->i_security = NULL;
1006 }
1007
1008 /**
1009 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
1010 * @inode: the newly created inode
1011 * @dir: containing directory object
1012 * @qstr: unused
1013 * @name: where to put the attribute name
1014 * @value: where to put the attribute value
1015 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
1016 *
1017 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
1018 */
1019 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1020 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
1021 void **value, size_t *len)
1022 {
1023 struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
1024 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1025 struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1026 struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
1027 int may;
1028
1029 if (name)
1030 *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
1031
1032 if (value && len) {
1033 rcu_read_lock();
1034 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
1035 &skp->smk_rules);
1036 rcu_read_unlock();
1037
1038 /*
1039 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
1040 * the directory requests transmutation then
1041 * by all means transmute.
1042 * Mark the inode as changed.
1043 */
1044 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
1045 smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
1046 isp = dsp;
1047 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
1048 }
1049
1050 *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1051 if (*value == NULL)
1052 return -ENOMEM;
1053
1054 *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1055 }
1056
1057 return 0;
1058 }
1059
1060 /**
1061 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1062 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1063 * @dir: unused
1064 * @new_dentry: the new object
1065 *
1066 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1067 */
1068 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1069 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1070 {
1071 struct smack_known *isp;
1072 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1073 int rc;
1074
1075 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1076 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1077
1078 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1079 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1080 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1081
1082 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1083 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1084 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1085 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1086 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1087 }
1088
1089 return rc;
1090 }
1091
1092 /**
1093 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1094 * @dir: containing directory object
1095 * @dentry: file to unlink
1096 *
1097 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1098 * and the object, error code otherwise
1099 */
1100 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1101 {
1102 struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1103 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1104 int rc;
1105
1106 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1107 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1108
1109 /*
1110 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1111 */
1112 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1113 rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1114 if (rc == 0) {
1115 /*
1116 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1117 */
1118 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1119 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1120 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1121 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1122 }
1123 return rc;
1124 }
1125
1126 /**
1127 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1128 * @dir: containing directory object
1129 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1130 *
1131 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1132 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1133 */
1134 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1135 {
1136 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1137 int rc;
1138
1139 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1140 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1141
1142 /*
1143 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1144 */
1145 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1146 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1147 if (rc == 0) {
1148 /*
1149 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1150 */
1151 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1152 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1153 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1154 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1155 }
1156
1157 return rc;
1158 }
1159
1160 /**
1161 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1162 * @old_inode: unused
1163 * @old_dentry: the old object
1164 * @new_inode: unused
1165 * @new_dentry: the new object
1166 *
1167 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1168 * new directories.
1169 *
1170 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1171 */
1172 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1173 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1174 struct inode *new_inode,
1175 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1176 {
1177 int rc;
1178 struct smack_known *isp;
1179 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1180
1181 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1182 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1183
1184 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1185 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1186 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1187
1188 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1189 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1190 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1191 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1192 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1193 }
1194 return rc;
1195 }
1196
1197 /**
1198 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1199 * @inode: the inode in question
1200 * @mask: the access requested
1201 *
1202 * This is the important Smack hook.
1203 *
1204 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
1205 */
1206 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1207 {
1208 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1209 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1210 int rc;
1211
1212 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1213 /*
1214 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1215 */
1216 if (mask == 0)
1217 return 0;
1218
1219 /* May be droppable after audit */
1220 if (no_block)
1221 return -ECHILD;
1222 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1223 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1224 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1225 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1226 return rc;
1227 }
1228
1229 /**
1230 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1231 * @dentry: the object
1232 * @iattr: for the force flag
1233 *
1234 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1235 */
1236 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
1237 {
1238 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1239 int rc;
1240
1241 /*
1242 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1243 */
1244 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1245 return 0;
1246 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1247 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1248
1249 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1250 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1251 return rc;
1252 }
1253
1254 /**
1255 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1256 * @mnt: vfsmount of the object
1257 * @dentry: the object
1258 *
1259 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1260 */
1261 static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1262 {
1263 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1264 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1265 int rc;
1266
1267 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1268 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1269 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1270 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1271 return rc;
1272 }
1273
1274 /**
1275 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1276 * @dentry: the object
1277 * @name: name of the attribute
1278 * @value: value of the attribute
1279 * @size: size of the value
1280 * @flags: unused
1281 *
1282 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1283 *
1284 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1285 */
1286 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1287 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1288 {
1289 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1290 struct smack_known *skp;
1291 int check_priv = 0;
1292 int check_import = 0;
1293 int check_star = 0;
1294 int rc = 0;
1295
1296 /*
1297 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1298 */
1299 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1300 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1301 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1302 check_priv = 1;
1303 check_import = 1;
1304 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1305 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1306 check_priv = 1;
1307 check_import = 1;
1308 check_star = 1;
1309 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1310 check_priv = 1;
1311 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1312 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1313 rc = -EINVAL;
1314 } else
1315 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1316
1317 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1318 rc = -EPERM;
1319
1320 if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1321 skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1322 if (IS_ERR(skp))
1323 rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
1324 else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1325 (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1326 rc = -EINVAL;
1327 }
1328
1329 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1330 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1331
1332 if (rc == 0) {
1333 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1334 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1335 }
1336
1337 return rc;
1338 }
1339
1340 /**
1341 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1342 * @dentry: object
1343 * @name: attribute name
1344 * @value: attribute value
1345 * @size: attribute size
1346 * @flags: unused
1347 *
1348 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1349 * in the master label list.
1350 */
1351 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1352 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1353 {
1354 struct smack_known *skp;
1355 struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1356
1357 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1358 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1359 return;
1360 }
1361
1362 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1363 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1364 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1365 isp->smk_inode = skp;
1366 else
1367 isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid;
1368 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1369 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1370 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1371 isp->smk_task = skp;
1372 else
1373 isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
1374 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1375 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1376 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1377 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1378 else
1379 isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
1380 }
1381
1382 return;
1383 }
1384
1385 /**
1386 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1387 * @dentry: the object
1388 * @name: unused
1389 *
1390 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1391 */
1392 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1393 {
1394 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1395 int rc;
1396
1397 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1398 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1399
1400 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1401 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1402 return rc;
1403 }
1404
1405 /**
1406 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1407 * @dentry: the object
1408 * @name: name of the attribute
1409 *
1410 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1411 *
1412 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1413 */
1414 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1415 {
1416 struct inode_smack *isp;
1417 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1418 int rc = 0;
1419
1420 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1421 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1422 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1423 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1424 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1425 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1426 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1427 rc = -EPERM;
1428 } else
1429 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
1430
1431 if (rc != 0)
1432 return rc;
1433
1434 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1435 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1436
1437 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1438 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1439 if (rc != 0)
1440 return rc;
1441
1442 isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1443 /*
1444 * Don't do anything special for these.
1445 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1446 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1447 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC
1448 */
1449 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
1450 isp->smk_task = NULL;
1451 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1452 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1453 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1454 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1455
1456 return 0;
1457 }
1458
1459 /**
1460 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1461 * @inode: the object
1462 * @name: attribute name
1463 * @buffer: where to put the result
1464 * @alloc: unused
1465 *
1466 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1467 */
1468 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
1469 const char *name, void **buffer,
1470 bool alloc)
1471 {
1472 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1473 struct socket *sock;
1474 struct super_block *sbp;
1475 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
1476 struct smack_known *isp;
1477 int ilen;
1478 int rc = 0;
1479
1480 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
1481 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1482 ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1483 *buffer = isp->smk_known;
1484 return ilen;
1485 }
1486
1487 /*
1488 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1489 */
1490 sbp = ip->i_sb;
1491 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1492 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1493
1494 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1495 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1496 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1497
1498 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1499
1500 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1501 isp = ssp->smk_in;
1502 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1503 isp = ssp->smk_out;
1504 else
1505 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1506
1507 ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1508 if (rc == 0) {
1509 *buffer = isp->smk_known;
1510 rc = ilen;
1511 }
1512
1513 return rc;
1514 }
1515
1516
1517 /**
1518 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1519 * @inode: the object
1520 * @buffer: where they go
1521 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1522 */
1523 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1524 size_t buffer_size)
1525 {
1526 int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1527
1528 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1529 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1530
1531 return len;
1532 }
1533
1534 /**
1535 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1536 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1537 * @secid: where result will be saved
1538 */
1539 static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1540 {
1541 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1542
1543 *secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
1544 }
1545
1546 /*
1547 * File Hooks
1548 */
1549
1550 /**
1551 * smack_file_permission - Smack check on file operations
1552 * @file: unused
1553 * @mask: unused
1554 *
1555 * Returns 0
1556 *
1557 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1558 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1559 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1560 *
1561 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1562 * label changing that SELinux does.
1563 */
1564 static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
1565 {
1566 return 0;
1567 }
1568
1569 /**
1570 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1571 * @file: the object
1572 *
1573 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1574 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1575 *
1576 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1577 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1578 *
1579 * Returns 0
1580 */
1581 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1582 {
1583 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1584
1585 file->f_security = skp;
1586 return 0;
1587 }
1588
1589 /**
1590 * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
1591 * @file: the object
1592 *
1593 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1594 * label list, so no memory is freed.
1595 */
1596 static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
1597 {
1598 file->f_security = NULL;
1599 }
1600
1601 /**
1602 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1603 * @file: the object
1604 * @cmd: what to do
1605 * @arg: unused
1606 *
1607 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1608 *
1609 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1610 */
1611 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1612 unsigned long arg)
1613 {
1614 int rc = 0;
1615 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1616 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1617
1618 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1619 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1620
1621 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1622 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1623 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1624 }
1625
1626 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1627 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1628 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1629 }
1630
1631 return rc;
1632 }
1633
1634 /**
1635 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1636 * @file: the object
1637 * @cmd: unused
1638 *
1639 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1640 */
1641 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1642 {
1643 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1644 int rc;
1645 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1646
1647 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1648 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1649 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1650 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1651 return rc;
1652 }
1653
1654 /**
1655 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1656 * @file: the object
1657 * @cmd: what action to check
1658 * @arg: unused
1659 *
1660 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1661 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1662 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1663 *
1664 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1665 */
1666 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1667 unsigned long arg)
1668 {
1669 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1670 int rc = 0;
1671 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1672
1673 switch (cmd) {
1674 case F_GETLK:
1675 break;
1676 case F_SETLK:
1677 case F_SETLKW:
1678 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1679 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1680 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1681 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1682 break;
1683 case F_SETOWN:
1684 case F_SETSIG:
1685 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1686 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1687 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1688 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1689 break;
1690 default:
1691 break;
1692 }
1693
1694 return rc;
1695 }
1696
1697 /**
1698 * smack_mmap_file :
1699 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1700 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1701 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1702 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1703 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1704 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1705 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1706 */
1707 static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1708 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1709 unsigned long flags)
1710 {
1711 struct smack_known *skp;
1712 struct smack_known *mkp;
1713 struct smack_rule *srp;
1714 struct task_smack *tsp;
1715 struct smack_known *okp;
1716 struct inode_smack *isp;
1717 int may;
1718 int mmay;
1719 int tmay;
1720 int rc;
1721
1722 if (file == NULL)
1723 return 0;
1724
1725 isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
1726 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1727 return 0;
1728 mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1729
1730 tsp = current_security();
1731 skp = smk_of_current();
1732 rc = 0;
1733
1734 rcu_read_lock();
1735 /*
1736 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1737 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1738 * to that rule's object label.
1739 */
1740 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1741 okp = srp->smk_object;
1742 /*
1743 * Matching labels always allows access.
1744 */
1745 if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1746 continue;
1747 /*
1748 * If there is a matching local rule take
1749 * that into account as well.
1750 */
1751 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1752 okp->smk_known,
1753 &tsp->smk_rules);
1754 if (may == -ENOENT)
1755 may = srp->smk_access;
1756 else
1757 may &= srp->smk_access;
1758 /*
1759 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1760 * possibly have less access.
1761 */
1762 if (may == 0)
1763 continue;
1764
1765 /*
1766 * Fetch the global list entry.
1767 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1768 * can't have as much access as current.
1769 */
1770 mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1771 &mkp->smk_rules);
1772 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1773 rc = -EACCES;
1774 break;
1775 }
1776 /*
1777 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1778 * potential access, too.
1779 */
1780 tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1781 &tsp->smk_rules);
1782 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1783 mmay &= tmay;
1784
1785 /*
1786 * If there is any access available to current that is
1787 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1788 * deny access.
1789 */
1790 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1791 rc = -EACCES;
1792 break;
1793 }
1794 }
1795
1796 rcu_read_unlock();
1797
1798 return rc;
1799 }
1800
1801 /**
1802 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1803 * @file: object in question
1804 *
1805 */
1806 static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1807 {
1808 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1809 }
1810
1811 /**
1812 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1813 * @tsk: The target task
1814 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1815 * @signum: unused
1816 *
1817 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1818 *
1819 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1820 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1821 */
1822 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1823 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1824 {
1825 struct smack_known *skp;
1826 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
1827 struct file *file;
1828 int rc;
1829 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1830
1831 /*
1832 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1833 */
1834 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1835
1836 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1837 skp = file->f_security;
1838 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
1839 rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1840 if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1841 rc = 0;
1842
1843 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1844 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1845 smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
1846 return rc;
1847 }
1848
1849 /**
1850 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1851 * @file: the object
1852 *
1853 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1854 */
1855 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1856 {
1857 int rc;
1858 int may = 0;
1859 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1860 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1861 struct socket *sock;
1862 struct task_smack *tsp;
1863 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1864
1865 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1866 return 0;
1867
1868 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1869 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1870
1871 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
1872 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1873 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1874 tsp = current_security();
1875 /*
1876 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1877 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
1878 * write to the receiving process don't accept
1879 * the passed socket.
1880 */
1881 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1882 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1883 if (rc < 0)
1884 return rc;
1885 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1886 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1887 return rc;
1888 }
1889 /*
1890 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1891 */
1892 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1893 may = MAY_READ;
1894 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1895 may |= MAY_WRITE;
1896
1897 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
1898 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1899 return rc;
1900 }
1901
1902 /**
1903 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
1904 * @file: the object
1905 * @cred: task credential
1906 *
1907 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1908 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
1909 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
1910 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
1911 *
1912 * Returns 0
1913 */
1914 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
1915 {
1916 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1917 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1918 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1919 int rc;
1920
1921 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1922 return 0;
1923
1924 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1925 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1926 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1927 rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
1928
1929 return rc;
1930 }
1931
1932 /*
1933 * Task hooks
1934 */
1935
1936 /**
1937 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1938 * @new: the new credentials
1939 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1940 *
1941 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1942 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1943 * complete without error.
1944 */
1945 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1946 {
1947 struct task_smack *tsp;
1948
1949 tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
1950 if (tsp == NULL)
1951 return -ENOMEM;
1952
1953 cred->security = tsp;
1954
1955 return 0;
1956 }
1957
1958
1959 /**
1960 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1961 * @cred: the credentials in question
1962 *
1963 */
1964 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1965 {
1966 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1967 struct smack_rule *rp;
1968 struct list_head *l;
1969 struct list_head *n;
1970
1971 if (tsp == NULL)
1972 return;
1973 cred->security = NULL;
1974
1975 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
1976
1977 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
1978 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
1979 list_del(&rp->list);
1980 kfree(rp);
1981 }
1982 kfree(tsp);
1983 }
1984
1985 /**
1986 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
1987 * @new: the new credentials
1988 * @old: the original credentials
1989 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1990 *
1991 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
1992 */
1993 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1994 gfp_t gfp)
1995 {
1996 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
1997 struct task_smack *new_tsp;
1998 int rc;
1999
2000 new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
2001 if (new_tsp == NULL)
2002 return -ENOMEM;
2003
2004 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
2005 if (rc != 0)
2006 return rc;
2007
2008 rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
2009 gfp);
2010 if (rc != 0)
2011 return rc;
2012
2013 new->security = new_tsp;
2014 return 0;
2015 }
2016
2017 /**
2018 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
2019 * @new: the new credentials
2020 * @old: the original credentials
2021 *
2022 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
2023 */
2024 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2025 {
2026 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2027 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2028
2029 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
2030 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
2031 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
2032 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
2033
2034
2035 /* cbs copy rule list */
2036 }
2037
2038 /**
2039 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
2040 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
2041 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
2042 *
2043 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
2044 */
2045 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
2046 {
2047 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2048 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2049
2050 if (skp == NULL)
2051 return -EINVAL;
2052
2053 new_tsp->smk_task = skp;
2054 return 0;
2055 }
2056
2057 /**
2058 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2059 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2060 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2061 *
2062 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2063 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2064 */
2065 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2066 struct inode *inode)
2067 {
2068 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2069 struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
2070
2071 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2072 tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2073 return 0;
2074 }
2075
2076 /**
2077 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2078 * @p: the task object
2079 * @access: the access requested
2080 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2081 *
2082 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2083 */
2084 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2085 const char *caller)
2086 {
2087 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2088 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2089 int rc;
2090
2091 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2092 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2093 rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2094 rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2095 return rc;
2096 }
2097
2098 /**
2099 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2100 * @p: the task object
2101 * @pgid: unused
2102 *
2103 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2104 */
2105 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2106 {
2107 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2108 }
2109
2110 /**
2111 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2112 * @p: the object task
2113 *
2114 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2115 */
2116 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2117 {
2118 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2119 }
2120
2121 /**
2122 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2123 * @p: the object task
2124 *
2125 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2126 */
2127 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2128 {
2129 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2130 }
2131
2132 /**
2133 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
2134 * @p: the object task
2135 * @secid: where to put the result
2136 *
2137 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2138 */
2139 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2140 {
2141 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2142
2143 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2144 }
2145
2146 /**
2147 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2148 * @p: the task object
2149 * @nice: unused
2150 *
2151 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2152 */
2153 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2154 {
2155 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2156 }
2157
2158 /**
2159 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2160 * @p: the task object
2161 * @ioprio: unused
2162 *
2163 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2164 */
2165 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2166 {
2167 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2168 }
2169
2170 /**
2171 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2172 * @p: the task object
2173 *
2174 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2175 */
2176 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2177 {
2178 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2179 }
2180
2181 /**
2182 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2183 * @p: the task object
2184 * @policy: unused
2185 * @lp: unused
2186 *
2187 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2188 */
2189 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2190 {
2191 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2192 }
2193
2194 /**
2195 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2196 * @p: the task object
2197 *
2198 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2199 */
2200 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2201 {
2202 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2203 }
2204
2205 /**
2206 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2207 * @p: the task object
2208 *
2209 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2210 */
2211 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2212 {
2213 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2214 }
2215
2216 /**
2217 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2218 * @p: the task object
2219 * @info: unused
2220 * @sig: unused
2221 * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
2222 *
2223 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2224 *
2225 * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
2226 * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
2227 */
2228 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2229 int sig, u32 secid)
2230 {
2231 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2232 struct smack_known *skp;
2233 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2234 int rc;
2235
2236 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2237 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2238 /*
2239 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2240 * can write the receiver.
2241 */
2242 if (secid == 0) {
2243 rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2244 rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2245 return rc;
2246 }
2247 /*
2248 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
2249 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2250 * we can't take privilege into account.
2251 */
2252 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2253 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2254 rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2255 return rc;
2256 }
2257
2258 /**
2259 * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
2260 * @p: task to wait for
2261 *
2262 * Returns 0
2263 */
2264 static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2265 {
2266 /*
2267 * Allow the operation to succeed.
2268 * Zombies are bad.
2269 * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs
2270 * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent
2271 * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still
2272 * may expect to know when the child exits.
2273 */
2274 return 0;
2275 }
2276
2277 /**
2278 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2279 * @p: task to copy from
2280 * @inode: inode to copy to
2281 *
2282 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2283 */
2284 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2285 {
2286 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2287 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2288
2289 isp->smk_inode = skp;
2290 }
2291
2292 /*
2293 * Socket hooks.
2294 */
2295
2296 /**
2297 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2298 * @sk: the socket
2299 * @family: unused
2300 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2301 *
2302 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2303 *
2304 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2305 */
2306 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2307 {
2308 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2309 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2310
2311 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2312 if (ssp == NULL)
2313 return -ENOMEM;
2314
2315 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2316 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2317 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2318
2319 sk->sk_security = ssp;
2320
2321 return 0;
2322 }
2323
2324 /**
2325 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2326 * @sk: the socket
2327 *
2328 * Clears the blob pointer
2329 */
2330 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2331 {
2332 kfree(sk->sk_security);
2333 }
2334
2335 /**
2336 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2337 * @sip: the object end
2338 *
2339 * looks for host based access restrictions
2340 *
2341 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2342 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2343 * taken before calling this function.
2344 *
2345 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2346 */
2347 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2348 {
2349 struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2350 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2351
2352 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2353 return NULL;
2354
2355 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2356 /*
2357 * we break after finding the first match because
2358 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2359 * so we have found the most specific match
2360 */
2361 if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2362 (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2363 return snp->smk_label;
2364
2365 return NULL;
2366 }
2367
2368 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2369 /*
2370 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2371 * @sip: the address
2372 *
2373 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2374 */
2375 static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2376 {
2377 __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2378 __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2379
2380 if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2381 ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2382 return true;
2383 return false;
2384 }
2385
2386 /**
2387 * smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2388 * @sip: the object end
2389 *
2390 * looks for host based access restrictions
2391 *
2392 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2393 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2394 * taken before calling this function.
2395 *
2396 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2397 */
2398 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2399 {
2400 struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2401 struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2402 int i;
2403 int found = 0;
2404
2405 /*
2406 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2407 */
2408 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2409 return NULL;
2410
2411 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2412 /*
2413 * we break after finding the first match because
2414 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2415 * so we have found the most specific match
2416 */
2417 for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2418 /*
2419 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2420 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2421 */
2422 if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2423 continue;
2424 if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2425 snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2426 found = 0;
2427 break;
2428 }
2429 }
2430 if (found)
2431 return snp->smk_label;
2432 }
2433
2434 return NULL;
2435 }
2436 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2437
2438 /**
2439 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
2440 * @sk: the socket
2441 * @labeled: socket label scheme
2442 *
2443 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
2444 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
2445 *
2446 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2447 */
2448 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
2449 {
2450 struct smack_known *skp;
2451 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2452 int rc = 0;
2453
2454 /*
2455 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
2456 * packet labeling based on the label.
2457 * The case of a single label host is different, because
2458 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
2459 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
2460 * label.
2461 */
2462 local_bh_disable();
2463 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2464
2465 if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
2466 labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
2467 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2468 else {
2469 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2470 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
2471 }
2472
2473 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2474 local_bh_enable();
2475
2476 return rc;
2477 }
2478
2479 /**
2480 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
2481 * @sk: the socket
2482 * @sap: the destination address
2483 *
2484 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2485 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2486 *
2487 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2488 *
2489 */
2490 static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2491 {
2492 struct smack_known *skp;
2493 int rc;
2494 int sk_lbl;
2495 struct smack_known *hkp;
2496 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2497 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2498
2499 rcu_read_lock();
2500 hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2501 if (hkp != NULL) {
2502 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2503 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2504
2505 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2506 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2507 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2508 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2509 #endif
2510 sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
2511 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2512 rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2513 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2514 } else {
2515 sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
2516 rc = 0;
2517 }
2518 rcu_read_unlock();
2519 if (rc != 0)
2520 return rc;
2521
2522 return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
2523 }
2524
2525 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2526 /**
2527 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2528 * @subject: subject Smack label
2529 * @object: object Smack label
2530 * @address: address
2531 * @act: the action being taken
2532 *
2533 * Check an IPv6 access
2534 */
2535 static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2536 struct smack_known *object,
2537 struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2538 {
2539 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2540 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2541 #endif
2542 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2543 int rc;
2544
2545 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2546 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2547 ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2548 ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2549 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2550 ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2551 else
2552 ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2553 #endif
2554 rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2555 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2556 return rc;
2557 }
2558 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2559
2560 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2561 /**
2562 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2563 * @sock: socket
2564 * @address: address
2565 *
2566 * Create or update the port list entry
2567 */
2568 static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2569 {
2570 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2571 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2572 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2573 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2574 unsigned short port = 0;
2575
2576 if (address == NULL) {
2577 /*
2578 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2579 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2580 * as well.
2581 */
2582 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2583 if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2584 continue;
2585 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2586 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2587 return;
2588 }
2589 /*
2590 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2591 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2592 */
2593 return;
2594 }
2595
2596 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2597 port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2598 /*
2599 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2600 */
2601 if (port == 0)
2602 return;
2603
2604 /*
2605 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2606 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2607 */
2608 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2609 if (spp->smk_port != port)
2610 continue;
2611 spp->smk_port = port;
2612 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2613 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2614 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2615 return;
2616 }
2617
2618 /*
2619 * A new port entry is required.
2620 */
2621 spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2622 if (spp == NULL)
2623 return;
2624
2625 spp->smk_port = port;
2626 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2627 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2628 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2629
2630 list_add(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2631 return;
2632 }
2633
2634 /**
2635 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2636 * @sock: socket
2637 * @address: address
2638 *
2639 * Create or update the port list entry
2640 */
2641 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2642 int act)
2643 {
2644 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2645 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2646 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2647 unsigned short port;
2648 struct smack_known *object;
2649
2650 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2651 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2652 object = ssp->smk_in;
2653 } else {
2654 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2655 object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2656 }
2657
2658 /*
2659 * The other end is a single label host.
2660 */
2661 if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2662 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2663 if (skp == NULL)
2664 skp = smack_net_ambient;
2665 if (object == NULL)
2666 object = smack_net_ambient;
2667
2668 /*
2669 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2670 */
2671 if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2672 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2673
2674 /*
2675 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2676 */
2677 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2678 return 0;
2679
2680 port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2681 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2682 if (spp->smk_port != port)
2683 continue;
2684 object = spp->smk_in;
2685 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2686 ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2687 break;
2688 }
2689
2690 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2691 }
2692 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2693
2694 /**
2695 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2696 * @inode: the object
2697 * @name: attribute name
2698 * @value: attribute value
2699 * @size: size of the attribute
2700 * @flags: unused
2701 *
2702 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2703 *
2704 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2705 */
2706 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2707 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2708 {
2709 struct smack_known *skp;
2710 struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
2711 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2712 struct socket *sock;
2713 int rc = 0;
2714
2715 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2716 return -EINVAL;
2717
2718 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2719 if (IS_ERR(skp))
2720 return PTR_ERR(skp);
2721
2722 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2723 nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2724 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2725 return 0;
2726 }
2727 /*
2728 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2729 */
2730 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2731 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2732
2733 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2734 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2735 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2736
2737 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2738
2739 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2740 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2741 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2742 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2743 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2744 rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2745 if (rc != 0)
2746 printk(KERN_WARNING
2747 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2748 __func__, -rc);
2749 }
2750 } else
2751 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2752
2753 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2754 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2755 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2756 #endif
2757
2758 return 0;
2759 }
2760
2761 /**
2762 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2763 * @sock: the socket
2764 * @family: protocol family
2765 * @type: unused
2766 * @protocol: unused
2767 * @kern: unused
2768 *
2769 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2770 *
2771 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2772 */
2773 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2774 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2775 {
2776 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2777
2778 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2779 return 0;
2780
2781 /*
2782 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2783 */
2784 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2785 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2786 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2787 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2788 }
2789
2790 if (family != PF_INET)
2791 return 0;
2792 /*
2793 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2794 */
2795 return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2796 }
2797
2798 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2799 /**
2800 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
2801 * @sock: the socket
2802 * @address: the port address
2803 * @addrlen: size of the address
2804 *
2805 * Records the label bound to a port.
2806 *
2807 * Returns 0
2808 */
2809 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
2810 int addrlen)
2811 {
2812 if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2813 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
2814 return 0;
2815 }
2816 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2817
2818 /**
2819 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2820 * @sock: the socket
2821 * @sap: the other end
2822 * @addrlen: size of sap
2823 *
2824 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2825 *
2826 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2827 */
2828 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2829 int addrlen)
2830 {
2831 int rc = 0;
2832 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2833 struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
2834 #endif
2835 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2836 struct smack_known *rsp;
2837 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2838 #endif
2839
2840 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2841 return 0;
2842
2843 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
2844 case PF_INET:
2845 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2846 return -EINVAL;
2847 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2848 break;
2849 case PF_INET6:
2850 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
2851 return -EINVAL;
2852 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2853 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
2854 if (rsp != NULL)
2855 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
2856 SMK_CONNECTING);
2857 #endif
2858 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2859 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
2860 #endif
2861 break;
2862 }
2863 return rc;
2864 }
2865
2866 /**
2867 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2868 * @flags: the S_ value
2869 *
2870 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2871 */
2872 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2873 {
2874 int may = 0;
2875
2876 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2877 may |= MAY_READ;
2878 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2879 may |= MAY_WRITE;
2880 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2881 may |= MAY_EXEC;
2882
2883 return may;
2884 }
2885
2886 /**
2887 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2888 * @msg: the object
2889 *
2890 * Returns 0
2891 */
2892 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2893 {
2894 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2895
2896 msg->security = skp;
2897 return 0;
2898 }
2899
2900 /**
2901 * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
2902 * @msg: the object
2903 *
2904 * Clears the blob pointer
2905 */
2906 static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2907 {
2908 msg->security = NULL;
2909 }
2910
2911 /**
2912 * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
2913 * @shp: the object
2914 *
2915 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2916 */
2917 static struct smack_known *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2918 {
2919 return (struct smack_known *)shp->shm_perm.security;
2920 }
2921
2922 /**
2923 * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
2924 * @shp: the object
2925 *
2926 * Returns 0
2927 */
2928 static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2929 {
2930 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2931 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2932
2933 isp->security = skp;
2934 return 0;
2935 }
2936
2937 /**
2938 * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
2939 * @shp: the object
2940 *
2941 * Clears the blob pointer
2942 */
2943 static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2944 {
2945 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2946
2947 isp->security = NULL;
2948 }
2949
2950 /**
2951 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2952 * @shp : the object
2953 * @access : access requested
2954 *
2955 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2956 */
2957 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
2958 {
2959 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
2960 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2961 int rc;
2962
2963 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2964 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2965 ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
2966 #endif
2967 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2968 rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
2969 return rc;
2970 }
2971
2972 /**
2973 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
2974 * @shp: the object
2975 * @shmflg: access requested
2976 *
2977 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2978 */
2979 static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
2980 {
2981 int may;
2982
2983 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2984 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2985 }
2986
2987 /**
2988 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
2989 * @shp: the object
2990 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2991 *
2992 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2993 */
2994 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
2995 {
2996 int may;
2997
2998 switch (cmd) {
2999 case IPC_STAT:
3000 case SHM_STAT:
3001 may = MAY_READ;
3002 break;
3003 case IPC_SET:
3004 case SHM_LOCK:
3005 case SHM_UNLOCK:
3006 case IPC_RMID:
3007 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3008 break;
3009 case IPC_INFO:
3010 case SHM_INFO:
3011 /*
3012 * System level information.
3013 */
3014 return 0;
3015 default:
3016 return -EINVAL;
3017 }
3018 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3019 }
3020
3021 /**
3022 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3023 * @shp: the object
3024 * @shmaddr: unused
3025 * @shmflg: access requested
3026 *
3027 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3028 */
3029 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
3030 int shmflg)
3031 {
3032 int may;
3033
3034 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3035 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3036 }
3037
3038 /**
3039 * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
3040 * @sma: the object
3041 *
3042 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
3043 */
3044 static struct smack_known *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
3045 {
3046 return (struct smack_known *)sma->sem_perm.security;
3047 }
3048
3049 /**
3050 * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
3051 * @sma: the object
3052 *
3053 * Returns 0
3054 */
3055 static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3056 {
3057 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3058 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3059
3060 isp->security = skp;
3061 return 0;
3062 }
3063
3064 /**
3065 * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
3066 * @sma: the object
3067 *
3068 * Clears the blob pointer
3069 */
3070 static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3071 {
3072 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3073
3074 isp->security = NULL;
3075 }
3076
3077 /**
3078 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3079 * @sma : the object
3080 * @access : access requested
3081 *
3082 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3083 */
3084 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
3085 {
3086 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
3087 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3088 int rc;
3089
3090 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3091 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3092 ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
3093 #endif
3094 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3095 rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3096 return rc;
3097 }
3098
3099 /**
3100 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3101 * @sma: the object
3102 * @semflg: access requested
3103 *
3104 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3105 */
3106 static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3107 {
3108 int may;
3109
3110 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3111 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3112 }
3113
3114 /**
3115 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
3116 * @sma: the object
3117 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3118 *
3119 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3120 */
3121 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3122 {
3123 int may;
3124
3125 switch (cmd) {
3126 case GETPID:
3127 case GETNCNT:
3128 case GETZCNT:
3129 case GETVAL:
3130 case GETALL:
3131 case IPC_STAT:
3132 case SEM_STAT:
3133 may = MAY_READ;
3134 break;
3135 case SETVAL:
3136 case SETALL:
3137 case IPC_RMID:
3138 case IPC_SET:
3139 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3140 break;
3141 case IPC_INFO:
3142 case SEM_INFO:
3143 /*
3144 * System level information
3145 */
3146 return 0;
3147 default:
3148 return -EINVAL;
3149 }
3150
3151 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3152 }
3153
3154 /**
3155 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3156 * @sma: the object
3157 * @sops: unused
3158 * @nsops: unused
3159 * @alter: unused
3160 *
3161 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3162 *
3163 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3164 */
3165 static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
3166 unsigned nsops, int alter)
3167 {
3168 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
3169 }
3170
3171 /**
3172 * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
3173 * @msq: the object
3174 *
3175 * Returns 0
3176 */
3177 static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3178 {
3179 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3180 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3181
3182 kisp->security = skp;
3183 return 0;
3184 }
3185
3186 /**
3187 * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
3188 * @msq: the object
3189 *
3190 * Clears the blob pointer
3191 */
3192 static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3193 {
3194 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3195
3196 kisp->security = NULL;
3197 }
3198
3199 /**
3200 * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
3201 * @msq: the object
3202 *
3203 * Returns a pointer to the smack label entry
3204 */
3205 static struct smack_known *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
3206 {
3207 return (struct smack_known *)msq->q_perm.security;
3208 }
3209
3210 /**
3211 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3212 * @msq : the msq
3213 * @access : access requested
3214 *
3215 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3216 */
3217 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
3218 {
3219 struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
3220 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3221 int rc;
3222
3223 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3224 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3225 ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
3226 #endif
3227 rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3228 rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3229 return rc;
3230 }
3231
3232 /**
3233 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3234 * @msq: the object
3235 * @msqflg: access requested
3236 *
3237 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3238 */
3239 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3240 {
3241 int may;
3242
3243 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3244 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3245 }
3246
3247 /**
3248 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3249 * @msq: the object
3250 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3251 *
3252 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3253 */
3254 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3255 {
3256 int may;
3257
3258 switch (cmd) {
3259 case IPC_STAT:
3260 case MSG_STAT:
3261 may = MAY_READ;
3262 break;
3263 case IPC_SET:
3264 case IPC_RMID:
3265 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3266 break;
3267 case IPC_INFO:
3268 case MSG_INFO:
3269 /*
3270 * System level information
3271 */
3272 return 0;
3273 default:
3274 return -EINVAL;
3275 }
3276
3277 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3278 }
3279
3280 /**
3281 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3282 * @msq: the object
3283 * @msg: unused
3284 * @msqflg: access requested
3285 *
3286 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3287 */
3288 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3289 int msqflg)
3290 {
3291 int may;
3292
3293 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3294 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3295 }
3296
3297 /**
3298 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3299 * @msq: the object
3300 * @msg: unused
3301 * @target: unused
3302 * @type: unused
3303 * @mode: unused
3304 *
3305 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3306 */
3307 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3308 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
3309 {
3310 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
3311 }
3312
3313 /**
3314 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3315 * @ipp: the object permissions
3316 * @flag: access requested
3317 *
3318 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3319 */
3320 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3321 {
3322 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3323 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3324 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3325 int rc;
3326
3327 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3328 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3329 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3330 #endif
3331 rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3332 rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3333 return rc;
3334 }
3335
3336 /**
3337 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3338 * @ipp: the object permissions
3339 * @secid: where result will be saved
3340 */
3341 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3342 {
3343 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3344
3345 *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3346 }
3347
3348 /**
3349 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3350 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3351 * @inode: the object
3352 *
3353 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3354 */
3355 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3356 {
3357 struct super_block *sbp;
3358 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3359 struct inode_smack *isp;
3360 struct smack_known *skp;
3361 struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3362 struct smack_known *final;
3363 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3364 int transflag = 0;
3365 int rc;
3366 struct dentry *dp;
3367
3368 if (inode == NULL)
3369 return;
3370
3371 isp = inode->i_security;
3372
3373 mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
3374 /*
3375 * If the inode is already instantiated
3376 * take the quick way out
3377 */
3378 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3379 goto unlockandout;
3380
3381 sbp = inode->i_sb;
3382 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
3383 /*
3384 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3385 * if there's no label on the file.
3386 */
3387 final = sbsp->smk_default;
3388
3389 /*
3390 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3391 * may be in the process of initialization.
3392 * If that is the case use the root value out
3393 * of the superblock.
3394 */
3395 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3396 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3397 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3398 /*
3399 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3400 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3401 * options.
3402 */
3403 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3404 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3405 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3406 break;
3407 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3408 /*
3409 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3410 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3411 */
3412 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3413 break;
3414 case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3415 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3416 break;
3417 default:
3418 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3419 break;
3420 }
3421 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3422 goto unlockandout;
3423 }
3424
3425 /*
3426 * This is pretty hackish.
3427 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3428 * file system specific code, but it does help
3429 * with keeping it simple.
3430 */
3431 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3432 case SMACK_MAGIC:
3433 case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3434 case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
3435 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3436 /*
3437 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3438 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3439 * extended attributes.
3440 *
3441 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
3442 *
3443 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3444 * structures associated with the task involved.
3445 *
3446 * Cgroupfs is special
3447 */
3448 final = &smack_known_star;
3449 break;
3450 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3451 /*
3452 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3453 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3454 * pty with respect.
3455 */
3456 final = ckp;
3457 break;
3458 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3459 /*
3460 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3461 * The superblock default suffices.
3462 */
3463 break;
3464 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3465 /*
3466 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3467 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3468 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3469 */
3470 final = &smack_known_star;
3471 /*
3472 * No break.
3473 *
3474 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3475 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3476 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3477 * superblock default.
3478 */
3479 default:
3480 /*
3481 * This isn't an understood special case.
3482 * Get the value from the xattr.
3483 */
3484
3485 /*
3486 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3487 */
3488 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3489 final = &smack_known_star;
3490 break;
3491 }
3492 /*
3493 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3494 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3495 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3496 * does not match that assigned.
3497 */
3498 if (inode->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
3499 break;
3500 /*
3501 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3502 */
3503 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3504 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3505 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3506 final = skp;
3507
3508 /*
3509 * Transmuting directory
3510 */
3511 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3512 /*
3513 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3514 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3515 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3516 * and mark the inode.
3517 *
3518 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3519 * directory mark the inode.
3520 */
3521 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
3522 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
3523 rc = inode->i_op->setxattr(dp,
3524 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
3525 TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
3526 0);
3527 } else {
3528 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dp,
3529 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3530 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
3531 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3532 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3533 rc = -EINVAL;
3534 }
3535 if (rc >= 0)
3536 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3537 }
3538 /*
3539 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3540 */
3541 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3542 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3543 skp == &smack_known_web)
3544 skp = NULL;
3545 isp->smk_task = skp;
3546
3547 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3548 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3549 skp == &smack_known_web)
3550 skp = NULL;
3551 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3552
3553 dput(dp);
3554 break;
3555 }
3556
3557 if (final == NULL)
3558 isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3559 else
3560 isp->smk_inode = final;
3561
3562 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3563
3564 unlockandout:
3565 mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
3566 return;
3567 }
3568
3569 /**
3570 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3571 * @p: the object task
3572 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3573 * @value: where to put the result
3574 *
3575 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3576 *
3577 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3578 */
3579 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
3580 {
3581 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
3582 char *cp;
3583 int slen;
3584
3585 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3586 return -EINVAL;
3587
3588 cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3589 if (cp == NULL)
3590 return -ENOMEM;
3591
3592 slen = strlen(cp);
3593 *value = cp;
3594 return slen;
3595 }
3596
3597 /**
3598 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3599 * @p: the object task
3600 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3601 * @value: the value to set
3602 * @size: the size of the value
3603 *
3604 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3605 * is permitted and only with privilege
3606 *
3607 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3608 */
3609 static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
3610 void *value, size_t size)
3611 {
3612 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
3613 struct cred *new;
3614 struct smack_known *skp;
3615 struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3616 int rc;
3617
3618 /*
3619 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
3620 * and supports no sane use case.
3621 */
3622 if (p != current)
3623 return -EPERM;
3624
3625 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3626 return -EPERM;
3627
3628 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3629 return -EINVAL;
3630
3631 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3632 return -EINVAL;
3633
3634 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3635 if (IS_ERR(skp))
3636 return PTR_ERR(skp);
3637
3638 /*
3639 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
3640 */
3641 if (skp == &smack_known_web)
3642 return -EPERM;
3643
3644 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3645 rc = -EPERM;
3646 list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3647 if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3648 rc = 0;
3649 break;
3650 }
3651 if (rc)
3652 return rc;
3653 }
3654
3655 new = prepare_creds();
3656 if (new == NULL)
3657 return -ENOMEM;
3658
3659 tsp = new->security;
3660 tsp->smk_task = skp;
3661 /*
3662 * process can change its label only once
3663 */
3664 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3665
3666 commit_creds(new);
3667 return size;
3668 }
3669
3670 /**
3671 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3672 * @sock: one sock
3673 * @other: the other sock
3674 * @newsk: unused
3675 *
3676 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3677 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3678 */
3679 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3680 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3681 {
3682 struct smack_known *skp;
3683 struct smack_known *okp;
3684 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3685 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3686 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3687 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3688 int rc = 0;
3689 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3690 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3691 #endif
3692
3693 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3694 skp = ssp->smk_out;
3695 okp = osp->smk_in;
3696 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3697 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3698 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3699 #endif
3700 rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3701 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3702 if (rc == 0) {
3703 okp = osp->smk_out;
3704 skp = ssp->smk_in;
3705 rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3706 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3707 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3708 }
3709 }
3710
3711 /*
3712 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3713 */
3714 if (rc == 0) {
3715 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3716 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3717 }
3718
3719 return rc;
3720 }
3721
3722 /**
3723 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3724 * @sock: one socket
3725 * @other: the other socket
3726 *
3727 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3728 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3729 */
3730 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3731 {
3732 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3733 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3734 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3735 int rc;
3736
3737 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3738 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3739
3740 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3741 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3742 #endif
3743
3744 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3745 return 0;
3746
3747 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3748 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3749 return rc;
3750 }
3751
3752 /**
3753 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3754 * @sock: the socket
3755 * @msg: the message
3756 * @size: the size of the message
3757 *
3758 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3759 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3760 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3761 */
3762 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3763 int size)
3764 {
3765 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3766 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3767 struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3768 #endif
3769 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3770 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3771 struct smack_known *rsp;
3772 #endif
3773 int rc = 0;
3774
3775 /*
3776 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3777 */
3778 if (sip == NULL)
3779 return 0;
3780
3781 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3782 case AF_INET:
3783 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
3784 break;
3785 case AF_INET6:
3786 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3787 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3788 if (rsp != NULL)
3789 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3790 SMK_CONNECTING);
3791 #endif
3792 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3793 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3794 #endif
3795 break;
3796 }
3797 return rc;
3798 }
3799
3800 /**
3801 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3802 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3803 * @ssp: socket security information
3804 *
3805 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3806 */
3807 static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3808 struct socket_smack *ssp)
3809 {
3810 struct smack_known *skp;
3811 int found = 0;
3812 int acat;
3813 int kcat;
3814
3815 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
3816 /*
3817 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
3818 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
3819 * behaving the way we expect it to.
3820 *
3821 * Look it up in the label table
3822 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3823 * for the packet fall back on the network
3824 * ambient value.
3825 */
3826 rcu_read_lock();
3827 list_for_each_entry(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
3828 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
3829 continue;
3830 /*
3831 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
3832 */
3833 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
3834 if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
3835 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
3836 found = 1;
3837 break;
3838 }
3839 for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
3840 acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
3841 acat + 1);
3842 kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
3843 skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
3844 kcat + 1);
3845 if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
3846 break;
3847 }
3848 if (acat == kcat) {
3849 found = 1;
3850 break;
3851 }
3852 }
3853 rcu_read_unlock();
3854
3855 if (found)
3856 return skp;
3857
3858 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
3859 return &smack_known_web;
3860 return &smack_known_star;
3861 }
3862 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
3863 /*
3864 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
3865 */
3866 skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
3867 /*
3868 * This has got to be a bug because it is
3869 * impossible to specify a fallback without
3870 * specifying the label, which will ensure
3871 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
3872 * secid is from a fallback.
3873 */
3874 BUG_ON(skp == NULL);
3875 return skp;
3876 }
3877 /*
3878 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3879 * for the packet fall back on the network
3880 * ambient value.
3881 */
3882 return smack_net_ambient;
3883 }
3884
3885 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3886 static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
3887 {
3888 u8 nexthdr;
3889 int offset;
3890 int proto = -EINVAL;
3891 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
3892 struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
3893 __be16 frag_off;
3894 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3895 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3896 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3897
3898 sip->sin6_port = 0;
3899
3900 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3901 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3902 if (ip6 == NULL)
3903 return -EINVAL;
3904 sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
3905
3906 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3907 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3908 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3909 if (offset < 0)
3910 return -EINVAL;
3911
3912 proto = nexthdr;
3913 switch (proto) {
3914 case IPPROTO_TCP:
3915 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3916 if (th != NULL)
3917 sip->sin6_port = th->source;
3918 break;
3919 case IPPROTO_UDP:
3920 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3921 if (uh != NULL)
3922 sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
3923 break;
3924 case IPPROTO_DCCP:
3925 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3926 if (dh != NULL)
3927 sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
3928 break;
3929 }
3930 return proto;
3931 }
3932 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3933
3934 /**
3935 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3936 * @sk: socket
3937 * @skb: packet
3938 *
3939 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3940 */
3941 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3942 {
3943 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3944 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3945 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3946 int rc = 0;
3947 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3948 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3949 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3950 #endif
3951 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3952 struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
3953 int proto;
3954 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3955
3956 switch (sk->sk_family) {
3957 case PF_INET:
3958 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3959 /*
3960 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
3961 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
3962 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
3963 */
3964 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
3965 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
3966 goto access_check;
3967 }
3968 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
3969 /*
3970 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3971 */
3972 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3973
3974 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
3975 if (rc == 0)
3976 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3977 else
3978 skp = smack_net_ambient;
3979
3980 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3981
3982 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3983 access_check:
3984 #endif
3985 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3986 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3987 ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
3988 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
3989 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3990 #endif
3991 /*
3992 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
3993 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
3994 * This is the simplist possible security model
3995 * for networking.
3996 */
3997 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3998 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
3999 MAY_WRITE, rc);
4000 if (rc != 0)
4001 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
4002 break;
4003 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4004 case PF_INET6:
4005 proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
4006 if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
4007 break;
4008 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4009 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
4010 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4011 else
4012 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
4013 if (skp == NULL)
4014 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4015 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4016 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4017 ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4018 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4019 ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4020 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4021 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4022 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4023 MAY_WRITE, rc);
4024 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
4025 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4026 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
4027 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
4028 break;
4029 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4030 }
4031
4032 return rc;
4033 }
4034
4035 /**
4036 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
4037 * @sock: the socket
4038 * @optval: user's destination
4039 * @optlen: size thereof
4040 * @len: max thereof
4041 *
4042 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
4043 */
4044 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
4045 char __user *optval,
4046 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4047 {
4048 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4049 char *rcp = "";
4050 int slen = 1;
4051 int rc = 0;
4052
4053 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4054 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4055 rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4056 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4057 }
4058
4059 if (slen > len)
4060 rc = -ERANGE;
4061 else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
4062 rc = -EFAULT;
4063
4064 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
4065 rc = -EFAULT;
4066
4067 return rc;
4068 }
4069
4070
4071 /**
4072 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4073 * @sock: the peer socket
4074 * @skb: packet data
4075 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4076 *
4077 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4078 */
4079 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4080 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4081
4082 {
4083 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4084 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4085 struct smack_known *skp;
4086 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4087 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
4088 int rc;
4089
4090 if (skb != NULL) {
4091 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4092 family = PF_INET;
4093 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4094 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4095 family = PF_INET6;
4096 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4097 }
4098 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4099 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4100
4101 switch (family) {
4102 case PF_UNIX:
4103 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4104 s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4105 break;
4106 case PF_INET:
4107 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4108 s = skb->secmark;
4109 if (s != 0)
4110 break;
4111 #endif
4112 /*
4113 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4114 */
4115 if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
4116 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4117 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4118 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4119 if (rc == 0) {
4120 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4121 s = skp->smk_secid;
4122 }
4123 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4124 break;
4125 case PF_INET6:
4126 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4127 s = skb->secmark;
4128 #endif
4129 break;
4130 }
4131 *secid = s;
4132 if (s == 0)
4133 return -EINVAL;
4134 return 0;
4135 }
4136
4137 /**
4138 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4139 * @sk: child sock
4140 * @parent: parent socket
4141 *
4142 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4143 * is creating the new socket.
4144 */
4145 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4146 {
4147 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4148 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4149
4150 if (sk == NULL ||
4151 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4152 return;
4153
4154 ssp = sk->sk_security;
4155 ssp->smk_in = skp;
4156 ssp->smk_out = skp;
4157 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4158 }
4159
4160 /**
4161 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4162 * @sk: socket involved
4163 * @skb: packet
4164 * @req: unused
4165 *
4166 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4167 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4168 */
4169 static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4170 struct request_sock *req)
4171 {
4172 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4173 struct smack_known *skp;
4174 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4175 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4176 struct sockaddr_in addr;
4177 struct iphdr *hdr;
4178 struct smack_known *hskp;
4179 int rc;
4180 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4181 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4182 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4183 #endif
4184
4185 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4186 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4187 /*
4188 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4189 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4190 * processing on IPv6.
4191 */
4192 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4193 family = PF_INET;
4194 else
4195 return 0;
4196 }
4197 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4198
4199 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4200 /*
4201 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4202 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4203 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4204 */
4205 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
4206 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4207 goto access_check;
4208 }
4209 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
4210
4211 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4212 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4213 if (rc == 0)
4214 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4215 else
4216 skp = &smack_known_huh;
4217 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4218
4219 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4220 access_check:
4221 #endif
4222
4223 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4224 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4225 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4226 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4227 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4228 #endif
4229 /*
4230 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4231 * here. Read access is not required.
4232 */
4233 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4234 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4235 if (rc != 0)
4236 return rc;
4237
4238 /*
4239 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4240 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4241 */
4242 req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4243
4244 /*
4245 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4246 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4247 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4248 */
4249 hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
4250 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4251 rcu_read_lock();
4252 hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4253 rcu_read_unlock();
4254
4255 if (hskp == NULL)
4256 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4257 else
4258 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4259
4260 return rc;
4261 }
4262
4263 /**
4264 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4265 * @sk: the new socket
4266 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4267 *
4268 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4269 */
4270 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4271 const struct request_sock *req)
4272 {
4273 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4274 struct smack_known *skp;
4275
4276 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4277 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4278 ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4279 } else
4280 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4281 }
4282
4283 /*
4284 * Key management security hooks
4285 *
4286 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4287 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4288 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4289 */
4290 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4291
4292 /**
4293 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4294 * @key: object
4295 * @cred: the credentials to use
4296 * @flags: unused
4297 *
4298 * No allocation required
4299 *
4300 * Returns 0
4301 */
4302 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4303 unsigned long flags)
4304 {
4305 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4306
4307 key->security = skp;
4308 return 0;
4309 }
4310
4311 /**
4312 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4313 * @key: the object
4314 *
4315 * Clear the blob pointer
4316 */
4317 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4318 {
4319 key->security = NULL;
4320 }
4321
4322 /**
4323 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4324 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4325 * @cred: the credentials to use
4326 * @perm: requested key permissions
4327 *
4328 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4329 * an error code otherwise
4330 */
4331 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4332 const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
4333 {
4334 struct key *keyp;
4335 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4336 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4337 int request = 0;
4338 int rc;
4339
4340 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4341 if (keyp == NULL)
4342 return -EINVAL;
4343 /*
4344 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4345 * it may do so.
4346 */
4347 if (keyp->security == NULL)
4348 return 0;
4349 /*
4350 * This should not occur
4351 */
4352 if (tkp == NULL)
4353 return -EACCES;
4354 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4355 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4356 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4357 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4358 #endif
4359 if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ)
4360 request = MAY_READ;
4361 if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
4362 request = MAY_WRITE;
4363 rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4364 rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4365 return rc;
4366 }
4367
4368 /*
4369 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4370 * @key points to the key to be queried
4371 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4372 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4373 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4374 * an error.
4375 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4376 */
4377 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4378 {
4379 struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4380 size_t length;
4381 char *copy;
4382
4383 if (key->security == NULL) {
4384 *_buffer = NULL;
4385 return 0;
4386 }
4387
4388 copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4389 if (copy == NULL)
4390 return -ENOMEM;
4391 length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4392
4393 *_buffer = copy;
4394 return length;
4395 }
4396
4397 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4398
4399 /*
4400 * Smack Audit hooks
4401 *
4402 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4403 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4404 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4405 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4406 *
4407 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4408 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4409 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4410 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4411 */
4412 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4413
4414 /**
4415 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4416 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4417 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4418 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4419 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4420 *
4421 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4422 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4423 */
4424 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
4425 {
4426 struct smack_known *skp;
4427 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4428 *rule = NULL;
4429
4430 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4431 return -EINVAL;
4432
4433 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4434 return -EINVAL;
4435
4436 skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4437 if (IS_ERR(skp))
4438 return PTR_ERR(skp);
4439
4440 *rule = skp->smk_known;
4441
4442 return 0;
4443 }
4444
4445 /**
4446 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4447 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4448 *
4449 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4450 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4451 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4452 */
4453 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4454 {
4455 struct audit_field *f;
4456 int i;
4457
4458 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4459 f = &krule->fields[i];
4460
4461 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4462 return 1;
4463 }
4464
4465 return 0;
4466 }
4467
4468 /**
4469 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4470 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4471 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4472 * @op: required testing operator
4473 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4474 * @actx: audit context associated with the check
4475 *
4476 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4477 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4478 */
4479 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
4480 struct audit_context *actx)
4481 {
4482 struct smack_known *skp;
4483 char *rule = vrule;
4484
4485 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4486 WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4487 return -ENOENT;
4488 }
4489
4490 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4491 return 0;
4492
4493 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4494
4495 /*
4496 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4497 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4498 * label.
4499 */
4500 if (op == Audit_equal)
4501 return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4502 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4503 return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4504
4505 return 0;
4506 }
4507
4508 /**
4509 * smack_audit_rule_free - free smack rule representation
4510 * @vrule: rule to be freed.
4511 *
4512 * No memory was allocated.
4513 */
4514 static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
4515 {
4516 /* No-op */
4517 }
4518
4519 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4520
4521 /**
4522 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4523 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4524 */
4525 static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4526 {
4527 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4528 }
4529
4530
4531 /**
4532 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4533 * @secid: incoming integer
4534 * @secdata: destination
4535 * @seclen: how long it is
4536 *
4537 * Exists for networking code.
4538 */
4539 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4540 {
4541 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4542
4543 if (secdata)
4544 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4545 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4546 return 0;
4547 }
4548
4549 /**
4550 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4551 * @secdata: smack label
4552 * @seclen: how long result is
4553 * @secid: outgoing integer
4554 *
4555 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4556 */
4557 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4558 {
4559 struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4560
4561 if (skp)
4562 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4563 else
4564 *secid = 0;
4565 return 0;
4566 }
4567
4568 /**
4569 * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
4570 * @secdata: unused
4571 * @seclen: unused
4572 *
4573 * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
4574 */
4575 static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4576 {
4577 }
4578
4579 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4580 {
4581 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4582 }
4583
4584 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4585 {
4586 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4587 }
4588
4589 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4590 {
4591 int len = 0;
4592 len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
4593
4594 if (len < 0)
4595 return len;
4596 *ctxlen = len;
4597 return 0;
4598 }
4599
4600 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
4601 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
4602 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
4603 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
4604
4605 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
4606 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
4607 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
4608 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
4609 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
4610 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
4611 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
4612
4613 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
4614 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
4615 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
4616
4617 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
4618 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
4619 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
4620 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
4621 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
4622 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
4623 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
4624 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
4625 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
4626 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
4627 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
4628 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
4629 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
4630 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
4631 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
4632 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
4633 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
4634 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
4635
4636 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, smack_file_permission),
4637 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
4638 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
4639 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
4640 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
4641 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
4642 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
4643 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
4644 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
4645 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
4646 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
4647
4648 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
4649
4650 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
4651 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
4652 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
4653 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
4654 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
4655 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
4656 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
4657 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
4658 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
4659 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
4660 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
4661 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
4662 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
4663 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
4664 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
4665 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
4666 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
4667 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait),
4668 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
4669
4670 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
4671 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
4672
4673 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
4674 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
4675
4676 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security),
4677 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security),
4678 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
4679 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
4680 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
4681 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
4682
4683 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security),
4684 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security),
4685 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
4686 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
4687 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
4688
4689 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security),
4690 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security),
4691 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
4692 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
4693 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
4694
4695 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
4696
4697 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
4698 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
4699
4700 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
4701 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
4702
4703 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
4704 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4705 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
4706 #endif
4707 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
4708 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
4709 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
4710 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
4711 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
4712 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
4713 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
4714 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
4715 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
4716 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
4717
4718 /* key management security hooks */
4719 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4720 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
4721 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
4722 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
4723 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
4724 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4725
4726 /* Audit hooks */
4727 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4728 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
4729 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
4730 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
4731 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, smack_audit_rule_free),
4732 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4733
4734 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
4735 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
4736 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
4737 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
4738 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
4739 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
4740 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
4741 };
4742
4743
4744 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
4745 {
4746 /*
4747 * Initialize rule list locks
4748 */
4749 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
4750 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
4751 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
4752 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
4753 mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock);
4754 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
4755 /*
4756 * Initialize rule lists
4757 */
4758 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
4759 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
4760 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
4761 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
4762 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules);
4763 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
4764 /*
4765 * Create the known labels list
4766 */
4767 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
4768 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
4769 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
4770 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
4771 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_invalid);
4772 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
4773 }
4774
4775 /**
4776 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
4777 *
4778 * Returns 0
4779 */
4780 static __init int smack_init(void)
4781 {
4782 struct cred *cred;
4783 struct task_smack *tsp;
4784
4785 if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
4786 return 0;
4787
4788 smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
4789 if (!smack_inode_cache)
4790 return -ENOMEM;
4791
4792 tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
4793 GFP_KERNEL);
4794 if (tsp == NULL) {
4795 kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
4796 return -ENOMEM;
4797 }
4798
4799 smack_enabled = 1;
4800
4801 pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
4802 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4803 pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
4804 #endif
4805 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4806 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
4807 #endif
4808 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4809 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
4810 #endif
4811
4812 /*
4813 * Set the security state for the initial task.
4814 */
4815 cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
4816 cred->security = tsp;
4817
4818 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
4819 init_smack_known_list();
4820
4821 /*
4822 * Register with LSM
4823 */
4824 security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks));
4825
4826 return 0;
4827 }
4828
4829 /*
4830 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
4831 * all processes and objects when they are created.
4832 */
4833 security_initcall(smack_init);
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