From: Kevin Coffman Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2010 17:03:04 +0000 (-0400) Subject: gssd_krb5: More arcfour-hmac support X-Git-Url: http://drtracing.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=1dbd9029f3024d058da1cf6c6658c28aac2e4e1c;p=deliverable%2Flinux.git gssd_krb5: More arcfour-hmac support For the arcfour-hmac support, the make_seq_num and get_seq_num functions need access to the kerberos context structure. This will be used in a later patch. Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h index b0ab827add26..d840856edecc 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h @@ -275,12 +275,13 @@ gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *inbuf, int offset); s32 -krb5_make_seq_num(struct crypto_blkcipher *key, +krb5_make_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, + struct crypto_blkcipher *key, int direction, u32 seqnum, unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf); s32 -krb5_get_seq_num(struct crypto_blkcipher *key, +krb5_get_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf, int *direction, u32 *seqnum); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c index e22fed3d9a1b..36fe487d93d2 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c @@ -152,9 +152,8 @@ gss_get_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text, seq_send = ctx->seq_send++; spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock); - if (krb5_make_seq_num(ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, - seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, - ptr + 8)) + if (krb5_make_seq_num(ctx, ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, + seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; return (ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c index 6331cd6866ec..83b593084976 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c @@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ #endif s32 -krb5_make_seq_num(struct crypto_blkcipher *key, +krb5_make_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, + struct crypto_blkcipher *key, int direction, u32 seqnum, unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf) @@ -61,13 +62,14 @@ krb5_make_seq_num(struct crypto_blkcipher *key, } s32 -krb5_get_seq_num(struct crypto_blkcipher *key, +krb5_get_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf, int *direction, u32 *seqnum) { s32 code; unsigned char plain[8]; + struct crypto_blkcipher *key = kctx->seq; dprintk("RPC: krb5_get_seq_num:\n"); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c index ef91366e3dea..97eb91b8c70c 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c @@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ gss_verify_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, /* do sequencing checks */ - if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx->seq, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum)) + if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8, + &direction, &seqnum)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) || diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c index 097cc27494cc..a95e7e0ac0e3 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, /* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum * and encrypt at the same time: */ - if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, + if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx, kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8))) return GSS_S_FAILURE; @@ -314,8 +314,8 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) /* do sequencing checks */ - if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8, - &direction, &seqnum)) + if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum)) return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||