From: Johan Hedberg Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 19:06:36 +0000 (+0300) Subject: Bluetooth: Use L2CAP resume callback to call smp_distribute_keys X-Git-Url: http://drtracing.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=44f1a7ab51ebe1ca189445837e0599a5edc6efb1;p=deliverable%2Flinux.git Bluetooth: Use L2CAP resume callback to call smp_distribute_keys There's no need to export the smp_distribute_keys() function since the resume callback is called in the same scenario. This patch makes the smp_notify_keys function private (at the same time moving it higher up in smp.c to avoid forward declarations) and adds a resume callback for SMP to call it from there instead. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann --- diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 40b6c06ab2c0..4de1e1827055 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -7281,12 +7281,6 @@ int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt) BT_DBG("conn %p status 0x%2.2x encrypt %u", conn, status, encrypt); - if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) { - if (!status && encrypt) - smp_distribute_keys(conn); - cancel_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer); - } - mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock); list_for_each_entry(chan, &conn->chan_l, list) { diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 744f678ac3e8..28014ad3d2d3 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -575,6 +575,189 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) return 0; } +static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) +{ + struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; + struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; + struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; + struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; + struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; + struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; + bool persistent; + + if (smp->remote_irk) { + mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk); + /* Now that user space can be considered to know the + * identity address track the connection based on it + * from now on. + */ + bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr); + hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type; + l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon); + + /* When receiving an indentity resolving key for + * a remote device that does not use a resolvable + * private address, just remove the key so that + * it is possible to use the controller white + * list for scanning. + * + * Userspace will have been told to not store + * this key at this point. So it is safe to + * just remove it. + */ + if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) { + list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list); + kfree(smp->remote_irk); + smp->remote_irk = NULL; + } + } + + /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides + * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests. + */ + persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING); + + if (smp->csrk) { + smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; + bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); + mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); + } + + if (smp->slave_csrk) { + smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; + bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); + mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent); + } + + if (smp->ltk) { + smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; + bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); + mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); + } + + if (smp->slave_ltk) { + smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; + bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); + mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent); + } +} + +static int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) +{ + struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; + struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; + struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; + struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; + struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; + __u8 *keydist; + + BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + + if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags)) + return 0; + + rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; + + /* The responder sends its keys first */ + if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07)) + return 0; + + req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; + + if (hcon->out) { + keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; + *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; + } else { + keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; + *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; + } + + BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist); + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { + struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; + struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; + struct smp_ltk *ltk; + u8 authenticated; + __le16 ediv; + __le64 rand; + + get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk)); + get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); + get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); + + authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; + ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, + SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk, + smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); + smp->slave_ltk = ltk; + + ident.ediv = ediv; + ident.rand = rand; + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; + } + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { + struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; + struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; + + memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); + + /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address + * after the connection has been established. + * + * This is true even when the connection has been + * established using a resolvable random address. + */ + bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src); + addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type; + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), + &addrinfo); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; + } + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { + struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; + struct smp_csrk *csrk; + + /* Generate a new random key */ + get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); + + csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); + if (csrk) { + csrk->master = 0x00; + memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); + } + smp->slave_csrk = csrk; + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; + } + + /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */ + if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07)) + return 0; + + clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer); + set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); + smp_notify_keys(conn); + + smp_chan_destroy(conn); + + return 0; +} + static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) { struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; @@ -1294,189 +1477,6 @@ done: return err; } -static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) -{ - struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; - struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; - struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; - struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; - struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; - struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; - bool persistent; - - if (smp->remote_irk) { - mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk); - /* Now that user space can be considered to know the - * identity address track the connection based on it - * from now on. - */ - bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr); - hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type; - l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon); - - /* When receiving an indentity resolving key for - * a remote device that does not use a resolvable - * private address, just remove the key so that - * it is possible to use the controller white - * list for scanning. - * - * Userspace will have been told to not store - * this key at this point. So it is safe to - * just remove it. - */ - if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) { - list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list); - kfree(smp->remote_irk); - smp->remote_irk = NULL; - } - } - - /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides - * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests. - */ - persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING); - - if (smp->csrk) { - smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; - bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); - mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); - } - - if (smp->slave_csrk) { - smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; - bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); - mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent); - } - - if (smp->ltk) { - smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; - bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); - mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); - } - - if (smp->slave_ltk) { - smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; - bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); - mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent); - } -} - -int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) -{ - struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; - struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; - struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; - struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; - struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; - __u8 *keydist; - - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); - - if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags)) - return 0; - - rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; - - /* The responder sends its keys first */ - if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07)) - return 0; - - req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; - - if (hcon->out) { - keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; - *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; - } else { - keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; - *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; - } - - BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist); - - if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { - struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; - struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; - struct smp_ltk *ltk; - u8 authenticated; - __le16 ediv; - __le64 rand; - - get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk)); - get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); - get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand)); - - smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); - - authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; - ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, - SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk, - smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); - smp->slave_ltk = ltk; - - ident.ediv = ediv; - ident.rand = rand; - - smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); - - *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; - } - - if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { - struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; - struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; - - memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); - - smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); - - /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address - * after the connection has been established. - * - * This is true even when the connection has been - * established using a resolvable random address. - */ - bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src); - addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type; - - smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), - &addrinfo); - - *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; - } - - if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { - struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; - struct smp_csrk *csrk; - - /* Generate a new random key */ - get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); - - csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); - if (csrk) { - csrk->master = 0x00; - memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); - } - smp->slave_csrk = csrk; - - smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); - - *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; - } - - /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */ - if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07)) - return 0; - - clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags); - cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer); - set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); - smp_notify_keys(conn); - - smp_chan_destroy(conn); - - return 0; -} - static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) { struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; @@ -1492,6 +1492,18 @@ static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) l2cap_chan_put(chan); } +static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) +{ + struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; + struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; + + BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); + + if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) + smp_distribute_keys(conn); + cancel_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer); +} + static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) { struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; @@ -1524,13 +1536,13 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = { .recv = smp_recv_cb, .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb, .teardown = smp_teardown_cb, + .resume = smp_resume_cb, .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection, .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, - .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume, .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, .memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec, diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/net/bluetooth/smp.h index 161ace3c3234..59a594278a85 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.h +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.h @@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ enum { /* SMP Commands */ bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level); int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level); -int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn); int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey); void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn);