From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Sep 2016 10:34:20 +0000 (+1000)
Subject: lib: harden strncpy_from_user
X-Git-Url: http://drtracing.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=4e51eaf71e0a47d92fca3fef1158ee8585897f9b;p=deliverable%2Flinux.git

lib: harden strncpy_from_user

The strncpy_from_user() accessor is effectively a copy_from_user()
specialised to copy strings, terminating early at a NUL byte if possible.
In other respects it is identical, and can be used to copy an arbitrarily
large buffer from userspace into the kernel.  Conceptually, it exposes a
similar attack surface.

As with copy_from_user(), we check the destination range when the kernel
is built with KASAN, but unlike copy_from_user() we do not check the
destination buffer when using HARDENED_USERCOPY.  As strncpy_from_user()
calls get_user() in a loop, we must call check_object_size() explicitly.

This patch adds this instrumentation to strncpy_from_user(), per the same
rationale as with the regular copy_from_user().  In the absence of
hardened usercopy this will have no impact as the instrumentation expands
to an empty static inline function.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472221903-31181-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---

diff --git a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
index 9c5fe8110413..7e35fc450c5b 100644
--- a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
+++ b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
@@ -111,6 +112,7 @@ long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
 		long retval;
 
 		kasan_check_write(dst, count);
+		check_object_size(dst, count, false);
 		user_access_begin();
 		retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, max);
 		user_access_end();